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ISTANBUL GELISIM UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES**

Department of Political Science and Public Administration

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN



Master Thesis

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Istanbul – 2023

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that in the preparation of this thesis, scientific ethical rules have been followed, the works of other persons have been referenced in accordance with the scientific norms if used, there is no falsification in the used data, any part of the thesis has not been submitted to this university or any other university as another thesis.

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ABSTRACT

Post-conflict societies need the rebuilding and restoration of the government system. Recognized administrative systems based on democracy and social rights standards make progress and success possible. In most post-conflict societies, local governance can be done by creating bureaucracies that contribute to solving major problems and making significant progress. Afghanistan has seen multiple decades of conflict, devastation, poor leadership, and public service. As a result, Afghanistan needs to build a competent bureaucratic system. The establishment of local government can facilitate participation in social, economic, and political activities while easing the burdens placed on the federal government. The international community's help in expanding and bolstering Afghanistan's local government following the Bonn Agreement was advantageous because the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's efforts fell short of fully resolving all issues. In addition, there are still various challenges (corruption, illiteracy, poverty, unemployment, abuse of laws and lack of strategic planning, etc.) with far-reaching causes of local government ineffectiveness and dissatisfaction with local government". This document addresses the following questions: What are the challenges hindering the growth of local organizations in Afghanistan? How does the local government work in Afghanistan?

Key Words: Afghanistan, Local, Province

ÖZET

Çatışma sonrası toplumların, hükümet sisteminin yeniden inşasına ve restorasyonuna ihtiyacı var. Demokrasi ve sosyal haklar standartlarına dayanan tanınmış idari sistemler ilerlemeyi ve başarıyı mümkün kılar. Çatışma sonrası toplumların çoğunda, yerel yönetim, büyük sorunları çözmeye ve önemli ilerlemeler sağlamaya katkıda bulunan bürokrasiler yaratılarak yapılabilir. Afganistan, birkaç on yıllık savaş, yıkım, iyi yönetim ve kamu hizmeti yokluğu yaşayan bir ülkedir. Bu nedenle Afganistan'da deneyimli bir bürokratik sistemin oluşturulması önemlidir. Yerel yönetimin oluşturulması, merkezi yönetimin sorunlarını azaltabilir ve insanların sosyal, ekonomik ve politik faaliyetlerde yer almasına yardımcı olabilir. Afganistan'daki yerel yönetimi genişletmek ve güçlendirmek için Bonn Anlaşması'ndan sonra uluslararası toplumun yardımı yararlı oldu, çünkü Afganistan İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin çabaları tüm eksiklikleri gideremedi. Buna ek olarak, yerel yönetimdeki etkisizliğin ve yerel yönetimden duyulan hoşnutsuzluğun geniş kapsamlı nedenleri olan çeşitli zorluklar (yolsuzluk, cehalet, yoksulluk, işsizlik, yasaların kötüye kullanılması ve stratejik planlamanın yokluğu vb.) hala vardır". Bu belge aşağıdaki soruları ele almaktadır: Afganistan'daki yerel örgütlerin büyümesini engelleyen zorluklar nelerdir? Afganistan'da yerel yönetim nasıl çalışır?

Anahtar kelimeler: Afganistan, Yerel, Vilayet

DEDICATIONS

I, honestly with all my love and passion dedicate this work to my dad, mother, and my wife who did a lot for me to accomplish this success, Whose Words of inspiration and push for persistence ring in my ears.



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ABBREVIATIONS

AIHRC	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
AIRD	Afghanistan Institute for Rural Development
ALGAP	Afghanistan Local Government Assistance Program
ANA	Afghanistan National Army
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghanistan National Police
AREDP	Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Programme
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ASGP	Afghanistan Subnational Governance Program
ASOP	Afghanistan Social Outreach Program
BPHS	Basic Package of Health Services
CBDR	Community-Based Dispute Resolution
CDC	Community Development Council
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CNTF	Counter Narcotics Trust Fund
COIN	Counter-insurgency
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DDA	District Development Assembly
DCC	District Community Council
DDP	District Delivery Program
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DIAG	Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups
FP	Facilitating Partner
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HIA	Hizb-i-Islami Afghanistan
HOO	High Office of Oversight
HRRAC	Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium
IARCSC	Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
IDLG	Independent Directorate for Local Government
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International nongovernmental Organisation
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock
MoEcon	Ministry of Economy

MoE	Ministry of Education
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
MoPW	Ministry of Public Works
MoWA	Ministry of Women’s Affairs
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NABDP	National Area Based Development Program
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NDS	National Directorate of Security
NGO	Nongovernmental Organisation
NRAP	National Rural Access Program
NSP	National Solidarity Program
PAA	Provincial Administrative Assembly
PAD	Provincial Affairs Directorate
PAR	Public Administration Reform
PBGF	Performance Based Governors Fund
PDC	Provincial Development Council
PDP	Provincial Development Plan
PMU	Project Management Unit
PRR	Priority Reform and Restructuring
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RTA	Radio Television Afghanistan
SNTV	Single non-transferable vote
TAF	the Asia Foundation
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNCAC	United Nations Convention on Corruption
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank

WORD INDEX

Amlak	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock's landownership division; alternatively, an officer based in the division
Arbab	Landlord, village representative; may be chosen by the community; acts as a quasi-official liaison between the community and the government; may also have executive responsibilities. (see malik, qaryadar)
Arbaki	Local militia
Baad	Practice of conflict resolution: the family of the killer provides the family of the victim either one or two unmarried girls.
Burqa	women's clothing covering the full body, including the face and eyes, in its entirety.
Hajj	Pilgrimage to Mecca
Hawza	police Organization or Historical word for a military
Huqooq	Civil cases division of the Ministry of Justice's law firm
Jihadi	One fighting in a holy war; also known as mujahiddin
Jirga	An ad hoc meeting of the council of elders was held to discuss issues.
Khan	Landlord or village leader
Kuchi	Pastoralist nomads; primarily Pashtun
Malik	Landlord, village representative; may be chosen by the community; acts as a quasi-official liaison between the community and the government; may also have executive responsibilities. (see arbab, qaryadar)
Manteqa	A flexible measure of social affiliation or geographic area that may connect villages
Maraca	Get-together
Meshrano	Jirga higher house of parliament
Mujahiddin	Confrontation fighters in the course of the Soviet period
Mustofiat	Ministry of Finance's Treasury division
Pashtunwali	Pashtun code of manner and conduct
Qaryadar	Village representative; may be chosen by the community; acts as a quasi-official liaison between the village and the government; also has the potential to perform executive duties.
Qazi	judiciary or Judge
Qawm	Unit of social solidarity based on kinship, place of residence, or line of work
Saranwal	prosecutor working out of the Attorney General's office
Sayed	Family members of the Prophet Muhammad or those who have roots with him
Seer	Weight measurement equal to around seven kilograms
Shura	Council of community
Ulema	knowledgeable clerics who serve as Sharia law judges

Wali	Provincial governor is called wali
Wasita	reciprocal ties to influential or powerful people
Waqf	Land donated for religious or charitable purposes (plural awqaf)
Wolesi	Jirga parliament lower house
Woluswal	Governor of district



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Rahimullah Akbarzai

KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS

Local government Administration

- The governor plays a key coordinating role in administration, planning and public safety. However, the position is political in nature. Governors operate through a network of informal stakeholders that are as important as formal officials. District governors have a similar coordinating role, although in recent years their formal authority has been limited, especially in judicial administration.
- Dysfunctional development planning and budgeting at the state level, primarily due to the highly centralized nature of these processes, prevents state governments from making development decisions that are aligned with local needs.
- The Public Service Commission's policy provides a practical framework for improving administration through programs such as recruitment, performance appraisals, and training monitoring. But their initiative is underfunded. Officer training tends to be sporadic and lacks continuity in focus. High levels of fraud related to the hiring of civil servants remain the rule, not the exception.
- The transfer of local government responsibilities to IDLGs in 2007 has improved communication between provinces and centers and increased the speed of decision-making. IDLG has played a key role in developing policy, coordinating departments, and providing training. But the direct reports to the president's office are highly politicized organizations, and the methods tend to strengthen rather than weaken central control.
- Corruption is a pervasive problem in all local government organizations, often at the highest levels. Rent income comes at every opportunity, and the influence of power and patron networks remains prevalent.

Security and Justice

- There was little evidence that Afghanistan is becoming more peaceful despite increased military deployments. Disarmament initiatives have met with only partial success, leaving large quantities of weapons in all states.
- The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) played a key role in strengthening the capabilities of the Afghan National Army. However, the Allies, even in the more stable northern states, are viewed with ambivalence at best, often with obvious resentment from the local population.
- Pervasive judicial corruption meant that most disputes were resolved at the local level. Community-based dispute resolution is based on a combination of customary law and Shariah law. Although issues regarding human rights and treatment of women remain, the use of more extreme customary practices such as baad is declining.
- In more stable regions, however, most serious crimes are referred to the state, suggesting that formal justice systems are beginning to gain and retain some degree of general legitimacy.
- Significant funds are being used to increase the size of the Afghan National Police and to train them. But the majority of the time, people don't trust the cops because they think they are crooked. Nevertheless, several of the provincial chiefs of police who were more recently appointed showed excellent professionalism.
- The progress of disarming is being reversed by the establishment of state-sponsored militias. These organizations are bitterly despised by the Taliban and are open to infiltration, despite the fact that they have increased daytime security on routes heading to specific provincial centers.
- The formal judicial system's flaws, including its length, accessibility, complexity, cost, and corruption, were cited as important contributors to the public's declining faith in the government. Notably, the Taliban prioritize controlling the court system as soon as they seize control of a territory.

Service Delivery

- All sectors have a heavy reliance on donations. Many health, education, and rural development programs may become unsustainable as a result of the projected military withdrawal in 2014, which is expected to be accompanied by a decrease in assistance flows. The development budget execution rate for 2010 was a pitiful 37%, further complicating problems as now, nearly 50% of all foreign aid is delivered outside of government financial processes.
- The quality of service delivery in provinces and districts tends to decline in proportion to their remoteness and levels of lawlessness, highlighting the need for greater attention to be paid to peripheries.
- Government efficiency as measured by its capacity to disburse and use funds is exceedingly low and demonstrates the centralised system's failure to deliver.
- Because budgetary flows are centralized in Kabul and local planning bodies are largely symbolic, coordination across provincial line ministries is challenging to achieve.
- High levels of corruption plague the majority of delivery systems, but health care is typically the best run. In each of the study provinces, there were numerous reports of the local government, line ministries, and police diverting World Food Programme (WFP) inputs.
- The development of the infrastructure, rural development, health, and education sectors has been significantly aided by nongovernmental actors. The dedication of international NGOs is impressive in all fields, and they give employing and utilizing the skills of women a much higher priority than the government.
- The NSP has had a great deal of success bringing development to unused areas. However, due to its inherent contradictions and flaws, it is now open to politization and can be used as a means of obtaining rents. By avoiding local government, the program undermines it. It is impossible to achieve the synergies that result from coordinated district planning when development is fragmented and piecemeal. CDCs cannot be understood independently of the more complex village structures in which they are ingrained.
- Despite playing a part in the NSP project selection process, women continue to be limited by low literacy rates and a lack of effective networking skills.

- PRTs are subject to several limitations in their role as development actors. Even though the military frequently performs a significant humanitarian function, there is a fundamental conflict between providing militarized aid in an effort to win support and making culturally appropriate efforts to promote development, fight poverty, and lessen social inequality.

Representation

- The electoral system lacks speed, transparency, and public trust. The Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system undermines the development of partisan politics and facilitates vote-buying and bribery of electoral officials because relatively few votes are required to produce a winner.

- The establishment of local councils in 2005 was an important first step towards establishing a representative government at the local level. But they are set up as participatory institutions, leaving little room for the important tasks of representing voters and holding the executive branch to account.

- Shuras are a common feature of most villages in Afghanistan and usually consist of traditional elites such as khans, maliks, al-babs, mullahs and jihad commanders. It embodies and upholds the generally accepted norms and practices of the village and deals with conflict and crime to varying degrees.

- For most villagers, mosques and prayer communities provide a structured point of contact and a kind of civil society forum to discuss and organize many joint activities. These include civil defense militias, the CDC, the deployment of schools and health boards, and other forms of collective action.

- Despite a slow improvement in provincial councils' resources, council members still lack the means to travel and carry out their duties.

- There isn't a clear policy defining what district-level representation should entail or identifying the authorities in charge of it. Uncoordinated and competing donor funding is exacerbating the tensions this has already caused.

- An intriguing alternate model for local representation is the constituency-based model of district representation developed in Helmand. It provides a practical and organized means of bridging the chasm between formal governmental structures and communities.
- There is a disagreement regarding the nature and purpose of district institutions between IDLG and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD); the failure to establish efficient representative mechanisms at the district level is detrimental to all parties involved.
- Because of how quickly society is changing, societal norms are progressively losing their power. People with strong ties to the government are increasingly treated with more deference than members of the traditional shura. Instead of being an issue of ideology.
- Political affiliation is a way to connect to patronage networks. Even though awareness of the duties of elected bodies is growing, some people still view representatives as providing direct services.

Policy recommendations to Local governance:

Policy issues

The paper looks into several interconnected policy areas and offers policy options. Here is a summary of some important policy issues:

State centralization or Centralized state

Key accomplishments in the growth of local government include the establishment of IDLG and the 2010 Subnational Governance Policy. Representative local government hasn't actually been given any significant authority, though. District administrations are essentially extensions of provincial administrations while provincial governors have broad authority and are only answerable to the president. Resources are still largely under the control of central line ministries. Provincial councils continue to have limited authority and are initially answerable to the IDLG. The 2010 Subnational Governance Policy nevertheless lays out a plan for defining local representative bodies and devolving authority; accomplishing this will necessitate both political will and a realistic timetable.

Policy recommendation:

- The Local Government Bill of 2010 should be amended to give meaningful powers to state and district representative bodies, to give them clear powers to exercise enforcement oversight and sanctions, and powers to act within State Development Commissions. I have.
- Provincial parliamentary autonomy should be clearly defined in the bill and a direct line should be established between the provincial parliament and her Wolesi Jirga (lower house of parliament).

Responsibility for Local Government

Although there are representative bodies at the provincial, district, and village levels, it is unclear how their responsibilities are to be divided; this issue is more serious at the district level. Donor policy has generally encouraged ministries to take an entrepreneurial approach. In terms of local governance, donor policies have promoted rivalry between ministries, most notably between MRRD and IDLG, and have supported competing district representative bodies. The inability of Provincial Councils, District Community Councils (under IDLG), District Development Assemblies (under MRRD), and CDCs (also under MRRD) to coordinate has been exacerbated by this. Given the current situation, it is not surprising that a unifying vision for local government has not yet materialized.

Policy recommendation:

- Responsibility for managing all levels of local government should be entrusted to a single executive agency.

Planning

The government's inability to carry out its budget has hampered the pace of development and the standard of service delivery. Both the lack of capacity within the line ministries and the dysfunctional relationships and poor coordination between them are to blame for this. Instead of addressing local needs, central ministries spend the majority of their time planning in order to fulfill their obligations under the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). Therefore, provincial and local planning organizations are unable to perform any useful planning. The NSP has resulted in piecemeal development at the village level that is unable to take advantage of opportunities for coordination between villages.

Policy recommendation:

- Each state development commission must receive an allocation from the central budget and make available to meet locally defined needs. Along with this, it is necessary to strengthen the authority of the Commission.
- The government should also draft legislation to enable state authorities to collect and withhold local taxes.

The District

The district is the lowest level at which it is realistically possible to deliver administration and services in a sustainable and coordinated manner. However, aside from by the National Area-Based Development Programme (NABDP), it has been slow to receive meaningful attention until relatively recently. The district offers a stable location for representation, line ministries, and administration. It creates a hub where residents of its designated area can easily meet. It frequently serves as a hub for both administration and trade.

The district shura and administration also give administrators, elected officials, and unofficial power brokers in the provincial center a practical way to interact with the local populace. Due to competing bodies and unclear connections between district representative bodies and the provincial center, defining duties for district representation has proven challenging.

Policy recommendation:

- All district representative bodies should be consolidated into one body.
- Until adequate resources and appropriate mechanisms are in place to conduct district elections, consultation mechanisms such as those used in the Helmand Model of District Delivery Programs should be used.
- Appropriate liaison between district and state legislatures on planning and administrative matters must be established and formalized.

Justice Delivery

The primary issues with Afghanistan's formal judicial systems include high costs, a lack of accessibility for justice officials, corruption, lengthy wait times, and a lack of transparency. Community-based shuras offer solutions, but they too have flaws, particularly when it comes to women's rights. The capacity of local shuras to carry out their judgments has decreased as a result of ongoing changes in Afghan society. A wide range of actors are involved in dispute

resolution as a result of the state's inability to provide effective justice, which adds to the confusion in a crucial but underserved industry. There is ultimately no substitute for a widely supported and uniform system of state-run justice. But doing so will require effort, funding, and political will.

Policy recommendation:

- The obligation to enforce justice should be removed from proposed state and local legislation and the village council.
- The registration of local judgments should be encouraged as a step towards integrating community-based justice into formal legal proceedings.
- Over time, the number of non-state actors involved in judicial administration should be reduced.

The Voting System

The numerous issues with using the SNTV system have come to the notice of the international world and numerous Afghan actors. However, there hasn't been a serious effort to reform it up to this point. SNTV not only prevents political parties from expanding, but it also gives Wolesi Jirga and provincial council members little motivation to answer to anyone save their narrow base of supporters. Additionally, it makes it more difficult for voters to remove an incumbent. This study confirms the detrimental effects of SNTV while also highlighting the advantages of the constituency-based selection process for district councils in Helmand.

Policy recommendation:

- To examine alternatives to SNTV, a joint government and international community commission should be established.
- A thorough discussion on alternate voting procedures should be started by the government and members of civil society.
- As soon as it's possible, SNTV usage should be stopped.

Donors

The Afghan reconstruction effort has flaws that are impeding progress in state legitimacy. The 2010 London Conference on Afghanistan placed a strong emphasis on the necessity of measured devolution as well as increased transparency and accountability in the provision of development assistance. For the reasons outlined in this paper, government and donors share responsibility for persistent failures to improve performance in this area. Additionally, relying on the military to deliver aid has exacerbated ethnic tensions, regional disparities, and corruption.

Policy recommendation:

- Co-ordinating and oversight bodies should step up their efforts to increase the number of donors. Coordinating local government development.
- Donors should adhere to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and use it as a framework to improve coordination with government-led local government initiatives.
- Donors should collectively agree on a common strategy for local governments and take the lead in encouraging governments and civil society to develop clear and coherent approaches to this issue.
- The focus should be on program monitoring and evaluation, not only from a process perspective, but also from a results and impact perspective.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan now is a complicated situation with multiple, conflicting goals. As the country adjusts to a new constitution, a new administration, and enormous resource flows, the post-2001 political landscape offers new opportunities but also introduces new types of complication. The resurgence of the insurgency has complicated state-building and development efforts over the past few years, and huge regions of the nation have actually become less stable. The number of civilian and military casualties rises every year, yet the internationally supported government in Afghanistan is unable to win over the public. (Medhi, June 2011). Ten years after the Taliban were overthrown, the country is still among the most wretched or unlucky in the planet (ranking 155th on the Combined Country's Human Improvement Index¹), and it will continue to depend on outside assistance for a very long time.

Despite the increasing level of conflict, there have been some important improvements during the past few years. A paved ring road is almost finished after considerable road building that has taken place all around the nation. The state of airports has changed. A simple but efficient healthcare system was built from the ground up. Both male and female teenagers are enrolling in school more frequently, and both male and female educators are joining training organizations in greater numbers. In reality, radio, television, and cell phones are now used for communication in even the more rural parts of the nation. Electricity has been making its way into metropolitan areas. Despite starting from a low basis, the GDP is growing swiftly. (Medhi, June 2011).

Notwithstanding, the main point of contention of supportability keeps on drifting over a significant part of the improvement occurring after 2001, in Afghanistan. With the exception of opium, the nation is dependent on huge inflows of development aid and an economy that is mostly focused on providing for the considerable foreign military and civilian presence in the nation. Heavy investment has been made, in particular, in creating a powerful, centralized structure of governance that is centered on institutions in Kabul. (Anne Evans, 2011). The basic inquiry is whether this approach can at last create a reasonable, powerful administration framework that can answer the desires of its kin.

The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), which was established in 2002, has

kept a close interest in the growth of Afghan administration. The 2004 Guide to Government in Afghanistan, produced in collaboration with the World Bank, focused primarily on the processes and organizational framework of the central government but also included an assessment and suggestions for the local government systems of the time. (Anne Evans, 2011). In the following year, Sarah Lister (Head of governance UNDP) evaluated the responsibilities, authority, and resources of local government (Last update on local government rule and function: 9 November 2021) before evaluating the success of public administration reform (PAR). Her research and a subsequent study she co-wrote with Hamish Nixon, which emphasized the necessity for clarification in provincial planning and the characteristics of provincial government institutions, are still relevant today. Following this, a province study conducted in 2007 examined problems such as the use of international assistance for state-building and the function of Community Development Councils (CDCs). Nixon summarized the findings by looking at regional administrative structures and the "administration of connections" in Afghanistan.

The development of Afghanistan has largely been founded on the premise that setting up a government and holding democratic elections modeled after those in the West would enable Afghanistan to advance as an independent nation capable of properly managing its own affairs. This is not what actually occurred. Corruption has risen, as has insecurity. Large vote tally equipment has been necessary for the popularity-based system, and widespread use of force abuses. The president's relationship with foreign funders is breaking down and becoming more unstable. The sustainability of many current programs is seriously questioned due to the anticipated decrease in aid flows following the scheduled foreign military withdrawal in 2014. (Medhi, June 2011).

Local government has not been given nearly as much attention as central government, despite significant resources and effort being dedicated to its development. However, what happens locally is crucial; in many ways achieving this is the entire purpose of government because it is here that the benefits of the security and services provided by the state directly benefit its people. Planning, service provision, security, and administration of justice are all accomplished by province and district organizations. Additionally, at different levels, representative bodies are essential for policymaking, observing operations, and making sure the government is considered accountable for its actions. (Shurkin, 2011). Nearby government is consequently the point of interaction among individuals and focal government.

While it has gotten a proportion of consideration, drives on the side of nearby government have would in general be piecemeal, needed comprehensiveness and been transient in vision. The substantial accomplishments that have been prepared as well as specific areas of worry are brought to light by this article. Through the presentation of its evidence, it suggests a number of relevant policy adjustments that might increase the sustainability of local government, further enhance the transmission of administrative information, and strengthen the legitimacy of the state. This Research part outlines the local government. And then focused on local government in Afghanistan (Medhi, June 2011).

1.1 Research Problems

Afghanistan, despite being a country with a rich history and culture, is yet to have a comprehensive and efficient system of local governance that could meet the needs of its people.

Consequently, in this study it is attempted to explain why several attempts to build a useful local government system in Afghanistan haven't yielded any results yet. Furthermore, based on the experiences and approaches of the two other cases in this study, the research provides the required recommendations for the improvement of the Afghan local government system.

1.2 Objectives

The goal of the research is to evaluate what is happening locally in Afghanistan and how the political environment has changed. Its main goal is to increase understanding of the development of local government. It studies the characteristics of official administrative structures in government as well as how they interact with local informal governance systems. A debate of policy is then based on this analysis. At a time when Afghanistan has been receiving unusual amounts of funding, the ultimate goal is to give information that will help in enhancing the makeup and effectiveness of local governance.

1.3 Scope and Limitations of the Study

In this study, the local government systems in terms of concept, history, structure, public participation and local autonomy in Afghanistan is analyzed and evaluated. The study investigates local administrative systems providing services to the Afghanistan. The researcher had also faced a few difficulties while conducting the research on local governance in Afghanistan. Firstly, the changing of Government system such as the travel restrictions and closer of academic institutions and libraries have limited researchers' accessibility to academic

data as well as traveling to Afghanistan in order to carry on with the cases study in the field. Secondly, the lack of available academic resources in the field of local government. Specifically, in case of Afghanistan. People in Afghanistan have limited access to the Internet and academic institutions such as universities do not publish conducted academic research online on the internet. Furthermore, lack of public knowledge and interest regarding the issue yielded government due to which, despite several attempts, the researcher was unable to collect public opinions about the subject of the research. Finally, lack of financial resources has been one of the main obstacles for researchers to conduct research. Most of the books and academic publications available online are not for free and they are only available after the required amount is paid.

1.4 Research Methodology

Without the assistance of these individuals, the research on local governance in Afghanistan would not have been complete. Khalid Afghan, the owner of the geoscientific material testing company, and his coworkers set up a meeting for me with the heads of the shura and Hamid Pashtoon, an active journalist for Ariana TV and the Khost province's Ghar ghakht TV. Akbar Khan Shirzai, the head of the local shura and a politician. This set the procedure for district and provincial level respondent selection. Each province's interviews focused on representatives of the provincial council, line agencies, and administrations, as well as other significant personalities from civil society, NGOs, political party leaders, and the media. The district administration, line departments, DDA and other district shura members (where present), local commanders, ulema, heads of CDCs, and important locals like maliks, arbabs, and qaryadars were just a few of the key informants in the district.

(Douglas Saltmarshe and Abhilash Medhi, Jone, 2011) Semi-structured interviews were noted as the main data collection technique. For each group of respondents, they covered a preset range of topics, but they were done in a flexible manner to allow respondents room to discuss what they believed to be important. After reaching out to nearly 800 responders, only one declined to participate in the survey. Information from interviews was thoroughly triangulated whenever possible, with the occasional inclusion of statistical data on education and health. In Samangan, a scoping exercise lasting three months came to an end on March 1, 2021. The research methodology, study objectives, and researcher training were all improved by this effort.

The research procedure also included visits to the PRTs running in the major research

provinces, as well as in Faryab and Helmand. These were typically extended visits during which official interviews were conducted and operational activity was observed.

Additionally, they reported that while choosing a site: 13 provinces were chosen, as in AREU's earlier study on local administration, to maximize heterogeneity, while it was also crucial to provide the research teams with reasonably secure access. The study focused on the six provinces of Samangan, Jawzjan, Sar-i-Pul, Day Kundi, Laghman, and Wardak.

The aforementioned provinces were chosen because they all offered reasonably safe access for researchers and had diverse racial makeups, economic conditions, and levels of development. To better understand the dynamics between each province's districts, every district was covered by the study. In order to better understand the operation of the District Delivery Programme and the process used to create district councils, the research drew on data from earlier studies in northern Faryab done in 2021 as well as studies completed in two districts of Helmand.

Limitations: After the data were collected, they were scrutinized and the most relevant information extracted, and conceptualized. Finally, the gained knowledge was applied to the relevant research parts of this study. Finally, with considering of site Research and library genesis I perform my research in this issue.

Keeping the importance of the research methodology in mind, efforts have been made to collect the relevant research data from the most reliable resources such as Library Genesis, Research Gate, and most importantly, Google Scholar. After the data were collected, they were scrutinized and the most relevant information extracted, and conceptualized. Finally, the gained knowledge was applied to the relevant research parts of this study. Finally, with considering of site Research and library genesis I perform my research in this issue.

1.5 Questions

The research question is the following:

1. How is the formation of Local Government in Afghanistan like?

CHAPTER TWO

GOVERNMENT

An administration is the structure or group in charge of managing a state or other organized locality. Government often consists of the legislative, executive branch, and judiciary due to its broad concept of shared authority. Government is both a system for selecting strategy and a means by which hierarchical strategies are maintained. There are numerous nations where the government has some form of constitution that specifies its guiding principles. (cambridge.org, 2021/09/27).

Despite the fact that all organizations have governance, Due to its broad connotation, the term "government" is frequently used to refer more explicitly to the; normally, a government is made up of legislators, executives, and authorities. Government is both the means by which state strategy is carried out as well as the instrument for establishing the attitude of autonomous national governments and subordinate institutions.(ROSE, 2000).

On the other hand, we can describe government as both the process for deciding the state's policy and the means by which it is carried out. The term "form of government" or "form of state governance" refers to the group of political institutions that make up a state's government. The two main, interconnected elements of governments that, in general, determine how a government is coded are the power source and the power structure. Power source refers to the people and organizations that wield governing authority over a state and the means by which they come into power, whereas power structure refers to the framework through which they are coordinated. (ROSE, 2000).

(Csiszer, 2008) A continuous stream of various governments service the states. Each succeeding government is made up of a group of people who hold and use political decision-making power. They can create rules and put them into effect, as well as start arguments. This group frequently exists as a hereditary or identity class in some societies. In other social structures, like majority rule systems, the political offices are held indefinitely, but the people who are actually filling them change with time.

2.1 Forms of Government

Governments with superior qualities are typically headed by the "best" individuals. In a form of government where aristocrats rule in nobility, quality refers to the rule of privileged citizens. It now generally refers to people of honorable birth who are "the quality or privileged" and dominate over society. A meritocracy refers to government by the best; it is a system of governance in which individuals or groups are chosen for positions based on their aptitude, expertise, and contributions to society. Last but not least, a technocracy is a system of government where persons who are knowledgeable or competent in governing in their particular fields of technology would be in charge of all decision-making. The ruling body would be made up of engineers, doctors, scientists, technicians, and other professionals with knowledge, expertise, or skills instead of politicians, businesspeople, and economics.(cambridge.org, 2021/09/27).

Autocratic governments are led by a single individual who has complete control over the nation's population. In times of war, the Roman Republic installed dictators as leaders. In today's ultramodern world, no constitution, social or political structure, or rule of law can halt an autocrat's rule. Many governments in Latin America, Africa, and Asia were dominated by dictatorial regimes after World War II. (ROSE, 2000).

The majority of eastern and western nations have democracies as their primary form of government. (Csiszer, 2010 own translation). In democracies, every citizen of a nation has the right to cast a ballot in elections for the political parties and legislative body of their choice. In democracies, the public can choose the members of legislative bodies that will sit in bodies like the Congress or the Parliament. Political parties are groups of individuals that have the same views on the best ways to run an area or nation. Political parties have different viewpoints regarding how the government ought to handle or deal with particular issues. Democracy is the rule of the people, for the people, and by the people. A king or queen who inherits the office from their family—often referred to as the "royal family"—rules over monarchical governments. Outright monarchy and established monarchies are two opposing categories of monarchs. In the first, or absolute monarchy, the ruler's wishes and powers are unrestricted. A document known as a constitution governs the second type of monarchy, which limits a ruler's authority. (cambridge.org, 2021/09/27).

Governments with oligarchic characteristics are governed by a select few strong or prominent individuals. These individuals may or may not exercise equal power. Due of the limited

opportunity for change, an oligarchy differs from a true democracy. An oligarchy need not be hereditary or monarchical. An oligarchy lacks a single obvious monarch in favor of a number of influential and powerful individuals. Two historical instances of oligarchy are the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and segregation in South Africa. The fictional oligarchic societies shown in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1984), *Starship Troopers'* stratocratic regime, and Oceania's dystopian civilization all serve as examples. "Street Judges" of Judge Dredd.

2.2 Definitions and Etymology of Government

The structure or system that manages a locality, a state, or a community is called government. Government is described as "an arrangement or system of social control where the choice to make rules, or the right to enact laws, or the option to sustain them, or the authority to enforce them, is vested in a certain group in society" by the Columbia Encyclopedia.(University, 2021). Although a wide variety of organizations have administration, the term "government" is frequently and expressly used to refer to the world's free public legislatures as well as their supporting organizations, such as state and common state managed administrations and neighborhood states. (Smelser & Baltes, 2001).

The word government is derived from the Greek word [kubernáo], which means to steer with a gubernaculum (rudder). The figurative meaning is supported by writings from classical antiquity, such as Plato's Ship of State. The term "government" in British English occasionally or sometimes alludes to what is also called as a "ministry" or a "administration," i.e., the policies and governing powers of a particular leader or supervising organization., (ROSE, 2000) Lastly, *government* is also sometimes government is likewise in some cases utilized in English as an equivalent for rule or administration.

Theocracy, a majority rule system, oppression, governance, gentry, and vote-based systems are among the more prevalent forms of government. In general, these structures are not entirely unconnected, and mixed states are common. The primary component of any theory of government is how political power is attained, with hereditary advancement and voluntary challenge serving as the two important foundations. (cambridge.org, 2021/09/27).

2.2.1 Monarchy

A monarchy is a form of administration in which the ultimate authority is nominally or completely vested in one person, who serves as the head of state, frequently permanently or until abdication. A ruler or monarch is the title given to the head of a monarchy. Throughout the ancient and medieval periods, it was a typical or widespread form of government.

Even though monarchy is a form of administration where there is only one sovereign, it has a variety of forms and qualities depending on the culture and circumstances.

Legitimation, The verifiable age and local culture were more important in determining levels of authority, the exercise of power, position and obligations, and development than the ruler's desires and preferences. Noblemen, elected officials, outside influences, and the satisfaction of the governed had a significant influence on the form and nature of the institution as civilization advanced, even while sitting monarchs were still regarded as absolute controllers. (academic, 2021/11/04).

Monarchs, whether ministers, shamans, magicians, or prophets, were a common consort to strict pioneers. There was occasionally tension between the particular workplaces due to the divide of control over the two important spheres of existence. When the two came together as one, their unity created areas of strength for the populace and the state was largely successful. The majority of kings today play purely ceremonial roles. While the monarch remains the head of state and the symbol of that authority, actual power now rests with another institution, such as a parliament. There are a few unique instances of this, particularly in the Middle East. (Figgis, 2021).

2.2.2 Democracy

Direct democracy is a type of government in which citizens are free to think about and choose the laws they want to enact as well as the bodies that will carry them out ("representative democracy"). Who is seen or considered to be a characteristic of "individuals" or the people, as well as how authority is divided or sheared between or identified by people or individuals, have transformed over time and at different rates in various countries, but generally speaking, more and more of a democratic country's occupants have been included. Among the core principles of democracy are freedom of assembly, association, property rights, freedom of speech and religion, equality and inclusion, citizenship, consent of the governed, voting rights,

freedom from arbitrary governmental deprivation of one's right to liberty and life, and rights of minorities.(Raaflaub, Ober, & Wallace, 2007).

The idea of a democracy-run government has significantly evolved over time. An instant vote based system was the first sort of democratic rules system. A delegate democracy rules system, like in a parliamentary or formal presidential democracy, is the most well-known sort of vote-based system in existence today. In this system, individuals or people elect government officials to oversee for their benefit. (John Dunn, 1993).

The majority of decisions in popular democracies are made on a regular basis; however, other dynamic procedures like supermajority and agreement have been integrated into or added to democracy.

On a constitutional level, they are generally given preference because they fulfill or serve the critical and essential role of comprehensiveness and wider legitimacy on complicated matters counterbalancing majoritarianism. In the most prevalent form of liberal democracy, the widely held powers are implemented within the framework of a representative democracy, but the constitution restrains the majority and protects the minority typically by allowing everyone to enjoy certain individual rights, such as freedom of association or freedom of speech. (Budge & Foweraker, 2001).

The term used to describe the political institutions then in place in Greek city-states, most notably classical Athens, first emerged or was first used in the fifth century BC. In contrast to aristocracy (o, aristokrata), which meant "governing by an elite," it actually implied "government of the people." In city-states like those in Classical Athens and the Roman Republic, where various plans and levels of enfranchisement of the free male population were observed before the form disappeared in the West at the beginning of earlier centuries, Western democracy, as distinct from that which preceded it, is typically thought to have originated. Almost all democratic governments throughout early and modern history consisted of an elite class up until full enfranchisement was attained for all adult citizens during the suffrage revolutions of the 19th and 20th centuries in the majority of new democracies.(John Dunn, 1993).

Democracy stands in opposition to forms of government where power is either held by one person, as in authoritarian regimes like the absolute monarchy, or by a small group of people, as in an oligarchy—opposites that date back to ancient Greek philosophy. Karl Popper defined

democracy in contrast to tyranny or dictatorship as the possibility for the people to influence their leaders and to replace them without the need for a revolution. Most people support democratic forms of government in the world.(Raaflaub, Ober, & Wallace, 2007).

2.2.2.1 Direct Democracy

People directly vote on the pros and cons of policies in direct democracy. This is not the same as representative democracy, when citizens elect legislators who then vote on the advantages of various policies. It may involve creating laws, appointing or dismissing officials, holding trials, and passing executive orders depending on the particular system in use. Participatory democracy and deliberative democracy are two of the most popular forms of direct democracy. (Budge & Foweraker, 2001).

The Athenian Democracy in the fifth century BCE is thought to have been the first direct democracy. However, because slaves, foreigners, and women were not permitted to participate, it was not a fully inclusive democracy. The public in Athens' direct democracy cast their own votes on laws and executive orders, as opposed to electing representatives to vote on their behalf (like in the US Congress). Although participation was not entirely free, a sizable portion of the in-group of members came from all socioeconomic classes and participated. The hilarious or comic poets' political satire that they performed in public affected how the general public saw voters. (Budge & Foweraker, 2001).

The history of the Roman republic, which began around 449 BCE, is also important. The "citizen lawmaking" of the early or ancient Roman Republic, which included citizen formulation and path or passage of laws as well as citizen rejection of laws produced by the legislature, began around 449 BCE and continued for nearly 400 years until Julius Caesar's death in 44 BCE. New or contemporary citizen legislation first appeared in Swiss cities in the 13th century. The "statute referendum" was inserted into the Swiss national constitution in 1847. (Budge & Foweraker, 2001). Currently in Switzerland, single majorities are acceptable at the town, city, and canton levels, but double majorities are necessary for constitutional concerns at the national level. The double majority is only engaged to ensure the legality of any law passed by the people.

2.2.2.2 Representative Democracy

Direct democracy was vigorously opposed by the writers of the United States Constitution and some of the Declaration of Independence's signatories. They saw it as dangerous when the majority tried to impose its will on a minority. Therefore, they favored a constitutional republic that was a representational rather than a direct democracy. James Madison, for instance, favors a constitutional republic above direct democracy in Federalist No. 10 in order to protect the individual from the majority's will. (Raaflaub, Ober, & Wallace, 2007). On the basis of the idea that elected individuals should represent a group of people, representative democracy was developed. For instance, three countries that practice representative democracy are Poland, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom, which is a constitutional monarchy (a republic). It is a part of both the parliamentary system and the presidential system of government and is most usually employed in a lower chamber, such as the House of Commons (UK) or Bundestag. (Germany)(Glossar, December 2020).

2.2.2.3 Democracy in the Contemporary World

Compared to 40 in 1972, the House of Freedom believes that there were 123 electoral democracies in 2007. Regarding Democracy According to the World Forum, electoral democracies account for 120 of the 192 existing nations and 58.2% of the world's population. The 85 liberal democracies that Freedom House classifies as free and supportive of fundamental human rights and the rule of law are home to 38% of the world's population. In 2010, the United Nations proclaimed September 15 as the International Day of Democracy. (Press., Feb, 2021).

2.2.3 Oligarchy

This refers to government by a select few, particularly autocratic power exploited by a select few for dishonest or self-serving objectives. Plutarchies are types of oligarchies where the wealthy or affluent members of the ruling class exercise their power.

Aristotle coined the term "oligarchia" to describe a situation where a select few people dominated unfairly, not by the best but by the worst. The term "oligarchy" in this context refers to a privileged kind of "aristocracy," which describes a system of constrained government in which the best people are granted the authority to rule. The majority of historic oligarchies came into existence when the whole ruling elite was chosen from a ruling caste, a hereditary

social class that stands out from the rest of society due to things like economic position, kinship, religion, prestige, or even language. These elites are likely to or usually wield their power for the benefit of their own class. (Oligarchy Available here: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oligarchy> accessed 2021/11/04, 2021).

It is a common belief that all forms of government can ultimately be reduced to the control of a small group of people. Oligarchs will safeguard their true power regardless of who is officially in charge: a dictator, a monarch, or the general public. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who popularized the proverb "the state is the executive committee of the misusing class," claimed that powerful capitalists have always influenced politics. Another claim made by the political scientist from Italy, Gaetano Mosca, was that a "ruling class" always structured true oligarchic power. The idea is explained by Vilfredo Pareto's concept of the "elite." Although the current tendency to view social formations through the lens of an elite has been significantly influenced by Pareto's theory, this tendency dates back to Marx and Engels, who used the term elite to characterize the class-conscious communists as the dominating group in society.

One of the most well-known modern uses of the word oligarchy is the phrase "iron law of oligarchy," which was coined by German sociologist Robert Michels to describe the ostensibly predictable tendency of political parties and labor unions to become bureaucratized, centralized, and traditional or conservative. No matter how classless or even radical the initial ideology and goals of a party or union may have been, in his opinion, to ensure the survival of the organization in the face of internal conflict and external opposition, there must emerge a small group of leaders at the center who can direct power skillfully or efficiently, get things done through an organizational and administrative staff, and improve some kind of rigid order and ideology. Later writers of various encouragements have either attempted to broaden and expand on Michels's thesis by applying it to legislatures, religious orders, and other organizations or have attempted to criticize the thesis or its limitations, and some unions and parties do maintain a practical system of democratic expression and governance. (Oligarchy Available here: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oligarchy> accessed 2021/11/04, 2021).

2.2.4 Theocracy

A theocracy is a kind of governance in which one or more deities are acknowledged as the ultimate governing powers and provide divine guidance to human intermediaries who carry out the daily tasks or affairs of the government. (Theocracy available here <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theocracy> accessed 2021/11/01).

2.2.5 Authoritarianism

The rejection of political plurality, the use of a strong central authority to uphold the status quo, and reductions in the rule of law, democratic voting, and the separation of powers are all characteristics of the type of government known as authoritarianism. Numerous typologies explaining various forms of authoritarian governments have been developed by political scientists. Autocratic or oligarchy-based authoritarian regimes are those that rely on a party or the military to maintain power. (Raaflaub, Ober, & Wallace, 2007).

The political scientist Juan Linz, in a significant 1964 work, *An Authoritarian Regime: Spain*, clearly defines authoritarianism as possessing four qualities:

1. Limitations on the legislature, political parties, and interest groups enable restricted political plurality.
2. Political legitimacy is founded on emotional appeals and portraying the regime as a necessary evil in order to combat "clearly identifiable societal ills, such as underdevelopment or insurgency."
3. Some political activism and the eradication of anti-regime efforts.
4. Clearly defined executive authorities, which are sometimes ambiguous and fluctuating, increase the executive's influence.

In a nutshell, a government that is authoritarian is one that does not allow for free and competitive executive, legislative, or both direct and indirect elections. Authoritarian states, broadly defined, are those that forbid civil liberties like the right to freedom of religion or those in which the ruling party and the opposition do not switch places at least once after free elections. (Authoritarianism available here <https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-politicalscience/chapter/forms-of-government> 2021/11/01). It is possible for authoritarian nations to have ostensibly democratic institutions like legislatures, elections, and political parties, but these institutions may be used to implement authoritarian control and may even stage rigged,

non-competitive elections. Since 1946, the proportion of authoritarian regimes in the world's political system increased until the middle of the 1970s, after which it failed or shrank until the year 2000.

2.2.6 Totalitarianism

Totalitarianism is a kind of government and a political system that criminalizes individual and group protests against the state and its claims, outlaws and restricts the participation of any opposition parties, and imposes stringent controls on both public and private life. It is viewed as the most stringent and all-encompassing type of authoritarianism. In totalitarian states, autocrats, such as dictators and absolute monarchs, typically control the political system. They employ all-encompassing propaganda operations that are displayed and broadcast through state-run mass media in order to keep control over the public. The concept gained a lot of momentum in Western political treatises during the Cold War. (Totalitarian rule: Available here <https://iep.utm.edu/totalita/> accessed 2021/11/02).

In terms of politics, totalitarianism is undeniably a modernist phenomenon with intricate historical origins. The philosopher Karl Popper claimed that Karl Marx's political philosophy, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's theory of the state, and Plato were the sources of totalitarianism. However, Popper's understanding of totalitarianism has drawn criticism from academics and is still actively debated today. Two other historians and philosophers, Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, believe that totalitarian doctrines originated in the Age of Enlightenment, particularly the anthropocentrism idea that "Man has become the master of the world, a master unbound by any connections to nature, history, and society." Italian fascists developed the idea of unlimited state power in the 20th century, while Carl Schmitt, a Nazi scientist and lawyer, did the same in Germany under the Weimar Republic in the 1920s. (Raaflaub, Ober, & Wallace, 2007).

The man who built the Soviet Union, Vladimir Lenin, was one of the first individuals, in the opinion of historians and academics, to attempt to establish a totalitarian state. The founder of the Italian fascist movement, Benito Mussolini, referred to his regime as the "Totalitarian State," where "everything is in the State, nothing is outside the State, and nothing is against the State." Schmitt coined the term "total state" to describe the legal basis of an all-powerful state in his seminal book *The Concept of the Political* from 1927, which is now considered to be a classic. (Totalitarian rule: Available here <https://iep.utm.edu/totalita/> accessed 2021/11/02).

Totalitarian regimes are distinct from other authoritarian ones in that the latter describe a state where political power is held by a single person, usually a dictator, a group, a military junta, or another small group of political elites. A totalitarian government may seek to control almost every aspect of social life through the use of a complex ideology, including the economy, the educational system, science, the arts, as well as the individual lives and morals of its citizens. It also has the ability to mobilize the entire population.

2.2.7 Anarchy

is a collection of people who have created a society or a government on their own. It could also be used to describe a community or collection of people that vehemently oppose a preset hierarchy. In English, the term "anarchy" was first used in 1539 to describe "a lack of government." In his essay from 1840, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon used the words "anarchy" and "anarchist." Real estate: What Is It? a fresh political philosophy, social movement, or anarchism that advocates for a free and voluntary society without states Many anarchists advocate for the formation of a worker cooperative-based system and the elimination of all oppressive hierarchies, including the state.(Raaflaub, Ober, & Wallace, 2007).

In real life, anarchy can refer to the limitation or removal of conventional systems or types of institutions and government. A country without a centralized government or system of rule may also be designated by this term. Individual anarchists are the main proponents of anarchy, and they advise substituting voluntary institutions for the state. Since these autonomous groups or institutions can symbolize ideas like economics, self-reliance, community, interdependence, or individuality, they are frequently modeled after natural phenomena. Although the word "anarchy" is sometimes used negatively to denote disorder or a breakdown in society, anarchists define anarchy as a society without hierarchies. Anarchy, according to Proudhon, is the "Mother of Order Not the Daughter"

2.2.8 Republic

When it comes to authority, "the people and their chosen representatives have extraordinary power" under a republic. The Latin *res publica*, which translates to "public concern," is where the name republic comes from. Republics are described as having "public substance or matter" as opposed to being the rulers' property or serving their own interests. The key positions of power within a republic are not obstinately controlled by any one family or group, but rather by a combination of democracy with oligarchy, democracy, or autocracy. Because

republicanism has developed into the opposite of monarchy as a system of government, a modern republic does not have a monarch as its head of state. (Raaflaub, Ober, & Wallace, 2007).

As of 2017, 159 of the 206 self-governing entities in the globe have the word "republic" in their official names. In the sense of having elected governments, not all of these are republics, and not all states with elected governments have the word "republic" in their names.

The name republic is derived from the Latin word *res publica*, which precisely means "public thing," "public matter," or "public item or business." It was used to refer to the state as a whole. The constitution of the early Roman Republic, which lasted from the overthrow of the monarchs in 509 BCE to the establishment of the Empire in 27 BCE, caused the term to develop and enhance its modern definition. A Senate made up of wealthy, powerful aristocrats with significant influence, several popular assemblies made up of all free citizens, each with the authority to select judges or magistrates and pass laws, and a number of magistracies with varying degrees of civil and political authority comprised this constitution.

Although a single sovereign state is most frequently meant when the term "republic" is used, it can also refer to other sub-sovereign state entities that follow republican principles of government. For instance, the US Constitution "assurance[s] or guarantee[s] to every State in this Union a Republican form of Government." Another example was the Soviet Union, which was described by its authoritarian and overly centralized government as a federation of "Soviet socialist republics" with equal rights and a discernible high level of internal autonomy. Similar to this, the Russian Federation is a state that comprises a number of "republics" in part.

2.2.9 Communism

By advocating for a classless society in which the means of production are held jointly or equitably and private property is either fully eliminated or severely curtailed, communism's economic and political ideology challenges liberal democracy and capitalism. (Communism available here <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/communism.asp> accessed 2021/11/4).

Additionally, the term "communism" is a catch-all that refers to a number of ideas. The phrase's current meaning is attributed to Victor d'Hupay, a French aristocrat who advocated living in "communes" where all property would be shared and "everyone may prosper and benefit from

everyone's labour." The Book of Acts describes first-century Christian communities sharing property under a system known as koinonia, which inspired later religious movements like the "Diggers" in 17th-century England to oppose private property ownership. Nevertheless, even at that time, the concept and idea had been around for a while. (Karl marx on communism Available here <https://votonsensemble.ca/what-is-actually-a-central-authorities> accessed 2021/11/04).

2.2.10 Federation

A federation is a political entity made up of a union of partially autonomous provinces, states, or other areas that are governed by a single federal authority. It is also referred to as a federal state (federalism). In a federation, the component states' self-government position and the power split between them and the federal political body are frequently firmly established in the constitution and cannot be changed by a decision made unilaterally by either the component states or the federal political body. Comparatively, a federation is a type of governance in which each region has some degree of autonomy over its internal affairs due to the notional distribution of self-governing power between a central authority and a number of constituent areas. (Raaflaub, Ober, & Wallace, 2007).

The claim that federal states with overriding federal authority are not truly federal states is made repeatedly. For example, such overriding powers may include the constitutional authority to suspend a constituent state's government by summoning grave mismanagement or civil unrest, or to adopt national legislation that preempts or interferes with the powers of the constituent states by summoning or invoking the central government's constitutional authority to ensure "peace and good government" or to carry out obligations under an international treaty. (Federation available here <https://books.google.com.tr/books> page no 11. 2021/12/08).

CHAPTER THREE

LOCAL GOVERNANCES

3.1 Introduction to the Local Governance

The local governments, in wide-ranging sense, are governmental institutions with distinctive resources, employees and, expenditures, with Constitutional accountabilities or responsibilities and powers, and whose decision-making bodies are nominated by the local people to satisfy the collective needs of the people living in a specific territory. As a result, it is possible to define a local government as an administrative division of the central government that is in charge of managing the affairs of a certain region and provide services to its residents. The local government serves as a conduit between local residents and the national government. (JALALI, June 06 2022). The local government is responsible for local people residing in the areas under its jurisdiction. The local government's goal is to strengthen local citizens' capacities and empower them by fostering their healthy development so that they can participate in the formulation and implementation of government policies, which cannot result in the desired outcomes when local citizens are not participating. (Urinboyev, 2015). Participation in democratic countries can help solve multi-dimensional problems. This it takes the burden off the shoulders of the government at the local as well as the central levels. Local government within the boundaries of law gives a substantial amount of power and authority to local officials which they can use for the interests of the local people and area under their jurisdiction (JALALI, June 06 2022).

Local government is generally referred to as a group of elected officials who are responsible for carrying out legislative, executive, and administrative duties on areas that are under their influence or control. It is described as a body that chooses or establishes certain policies for a given area. Local governance is what? to actually determine the questions' answers. Which features and areas does it cover? It is vital to examine the viewpoints and opinions of various academics and professionals in the fields of political science and public administration. (Thapa, 2020).

Receiving British aid helped Afghanistan become a centralized buffer state in the 19th century, which paved the way for a more absolutist state with an army and government by shifting the balance of power away from the tribes and towards the monarch. Court politics served as the foundation or inception of a system of government and were based on relationships and

intrigue. Nevertheless, there was minimal administrative diffusion outside of cities and towns. (Medhi, Local Governance in Afghanistan, June 2011). The exchange of duties and service among various clans, tribes, and families that adhered to a system of rules was essential to stable governance. Thus, a central power that maintained its position through negotiations with local power brokers by intermediaries served as the main component of governance at the national level in Afghanistan. (Medhi, Local Governance in Afghanistan, June 2011).

The present study of local governance in Afghanistan makes two assistances and influences to the literature on local government in Afghanistan. It accepts a complete evaluation of what is now known about the influence of local governments on management before incorporating the theories and information from the empirical research that have been published over the past 20 years in the leading public administration journals. This thorough analysis has the ability to offer perceptive recommendations for the progress of public administration theory and research in the field of local government as well as the more general subject of management and performance in the public sector local government. Second, a thorough analysis of the techniques and findings of the current studies would help in classifying a research agenda that builds on the advantages of the evidence now available while addressing areas that need more research. (Richard M. Walker*, 2013).

As we know every country has its own good practice in Government system, which is home-grown, management and front-line staff, springs from the quality of municipal leadership and from individuals who lack humility when striving or making a sincere effort to achieve excellent quality. The goal of best practice is to categorize government policy, celebrate it, and transform it into a model for local governments worldwide. (Jackson, April 2015).

This shouldn't be seen as evidence for the existence of a "golden rule," which would be a generic solution that could immediately be applied elsewhere. While it is true that what works well in one government system may not be appropriate in another or provide the same beneficial effects, it is nevertheless important to share information and learn from other countries' experiences in order to develop new and inventive ideas for local government. (Jackson, April 2015).

3.2 Concept and Theory of the Local Governance

Local governance in the book of "Elements of Politics" (Henry Sidgwick 2000) as a "government of certain sub organs with specific experts and powers to impose policies or rules in the region they control". Due to historical, cultural and resources differences between the nations of the world every realm or state has a different thought or understating of the local government (JALALI, June 06 2022). Studying the conception of the local government by the country could help us understand their concept of local government. Understanding the concept and theory of local government as they drive in each of the above-mentioned countries with different cultural, historical, and social backgrounds of the local government would lead us towards some beneficial outcomes which could be used to make stronger the local governments of the countries with relevant differences from one another (JALALI, June 06 2022).

It refers to the political subdivision of a country, state, or other major political entity that deals with the government of a particular geographic area. A county, city, town, or state are examples of small geographic areas that have local governments. (Thapa, 2020). A local government often has jurisdiction over a specific geographic area and is unable to enact or enforce laws that apply to a larger area.

Local governments have many of the same powers as a national government, but on a smaller scale. They can choose or elect officials, pass taxes, and carry out many other functions. The structure of local government is an elective legislative body in charge of managing public services and facilities in a specific area.

(Thapa, 2020).

3.3 History of the Local Governance

Local government emerged as organized institutions in almost every society in order to increase its effectiveness in the field of local public services. These organizations have emerged in parallel with the historical developments of societies in order to achieve certain goals and respond to certain needs in the local community (JALALI, June 06 2022). Knowledge about the history of local government in a country helps us better understating the present-day perception of the local government in the identified state.

3.4 Type and Structure of the Local Governance

The structure of local government is composed of numerous stakeholders that collaborate to achieve the common goal of offering a service to local residents. The council is the most significant body in the local government system. The council, which is the main representative body of local government, makes up the bulk of its organizational structure. A council must be present at every level of local representative governance. Depending on the evolution and dynamics of local government processes in the relevant country, the council's status as a legislative body differs by country. (JALALI, June 06 2022). Construction plays a significant role in the whole performance of the government system. Unless the government has a strong structure, which is suitable and compatible with its social, historical, and cultural roots, it cannot meet the needs of its nation.

3.5 Roles of the local government

It can be seen and examined in the methods listed below:

From a political perspective, the local government has three fundamental characteristics: legislative, judicial, and executive. Thus, the local government may play the following roles:

Executive role: is to implement or execute the idea and strategies.

Legislative role: To make the essential laws, commands and other policies and strategies. Legalize the strategies, policies and programs of local government.

Judicial role: this is justices for the local people and also to rise the access to the fair dealing for the local people. To decrease the insignificant or minor clash or disputes to local level in active and well-organized method (Thapa, 2020).

3.6 Local Government Democracy

Delegation of authority and duty to political institutions at the village, towns, municipal, districts, counties, and similar regional level, but not entirely, via elective mayors, councils, and other local officials is referred to as "local democracy." It means that the locally elected people representatives are allowed by law to act freely within the limits of law in order to

implement the tasks given to them. Local officials must be chosen democratically through general elections. Local democracy aims to ensure that government laws meet the goals and preferences of the people who live there. Successful local democracy can encourage social involvement, quality management, community strengthening, and economic growth. Even if some states meet basic democratic standards at the national level, they are only moderately democratic at the local level, with dark realities of totalitarianism, aristocracy, or corruption remaining inside them. Other nations have very well designed local democratic structures that can provide a more open and integrated kind of democracy than at the national scale. Successful local democracy is becoming more acknowledged as a requirement for guaranteeing long-term and equitable growth of the economy, better governance, and the promotion of liberal principles (JALALI, June 06 2022). The local government democracy can effectively be evaluated through assessment of executive authority at the local level, taking a look at the fiscal autonomy of the local authorities and partaking of public in the local-level decision-making process. The terms "local democracy" and "local autonomy" are interchangeably used repeatedly. He further explains that local democracy is a larger term that also incorporates local autonomy. The establishment of an autonomous local government system is a requirement for local democracy. Local authorities must have independent governance in order to function as a site where politics takes place and where varied interests clash and resolve. Studying the connection among the central governments and local governments will allow us to effectively analyze the degree to which the reform studies were democratic and participatory, and whether they were pro-local autonomy. The relations between the central and local governments in a country's public administration system are formalized as a result of the country's historical process's social, economic, political, and administrative structure. For this reason, the political, administrative, and sociocultural system that developed during the historical phase has an effect on the country's situation in terms of relationships between both administrative levels. Administrative tutelage and local autonomy are the two main principles in the bond amongst the central government and local governments (JALALI, June 06 2022).

3.7 Local Autonomy

The local autonomy could be divided into two parts the administrative and fiscal. The administrative independence of local officials means to what extent do the officials at the local level are independent in planning and implementation of their policies or to what extent the central government has impact over the strategy and decision-making process on the local

government. On the other hand, fiscal autonomy as the ability of a local government to hire and administer its own workforce, generate and handle its very own revenues and funds, create laws and regulations in this regard with its fiscal issues, and carry out its tasks as prescribed by law with intervention from higher governmental authorities (JALALI, June 06 2022).

3.8 Public Participation

Direct or indirect engagement via representatives of relevant parties in decision-making regarding policies, strategies, or policies in which they have a stake is referred to as public engagement or people participation. Stakeholders can be certain groups of people, individuals, parties, or entities who have a claim on an institution's or other entity's interest, assets, or outputs and can influence or be impacted by government policies. Stakeholders may engage with local authorities, elected parties, nonprofit groups, and various organizations that formulate or implement public policies and programs via public involvement (JALALI, June 06 2022). Citizens are assumed to be essential stakeholders in democratic governments because they may engage in the creation, approval, and execution of legislation and rules that impact them explicitly or implicitly via elected representatives. In democracies, democratic engagement is thus an essential component of the public–government interaction. People participation could be in two different ways. First is the temporary and limited participation such as attending meetings in certain places or citizen surveys. Secondly, the participation could be more influential or direct, this type of participation requires continuous and long-term public involvement. The second type of public participation can be in two stages; the first stage is the direct participation of people in elections and the voting process, while the second stage requires public engagement. The people engaged in the decision-making process of the government are done via; People’s Councils, Mass Organizations, and through Private Sector Representatives. In addition, community meetings are organized to discuss and even take decisions regarding social and political issues (JALALI, June 06 2022). Public participation serves a variety of functions. These can also include meeting statutory obligations, emulating representative democracy involvement and participation principles, expanding social justice, spreading awareness, improving public problem understanding and finding and developing alternative approaches, and producing higher-quality measures, strategies, and developments in terms of content (JALALI, June 06 2022). The participants could contribute to bureaucratic decision-makers and help the public become more aware and build a broader vision of national

matters by sharing new knowledge, diverse perspectives on a situation, and incentive to find solutions. Engagement from the public could also help to ensure a more appropriate allocation of government funds by boosting trust and confidence, establishing relationships, and developing knowledge and interest about government concerns, it can also provide means for better problem-solving and execution to solve new public challenges. Active people participation results in a strong people-oriented government, the people can hold the authorities accountable for their responsibilities.

3.9 Reforms and Decentralization in the Local Governance

In order to promote democracy and increase the efficiency of the government policies most of the scholars in the world have come to the conclusion of providing local administration with political and economic autonomy but the main obstacle against the occurrence of this idea is the will of the central governments. For many reasons central governments always want to keep the whole power within their hands. This could be because of distrust between central and local authorities, usage of the resources, etc. The keeping the entire power inside the center results in centralization of the power at the hands of certain groups which will eventually lead to sidelining of the local democracy and local participation. The implementation of democracy in smaller administrative units is easier, and it enables the citizens to act more democratically and influence the actions and policies of the local authorities and actively participate in the decision-making process of their countries. In the meantime, the local government plays an important role in restricting the power of the central government and providing more freedom to the citizens of the local areas. Therefore, most of the countries in the world have started to implement some decentralization reforms. The main goal behind the ongoing reforms is to decentralize the power and autonomy of the central government by sharing the authority with the local government units. This process is called decentralization. Decentralization is explained as the transfer of power, duty, and authority from the central authorities to regional organizations and local officials (JALALI, June 06 2022). Decentralization is a collection of state reforms, not a single event. It is a set of political reforms aimed at transferring authority, duties, and resources from upper to lower levels of state administration. The transfer of authority to non-state actors is not included in decentralization. It consists of three main dimensions or aspects: bureaucratic, political, and fiscal. The transfer of state management, legislative authority, and judiciary liberty to local authorities is part of the political dimension. The bureaucratic aspect refers to the transfer of some traditional governmental duties to

independent governmental agencies. The economic aspect encompasses intergovernmental financial relationships in states where government bodies within the federal state have Constitutional and statutory taxing, budgetary, and spending authorities (JALALI, June 06 2022). Throughout history, decentralization has been in the center of the focus statesmen who do not want to share their powers with authorities in the local areas. However, the implementation of decentralization reforms has many advantages also. Firstly, it reduces the burden of administrative work on the central government and promotes people's participation. Secondly, it facilitates diversity and promotes executive development. Finally, it promotes better control of supervision which will eventually lead to a quicker decision-making process.



CHAPTER FOUR

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on local governance is either new or emerging, and it ranges from general justifications and commentary to analysis that has a more significant influence dependent on sector or region. Or A constantly expanding literature on local governance is available, ranging from broad descriptions and commentary to evaluations with a more narrow focus depending on geography or industry.

Among the literature that provides a thorough examination, an early World Bank study outlines the main challenges to bolstering local government institutions in Afghanistan. The Asia Foundation recognized a local government assessment that gives a thorough examination of the legislative context and a breakdown of structures in the same year. Larson's study was regarded as using a comparative methodology and was designed to give SIDA key political, economic, social, cultural, and security information on four Northern provinces. An extensive list of recommendations was provided by a general study of local government and the role of NGOs in aiding the development of sub-national governance capacity that was commissioned by NGOs having a presence in Afghanistan. The UNDP released a report on local government in 2009 that used the notion of drivers of change to develop a technique for calculating social capital. The Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium produced high-quality research on local governance. It is necessary to study their report on provincial councils. A wide range of articles about elections and the democratic process are published by the National Democratic Institute. Not least because of its assessment from 2007 and subsequent observation surveys, the Asia Foundation has continually been a trustworthy source of insightful information about local governance. The Afghanistan Analysts Network has written about a variety of issues with government. Numerous publications by Rubin have been written about governance, but His contextualization of public administrative change is particularly relevant to this study's research of local government in Afghanistan. Nojumi and Barfield have provided a realistic and sincere collection of suggestions for enhancing local governance.

The UNAMA papers on Sar-i-Pul, Jawzjan, and Samangan are beneficial when it comes to publications that concentrate more on a specific area or areas because they offer a thorough and in-depth analysis of the more formal characteristics of local government structures and operation. In laying out a number of problems with the way local government is administered

in the provinces, they are open and honest. The publications from the Feinstein International Centre provide a fair overview of some provinces' distinctive governance frameworks, particularly in terms of aid and security. A Noragric paper on Day Kundi, a provincially underserved area, presents important research information.

One of the smart district conflict studies that CPAU has conducted with connections across Afghanistan is particularly pertinent to this study. Then there are numerous evaluation studies, such as the USAID LGCD program's surprisingly open evaluation. A review of the NABDP and a more gnomonic remark on the ASGP are two UN reviews that are pertinent to this investigation. Key indices of poverty, gender, health, education, and infrastructure have been released by the World Bank for each Afghan province. (Routledge, 2011/02/02).

With a few exceptions, the majority of literature tends to be program- or state-focused. There are also a lot of case studies that focus on a specific area or effectively analyze cultural traditions. Many domestic and foreign academics have focused on Afghanistan's local government, particularly since the country's contemporary local government system was established.

According to Shabnam Habib's article from 2013, "Local Government in Afghanistan: How it Works and Main Challenges," the contemporary local government structure that is typical of western nations is actually a fresh experiment in Afghanistan. She goes on to show that: A system of effective governance is necessary for Afghanistan to have a modern, autonomous government. (JALALI, June 06 2022). Since it is a new investigation in Afghanistan, it is facing a lot of challenges. As a result, the majority of academics have concentrated on the difficulties facing Afghanistan's local government system and have offered suggestions for how to address the pertinent problems. Understanding State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan, 2007, is the title of a working paper that Sarah Lister, a research analyst at the Crisis States Research Center, wrote. The article addresses the local government system of Afghanistan's power structures. She uses the following quote to discuss the development of a centralized system of governance in Afghanistan: A dispersed, decentralized traditional society has coexisted awkwardly with centralized official institutions ever since Afghanistan's attempts at state-building began. Tribal and religious leaders created "micro-societies" throughout millennia that engaged in patronage and bargaining with the state and other forces. (Lister, 2007). Micheal Shurkin in his study paper Sub National Government in Afghanistan, 2011 which is focused on the existing problems of the local government in Afghanistan points out

the problems to be the lack of performance and representation in the Afghanistan local government system. He provides some recommendations such as inspiring public contribution, strengthening informal and semiofficial bodies, promoting national development programs, and seeking new ways to measure the success of the government officials in order to deal with the above-mentioned challenges (Saltmarshe, 2011). The Nature of the Afghan State: Centralization vs. Decentralization 2020 is her research project or study that includes them. Points out the lack of responsible and wide-ranging government to be the main challenge ahead of peace in Afghanistan. He states that; Afghanistan is one of the world's most centralized states on paper, but in practice it is one of the most fragmented. For the past century, this conflict has significantly influenced Afghan history. The majority of Afghans have traditionally lived a long way from the city, and the institutions and infrastructure have not been adequate to impose strict controls, and institutions and infrastructure have been unsatisfactory to enforce high levels of control. In order to deal with the mentioned matters, he recommends equal decentralization of power, talking about people's demands, paying attention to the budget, and having a clear understanding of decentralization and federalism. Authors Anne Evans, Nick Manning, Yasin Osmani, Anne Tully, and Andrew Wilder centered their 2004 study, A Guide to Government in Afghanistan, on the administrative, financial, and process aspects of governance in Afghanistan at both the national and local levels. The results of this study demonstrate that the emergence of de facto governments controlled by local warlords at the subnational levels poses a significant challenge to Afghanistan's centralized government. It claims that in order to replace the currently illegal de facto states governed by the local regional commanders, the power of the central government must be extended to the provinces. In response, it advises that tactics to promote the rule of law as well as construction projects and other actions to lessen local warlords' influence and power at the subnational level are necessary.

Douglas Saltmarshe is a senior research manager in Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. He and his collaborator Abhilash Medhi wrote a summary essay titled Local Governance in Afghanistan. According to A View from the Ground 2011, whose goal was to track the growth of local government in Afghanistan, provincial budgeting and planning for development are dysfunctional primarily due to these processes' highly centralized nature, which prevents provincial administrations from making decisions about development that are in line with local needs. It goes on to add that: Since budgetary movements are governed by centralized line ministries in Kabul and local planning organizations are primarily symbolic, coordination

among provincial line ministries is challenging to obtain.(Saltmarshe, 2011). The study report suggests that a single executive body should be given control over all local government administration responsibilities

The Asia Foundation has consistently worked to advance public understanding of local government, not least through its assessment from 2007 and following perception studies. The Afghanistan Analysts Network has written about a wide range of governance-related problems. Rubin has authored a number of publications on governance, but his contextualization of public administrative change is particularly pertinent to this study. For enhancing local governance, Barfield and Nojumi have provided a series of proposals that are feasible and useful.

Moving on to books that are more location-specific, UNAMA has published some excellent papers on Sar-i-Pul, Jawzjan, and Samangan that provide a comprehensive and in-depth overview of the more formal facets of local government structures and operation. They are candid in outlining a variety of issues with how local government is run in the provinces. The Feinstein International Centre's papers give a good overview of a few provinces' unique governance structures, especially in relation to aid and security.

A Noragric paper on Day Kundi, a provincially underserved area, presents important research information. A CPAU has Conducted several insightful district conflict analyzes relevant to all of Afghanistan. One of them is particularly relevant to this study. Finally, there are various evaluation studies, including a refreshing and candid evaluation of the USAID LGCD program.

Summary of Key Indicators of Poverty, Gender, Health, Education and Infrastructure for all provinces of Afghanistan. Evidence from this study points to the existence of complex social orders that have proven capable of maintaining cohesion throughout recent waves of development, such as the PDPA, the Soviets, the Taliban, or the current stage of external donor support. Governance remains diffuse, diverse, and fragmented, but these characteristics have allowed Afghan society to maintain a degree of stability despite frequent changes in regime and ideology.

Nevertheless, society and expectations are changing due to migration, communication, infrastructure development, and technology. In the context of a modernizing world, a future Afghan government will need a structure that will allow this, regardless of the outcome of the current conflict.

To care for and serve those who are responsible for governing. Much has been achieved at the central level, but one of the most beneficial legacies of current international engagement in Afghanistan is the government's establishment of robust, effective and accountable mechanisms for local government activities. to help develop.

The more general literature tends to be national or program oriented, with a few exceptions. There are also many personal studies that relate to specific places or deliberately examine cultural practices.



CHAPTER FIVE

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND CONTEXT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

In Afghanistan, there are a number of elected bodies that have executive, legislative, and administrative responsibility over the regions that fall within their purview. It is defined as an organization that selects or creates certain regulations for a given area. If we take the word or terminology literally, it refers to the control or management of local affairs by the residents of that community. The crucial notion of subsidiarity is brought up here, which states that local residents can better meet and satisfy local demands than the federal government can. (Ndreul, 2016).

After the US-led NATO invasion of Afghanistan, the rebuilding process of the country was started, in this process, the western powers established a western-style of local government in Afghanistan. Afghanistan got its most democratic Constitution in 2004. Articles 136 and 137 of the new Constitution of Afghanistan state that while the government should maintain the principle of centralism it should also provide necessary authority and power to the local administrative bodies so that they could provide better and timely services to the local people of the area. Similarly, it stresses on the participation of the people in the governmental decision-making process (Ayobi, 2018). While the Constitution emphasizes the unitary type of government it also asks for certain decentralization measures to be taken by the central government. In Afghanistan's local government structure, the sub-national government is referred to as the local government authorities such as provinces, municipalities, districts, and villages. The country has 34 provinces, 387 districts, 165 municipalities, and almost 45,538 villages (A Roadmap for Subnational Reform, 2018, p. 3). This type of political system is modeled after the centralized US presidential system with the elimination of the federal system, which is in fact a new experience in Afghanistan in the last two decades. The efficiency of this experiment is the question to be answered in this paper (Lister, 2007).

5.1 Concept and Theory of the Local Government in Afghanistan

The administrative structure of Afghanistan is centralized, as stated in articles 136 and 137 of the Afghan Constitution. According to the article, "the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's administration is governed by law based on the unit of local and central governments. It

continues by stating that each minister leads a separate administrative unit inside the central administration. The province is the local government's organizational unit. (Const., 2004). Therefore, it can be understood that the local governance according to the Constitution of Afghanistan refers to a set of departments and systems that are responsible for providing security, service delivery, accountability and transparency at the provincial level. Given that Article no. 137 of the Afghanistan Constitution states that the province is the unit of local government, it may come to mind that the province, as the decision-making and executive body of the administrative system, takes the Afghanistan local government system out of its simplicity. The province as an institution, if elected and created by the people themselves, might take the organizational system out of its centralized form, but because the provinces are in fact a continuance of the central system and the governors are nominated by the organizations and individuals in the center (Const., 2004). As a result, the administrative structure is still centralized. However, unlike the central institutions, the provinces lack a distinct legal personality. In order to advance and improve economic, social, and cultural affairs and involve as many people as possible in the development of the country, the government must transfer the necessary authority to the local government in accordance with the law. This is done by upholding the centrality principle. The local governments have been given the necessary authority by the central government, in accordance with the legislation, so that provincial people do not have to travel to the center for administrative tasks. Furthermore, in another article the Constitution states that; every province should have a provincial council. According to legislation, provincial council representatives are chosen for four years by residents of the province in open, free, and transparent elections proportionate to the province's population. The provincial council members will choose one of their number to serve as president. (Cons., 2004). Many may contend that Article 128 of the Afghan Constitution establishes a provincial council whose members are chosen by the people of the province, which might be interpreted as decentralizing the local government structure in Afghanistan. However, Article no. 139 of the Afghanistan Constitution mentioned that; "The provincial council is responsible for assisting the provincial administrations in achieving the state's development goals and improving the province's affairs in the way prescribed by law, as well as providing advice to the provincial administrations on related problems" (Saltmarshe, 2011). The provincial administration will assist the members of the provincial council in performing their tasks. It should be noted that the Constitution only grants the provincial councils the authority to provide recommendations on matters that pertain to their respective provinces. They don't possess executive power. The mayor and members of the municipal council are

chosen in free, open, secret, and direct elections in Afghanistan, as stated in Article 141 of the Constitution, according to the Department of Urban and Municipal Affairs. (AFG Const., 2004, Article 141). However, Afghanistan has not yet had municipal elections, which may be because the lower house of parliament did not approve the municipal election law. According to Article 60 of the Constitution, which is in addition to these articles of the Constitution from which the simplicity of the Afghan administrative system is inferred, the president is the head of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and exercises her powers in the executive, legislative, and judicial spheres in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. She is also the chief executive officer of the country. (Article 60 of the AFG Const., 2004).By anticipating regional organizations like the province, the Afghan Constitution has reduced overcrowding and made the administrative structure more straightforward, although the issue of power concentration is still there. One of Afghanistan's major administrative systems's critical issues is this.

5.2 Terms of the Local Government in Afghanistan

Three stages could be used to categorize Afghanistan's local government history:

- 1) Medieval era,
- 2) Post-Independence era,
- 3) Post NATO invasion of Afghanistan.

5.2.1 The Medieval Era

Afghanistan after its liberation. As a result of the construction of an Afghan state founded on hierarchical principles that rejected common federal institutions in favor of a distinct intellectual class, Pashtun tribes took control of the country. The nation was then invaded by foreigners in the 19th century, which led to a period of political upheaval. The Amirs' reluctance to share authority or favor with these organizations led to a period of instability even though Afghanistan's rulers significantly relied on armed militias to maintain their control. (Saltmarshe, 2011). This process came to an end during Abdur Rahman's leadership between the years 1880 to 1901, when he fiercely insured that no one could challenge his position or dominance. Throughout the 20th century, the form of administration he established has remained largely unchanged, with Pashtun rulers retaining nearly total control. This was

continued by the election of Pashtuns as rulers in non-Pashtun regions in order to quell prospective anti-Kabul uprisings. By forming a regular military and establishing a more effective government that enhanced taxes regulations, as well as businesses, roadways, and primary education, the king established the foundation for the modern Afghan government. He restructured the state bureaucracy and expanded it beyond the capital by splitting Afghanistan into some provinces, and then small regions and divisions, each led by government representatives loyal to the kingdom. Instead of displacing local political formations, Abdur Rahman's government attempted to enter them. Judges kept their jobs, but they were now paid and controlled by federal authorities. Local agents "ARBABS" acted as middlemen between elected provincial officials and community councils and tribal assemblies. In return for their collaboration, wealthier landowners, community authorities, and the ulama were given extensive independence (Ibrahim, 2009).

5.2.2 Post-Independence Era

After the independence of Afghanistan, under the kingdom of Amanullah Khan Municipalities and provincial councils were established. Farmers and traders were taxed directly by King Amanullah. He also implemented regular accounting and budgeting reforms. However, his efforts to implement these reforms through the state administration, were met with opposition by religious fundamentalists and tribal chiefs. Which in the end caused in the collapse or failure of his government? After the assassination of Mohammad Nader Shah in the year 1933, his son, Zahir Shah took power in hand. During this time, the country's administration continued centralized, with income taxes on major agricultural exports such as qaraqul, cotton, and fruit providing the required funding. Tax collection from rural areas had decreased dramatically by the 1950s, and revenue hardly met municipal expenditures. In 1953, Daud Khan became the first prime minister of Afghanistan after a successful coup he did against the kingdom of the king Zahir Shah. The new ruler opened a new stage in the political history of Afghanistan by changing the government system from monarchy to democratic republic. During his time in power, local administrations became more efficient. Governors, commissioners, and district governors led the country's local administrative bodies. Districts became the country's most important administrative units, and the only administration with which most inhabitants had a connection. Cities with populations of more than ten thousand inhabitants were allowed to elect municipal council members and mayors every 4 years as a step toward greater public participation (Evans, March, 2004). Despite his achievements, which included cultural and

educational changes, Daoud was illequipped to undertake any of the much further reforms and goals that he had plans for. Afghanistan's governance model in 1964 was that of a unitary state. All governmental institutions were bureaucratic in nature, and provincial and local institutions were completely subject to the Kabul government. The provinces ("Wolayat"), districts ("Uluswali"), sub-districts ("Alaqadri"), provincial municipalities ("SharwaliWolayat"), and rural municipalities were the five subnational governmental entities recognized by the 1964 Constitution Act ("SharwaliUluswali"). In this arrangement, the provinces had very little formal influence over choices impacting their organizational structure, human resource management, and labor force. The governor and other top officials, such as district chiefs and senior provincial government officials, were chosen by the president. A further requirement of the 1964 Constitution was the creation of elected provincial assemblies to support and counsel regional governments. The Taliban ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, clearly exercising top-to-bottom authority from the capital under the leadership of Amir al-Mu'minin, who had significantly more power than the current president. While certain bargains for decentralization were negotiated to co-opt commanders and territories, power ultimately flowed from the Amir's central leadership of the Taliban "The Shuras," or consultative councils. Only two provisions articles 83 and 84 of the Taliban's 1998 draft Constitution, addressed sub national units, declaring that the Sharia council and the Amir would establish provinces, districts, and local municipalities. After 2001, the Taliban prioritized unit and commander proliferation over centralized authority before their full expansion on all of the Afghanistan. However, as the insurgency's authority has increased, so has the Taliban's administration in the areas under its jurisdiction. They started to appoint candidates to shadow government at the province and district levels and establish policies centrally (Thier, 2020). While the Taliban, like all Afghan leaders, had to accommodate local leaders and local demands, there was no sign that the Taliban's earlier priorities for centralized leadership, rigorous policy, and command over the group's philosophy had changed.

5.2.3 Post NATO Invasion of Afghanistan

After the invasion of Afghanistan by NATO forces and removal of the Taliban regime in the country in 2001, Afghanistan got its most democratic Constitution in 2004. Articles 136 and 137 of the new Constitution of Afghanistan debates about the governance and administration. The government should uphold the centralization principle, but it also needs to give the local administrative bodies the necessary authority and strength so they can serve the region's

residents more effectively. Similarly, it stresses on the contribution of the people on governmental decision-making process (Ayobi, 2018). The Afghan Constitution's centrality status must be upheld by the government in order to advance economic, social, and cultural affairs, according to Article 132, which states that as more people take part in the development of national life, submission is required for the organization and management of provincial offices in accordance with current law.(Const., 2004). The Independent Directorate of Local Governance was established in 2007 to improve coordination between the federal government and local governments. The office's objectives include improving local administrations, increasing transparency, providing the opportunity for citizen involvement, and ensuring that local offices actively participate in executing national development projects to support the Afghan people's socioeconomic wellbeing. The IDLG has been the central independent organ of the afghan state that is managing the provinces and their administrative affairs. It has released a burden on the central government in Kabul.

5.3 Structure of Local Government in Afghanistan

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, which has three branches (legislative, executive, and judicial) headed by the president of Afghanistan, is the foundation upon which the government of the country was built. Afghanistan's present political leadership is a centralized presidency (Const., 2004). In Afghanistan's government organization, the sub-national government is Denoted to the local government authorities such as provinces, districts, villages and municipalities,. The country has 34 provinces, 387 districts, 45.538 village and almost 165 municipalities (Routledge, 2011/02/02). This type of political system is actually demonstrated after the centralized US presidential system with the removal of the federal system, which is in fact a new experience in Afghanistan in the last two decades. In a centralized presidential system, political power is combined and undivided, which controls both the entire country geographically under a single political center, and functionally focuses and concentrate political power in government organizations. Afghanistan was in a dire state following the Taliban's ouster or demise and the establishment of a new democratic system. Developments in Afghanistan, the region and the world were fast-tracking. The western powers were all in favor of a powerful or strong centralized state led by a powerful the president. Among the major developments in local government are the creation of the independent directorate of local government and the introduction of the 2010 local government strategy. However, in reality, local government officials do not hold a lot of authority. Only governors

have vast powers and are directly accountable to the presidency. In the same way, the departments in the districts act as offices under the provincial administration. The main control over the resources and facilities related to the local sectors is in the hands of the ministries. The power of provincial councils is also limited, and these councils are primarily answerable to the administration of local organs. Despite this, Local Governance 2010 establishes a policy for defining the role of local representation institutions and the transfer of authority from the center to the local, to satisfy the demands of the local population. (Saltmarshe, 2011).

Also Afghanistan is a centralized country where all the controls and powers are occurred or existed in center, and the center is answerable for all political affairs and social economic of the whole country. According to the provisions of Article 137 of Afghanistan's new constitution, the "government shall transfer essential powers, in accordance with the law, to local administration in order to quicken and improve economic, social, as well as cultural matters and substitute people's contribution in emerging national life," So base on this article in a struggle has been made to identify the structure of local governance. Two types of performer or actors play significant role in the local governance of Afghanistan, Formal Actors like for instance, Provincial Assemblies, Provinces, Municipalities, Districts, Villages Council and Districts Councils. The other Actors are informal which contains, Khan, Malak, Mula, Arbab, Tribal leaders and local police or Harbaki. So the structure of local governance in Afghanistan is described in this research.

5.3.1 Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG)

Prior to 2007, the ministry of interior was responsible for overseeing matters relating to local government in Afghanistan; however, as a result of the presidential decree No. 1047 issued in August 2007, the administration of local government was transferred to a newly established organization known as the Independent Directorate of Local Governance. All governors and mayors are now represented by IDLG in its reporting to the President. It suggests governors and mayors to the President to administer all subnational organizations (Routledge, 2011/02/02). Independent Directorate of Local Governance's objectives comprise enhancing provincial structures, increasing transparency, providing opportunities for citizen involvement, and ensuring that local agencies actively participate in strengthening various service initiatives to promote the Afghan people's socioeconomic prosperity. The agency recognizes that each province, district, and community is distinct from one another, and that planning process must account for obstacles and opportunities in each district. All employees in local government are employed by the central government and are managed through their respective ministries. The

budgets of linked ministries also cover provincial expenses. People participation is the key to good governance. Therefore, IDLG has taken some practical steps to improve the public involvement in the decision-making process. The main step which was taken by the IDLG is to establish people councils in all levels of the local government such as Provincial councils, district councils and village councils (Saltmarshe, 2011).

5.3.2 Model of Local Government

Applying the following model would cause the structures or constructions to realign, as seen in Figure 1. (on the next page). The division between the executive, judicial, and representative bodies—the three pillars that make up the state—would become more distinct and vital.

The ability of representative bodies to check the executive would be increased. The emphasis on lines of accountability, which contrasts with the current inadequate lines of reporting and communication, suggests this. (Routledge, 2011/02/02). Despite the study Afghanistan's local government has traditionally been dominated by provincial and district councils; theoretically, changes to the legal framework for representative institutions could also increase the Wolesi Jirga's accountability or responsibility while gradually decreasing the president's office's influence. More power will strengthen representative bodies while also giving them some leeway for judicial error. The implementation of a different voting mechanism from SNTV would undoubtedly increase councilors' accountability to the constituents they represent. According to a study of local government in Afghanistan, there is a mismatch between the court and other pillars of the state and a lack of clarity in the procedures for administering justice. The impacts of the judiciary's ineffective functioning were clearly visible, despite the fact that a comprehensive investigation of it was not a part of this research. Increased examination of the courts' operations and rulings by provincial and district-level entities could lead to more local accountability for the justice system. (Medhi, June 2011).

The As a result of the intended reforms, the executive's current authority would be reduced in two ways. First instance, the president's office would have less of an influence overall, especially on the province and district governments. The wali, or provincial governor, and wuluswal, or district level commander, would focus more of their responsibilities on assisting and coordinating provincial and district line departments. Second, by being in charge of planning and budget lines to address locally prioritized requirements, the Provincial Development Committees' authority and function would alter. A longer legislative mandate

would encourage planning within the committees or their sectorial working groups, to which provincial councils would be able to make more beneficial contributions. The Provincial Development Committees would be more eager to share information on income and other funds aggregated by the Mustofiat, making planning and spending decisions more transparent and well-informed. For the purpose of simplicity, Figure 1 treats the MoF as a component of the line ministries and the Mustofiat as a component of the provincial line departments. (Medhi, June 2011).

The model shown in Figure 1 highlights the necessity of moving toward a greater division of powers, giving more authority to the chosen bodies and subsequently reducing presidential power (especially over appointments), and creating a more accountable judiciary. It suggests that there is political desire and financial support to establish an efficient local administration in Afghanistan. The model may be deemed to have the highest expectations, yet it nevertheless offers a practical objective that may be worked toward. (Routledge, 2011/02/02).




Figure 1. A Model of Improved Local Government

CHAPTER SIX

6.1 Provinces

Afghanistan is divided into 34 provinces. Depending on their population and ecological characteristics, each of these provinces has been classified as a class I, II, or III provinces under the act of sub national governance. Every province is led by a governor who is the direct representative of the central government. There is a tremendous degree of variation in provincial management when it comes to governance. On the one hand, governors in some provinces have a lot of power. Governors in many other provinces occasionally serve as liaisons between different entities (Medhi, June 2011). According to Provincial Council Act, appointed provincial councils serve as a check on governor acts. By the end of 2019, the Kabul administration will modify the Regional Administrative Act to formalize the acts of Provincial Governors and other provincial executive entities. The essential roles for provincial governors, district rulers, and village Qariyadars shall be outlined in this document. The draft Council act will be supplemented by this legislation (Routledge, 2011/02/02). For more details the six provinces will study as will consider in Annex.

6.2 Provincial Councils

During 2005, the first democratic local level public institutions, known as province councils, were founded. Provincial councils are chosen by the people for 4 years in every province, which is a constituency. They were established to collaborate with the local administration to provide advice and carry out its responsibilities. In fact, the provincial councils are the first elected bodies in the Afghanistan administrative system. The provincial council is made up of representatives who are proportional to the population of each province. Nevertheless, because the provincial council aims to ensure female participation, a quarter of the positions on the provincial council are designated for women by law. As previously stated, provincial leaders have had limited influence over how money is distributed within their regions. Kabul's central ministry provides funding to provincial line ministries in the form of regular program appropriations (Medhi, June 2011). This is worth mentioning that this council does not have any executive authority and its only there to advice and collaborate with the local administrative bodies for a better local government.

6.2.1 Districts

The 34 provinces in Afghanistan are split into 387 districts. The district management arrangements are similar to those in the center of province. Furthermore, because the central ministry confirms district employment assignments, provincial officials have comparably less authority in respect to districts. The provincial governor, on the other hand, usually nominates the district governor or other highranking officials to be appointed by the central government (Medhi, June 2011). The district rulers are directly appointed by the central government and are the direct representatives of central government. Despite his or her restricted official authority, the district administrator (Woluswal) is an important individual who acts as a guardian to government programs, particularly in the sphere of law. District administrations also have an executive officer in charge of managerial tasks, a sectoral representative in charge of communicating and overseeing ministry work in districts, and an officer in charge of fiscal administration in addition to the Woluswal (Saltmarshe, 2011).

6.2.2 Municipalities

Municipalities (SHARWALI) are recognized or established to provide services for the common welfare of the citizens. Sharwali or Municipalities are governmental, administrative, and legal bodies having definite regional and physical boundaries. Municipalities are established to "administer city matters," according to Article 141 of Afghanistan's 2004 Constitution. Furthermore, a municipality may stand below a province or between a district and a village in the governance and bureaucratic structure. In fact, the provincial structure for municipalities does not appear to be organized vertically. Regardless of the fact that municipalities are free to collect and preserve their own taxes, the IDLG accepts each municipality's employment counts and expenditures. Municipalities are governed by a combination of the municipal laws of 1957, 2000, and 2003; however, there is a strong demand inside IDLG and the global community to develop a new law on municipalities to make simpler regulations and clearness. Municipalities presently gather income from internal sources and depend completely on these funds to operate and afford services. Municipalities will begin to receive central transfers under the Sub National Governance Policy. This could indicate that municipalities will increase revenues in the coming years, which will pay off for liabilities in the annual budget (Medhi, June 2011). In opposed to the provincial and district levels, the Afghanistan Constitution creates elected municipalities in the country's urban regions, giving citizen's control over the public territory. According to the Constitution, the mayor or wali and representatives of city councils in each

of the country's 153 municipalities should be elected in independent, democratic, private, and open elections. However due to some political and legal issues within the Afghan government, still the mayor or wali and other employees of the municipality are elected by the Independent Directorate of Local Government in line with the presidential order (Saltmarshe, 2011). There is a strong requirement for locally elected wali or mayor in Afghanistan because so far, the mayors elected by the central government could not prove to be helpful to the local government in Afghanistan. They have worked for their own benefits rather than the benefits of the local people (Fernandes, November 2005).

6.2.3 State-Building in Provinces

In the provinces of Afghanistan, the problem of enhancing governance through institutional change has so far been tackled haphazardly. Administrative reform and support initiatives have taken place, and new organizations have been created, such as Provincial Councils and Provincial Development Committees (PDCs). However, rather than a general strengthening or clarity of the formal institutions of state, the ultimate result has merely been the construction of a bewildering and disorderly arrangement of institutions with indeterminate accountabilities, resources, and linkages.

These initiatives did not result in a vacuum. According to earlier AREU research, civil servant skeleton structures continued in several regions after 2001 despite ambiguous job duties, routines, and frequently unpaid salaries. Numerous different initiatives were made between 2001 and 2005 to enhance administrative functioning, cooperation, and representation. The results of these state-building attempts in terms of governance varied greatly. These new structures were implemented in settings with a variety of customary governance patterns, frequently with older systems layered on top of newer ones as a result of conflict or a history of NGO engagement. (Nixon, April 2008).

6.2.4 Formal Institutions in Provinces

Among the formal institutions of provincial government are the Governor's Office, the departments of various ministries, and the offices of some independent government organizations like the Independent Afghanistan Reform and Civil Service Commission and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. as was briefly mentioned in section two above (IARCSC). The departments known as PDCs now have nominated PCs and managing bodies.

The ministerial departments are responsible for the provision of services in sectors like rural development, law enforcement, health care, and education. They are given quarterly allocations based on the central line ministry's budget proposal, but nearly never have significant local authority over resource re-allocation, appointment, or programming. (Thier, 2020).

In addition to serving as the President's representative, each province's governor has also required to report to the interior minister. Contrary to the vertical organization of line ministries, the Governor's role, which is theoretically one of harmonizing or coordination, is actually carried out through a Provincial Administrative Assembly (PAA) or a Provincial Development Committee (PDC). Governors also have power over expenditure approval and appointments. The Governor, who serves as the President's envoy and frequently as a powerful authority figure in their own right, becomes involved in concerns of planning, expenditure, and procurement, municipal affairs, conflicts, and other issues impacting the province. This inconsistency illustrates how a presidential appointment and power-sharing system co - exists with continuing technical initiatives to increase the cohesiveness of subnational institutions through state-building operations. It also illustrates a systemic contradiction.

The National Assembly and Provincial Councils (PCs) were elected concurrently in 2005, and the PCs were given a nebulous mandate that includes advisory, dispute-resolution, and oversight responsibilities.

After being altered in earlier drafts to include more PC monitoring features, a Provincial Council Law has been adopted. A single non-transferable vote is used to elect these councils from a province-wide constituency, with one-fourth of the seats designated for women. Concerns revolve around the resources at their disposal, how well they represent their constituents, how well connected they are to the provincial government, and whether they have recently established or established new provincial planning agencies and processes. (Nixon, April 2008).

Unconstitutionally mandated Provincial Development Committees (PDCs) were established to coordinate a variety of straightforward planning and coordination initiatives that have sprung up all over the country since 2003 and to offer a framework for provincial participation in federal planning initiatives like the ANDS. They are officially governed by the Ministry of Economy, and their chairman is either the Provincial Governor or a representative of him. The PDCs' varying levels of practical capability are confirmed by the range in quality of the

provincial plans that they produce. It's unclear right now. (Medhi, Local Governance in Afghanistan, June 2011).

6.2.5 Provincial Governors and Provincial Administration

Beyond coordinating orders, provincial governors frequently serve important tasks that are connected to their function as the local branch of the presidency. The subnational center of a "government of relationships" that extends to the district level and below is the provincial governor. Just as ministerial and other central government border markers and posts have been used to coax provincial military commanders or warlords, provincial governorships are highly prized positions that have been utilized as encouragements to win the cooperation of locally based strongmen. In other instances, less prominent governors have been chosen, but with the intention of utilizing connections to address crises and accomplish stability, counter-terror, or counter-narcotics goals in specific provinces. This "government of relationships" is particularly apparent in regions where the insurgency, counternarcotics, and stabilization issues are most pressing. Paktia, Nangarhar, and Badakhshan are the case provinces in this instance. Additionally, it appeared to be particularly crucial in Paktia and Nangarhar, where strong tribal networks and connections served as the Provincial Governor's main influence-peddling tool. (Nixon, April 2008).

An key aspect of this governance structure has been the supply of largely opaque or unaccountable funding to foster connections through governors. These monies consist of so-called "hospitality money," "operational money," and even Commanders Emergency Response Funds (CERP) allotments made to governors or directed at specific recipients.

The distribution of such cash may undermine initiatives to create accountable institutions and revamp district and provincial governance. Although it's vital to note that the dependency on such funds is said to have decreased in 2007, it's also crucial to highlight that in 2005 and 2006 they continued to be a significant aspect of the dual system of government. (Nixon, April 2008).

6.2.6 Provincial Development Committees: (Coordination and Planning)

During the research period, significant changes were undertaken at the provincial level to improve planning and coordination between the many line departments and the Governor's office. Although Provincial Councils (described below) were granted some engagement in this

regard or regard, the introduction of Provincial Development Committees (PDCs), which were created by a declaration issued by the government in November 2005, was to be the principal mechanism.

The PDCs' duties, according to the directive, include coordinating and communicating with provincial councils, government, nonprofit organizations, and foreign organizations, as well as provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). They must also prepare accountability or responsibility tasks, such as creating a provincial budget, even when one is not currently anticipated. Other duties of the PDC include monitoring counternarcotics operations and admiring or approving provincial development plans, public and private investment plans, and strategies. According to the order or decree, the local Department of Economy should serve as the PDC's secretariat while the governor or his representative serves as its chair.

The planned organizational structure of PDCs included certain potential issues or conflicts, as mentioned in an earlier AREU briefing document. The most significant is probably the potential overlap of duties with elected Provincial Councils. It's unclear or unclear how the two bodies relate to one another.

The provincial department of economics is meant to serve as a "central office of the development committee," but it only has a little amount of resources to do so. It is unclear how precisely the Ministry of Economy and the Provincial Governor split their responsibilities with relation to PDCs. Even the PDC's makeup is unknown because to the wide variation in the presence or absence of Provincial Council members and the involvement of international actors.

The study of local administration in Afghanistan, almost half of which was conducted before the order creating PDCs, showed that these organizations were typically not introduced into a vacuum. Prior to the introduction of a PDC, some type or form of coordinating forum existed in each province, although the nature, history, and efficacy of these entities varied greatly. In the province of Herat in 2005, Every two months, the governor, department heads, and funders' or project implementers' representatives were also invited to or contacted. The Provincial Health Office created a framework for clinic project selection that allowed donors to establish "off-budget but on-plan" clinics in cooperation with NGOs and the PRT, although the results were inconsistent or varied. The Ministry of Education and the agencies sponsoring school construction remained uncooperative, according to the Herat education department, during this time. (ASP, PRT, NSP). (Thier, 2020).

Provincial Coordinating Bodies (PCBs) that convened monthly were in charge of the PDC in Faryab and Nangarhar, although they weren't very effective. Both provinces had obvious signs of inadequate governance, with UNAMA or PRTs taking the helm of conflicts and initiatives. In the absence of domestic leadership, it was commented that these events might at most be used for "information sharing," and one official said that in order to construct coordinating mechanisms, "there is a need to create teams, not simply support individuals." In the province of Paktia, where the PDC wasn't operational at the time of the research, the late Governor organized weekly meetings with department heads and invited officials from the UN and other organizations having activities in the area to participate.

At the time of information gathering, PDC activities and duties varied or differed according on the provinces where they had been created. The PRT and the Governor's office established a system of coordination meetings in Badakhshan beginning in 2005 to construct a provincial development plan. Although the staff of the Governor's office admitted that the resultant provincial development plan lacked structure and costing, its existence placed the newly constituted PDC in a secondary or redundant role and substantially burdened the Governor's office's coordination efforts. This was particularly true given that it didn't seem like the Department of Economy assumed control of the PDC. (Nixon, April 2008).

In contrast, a PDC conference in Bamyan with participation from provincial council members and heads of ministries had been formed by late 2006. In this case, The Provincial Council's position as a member of the PDC was clearly outlined in the Department of Economy's proposal for the PDC, which helped to locally clarify one of the major doubts in the enabling orders. Despite having only 9 of 17 employees on staff, the Department of Economy was able to pull off this comparatively good coordination effort despite the fact that We have a Grade III task but a Grade II tashkil.

PDCs can be viewed as an endeavor or attempt to standardize a response to the conflict between subnational sectorial spending and the ostensible coordinating and planning duties of the Provincial Governor's office. Prior attempts at coordination and the development of PCs hampered their entry into a dynamic and shifting environment in November 2005. PDCs tend to be heavily reliant on governors' cooperation, and it is unclear or unclear what function PDCs have in planning and budgeting outside of coordination. The provincial budget pilots that are currently taking place in Balkh, Panjshir, and Kandahar and will be expanded in the 1387 budget process offer a potential path ahead for establishing a function in connection to budgets.

However, despite these measures' partial mitigation, the stark inconsistency between planning at the provincial level and a centrally determined budget still exists. (Thier, 2020).

6.2.7 Provincial Councils: (Representation and Accountability)

After being elected in September, Provincial Councils were seated or held in November 2005, but it has not yet established a legal and regulatory structure. When this new subnational representative body was founded, there was pressure to comply with a constitutional mandate to create subnational representative bodies and the upper house of the National Assembly, the Meshrano Jirga, which was to include certain subnational representative bodies. Only the province council, or PCs, was chosen concurrently with the Wolasi Jirga, or lower house of the National Assembly.

As a result, both before and after the election, The Provincial Councils' duties and responsibilities were not clear. The Joint Electoral Management Board (JEMB) headquarters received numerous visits from Herat PC candidates in June 2005 seeking information on the function and, in particular, the compensation of PC members. The final roles decided upon for the Provincial Councils included involvement in the planning of provincial development, oversight and evaluation of other provincial governance institutions, and involvement in conflict resolution, the exclusion of customs that were contrary to the law, sharia, or human rights standards, environmental protection, and the reduction of illegal drug activity. (Saltmarshe, 2011).

This erratic and vague list of responsibilities reveals the speed with which a task was assigned to a body that was created without a clear place within a larger framework of subnational representative entities. The absence of a framework, in particular, raises several significant issues surrounding the roles and responsibilities of the councils.

The absence of a framework defining provincial planning and how it relates to finances, as well as a system for monitoring the administration, is the first problem. It is vital to clarify the relationship between the governors' offices, provincial councils, and PDCs in particular. Following the establishment of PDCs and Provincial Councils, there were two quite different sorts of PC participation in the two instance provinces that were visited. In Bamyan, the institutionalization of the PCs' role in planning and prospective future budgeting by the PDC had received support from the Governor's Office, the PC, and the Ministry of Economy. The

six commissioners that make up the Bamyan PC are in charge of liaison, law, finances, culture, internal supervision, and checking or overseeing administration. They monitor and confer with the provincial government, consult with the PRT, attend DIAG meetings, attend PDC meetings, attend emergency incident councils, settle disagreements, consult with ulema, and collaborate with the AIHRC. The head of the PC is, The second-most significant individual in the province, in their own words.

On the other hand, in Badakhshan, the institutionalization of a Provincial Council role was restricted by the Governor's vision, the relatively minor PDC position, and the previous construction of a provincial development plan. Several sources claimed that despite the PC's complete reliance on the Governor for funding and infrastructure, it was attempting to establish itself and "become a legitimate provincial parliament." Contrary to this objective, The Governor had determined that the PC will maintain its consultative role and refrain from disparaging or "insulting" public employees. As a result, individuals who received and handled the roughly 100 appeals every week felt that the Badakhshan PC's or province council watching role was defective. Many of these petitions included complaints about the provincial or district administrations, but the responses were almost always local, applicable to the specific circumstance, and did not address any structural problems in the involved government entities. (Nixon, April 2008).

6.2.7.1 District Governance: (The Government of Relationships)

The district is now the lowest level of officially recognized government in Afghanistan, as described in Section 2. The district administration is made up of a District Governor and varied numbers of district offices for central ministries. Each district also typically features a main or central court, a police agency, and a prosecutor. The District Governor, or woleswal, once a delegate of the Interior Ministry, formally serves in a coordinating function. In reality, Woleswals are the main contributors to district-level governance. The woleswal's informal role frequently implies conflict or dispute mediation as well as other problem-solving activities, depending on relationships with the province government, local customs, and informal power holders. The majority of the time, woleswals converse with maliks, arbabs, or qaryadars when these still have a substantial influence.

Since 2001, there has been an increase in "unofficial districts," which have been around since the 1990s. These are created when the centrally recognized districts are split, reflecting either

local management of tribal heterogeneity through district division along tribal lines or demands for increased resources. This procedure may have benefited by the informal authority of the woleswal's office and, more recently, the availability of money provided for aid, counterinsurgency, or stabilizing goals that are mostly unaccountable. Although the total number of districts has not yet been determined, it was reportedly 364 or 398 at the time of publication.

6.2.7.2 District Governors: (The Gatekeepers)

In the following aspects, the District Governor's role is similar to that of the Provincial Governor in some respects: Despite having only a few formal powers, the District Governor is an important figure in the district-level administration of all territories. The District Governor clearly plays a significant role in resolving local disputes or deciding how they will be resolved, calling in traditional representatives to discuss local issues, and receiving appeals of all kinds from district residents, in addition to the obvious administrative duties of the position, such as registering births, deaths, and marriages.

The District Governor is a key player in the local "management of connections" in politics, frequently working against district-level initiatives to create a technical state. The District Governor essentially serves as a gatekeeper for local government.

Visitors to a District Governor's office will generally find oneself waiting to meet the Governor among a throng of residents carrying paperwork for various appeals. These requests can be made in reaction to social problems, legal disputes, or pleas for assistance in the event of an emergency or natural disaster. It was indicated that the first point of contact for people who had their applications for the formal government agencies in each district reviewed should be the District Governor's office.

A woleswal The governor, who functions as the main liaison between society and the state at the district level, is able to ascertain the appropriate response when a specific application first reaches the official institutions of the state. Access control, a function that dates back to the expansion of state power by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan at the end of the eighteenth century, has a considerable impact on how the state treats its inhabitants. By managing or significantly influencing how and when the state and external players deal with or react to local concerns like revolution or local clash or conflict, drug production and trafficking, or conflicts, the woleswal's authority goes far beyond his statutory powers.

Understanding the importance of this position to the administration, the provincial governors who have an impact on their selection, and the workers themselves is essential. To the degree that it can use the nomination process to regulate the conduct of the woleswals district commander, the executive can use this position to extend the "government of relationships" to the local levels. The general consensus is that the system has been significantly impacted by provincial governors. The district governors themselves have access to resources and authority through little acts of corruption in the service industry or major acts of corruption in the drug trade or illegal detention centers. Many instances of District Governorships being "purchased" in areas where opium is produced or marketed have been reported.

These elements might also be to blame for how frequently the District Governorship appears to change hands. As the local division of the Ministry of Interior and the access point to services, the woleswal has so far been successful in projecting both his personal influence and the influence of the Provincial Governor. The movement and relocation of these governors between provinces has been a part of that strategy, which the administration has leveraged the office of Provincial Governor to encourage engagement from local power brokers in government. It is less commonly recognized that the District Governor position and the Chief of Police, the next most significant district-level position, function quite similarly. Due to this, woleswal title holders have seen considerable turnover, and changes frequently correspond with changes at the provincial level. (Nixon, April 2008).

All district officials questioned for this study had an average tenure of 26 months, but woleswals had an average tenure of only 8 months. With Chiefs of Police, a hardly distinct period was discovered. Judges and department heads may be exposed to different pressures during the selection process than department workers because they have held their posts for much longer than department staff. This section examines the differences between jobs involved in the "management of relationships" and those involved in the actual or hypothetical provision of services.

Statistics show that due to relationship politics or corruption, the positions of woleswal and police chief frequently change hands at the district level.

This is supported by research on Afghan local government based on qualitative observation in a number of provinces. A foreign official said that the District Governor and police chief positions in Nangarhar used as a tool to "form up the province according to ethnic tendencies."

In both Badakhshan and Faryab, the political commitment of the district governors—a crucial role at the district level—has been operating basically in the same manner. As a result, there has been a significant turnover of woleswal title holders, and changes frequently correspond with changes at the provincial level. (Saltmarshe, 2011).

All district officials questioned for this study had an average tenure of 26 months, but woleswals had an average tenure of only 8 months. With Police Chiefs, an essentially identical interval was discovered. Judges and department heads, on the other hand, remained in their positions for significantly longer lengths of time, suggesting that the appointment methods for woleswals and police chiefs may be subject to different pressures than the procedure for department workers. This reflects the distinction between positions involved in the "management of relationships" and those involved in the actual or imagined provision of services. The research's qualitative commentary in various provinces supports the data's conclusion that the woleswal and police chief positions frequently shift hands in reaction to relationship politics or corruption. The District Governor and police head positions in Nangarhar, according to a foreign official, were a mechanism to "carve up the province according to tribal tendencies." The political affiliation of the district governors in Badakhshan and Faryab shows that the distinction between the relationship between politics and other technical improvements is replicated at the district level, according to study on local administration in Afghanistan. This discovery has significant repercussions for the reform of public administration. Despite the fact that initiatives to implement technical transformation are increasingly being viewed from the perspective of service delivery, the District Governor continues to act as the district administration's gatekeeper. There have been attempts to thwart reforms meant to increase accountability in the selection procedure for these positions, as the World Bank highlights. Despite the fact that police, courts, and other line departments may go through transformations and perform better at providing their services, the effectiveness of any restructurings in changing the relationship between the state and society will obviously depend on how well access to services is controlled by the District Governor in many areas. The District Governor's role in conflict resolution is a good illustration of this dynamic.

District governors, like provincial governors, have important roles that highlight how difficult it is to pursue technical state-building and reform projects while also conducting a political assessment of governance through governors' offices. Any such change will be ineffective or even harmful if the subnational governance system is not defined in a comprehensive way.

Once more, it is clear that a subnational governance policy is necessary. However, there are still issues with district administration that are tied to this requirement for a framework. (Nixon, April 2008).

6.2.8 District governors, advisory shuras, commanders, and customary leaders

The woleswal organizes a special assembly known as a shura in numerous districts to gather direction and information on local issues as well as to issue instructions. The composition of these bodies and how they work can differ greatly. From them, four categories can be roughly derived.

Unstructured, political-party-based or commander-based: This consultative group was described as being highly unstructured in some regions, including one in Faryab, and made up of "important people" who only met when necessary. It was evident that the majority of people involved had ties to the province's two major political parties; in fact, a large number of them were local commanders of either Jamiat or Junbesh. Similar reactions are seen in Bamyan when the dominant political movement, Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami, has a provincial-level political shura. (Nixon, April 2008).

6.2.8.1 Arbab- or malik-based

In a few of the districts under study, the woleswal gathers authorized representatives of communities, sub-districts, or formally designated geographical sub-district zones. Four representatives from each of the eleven manteqa, or subdistrict divisions, that were acknowledged locally were placed on one woleswal's shura in Herat. Sometimes these representatives are the arbab or malik (elder) in a particular area, in which case they sit on the shura. For instance, the recognized maliks of each sub-district made constituted the shura in one Nangarhar district, while the district governor of one Faryab district regularly gathered the area's 331 arbabs in groups. (Nixon, April 2008).

6.2.8.2 Ulema-based

Other districts' woleswal advisory councils, like those in Bamyan, were predominantly composed of ulema. These shuras appeared to be used less frequently than the other groups indicated above and tended to focus on confrontations. Political shuras may occasionally join an ulema shura, as was previously indicated.

6.2.8.3 tribally-based

The advisory body in Paktia is made up of prominent male tribal leaders from the area. In the tribal regions of Paktia and Nangarhar, government relationships with tribal leaders are of a transactional nature; as a result of their support for the government, the government is required to reciprocate by providing them with corresponding support, which is allegedly lacking in Paktia's case regarding security and Nangarhar's case regarding opium cultivation.

Some district governors cited a combination of these categories in the make-up of their shura, despite the fact that these classifications may help in recognizing the range of district governance participants. The District Governor of one Herat district said that his advisory shura included ulema, commanders, and arbabs. Similar to how these organizations were changing during the research: The advisory shura was just recently established in one Herat district by the new woleswal, and several woleswals in Nangarhar reduced their reliance on only tribal elders in favor of a system in which maliks played a more prominent role following the change in provincial governor. (Nixon, April 2008).

The existence or Aside from their function in district-level advisory councils, armed commanders were a factor in district governance. The province of Faryab was the one of the six that was analyzed where the importance of local strongmen with guns was most noticeable. The woleswal, who was also the local commander in one district, made use of his position to exert influence outside of his official responsibilities by giving the local administration more sympathizers, for example. The local commander was running a separate, unlicensed prison system in another district against the will of the woleswal. With the assistance of the PRT soldiers, the woleswal had only sometimes been able to oppose this state of affairs. However, this was the only district among the incidents where a local commander was alleged to have consistently interfered with the woleswal's choices.

The woleswal claims that this type of advising shura has occasionally been supplanted by connections to other organizations, particularly NSP-CDCs. However, the District Governor in one Herat region had also given the CDC the stamp for vetting documents in place of the arbab, who had previously performed that responsibility. The most common encounter where this has happened is the referral of disputes to CDCs. In another Herat district, the woleswal had begun inviting CDC members to his advisory shura. Herat provided the best evidence of widespread understanding and legitimacy of CDCs, potentially indicating the potency of the NSP aiding

partners as mentioned.

6.2.8.4 Maliks and Qaryadars

Since the royal and republican eras up to 1979, the head of the village, or malik or qaryadar, has effectively served as the district administration's point of contact with the local population. These individuals served as de facto representatives of the federal government and, in former times, made a living as tax collectors. The word "malik" means "authority, possession, and rule" in Arabic, and the paradigm is based on the indirect form of rule that has historically predominated in the Muslim world. As well as their importance in relation to other actors, the functions, authority, and appointment of maliks appear to vary substantially at the moment. The phrase may denote obviously distinct structures in various locations because to the shifting historical evolution of local representation between tribal and non-tribal communities, as well as areas that are more or less in conflict. (Nixon, April 2008).

In three of the districts examined in Faryab and Badakhshan, local leaders and residents asserted that the maliks system had either been abolished or had completely disappeared. By contrast, in other locations, the malik continued to play a significant role in governing structures below the district. According to one woleswal in Nangarhar, maliks, or heads of villages, serve as the connection between the district government and the community.

In Nangarhar, out of all the research provinces, the maliks' function seems to be the most crucial. They participate in jirgas, represent families in marriage contracts, register births and marriages, and, according to one woleswal, because of their influence, they carry out development operations through NSP rather than CDCs. Maliks are usually chosen by communities, therefore it can be assumed that there is some connection between their status as one and that of a tribal leader, however additional research is necessary to determine this.

It was found that some of the maliks had been selected by their communities or had inherited the post through family members selected before the previous crisis. The system believed to be particularly important in the Nangarhar study districts, where district officials said that new maliks are only appointed with the approval of each family's head. The district advisory shura was the solution when two maliks competing for the same seat came to a deadlock, demonstrating the ongoing unification of maliks and district governance. (Nixon, April 2008).

The reach of a malik's influence also varied. The words "qaryadar" and "head of village," as in Badakhshan, were sometimes used alternately in these situations; they could be connected to a single hamlet or a small group of settlements. Other instances, like Nangarhar, involved district officials describing an established and acknowledged system of subdistricts known as places or manteqas, each with a certain number of head of village or maliks. Interlocutors in areas where maliks were prominent remarked that these individuals receive no financial support from the community or the government for their position. Respondents asserted that as a result, some maliks occasionally accept bribes or payoffs when they resolve disputes between parties engaged in conflict or when they give aid to communities through NGO programs. These authorities stated that "the government would be able to avoid corruption if they paid wages to maliks or head of villages."

The term "arbab" is used in certain of the provinces under investigation to describe powerful people within or among a number of communities. In some areas, there were little differences between an arbab and a malik, but generally speaking, the former was associated with authority earned by property ownership, which may or may not be associated with a role advocating for communities before local authorities. The introduction of structures like CDCs has been credited with reducing arbab influence in some regions.

The diverse ways that governance functions are set up below the district level suggest that state-building projects will probably have different results in different places. The outcomes of such an endeavor will vary, irrespective of the fact that it may be attractive to hunt for a general "model" for interactions between districts and lower layers of social structure. For instance, where CDCs have been implemented, the sub district engagements already in place influence how they interact with district governors. This remark also holds true for districts where District Development Assemblies have been set up in accordance with the National Area-Based Development Programme (NABDP), where it is possible to expect that the roles performed by these new institutions will be based on local sub-district practices.

In practice, townships with formal government authority are rarely overly targeted by district authorities, including governors and court representatives. Instead, they include communities in disputes or conflicts and rely on informal consultative structures to shape decisions in certain situations. This is backed by historical tendencies that date back to the nineteenth century, which show that a slight balance between formal and informal power is required to increase the reach of the state. As noted by Noelle-Karimi in the 1970s:

Technical changes undertaken at this level are probably constrained by political evaluations of local government made through the aforementioned informal institutions, or they may even take place at the same time. For information on the results of the National Solidarity Programme and how they relate to these local political issues, see Section 5.. (Nixon, April 2008).

6.2.9 Governors and “Contradictory State-Building”

The de facto and de jure responsibilities of province or district governors in Afghanistan are illustrated in the first two units. In their respective jurisdictions, they formally play a mostly harmonizing role with certain administrative accountabilities. A local representative of the national executive, they also broadcast or report on local happenings while disseminating decrees or other directives from the center.

The ambiguity surrounding the governors' true functions has been exacerbated by the fact that they have historically acted as both the legislative body for the Office of the President and the Ministry of the Interior, as well as a powerful figure during the twentieth century. Permanent oversight of police activities is also provided by provincial and district governors. The police statute states that governors "guide" the police at both levels, but a Ministry of Interior regulation forbids governors from overseeing operations at the "planned or operational level." However, the directive still holds governors responsible for carrying out or transmitting executive orders to the police commanders. (H. Nixon and R. Ponzio, (January 2007).

Therefore, a crucial element of formal subnational administration in Afghanistan is the construction of an administrative system with two faces—that of the governors' offices and that of the other departments of ministries. The World Bank claims that these two parties coexist in "systemic contradiction," rather than as a clear separation of powers that makes up a local government. One of the main features of that contradiction is how provincial governors play a role in district-level appointments, the creation of provincial development plans in the absence of a provincial budget, and the approval of local line department expenditures. The people involved's personalities and power structures mediate these roles. (H. Nixon and R. Ponzio, (January 2007).

The political change that is taking on in Afghanistan is comparable to this dual system. Change is primarily connected to the Interior Ministry and the Presidency through the governors' offices, and is hence associated to the hiring and firing of individuals as well as the

manipulation of interpersonal relationships. This strategy puts equal emphasis on tackling the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency issues that go along with creating or maintaining stability. An alternative technical sort of change known as institutional reform includes line ministries, endeavors to create representative bodies, and the large variety of global efforts to reform and restructure the public sector. (H. Nixon and R. Ponzio, (January 2007).

This twofold or dual system of "contradictory state-building" is a result of the historical role of governors as well as the rebirth since 2001 of both a short-term crisis-management strategy and a long-term state-building program. The immediate or real-time resolution of both of these strategies distorts the relationship between executive and representative authority and prevents the development of an effective, resource-rich formal system of subnational government. In August 2007, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance took over operation of governors' offices that had previously been under the Ministry of the Interior by presidential order. At the time this article was written, it was unclear what impact this significant structural transformation would have on the governors' offices' overall position within the framework of subnational government systems. Conflicts and misunderstanding will persist until the "government of relationships" and an institution-based state can be more peacefully coexisted.(H. Nixon and R. Ponzio, (January 2007).

Table 1. Actors and structures in community government, for instance

Actor/Structure	Other Names	Function/Meaning
<i>ashar</i>		Communal labour
<i>commander</i>	<i>qumandan</i>	Local leader with armed followers who draws authority from defence of community or participation in jihad or control of armed men.
<i>jirga</i>		Council that meets as problems arise to solve them. Problems range from disputes to maintenance of communal property.
<i>khan</i>	<i>zamindar, beg, arbab, sardar, nawab</i>	Large landowner who controls resources in the community; may provide jobs to labourers and land to sharecroppers; may also arbitrate conflicts
<i>malik</i>	<i>arbab, qaryadar</i>	Representative between community and government. Can resolve disputes; maintains communal property.
<i>mirab</i>	<i>khadadar, murab</i>	Controller of community water canal; responsible for maintenance of canals.
<i>rawaj</i>	<i>pashtunwali, madaniyat, ma'arifat</i>	Customary law
<i>rish-i-safid</i>	<i>oq soqol, malik-i-gozar, kalantar</i>	Leaders, generally male elders of neighbourhood organizations or tribal grouping. "White beards".
<i>sharia</i>	<i>shariat</i>	Islamic jurisprudence
<i>shura</i>	<i>jalasa</i>	Council, sometimes equivalent to <i>jirga</i> , sometimes with more persistent membership and ongoing governance roles rather than ad hoc problem solving.
<i>ulema</i>	<i>mullah, talib, sufi, mukhi, mukhiyani</i>	Religious leaders who lead prayers, give sermons, and have the power of moral judgment in the community; also involved in resolving conflicts from the point of view of sharia law.

6.2.10 District and Village Representation

As was mentioned in Part I above, there are several anomalies in the district and sub-district governance reform. On the one hand, the majority of national and foreign or international technocrats and politicians in Kabul today are focused on the higher layers of subnational governance, such as governors, provinces, PCs or province councils, and municipalities. However, it is obvious that there cannot be a meaningful rearrangement of subnational administration in the absence of a credible, thorough, or broad-based district and village representation. However, despite its significance, the technocrats creating the reform agenda have long resisted or disregarded the reorganization at the sub-district level. (Andrew Beath, 2015).

District and sub district government rearrangement has come up recently due to many events, most notably the President's obligation to carry out district-level elections and implement the Constitution's directives (see Part I, Section 3.2 above). As a result of the power-sharing

arrangement created between President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah, district and sub-district governance is now urgently in need of attention. According to this agreement, a constitutional Loya Jirga will be called in order to make meaningful and significant improvements to Afghanistan's democratic structure. However, this would only be possible once DCs have been established, as required by the Afghan Constitution, because their representatives would be needed to serve as Jirga delegates.(Andrew Beath, 2015).

There are various ways to create district councils, as discussed in the previous section. Some alternatives build on the existing sub-district-level structures, mostly maintaining the shura structure as is. Other proposals, such as implementing District Coordination Councils, would entail minor or major modifications to the current situation, while others, Afghanistan's sub-district governance would be radically altered by measures including electing wholly new Village and District Councils. Only a development-focused civil society group would retain the shura structure. Regardless matter the decision made, the issue of reorganizing sub-district governance cannot be ignored or disregarded. (Andrew Beath, 2015).

The selection of The sub-district governance model is far from insignificant because it will directly affect the lives of rural Afghans, who make up the majority of the nation's population. In order to aid in the discussion about the future of sub-district governance, Part II of this article on local governance in Afghanistan includes empirical findings from northeast Afghanistan that are relevant to the shura structure. We especially ask how the shura structure's procedures impact conclusions on the many facets of village and district governance. In two crucial respects, our empirical or experiential evidence diverges dramatically from past studies of the mechanisms underlying the shura structure. First, it evaluates the lowest level of the structure— i.e., CDCs—at a far later stage of development than other quantitative studies. For instance, the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), which built and funded the CDCs, was evaluated by Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov over a four-year period from 2007 (baseline) to 2011. (endline). The sampled CDCs had just one cycle of NSP money during this time. In contrast, our data was collected from 2010–11 (the baseline) through 2014–15. (endline) (Andrew Beath, 2015). Our sample of CDCs had been operating for a much longer period of time by the end of the study than in the aforementioned survey, which is likely to have had an effect on how institutionalized they were. By the time we crossed the finish line, the bulk of our CDCs had already finished or were in the process of submitting their applications for their second round of NSP financing. The second distinction is that our information particularly addresses

CLDCs and DDAs, which are upper levels of the shura structure. To our knowledge, this is the first dataset that analyzes these higher and evolved stages using extensive quantitative and qualitative study data. (Aarya Nijat, July 2016).

In the sections that follow, we first provide an explanation and description of the shura structure before discussing how it is seen by Afghan and international officials, practitioners, and academics. Then, using multivariate or different reversions, the association between more or less active CDCs and better or worse combined CDCs, on the one hand, and perceptions of village and district-level governance, on the other. The concept of "integration" refers to the connections and collaboration between CDCs and upper echelons of the shura system, particularly CLDCs and DDAs. We also look for any experiential impacts that are tied to the specific local setting (i.e., security situation, remoteness of the district). In the regression models, we account for other factors that could have an impact on governance (i.e., we statistically control for 21 variables that offer unconventional clarifications for the dissimilarities observed in our dependent governance variables). Third, we give a summary of our findings together with some early arguments in support of them. Finally, we provide references based on our empirical findings. (Nixon, April 2008).

Some interviewed questions participants.

Participant 1: The mujahiddin killed many educated people. With the coming of the Taliban in 1996 education was completely stopped until 2002. Our big problem is what the mullahs preach to our men. Those that let their daughters or sisters go to school are unable to go to the mosque because mullahs will publicly berate them. However, I go to work despite opposition from my husband and father-in-law

Participant 2: There is antagonism and discrimination against women by those in authority who do not want to see women take leading roles.

Participant 3: Where we do not agree with officials, we will vote against them because they do not do useful things. In the last election we voted blindly but now we have experience. We will vote for good and honest people.

Participant 2: Bashardost is a good person because he came here without gunmen.

Participant 1: We can't do anything against people with power and guns. Those with weapons

will win the next election too. It doesn't matter if we vote or not. One of our Wolesi Jirga representatives is Engineer Qarar, a big criminal from HIA. He takes peoples' land by force. He has many agents.

Participant 4: Our school is one of the best in Laghman but we don't have chairs, tables or carpets. All our classes are outside. The consequences of rain are that children do not come to school.

Participant 1: We are working under a lot of pressure from men. There is bigotry in the family and the village but poor security is the worst thing.

Participant 2: Justice is not good. If a woman has a case she will languish in jail. We do not have a safe house. Most issues are solved by the *jirga* in an unjust way.

Participant 3: Most of our problems are caused by our bad and irreligious culture. Our people don't accept human rights principles because they say these are unholy laws coming from the foreigner. But they don't act according to our religion either. I think gender and human rights workshops are more necessary for men than women.

Participant 1: Over the last three years we have an increasing number of female students. Even most *jihadis* send their daughters to school.

Participant 4: The number of women dying at childbirth is high because of male attitudes. Most women are not permitted to visit clinics because their husbands don't want them seen by male doctors. So most deliveries take place at home in an unclean environment.

CHAPTER SEVEN

LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEMOCRACY IN AFGHANISTAN

Local government democracy in Afghanistan is going to be assessed established on three factors such as; fiscal autonomy, administrative autonomy, and public participation (Medhi, June 2011).

7.1 Local Government Administrative Autonomy

Afghanistan is undoubtedly a unified nation. The provinces have relatively little say in official choices about their own organization, senior staff employment, foundation scale, and personnel composition. They are not legitimately separate bureaucratic bodies. Every province is essentially a collection of dispersed national state ministries. The home ministry makes all decisions on provincial employment units in Kabul, in consultation only with OAA, and under the supervision of the IARCSC's director. The governor has the authority to elect junior level staff recruitment and their transfers, but the relevant minister has the authority to recruit employees from categories 3 to 5, and the president appoints top executives (Evans, March, 2004). Provincial authorities have relatively little control over district employment allocations because Kabul's central government ministry sets them. While Kabul continues to have the legal capacity to appoint people in the aforementioned categories, this official authority is frequently circumvented in provinces with strong governors or provincial leaders. Many of the top officials in the militia- and commander-run provinces owe their positions and allegiances to local elites rather than the federal authority. For instance, all of the provincial governors in Herat were reported to hold their positions because they fought alongside the local warlord Ismail Khan during the jihad against the Soviet Union. (Evans, March, 2004). Warlords' control on provincial recruitment frequently hinders skilled and suitable officials and skilled workers from being appointed. A common issue has been the lack of qualified staff as well as the existence of significant numbers of unskilled former soldiers in public jobs. The existence of these problems since 2001 when the new democratic government was formed has been the fundamental issue and reason for corruption, slow local development process, most importantly it distanced the local people from the central government (Bank, April 1, 2004). The local officials were not working for the benefits of the nation but instead they were serving the interests of local warlords. The central government couldn't implement the policies and

projects in the local areas unless it had the agreement of the local warlords. This led the national government towards a total destruction.

7.1.2 Local Government Fiscal Autonomy

Both expenditures and income must be considered when assessing the fiscal connection between both the central government and local governments, or the level of financial centralization. Even outside of the national government, the only financial autonomy accessible in Afghanistan has been at the local level, and even that liberty is restricted. The distribution of revenues paints a more complete picture of financial decentralization. However, the funds remain in the municipality and are used to finance all local expenses. All income and charge rates are set in Kabul. While central government ministries and bodies are the principal budgeting entities with specific budgets mandated by law, provincial divisions of central government ministries are subsidiary financial entities that get allocations with the approval of the main financial body. Articles 8.2 and 8.3 of the Afghanistan Budgetary Law states as "local institutions of central government" are allowed to draft a plan that incorporates lending as a resource, but even this drafted plan must be reported to the central authorities as part of the budgeting process. Government-owned businesses, on the other hand, appear to be permitted to lend. Districts are lower secondary budgeting entities, making them much more reliant on government decisions; their financial allocations are determined by decisions taken by the Central departments' appropriate provincial level agencies. In Afghanistan, municipalities seem to be self-sustainable institutions that are accountable for supplying certain functions such as waste disposal, leisure, and parking services as well as accumulating modest income via local level service charges and commercial licensing participation (Evans, March, 2004). The fiscal autonomy in Afghanistan government is almost to nothing, every decision regarding the revenue and expenditure is taken in Kabul. Local officials are almost completely unauthorized in taking decisions regarding their provincial budgeting and expenditure. The only thing left for them is to send their proposals to the central authorities in Kabul, if accepted then only they can implement their projects and policies at their areas of jurisdiction. The only result of this approach has been to distance the country from the federal government. Due to the heavily centralized government structure, corrupt central government officials are able to abuse their positions of power and siphon off local governments' income. The only institutions that are relatively independent are the Municipalities. But they are revenue and expenditures are

strongly manipulated by the corrupt official and mayors elected by the central government (Evans, March, 2004).

7.1.3 People Participation in the Local Governance

Citizens' participation in political decision-making is a completely new phenomenon in Afghanistan, as people of this country have almost always been refused such a right. The new Constitution, on the other hand, has highlighted some of these issues by putting significant checks on the official's powers and also 2 layers of government: national and regional levels. Citizens must be at the core of decision making processes for public engagement to be effective. This is an essential part of democratization since the fundamental and basic principle of democracy is "government of the people." As a result, democratic countries define themselves by giving people the opportunity to make decisions that affect their lives. In reality, political participation necessitates citizens' effective participation in the county's public affairs. As a result, the quest to promote democratic participation in Afghanistan and make participation a key aspect in the administration of government issues has become a major subject in Afghanistan's governmental debates. Articles 6, and 35 of Afghanistan's new Constitution involve democratic values and public participation among some of the principles and values of governance in the country it also contains all state bodies and organizations, and also high - ranking officials, as a result of this, and in acknowledgement of prolonged struggles for political reforms in the preamble (Const, 2004). The development of democracy depends on allowing people the freedom to make political choices, especially during elections. This freedom of choice enables them to establish an accountable and receptive administration, whose term is regularly renewed based on how successfully it has carried out the will of the people. Residents will therefore obediently follow the law if the applicable authority applies it uniformly. The majority of the time throughout the history of the nation, the Afghan people have in fact been denied this privilege. The 2004 Constitution, on the other hand, marks a break with the past; it paves the way for a fresh start in many ways. It establishes a new governance framework and, in particular, a devolved form of government in which citizens can effectively engage in governance decision-making. As a result, in order to have a better future, all Afghan nationals must uphold the Constitution's essential democratic principles (Cookman, 2021). In Afghanistan the provincial governors are directly appointed by the President, they are central governments representatives in the local level. The governor nominates the district

administrators to the independent directorate of local government in Kabul, The IDLG then appoints the low-level officials, the high-level authorities' appointments need the president confirmation, and the president takes the final decision on appointment of them. In response to the question on how much influence do the people in Afghanistan have over the local authority's decision making process It can be said that the only local government body that is elected by the people are provincial councils. The provincial council members are proportional according to the population of the province. However, the provincial council are only advisory bodies and do not have any executive authorities. They can only provide advises to the local authorities (Evans, March, 2004). The provincial councils were created to be a channel between the people and authorities of the local government in Afghanistan. Not being able to make decisions on issues related to their people's lives is indeed limiting people's influence over the authorities to a lot extend. According to a survey conducted by democracy international, 76% of the Afghans showed willingness to vote and participate in the 2014 elections (A Survey of Public Perception on Elections and Civic Education Afghanistan, 2013). While according to another report 9.6 million voters registered their names in order to vote for 2019 presidential elections which shows a significant decrease in the number of voters compare to 2014 elections. This significant difference is due to lack of public solidification from the central government. The central authorities specially, the power circles in the Afghanistan presidential palace kept all of the power at their own hands and manipulated the power for years. This behavior distanced the people from the government Not being able to have a say in the decision-making process at the local level has itself persuaded the people on leaving the government side which empowered the Taliban movement which consequently led to the fall of the Afghan government at the hands of the Taliban (Cookman, 2021).

7.2 Reforms and Decentralization

Afghanistan is one of the most decentralized nations in the world on paper, but in reality it is also one of the most fragmented. This struggle has shaped much of Afghan history during the past century. The majority of Afghans have consistently lived far from the government's core, and the institutions and structures in place to exercise strict control have never been sufficient. The lack of inclusive, responsible administration continues to be a source of violence, and there are few viable solutions for governing Afghanistan's diverse community. Since the establishment of a democratic and independent Afghanistan, the state's building approach has been centralism. The Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan's 1998 Constitution preferred a highly

centralized governance with very little administrative or bureaucratic authority given to the local authorities. Now even after the Taliban regime Kabul appoints provincial administrators and senior ministry employees, and central ministries in Kabul determine local expenditures (Thier, 2020). The article 137th of the 2004 Constitution determines a highly centralized system of government but at the same time asks for the village, district and municipal mayors to be elected by the local people (Const., 2004). However, the municipal elections are yet to held. While it's agreed that decentralized system of government is neither in interests of Afghanistan, nor the country have the budget, capacity and logistics to form a decentralized system of governance at the moment. The government of Afghanistan has taken some practical steps and implement some reforms in order to improve the local governance in the country. The most important step in this regard is the establishment of the Independent Directorate of Local government. IDLG objectives comprise enhancing provincial structures, increasing transparency, providing opportunities for citizen involvement, and ensuring that local agencies actively participate in strengthening various service initiatives to promote the Afghan people's socioeconomic prosperity. Apart from the management of the provinces the IDLG is also responsible for middle and low level of employments of the local government authorities. It has taken a crucial step as a reform to engage the local people in the decision-making process by establishing people councils, such as provincial councils. The establishment of IDLG has helped the local governance in Afghanistan to a lot extend. Even though it couldn't completely vanish the nepotism in the staffing of the local officials and corruption in the expenditure of the local resources, it helped in decreasing the level of corruption, and nepotism. Afghanistan has historically had a central government on paper, but in fact none of the central governments have been able to implement their policies properly in local areas. The main reason for this was the local opposition, in which the tribes living in those areas were ideologically opposed to the central government's view of local programs made by a limited number of individuals. Centralized governance is a viable option in the current context for Afghanistan, but it can only succeed if it gives local governments more decision-making powers. The governors and mayors should be elected by the same people, and the provincial councils should have a decision-making role and be elected by the local people. The decentralized type of government in the current situation, although compatible with the structure of our multinational society, but its implementation requires several important things that we have lost due to years of war. First, it's in dire need of localization, with the exception of large cities and none of the provinces with a local structure and economy are sufficient to meet local needs of the local people in there. Which, in order to purify those needs, in some cases even provides the ground for the

intervention of foreign countries in Afghanistan. Secondly, we need experienced local cadres, which, unfortunately, Afghanistan is seriously facing a shortage of it. Third factor is logistics, which, from a structural point of view, none of the provinces have the logistic and resources in order to implement a decentralized type of government in there. Consequently, one can say that there is a need of a unitary government with some levels of decentralization. This could be done by giving the public assemblies such as provincial council's decision making authority rather than just an advisory role which they currently have (Thier, 2020).

7.3 Challenges and Solutions

After the invasion of Afghanistan by NATO in 2001 the Bonn agreement was concluded which determined a unitary form of government in Afghanistan that was led by a strong centralized government in Kabul. Hence, even after the 20 years of state building efforts by the western countries, Afghanistan is still counted to be one of weak countries in the world. There could be multiple reasons for this (Thier, 2020). However, the most important reason is their effort to build a westernized system of governance that was not compatible with the social and cultural structures of the Afghan society. As a result, Afghanistan local government system is facing some major challenges such as; Centralized authority, Lack of public participation, Warlords Bureaucracy and Professional inefficiency (Şahin, 2006).

7.3.1 Centralized Authority

Based on the state's constitution, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's government is organized into three branches—executive, legislative, and judicial—under the leadership of the president of the country. Afghanistan's current political leadership is a centralized presidency (Const., 2004). This type of political system is modeled after the centralized US presidential system of government with the elimination of the federal system, which in fact has been a new experience in Afghanistan in the last two decades. In a centralized presidential system, political power is unified and undivided, which controls both the whole country geographically under a single political center, and functionally concentrates political power in government institutions Hague and Harrop (Thier, 2020). Afghanistan was in a dire state following the demise of the Taliban and the installation of a new governmental system. The pace of change was quickening in Afghanistan, the wider region, and the entire world. The western powers were all in favor of a strong centralized state led by a powerful the president. The establishment of independent directorate of local government and one of the major developments in local government is the

introduction of the 2010 local government policy. However, in reality, local government officials do not hold a lot of authority. However, governors are directly answerable to the president and have broad authority. In the same way, the departments in the districts act as offices under the provincial administration. The main control over the resources and facilities related to the local sectors is at the hands of the ministries. Provincial councils have a limited amount of authority and are mostly answerable to the management of local organs. Despite all of this, Local Governance 2010 also outlines a strategy for outlining the role of local representation institutions and the transfer of authority from the center to the local, in order to meet the needs of the local populace. (Medhi, June 2011). The system of administration, which was directly copied from the western countries, has not been able to produce positive outcomes in Afghanistan and the reason for this is because it is not compatible with the social and economic conditions of this country. The centralized system of government has been the source of problems for the local institutions in Afghanistan. The whole power is at the hands of certain circles in the center. Everything is decided in the center and local authorities are not given adequate authorities to take decisions regarding the area of their jurisdiction. The authorities in the center have prioritized some provinces because of their ethnic connections with those provinces which has resulted in unequal distributions of funds and implementation of development projects. Additionally, due to corruption, some central government officials now use the civil service as a source of income. The civil service system, the cornerstone of public administration and bureaucracy, is therefore no longer sufficient to serve the local populace. (Thier, 2020).

7.3.2 Lack of Public participation and engagement

In Afghanistan the provincial governors are directly appointed by the President, who are central governments representatives in the local level. The governors nominate the district administrators to the independent directorate of local government in Kabul, The Independent directorate of the local government then appoints the low level officials, the high-level authorities' appointments need the president confirmation, the president takes the final decision on appointment of them. The only local government institution that are directly elected by the people are provincial councils. The provincial council members are proportional according to the population of the province (Nixon, April 2008). However, the provincial council are only advisory bodies and do not have any executive authorities. They can only provide advises to

the local authorities. The local populace is not actually involved in the local government's decision-making process. They play no significant part in the administrative procedure. Therefore, the Afghan local government system has an obvious need for various decentralization strategies. The absence of district and village councils that are enshrined in the Constitution and the inability to utilise existing structures present another significant obstacle. It is challenging to connect the planning of local development councils with the planning and allocation of resources at the big level because the budget planning processes are extremely centralized and there is a lack of genuine devolution of authority to the provinces or lower levels of government. Despite correspondence between local development council programs through districts and provinces to the center, the program planning at the community level has not yet been reflected in central planning and budgeting (Aarya Nijat, July 2016).

7.3.3 Warlords bureaucracy and Professional inefficiency

After the conquest or invasion of Afghanistan by the US led western alliance. The United States of America started a policy of integrating not state actors into the architecture of Afghanistan government, especially at the local government structure. These none state actors were none other than those warlords who fought against the soviets during the Afghan Jihad. Their engagement in the emergency Loya Jirga (Grand assembly of the people) in 2002 and taking part in the parliamentary elections in 2005 had undermined the credibility of the bureaucratic process in the country. Their Integration into the political process has added to their power and influence in the local areas. This has paved the way for the creation of power islands in the country which consequently limited the central government's power and influence in the local areas. For example, in the northern Afghanistan the governor of Balkh province Atta Mohammad Noor and in eastern Afghanistan the governor of Nangarhar province Gul Agha Sherzai, had the direct support of the coalition forces which made me them powerful enough to challenge central government authority in their areas (Nixon, April 2008). Whereas Kabul maintains the statutory ability to hire personnel of the local government, this official authority is regularly evaded in provinces having powerful governors or provincial leaders. Several top officials in provinces governed by militias and commanders owe their jobs, and thus their allegiances, to local elites instead of the national government. For instance, all of the provincial governors in Herat were reported to hold their positions because they fought alongside the local warlord Ismail Khan during the jihad against the Soviet Union. (Evans, March, 2004).

Warlords' control on provincial recruitment frequently hindered skilled and suitable officials and skilled workers from being appointed. This situation resulted in a significant lack of professional employees in the local level. The local officials were not performing their duties for the benefits of the nation but instead they were serving the interests of local warlords. The central government couldn't implement the policies and projects in the local areas unless it had the agreement of the local warlords (Nixon, April 2008). The ignorance of this issue by the central authorities created a distance between the government and local people. Consequently, leading towards the total breakdown of the government at the hands of Taliban group.



CONCLUSION

This research has done a comparative study of the local government systems in Afghanistan. Firstly, Local government systems of the mentioned country have been studied based on their concept, history, structure, reforms and decentralization, local government democracy and problems and solutions of the local government issues in this country. Second, by carefully examining each of the aforementioned issues separately, a comparative analysis of the local government in the aforementioned nation is offered in order to identify parallels and contrasts between the mentioned situations based on the pertinent issues. The idea of local government in Afghanistan has been discovered to be central government entities in the local districts that lack the authority and power to operate independently. While in the course of history of local government in Afghanistan have experienced heavily centralized government systems while being ruled by Mughals and Muslims. Therefore, they put the base of the decentralization in the country by improving the Panchayat system. On the other hand, in neighboring Afghanistan in order to protect his dominance the emir of that time Amir Abdul Rahman khan put the base of strong centralized government, this trend has unfortunately been continuing until now. The provincial general assembly is the decision-making authority of the local government in the province has been provided with relevant executive authority to decide on their own. In contrast Afghanistan the local government authorities are directly elected by the central government and are observed to under direct control of the central government. This do not have administrative and financial autonomy. While in Afghanistan the provincial council is the decision-making authority of the province. In terms of local government democracy, it has been illustrated that Afghanistan has a heavily centralized system of government and local institutions does not have decision making authority. An interesting fact about Afghan local government democracy is that mostly in this country the local warlords act as state bureaucrats which eventually undermine the central government dominance in the local areas. Unlike Afghanistan, has very decentralized form of government and the country has successfully amended its Constitution in order to provide the local authorities with the relevant authority to decide on their own. Fiscal autonomy is the second factor that has been investigated to examine the level local government democracy in the relevant cases. At the result of this it has been concluded that Afghanistan has heavily centralized government that controls every aspect of the local government affairs including the local government finances.

The central government decides on where to use the local budget and local authorities along with the provincial councils only advisory roles have. In Afghanistan meanwhile the villages

have not been given the required importance and at the same time the only elected local body which is provincial council has not been provided with the executive authority which resulted in extreme centralization and decreased the people engagement that had ultimately distanced the locals from the government. It is normal for every government to face challenges in their local administrative system but the efficiency of the approaches they take is factor to be focused on. Just like the rest of the Afghanistan has also faced several challenges. Afghanistan has always had the problems centralization of power, low level of local people participation and engagement and recently the country have faced the issue of warlord's bureaucracy on its way to implementing its local policies.



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
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


APPENDIXES


Appendix 1: Maps of Research Provinces

The Afghanistan Geodesy and Cartography Head Office directly sent the following maps to AREU. As a result, certain spellings on the maps are different from those in the original text. Although the maps' scales do not match, it is possible to determine their relative sizes by comparing them to the Afghanistan map showing their locations, which is the same size in each case.









Appendix 2: Profiles of considered Provinces

Day Kundi Province

Geographically, Day Kundi Province is bordered to the north by Bamiyan Province, to the north and west by Ghor, to the south by Uruzgan, to the southwest by Helmand, and to the east by Ghazni. Ashtarlai, Khedir, Kijran, Kiti, Miramor, Sang-i-Takht, and Shahrstan are its seven districts. The province capital is Nili. Population and tribal organization: Of Day Kundi's 424,100 predicted residents, 154, or 38,400, are Nili. The majority of the population is Hazara. The province's south is home to two minorities: Pashtuns and Baluchis.

In 2004, Day Kundi was separated from Uruzgan and awarded province status. The government granted Uruzgan Gizab, the biggest and most populous district in Day Kundi, in 2006. Sultan Ali Uruzgani, the provincial governor of Day Kundi at the time, contested the judgment. The situation is still unclear or unresolved. While Day Kundi handles the supply of additional health services and makes plans for pilgrims to be dispatched to Hajj, Uruzgan provides education and vaccinations in Gizab. Members of the Day Kundi Wolessi Jirga and the provincial council are chosen by the residents of the district. It is largely in Taliban hands. Due to its isolation, mountainous terrain, and chilly climate, Day Kundi is in a bad position for communications with Kabul. With the exception of two northern districts, Miramor and Shahrstan, it hasn't drawn much notice from the international community. Just in 2007, a UNAMA branch office was established. Azra Jafari, the country of Afghanistan's first female governor or mayor, is in charge of the municipality of Nili.

Security: Other than the two northern regions of Miramor and Shahrstan, there was no indication of governmental control. Arms reduction has not occurred in the west and northwest, and it was discovered that law and order were in the hands of commanders—two of whom had their own jails and one of whom was a member of the provincial council. The Kiti and Kijran communities in the south had assumed responsibility for their own security and routinely warded off Taliban attacks. The ANP received improvements to encourage them to fulfill their responsibilities. Militias have prevented them from abandoning their positions during recent strikes. Kandahar was the closest sizable city to which inhabitants in Day Kundi's south had access. Armed thieves and the Taliban, who controlled the road south through Helmand, attacked trucks and other vehicles.

The three main political groups in Day Kundi are Hizb-i-Wahadat (Khalili and Mohaqiq factions), Harakat-i-Islami, and Insijam-i-Milli. In 2009, Afghan Millat established a party office in Nili.

Education: Facility types and number in Day Kundi Province:

Facility Type	Primary	Secondary	High	Teacher Training Institute	Total
Number	96	177	104	1	318

Source: Interviews with Ministry of Education provincial and district line department heads

Health: Facility types and number in Day Kundi Province:

Facility Name	PH	DH	CHC	BHC	SC	MOB	Other	Total
Number	1	2	9	13	13	4	0	42

Source: Ministry of Public Health

Key: PH - Provincial Hospital; DH - District Hospital; CHC - Comprehensive Health Clinic; BHC - Basic Health Clinic; SC - Sub-Centre; MOB - Mobile Clinics.

Jawzjan Province

Geographically, Balkh to the east, Sar-i-Pul to the south, and Faryab to the south and west encompass Jawzjan. To the north is Turkmenistan. Aqcha, Darzab, Fayzabad, Khamyab, Khaniqa, Khwaja Du Koh, Mardyan, Mingajik, Qarqin, and Qush Tepa are its ten districts. The provincial capital is called Sheberghan.

Population and tribe or cultural organization: Jawzjan has a predicted or known population of 494,200.

Sheberghan is home to 155,600 of these individuals. Uzbeks and Turkmens make up the two largest tribal and ethnic groups in Jawzjan, with minor populations of Tajiks, Pashtuns, and Arabs following.

Overview of governance: Abdul Rashid Dostum, the leader of Junbesh-i-Milli, has dominated provincial politics in Jawzjan. Mohammad Aleem Saiee, the current provincial governor of Jawzjan, is a Junbesh member and a former Wolesi Jirga delegate.

Security: Over the past two years, Jawzjan's security situation has been worse, especially in the southern districts of Qush Tepa and Darzab. 2009 saw ongoing criminal activities from Sar-i-adjacent Pul's Sayyad District spreading into the two districts. Criminal organizations from Uzbekistan forged ties with the Taliban and maintained control of the region until 2010. Along the roadway that connects Sar-i-Pul and Sheberghan, unsatisfied rebel activity has increased dramatically recently. The best illustration of security organization was seen in the parts of Jawzjan that were under Uzbek and Turkmen control.

The qaryadar system, which designated a member of each village to speak on behalf of the village's security needs, was widely used. Along with the district police head, the qaryadar

would attend weekly meetings presided over by the district governor. This made it possible for information to travel both ways, which was crucial in establishing a secure environment. Qaryadars could purchase weapons and defended settlements. However, the system was unable to handle a growing number of cases occurring in the western districts of Aqcha, Mardyan, and Fayzabad, or to withstand the actions of armed Pashtun groups operating from Chahar Bolak in neighboring Balkh.

Political Parties: The most powerful party in the province is Jumbesh-i-Milli. Jamiat-i-Islami and HIA are other influential parties.

Education: Facility types and number in Jawzjan Province:

Facility Type	Primary	Secondary	High	Higher Education Institutions	Total
Number	102	111	83	2	298

Source: Interviews with Ministry of Education provincial and district line department heads

Health: Facility types and number in Jawzjan Province:

Facility Name	PH	DH	CHC	BHC	SC	MOB	Other	Total
Number	2	2	7	17	7	1	2	38

Source: Ministry of Public Health

Key: PH - Provincial Hospital; DH - District Hospital; CHC - Comprehensive Health Clinic; BHC - Basic Health Clinic; SC - Sub-Centre; MOB - Mobile Clinics.

Laghman Province

Geographically, Kabul and Kapisa to the west, Panjsher and Nuristan to the north, Kunar to the east, and Nangarhar to the south, encompass the province of Laghman. Alingar, Alishing, Dawlat Shah, and Qarghayi are its 4 districts. The province capital is Mehterlam.

Population and ethnic conformation or composition: Of the 410,300.156 estimated residents of Laghman, 128,800 are believed to reside in Mehtarlam. Tajik, Pashai, and Pashtun are the primary origins. There are also a few Kuchi and a tiny number of Nuristanis. The Alingar and Alishing rivers' side valleys are home to the Pashai.

Overview of governance: Mohammad Iqbal Azizi is the current provincial governor of Laghman. Former governors Gulab Mangal and Lutfullah Mashal are examples. Each of the districts was governed by Taliban supporters. The selection of local government representatives required their approval and assent.

Security: There has a history of conflict within the Taliban, HIA, and Jamiat between strong commanders. In the vicinity of Mehtarlam, security is ok. Along with the ANA, Laghman had a significant US PRT presence that helped to maintain security in and around Mehterlam, the

provincial capital, and the important routes leading to Alingar and Alishing. However, the Taliban and HIA militias controlled the side valleys in those two districts, making them unstable.

The troops had difficulties when attempting to reach the Dawlat Shah district in the north, which was under the authority of the Taliban and HIA. Taliban attacks were sporadic and targeted the main route from Kabul to Jalalabad, which passes through the southern region of Qarghayi. Locals by and large, Talib households frequently had members in both the Taliban and the police. In the previous five years, no police officers in Qarghayi had suffered any damage. In certain cases, the Taliban would alert the police chief of an impending attack to prevent casualties. There were mutual agreements in place. Additionally, there were rumors that Al Qaeda was present, with fighters coming from Pakistan and other nations. It was a big deal when Dr. Abdullah Laghmani, the NDS deputy director, was fired in 2009. He was claimed to have treated captured Talibs violently and cruelly before being killed by a suicide bomber. Emaduddeen Abdulrahimzai, a member of the HIA and a former provincial councillor, was one of the 23 individuals killed in the incident.

Political Parties: HIA and Afghan Millat are the two biggest parties in the province. Jamiat-i-Islami and Mahaz-i-Milli are two further parties with a presence, primarily in the north, which is populated by Tajiks and Pashais.

Education: Facility types and number in Laghman Province:

Facility Type	Primary	Secondary	High	Madrassa	Higher Ed. Institutions	Total
Number	68	95	88	12	2	265

Source: Interviews with Ministry of Education provincial and district line department heads

Health: Facility types and number in Laghman Province:

Facility Name	PH	DH	CHC	BHC	SC	MOB	Other	Total
Number	1	0	8	17	14	2	1	43

Source: Ministry of Public Health

Key: PH - Provincial Hospital; DH - District Hospital; CHC - Comprehensive Health Clinic; BHC - Basic Health Clinic; SC - Sub-Centre; MOB - Mobile Clinics.

Samangan Province

Geographically, Samangan is bounded to the north and west by Balkh, to the southwest by Sari-Pul, to the south by Bamiyan, and to the east by Baghlan. Dara-i-Suf Bala, Dara-i-Suf Poyeen, Feroz Nakhchir, Hazrat-i-Sultan, Khorram wa Sarbagh, and Roye Doab are its six districts. The province capital is Aybak.

Population and tribal ethnic makeup: 96,800 of Samangan's predicted 356,300,157 residents

are in Aybak. Geographical polarization is to a large extent. Tajiks reside in the east, Uzbeks in the northeast, and Hazaras in the south. Greater ethnic diversity and minor Pashtun and Turkmen groups can be found in the west. In the south, close to Bamiyan's border, live minorities like the Tatars and Habash.

Overview of governance: Since 2001, Samangan has had four governors, which is a good indicator of how much power struggles between national and local powerholders have influenced provincial appointments. Abdul Rashid Dostum is friends with the obligatory Khairullah Anush. In recent years, Ahmad Khan, an Uzbek leader who regularly switched allegiances, has been the most effective performer. He served in the Wolesi Jirga until 2010, however he was not reappointed to the new assembly.

Security: Samangan was largely peaceful at the outset of the study, with a small Taliban presence in nearby areas to Baghlan. The Roye Doab area in the south had little law enforcement and was frequently the scene of illicit activity. However, in 2010, it was evident that the military and government had not given the dissident action in Dara-i-Suf Poyeen and Dara-i-Suf Bala enough thought. The struggle for seats in the Wolesi Jirga election was thought to be the source of tension. Disgruntled individuals were turning to the Taliban, who were increasing their power by capitalizing on local concerns. In February 2011, more than twenty Taliban fighters disarmed in Dara-i-Suf Poyeen. Following protests over the Quran-burning event in the United States, the PRT signed an agreement with the provincial administration in April 2011 and was subsequently expelled from the province.

Political parties: The largest party in the province is Junbesh-i-Milli. Jamiat-i-Islami, Hizb-i-Wahadat (Khalili and Mohaqiq factions), Harakat-i-Islami, HIA, and Afghan Millat are additionally represented.

Education: Facility types and number in Samangan Province:

Facility Type	Primary	Secondary	High	Madrassa	Higher Ed. Institutions	Total
Number	89	108	24	7	2	231

Source: Interviews with Ministry of Education provincial and district line department heads

Health: Facility types and number in Samangan Province:

Facility Name	PH	DH	CHC	BHC	SC	MOB	Other	Total
Number	1	2	5	14	11	2	0	35

Source: Ministry of Public Health

Key: PH – Provincial Hospital; DH – District Hospital; CHC – Comprehensive Health Clinic; BHC – Basic Health Clinic; SC – Sub-Centre; MOB – Mobile Clinics.

Sar-i-Pul Province

Geographically, Jawzjan and Faryab to the north and northwest, Ghor and Bamiyan to the south, and Samangan to the east, encircle Sar-i-Pul. Balkhab, Gosfandi, Kohistanat, Sayyad, Sozma Qala, and Sangcharak are its six (6) districts. Provincial government is based in Sar-i-Pul Town.

Population confirmation and ethnic composition: 514,100 people are expected to dwell in Sar-i-Pul; 145,500 of them reside in Sar-i-Pul Town. The Uzbeks are the largest ethnic group, followed by the Hazaras, Tajiks, Aimaqs, and Pashtuns. Aimaqs live in the south and southwest, Hazaras in the south and southeast, Tajiks in the east, and Uzbeks and Pashtuns mostly in the north.

Overview of the governance: Sar-i-Pul has had five governors since 2001. Taj Mohammad Kohi, the original and a supporter of Dostum, was replaced by Abdul Shafaq by Karzai in 2004. Dostum and Kohi both had a significant reaction to this assignment. Khalili and the current mandatory, Sayyid Anwar Rahmati, are close friends.

Security: There have been tensions and clashes between influential local characters in Sar-i-Pul in the past, most notably factional fighting between Dostum and Atta Mohammad Noor in the years after the Taliban. After 2005, pressures and tensions reduced. However, security in Sar-i-Pul has significantly declined in 2010 along with many other regions of Afghanistan. A small group of Sayyad District criminals engaged in the trafficking of drugs and weapons have been able to quickly expand their operations to take control of the majority of the district and establish contacts with the Taliban. In the late spring of 2010, as US-led anti-Taliban operations were launched in Baghlan, Taliban insurgents sought refuge with the outlaw organization operating from Sayyad District. The projected route connecting Sheberghan and Sar-i-Pul was afterwards the target of an increasing number of incidents or cases. According to reports, Kohistanat's status was deteriorating due to a dearth of employment options. The provincial center has a modest Swedish PRT.

Political parties: In the province, Jamiat-i-Islami, Hizb-i-Wahadat, and Junbesh-i-Milli are the three biggest political groups (Khalili and Mohaqiq factions). Afghan Millat and Eqtedar-i-Milli are also present.

Education: Facility types and number in Sar-i-Pul Province:

Facility Type	Primary	Secondary	High	Madrassa	Higher Ed. Institutions	Total
Number	143	143	30	10	3	329

Source: Interviews with Ministry of Education provincial and district line department heads

Health: Facility types and number in Sar-i-Pul Province:

Facility Name	PH	DH	CHC	BHC	SC	MOB	Other	Total
Number	1	2	8	17	21	1	0	50

Source: Ministry of Public Health

Key: PH – Provincial Hospital; DH – District Hospital; CHC – Comprehensive Health Clinic; BHC – Basic Health Clinic; SC – Sub-Centre; MOB – Mobile Clinics.

Wardak Province

Geographically, Bamiyan surrounds Wardak on three sides, Parwan and Kabul on the other, Logar to the east, and Ghazni to the south. Chak, Dai Mirdad, Hisai-Awali Behsud, Jaghatu, 160 Jalrez, Markaz-i-Behsud, Nerkh, and Saydabad are its eight districts. Capital of the province is Maidan Shahr.

Population, ethnic makeup, and structure: There are likely 549,200 people living in Wardak. 37,900 of these 161 people reside in Maidan Shahr. The Pashtuns are the dominant ethnic group. The Hazaras, who make up the second largest ethnic group, are concentrated in the districts of Markaz-i-Behsud and Hisa-i-Awali Behsud. Small populations of Tajiks and Qizilbash are present.

Overview of governance: Mohammad Haleem Fidai is the current provincial governor of Wardak. In 2008, he took over for Abdul Jabbar Naeemi.

Security: The Pashtun districts of Wardak were excellently under Taliban control, with the exception of major population centers. As soon as the Taliban gained control of a district, they intended to take over the administration of justice. First, justice was strictly upheld; afterwards, at intervals, additional inhumane exemplary methods were used against people who were thought to have committed crimes. Government representatives were only allowed to operate out of their district centers, which were regularly abandoned. The two Behsud districts, which are largely Hazara, had strong security, though. Conflicts between the Kuchis, whose land rights are documented, and the Hazara populations have occurred in these two districts. Abdur Rahman granted the privileges in the late 19th century as part of his victory against Hazara resistance. Since then, Kuchi has continued to exercise its grazing rights and to lease land to Hazaras, but there have been disagreements and fights on occasion. When the issue resurfaced

in 2010, some Pashtuns said Hazara leaders were to blame because they were attempting to gain political capital and reclaim former Hazara territory.

Political parties: In the province, HIA is the dominant party. In the Hazara-populated north, Hizb-i-Wahadat (Khalili and Mohaqiq groups) is influential.

Education: Facility types and number in Wardak Province:

Facility Type	Primary	Secondary	High	Madrassa	Higher Ed. Institutions	Total
Number	175	95	75	19	6	370

Source: Interviews with Ministry of Education provincial and district line department heads

Health: Facility types and number in Wardak Province:

Facility Type	PH	DH	CHC	BHC	SC	MOB	Other	Total
Number	1	3	9	25	18	1	2	59

Source: Ministry of Public Health

Key: PH – Provincial Hospital; DH – District Hospital; CHC – Comprehensive Health Clinic; BHC – Basic Health Clinic; SC – Sub-Centre; MOB – Mobile Clinics.

Appendix 3: Division of Line Ministry Responsibilities

	MoPH	MoE	MAIL	MRRD
Central	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Developing strategies and action plans Appointing service providers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Developing strategies and action plans Appointing staff from grades 1 to 5 Revising curriculum Procuring materials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Developing strategies and action plans Appointing staff from grades 1 to 5 Funding of salaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Developing strategies and action plans Appointing staff from grades 1 to 5 Funding of salaries
Provincial	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Developing provincial plan Disbursing salaries Coordinating with service providers Collecting Health Management Information System (HMIS) data from all provincial and district health facilities Evaluating district health facilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Developing provincial plans Appointing staff lower than grade 6 Disbursing salaries Inspecting schools Distributing materials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Developing provincial plans Appointing staff lower than grade 6 Disbursing salaries Managing activities of MAIL departments in province and districts Managing lease and rent from public and private land Coordinating with INGOs and NGOs working in agricultural sector 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Developing provincial plans Appointing staff lower than grade 6 Disbursing salaries Managing MRRD programmes in province and districts Conducting trainings through Afghanistan Institute for Rural Development and in association with NGOs Coordinating with NGO FPs Monitoring and evaluating development projects
District	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring health delivery Training of community health workers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identifying sites for construction of schools Recruiting teachers and evaluating teacher performance Inspecting schools Distributing materials Liaising with education shuras and leading awareness campaigns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Distributing seeds and fertilisers Demonstrating farming techniques Collecting information on annual district produce Publicising lands available for lease and collecting land tax Setting up agricultural cooperatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assisting NSP FPs in constitution of CDCs Liaising with CDCs and assisting them in prioritising projects Identification of community demands for NSP projects Monitoring and evaluating NSP projects Managing NABDP

Curriculum Vitae

Personal information:

Name: Rahimullah

Surname: Akbarzai

Professional Summary:

A passionate and committed postgraduate MA student with a master's in political science and public administration, who is ready to put in his heart and mind absolutely in his future endeavors, I have also managed to maintain a good academic performance.

Education

➤ Completed Secondary education in Sarban high school Khost Province Afghanistan in 2013.

➤ Sharda University, India

August 2014 – May 2019

BA – LLB Five Years (Integrated Bachelors in Arts and Law)

- Acquired a 1st division degree with a CGPA of 6.730(out of 10.000)

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Student Internship

District Court Saket, Delhi

January 2019 – May 2019

Student Internship

- Prepare drafts and conducted research on sundry civil cases
- Performed research and analysis on different criminal and civil cases followed by a briefing of the research to the senior Counsel

- Performed research and analysis on different criminal and civil cases followed by a briefing of the research to the senior Counsel
- Incumbent upon me to keep a track of dates and times of hearings of the cases
- Exposed to the intense competition that prevails in the legal industry along with persistent hard work which is imperative to sustain in such competition
- Opportunity to attend the proceedings of landmark cases

Achievements:

- Improved efficiency of research by meticulous documentation of precedents.
- Started MA (political science and public administration) in Istanbul gelisim University located in aviclar Istanbul turkey from 24 February 2020 completed my all theory classes and examination successfully currently working on my thesis proposal.

ADDITIONAL SKILLS AND ACHIEVEMENTS:

- Presented a paper on “Analysis impact of Uniform Civil Code on personal laws reference to triple talaq” at Sharda university
- Presented a paper on “‘Problem of Juvenile Justice System in India’ at Sharda University
- Participated in Research Paper Competition organized by school of law, Sharda University. The presented paper titled “Constitutional Integration of Jammu & Kashmir
- Participated in Model United Nations as Delegate of Burkina Faso in United Nations Commission on status of women held at Delhi Metropolitan Education on 5-6 November 2016
- Participated in Model United Nations as Delegate of Greece in United Nations Human Rights Council held at Sharda University on 4-5 February 2017
- Completed CEL (certificate of English language) from Kardan English language Institute 2012.
- Completed DEL (Diploma in the English language) from Kardan English language Institute from May December 2013.

Volunteering experience:

- Participated in legal aid programs conducted for people in rural areas to increase their awareness in legal rights

Training:

- DEL (Diploma of English language) at IQRA institute of modern studies from May-2019 until Aug-2019 Kabul Afghanistan.
- Word PowerPoint excel computer program at Aryob Oxford private high school from Sep-2019 until Oct-2019 Kabul Afghanistan beside that taught Oxford system school subjects to the student.

Languages, Native Language: Pashto:

Language	Speaking	Reading	Writing	Understanding
Pashto	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
Dari	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
English	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
Urdu	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
Hindi	Excellent	Not good	Not good	Excellent
Panjabi	Good	Not good	Not good	Good
Persian IR	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
Turkish	Good	Good	Not good	Excellent