

**REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
ISTANBUL GELISIM UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES**

Department of Political Science and Public Administration

**INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE
LAKE CHAD BASIN REGION TO FIGHT TERRORISM:
ROLES AND EFFECTS**

Master Thesis

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Supervisor

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Istanbul – 2022

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that in the preparation of this thesis, scientific ethical rules have been followed, the works of other persons have been referenced in accordance with the scientific norms if used, there is no falsification in the used data, any part of the thesis has not been submitted to this university or any other university as another thesis.

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SUMMARY

The Boko Haram insurgency in Lake Chad Region has gradually evolved into a complex regional catastrophe as many lives have been taken, properties worth billions of dollars have been destroyed, and destitution has increased in the immediate vicinity of Lake Chad, escalating tensions in other areas. Despite the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force, the killings and destructions continued. Thus, a crucial question had to be queried: What have been the roles and effects of MNJTF in the LCR, especially with the continuing and seemingly unpreventable terrorist attacks? Neoliberalism (Institutional Liberalism) is being used to investigate the issue. As a result, this research looked into the extent of international military cooperation between the Joint Task Force and the respective governments of LCR, as well as providing a variety of critical perspectives on security studies, covering a wide range of theoretical subjects from economic to political.

The study looked at the complexity of theater (LCR) of the war against terrorists as a major concern, as well as poor coordination among various military forces, political and economic restraints, and pertinent recommendations based on the findings. The role of the Civilian Joint Task Force, its flaws, and how these flaws could be exploited are also reviewed. On the one side, this research looked at the link between government policies and terrorism, as well as how a lack of socioeconomic and political frameworks in the LCR encouraged the spirit of terrorism. The role of humanitarian organizations, intergovernmental entities, and international organizations in combating terrorist groups or mitigating the impact of subsequent assaults on the public is examined in this piece of work.

Key Words: International Military Cooperation, Multinational Joint Task Force, the War, Terrorism, Civilian Joint Task Force, Intergovernmental

ÖZET

Çad Gölü Bölgesi'ndeki Boko Haram isyanı, birçok canın alınması, milyarlarca dolarlık mülkün yok edilmesi ve Çad Gölü'nün yakın çevresinde kıtlığın artması ve diğer bölgelerde gerilimi tırmandırması nedeniyle yavaş yavaş karmaşık bir bölgesel felakete dönüştü. Çokuluslu Müşterek Görev Gücü'nün faaliyetlerine rağmen cinayetler ve yıkımlar devam etti. Bu nedenle, can alıcı bir soru sorulması gerekiyordu: MNJTF'nin LCR'deki rolleri ve etkileri, özellikle de devam eden ve görünüşte önlenemez terörist saldırılarla birlikte neler oldu? Konuyu araştırmak için neoliberalizm (Kurumsal Liberalizm) kullanılmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, bu araştırma, Müşterek Görev Gücü ile LCR'nin ilgili hükümetleri arasındaki uluslararası askeri işbirliğinin kapsamını incelemenin yanı sıra, ekonomikten siyasete kadar geniş bir teorik konuyu kapsayan güvenlik çalışmaları hakkında çeşitli eleştirel bakış açıları sağladı. .

Çalışma, önemli bir endişe olarak teröristlere karşı savaşın tiyatrosunun (LCR) karmaşıklığına ve ayrıca çeşitli askeri güçler arasındaki zayıf koordinasyona, siyasi ve ekonomik kısıtlamalara ve bulgulara dayalı ilgili önerilere baktı. Sivil Ortak Görev Gücü'nün rolü, kusurları ve bu kusurlardan nasıl yararlanılabileceği de gözden geçirilmektedir. Bir yandan, bu araştırma hükümet politikaları ile terörizm arasındaki bağlantıya ve ayrıca LCR'deki sosyoekonomik ve politik çerçevelerin eksikliğinin terörizmin ruhunu nasıl teşvik ettiğine baktı. İnsani yardım kuruluşlarının, hükümetler arası kuruluşların ve uluslararası kuruluşların terör gruplarıyla mücadelede veya müteakip saldırıların halk üzerindeki etkisini azaltmadaki rolü bu çalışmada incelenmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Bölgesel Felaket, Uluslararası Askeri İşbirliği, Çokuluslu Ortak Görev Gücü, Neoliberalizm, Güvenlik Çalışmaları, Savaş Alanı, Terörizm, Sivil Ortak Görev Gücü, Sosyoekonomik, İnsani, Hükümetlerarası

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ABBREVIATIONS

AD	:	After the Death.
AfDB	:	Africa Development Bank.
AO	:	Area of Operation.
APSA	:	African Peace and Security Architecture.
AU	:	African Union.
AUC	:	African Union Commission.
BC	:	Before Christ.
CBLT	:	Commission du Bassin du Lac Tchad.
CIMIC	:	Civil-Military Co-operation.
CJTF	:	Civil Joint Task Force.
CNN	:	Cable News Network.
COIN	:	Counter-Insurgency
DNA	:	Deoxyribonucleic Acid.
DSO	:	Domestic Support Operations.
EARTH	:	Exploring Alternative Realpolitik Theses.
ECCAS	:	Economic Community of Central African States.
ECJ	:	European Court of Justice.
ECOWAS	:	Economic Community of West African States.
ES	:	Executive Secretary.
EU	:	European Union.
EUTF	:	European Union Trust Fund.
FACT	:	Front for Change and Concord in Chad.
FC	:	Force Commander.
FHA	:	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.
GEF	:	Global Environment Facility.
ICC	:	International Criminal Court.
ICJ	:	International Court of Justice.
ICT	:	Information and Communication Technology.
IDA	:	International Development Association.
IDP	:	Internally Displaced Individuals.

IGO	:	International Intergovernmental Organizations.
INSO	:	International NGO Safety Organization.
IPOB	:	Indigenous People of Biafra.
IS	:	Islamic State.
ISIS	:	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISWA	:	Islamic State in West Africa.
ISWAP	:	Islamic State in West Africa Province.
JAS	:	Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād
JF-G5S	:	Joint Force of the Sahel.
LCB	:	Lake Chad Basin.
LCBC	:	Lake Chad Basin Commission.
LCBR	:	Lake Chad Basin Region.
LCBRGs	:	Lake Chad Basin Region Governments.
LCR	:	Lake Chad Region.
MNJSF	:	Multinational Joint Security Force.
MNJTF	:	Multinational Joint Taskforce.
MNLA	:	Malaya, the Malayan National Liberation Army
NATO	:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
OEF	:	Operation Enduring Freedom.
PSC	:	Peace and Security Council.
R&D	:	Research and Development.
RCT	:	Rational Choice Theory.
RSF	:	Regional Stabilization Facility.
SALW	:	Small Arms and Light Weapons
StratCom	:	Strategic Communication.
TCC	:	Troops Contributing Countries
UK	:	The United Kingdom.
UNDP	:	United Nations Development Programme.
UNHCR	:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
UNSC	:	United Nations Security Council
USA	:	The United States of America.
WFP	:	World Food Programme.

WHO : World Health Organization
WTO : World Trade Organization.
WW : World War



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CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND OF STUDY

1.1. Introduction

The rapid disappearance of Lake Chad which used to be one of Africa's principal freshwater basins and a means to the survival of millions of people living in its immediate area had far-reaching consequences for these people's lives. Leon (2019) observed the news in the Chad Basin's one-of-a-kind and intricate humanitarian disaster, which is among the world's worst; terrorism, herders and farmers, lake drying, reintegration of displaced people, hunger and poverty; agriculture, livestock, and fisheries account for 80-90 percent of Lake Chad's livelihood. Due to the prolonged drought and desertification of the Lake, inflows into the lake have diminished, and the lake's surface area has shrunk from 25,000 km² in the 1960s to 2500 km² in recent years. The entire ecosystem of the enlarged lake was destabilized due to the growing human strain on the decreasing lake (Jauro, 1998).

In 1964, the LCBC was founded to control and plan the use of water and other natural resources in the region, among other things, as part of Africa's wave of independence. The commission's original members were Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. It began as a regional stabilization plan; an intergovernmental organization that oversees the basin's use of water and other natural resources (Dumont, 1992). Sarch and Birkett (2000) demonstrated that regulations are exceedingly convoluted and haphazardly administered, with misunderstanding over-regulation and taxation among several administrative entities. Despite the establishment of the LCBC, the region is beset by a slew of vices and unrest, owing to the LCBC's weak capacity to uphold its purpose and the contributing States' administrative problems. Overgrazing and illegal irrigation activities have resulted in aggressive plant species displacing indigenous flora, transforming Lake Chad from a water spring in the desert to a desert.

Since the beginning of the BH insurgency in northeastern Nigeria in 2009, the Lake Chad Basin has gradually evolved into a complex regional catastrophe. The area, which is plagued by insecurity, is around the borders of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Thus, this study will be based on a well-established study subject that examines the social consequences of insecurity in nation-building. The study looks at

how terrorism and other forms of insecurity interact with the framework of government policy formulation and execution, leading to erroneous ways of combating the epidemic.

This issue will be addressed by examining the understanding case of the LCR, which includes Cameroon, the Chad Republic, the Niger Republic, and Nigeria. From historical times to the twenty-first century, this region has a particularly unique feature as one of the great lakes in Central Africa and its geographical significance in the Sahel zone; culturally, socially, politically, and commercially.

This study is chiefly concerned due to the substantial risk it poses to unity, peace, and progress in the region. Non-state armed groups have exploited porous borders, and security measures (or the lack thereof) have contributed to local communities' alienation, culminating in a progressive escalation and geographic expansion of violence. Countries in this region are major regional players, with the largest and fastest-growing economy in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as, the countries that thrive on their natural and human capital resources, however, manifold armed rebellions with corresponding local grievances, as well as transnational intense extremism, are involved in the unrest, which had made the region inhabitable. While there is a global concern with the links between terrorism, conflicts, and harm to indigenous and vulnerable groups, this region presents a particularly serious but understudied situation. This study would look into this issue because the region, in particular, has had a long history of conflict.

1.2. Statement of Problem

It calls for greater concern as countries in the Lake Chad Basin are currently facing various internal threats from terrorist and insurgency groups at some other points, they work in synergy as an organized crime to carry out unlawful attacks across borders. The incessant actions of Boko Haram and banditry in Nigeria have nearly brought the country to its knees. Republic of Chad's President Idris Deby dies after clashes on the frontlines combat against some rebels, soldiers from the Libyan-based Front for Change, and Concord in Chad, a group created by dissident army officers, in the Chad Republic on April 19, 2021. Cameroon is taking a beating as a result of the

never-ending conflict between the North and the South. The terror strikes by Boko Haram have not spared the Niger Republic.

The interdependence of these aforementioned countries and the endless actions of the deadly rebel groups has in no small measure called for an immediate approach to quench or in totality crash their spread. Oyewole (2015) noted that the majority of Boko Haram's members are recruited in Cameroon, the Chad Republic, the Niger Republic, and Nigeria (LCR). From the abovementioned, the governments of these countries have hugely undermined the role of formidable military cooperation to subdue the activities of these groups but what is obtainable is predominantly the use of conventional ways of divided military actions.

1.3. Purpose of Study

The primary goal of this research is to address concerns and questions that have been the subject of security studies in the LCBR. This research aims to provide a variety of critical viewpoints on security studies, addressing a wide range of theoretical topics spanning from economic to political. Second, this research looks into the spread of advanced weapons into the hands of terrorist organizations. This research is motivated in part by a desire to present technical warfare/military expertise to complement the valuable contributions already made.

In this study, the focus of the terror activities around the LCBR is eminent because it demonstrates the need to understudy how the spread of the activities of terrorism and insurgency are interconnected among these countries if done otherwise it would be a half-baked effort, no matter how deep is such research. The process of studying the terror attacks independently of the individual countries in this region has fueled the increase and uncontrollable dispense of terror by these sects.

The goal of this study is to figure out how to eliminate terror groups' operations or dominance in the LCBR by enlisting the help of the affected countries' collective or joint military cooperation to gain overwhelming control and deploy both human resources and adequate military equipment to dislodge the terrorists. Countries in this zone exhibiting their military power unilaterally over terrorist groups has had little or no effect over time, therefore elucidating the findings from this study would be of considerable interest.

A more important area of interest is the need to embrace the use of most recent technology from ICT to artillery in combating the spread and networks of these deadly sects and to define the existing cooperation among the military forces in the region and subsequently make recommendations where necessary. Thus, this work will examine the need for a full synergy among countries (also, CJTF) of the LCBR to advance the technological know-how of the operatives facing the terror groups. Using government timely intervention to demonstrate the ideals of the fourth industrial revolution mechanism to root out the terrorists from their hideouts.

1.4. Significance of Study

Significantly, policymakers the armed forces, researchers, academics, students, interested readers, and other institutions, as well as the immediate and extended nations, are expected to profit from the study in the following ways: It will aid policymakers at all the levels of government (locally and internationally) in developing policies on the many operational patterns of approach in dealing with ongoing terror attacks, particularly given the intricacies of the various countries surrounding the Lake Chad Region.

A number of donor agencies, companies, institutions, and individuals interested in the topic of terror attacks in the Lake Chad region would be interested in this study, whether national or international, especially those ready to contribute to military development. The research would help the military forces and respective national interests of the selected countries, as well as other members of the public. This is because the study would reveal the armed forces' strengths and deficiencies, and then recommendations for future actions would be made by both the staff, officials, and the general public, whose interests have been thwarted by the terrorist groups' onslaught.

Furthermore, the research's findings will go a long way towards providing a long-term solution to the region's persistent dilemma of terror attacks and the maintenance of relative peace, as it will examine the gray regions of terrorist operations. Researchers, scholars, students, interested readers, and other organizations might find the conclusions of this study beneficial in doing additional research in the domain of international armed forces cooperation to combat operations of both local and international coordinated terror attacks. It would also serve as a source of reference

by adding to our knowledge and understanding of the concept, nature, operational patterns, strengths, and weaknesses of military methods to terrorism that have not before been addressed.

1.5. Research Questions

The goal of a research or researcher project is to answer a research question. Every study is prepared to answer one or more questions, independent of the methodological instrument (s) used to collect data. As part of the inquiry, data collection and analysis will be required, and the methods used to do so will differ substantially. Good research questions are narrowly focused and specialized, with the goal of improving knowledge in a certain field (Mattick, Johnston and de la Croix, 2018). *Therefore, the questions of this research aimed to answer include the following:*

1. How efficient is conventional armament in battling insurgency and terrorism in the LCBR?
2. What are the roles and effects of international military cooperation in the region under consideration in general?
3. What is the common man's military capacity (understanding) in this region?
4. How frequently are the military's tools, ranging from air combat equipment to information technology, thoroughly reviewed?
5. How important are governmental policies, implementation standards, and efficiency in combating terrorism in the region under consideration?
6. Are there any inward-looking choices for acquiring new technological equipment through R&D, ingenuity, and development?

1.6. Research Hypothesis.

To address these challenges and the worries that result from them, this study begins with the following hypothesis:

Hi: Military cooperation amongst nation-states in the affected zone should exert hegemony over terrorist groups.

H₀₁: The activities of terrorist organizations proliferate due to the lack of cooperation between governments.

H₂: Instead of over-reliance on merely conventional measures, ICT is a catalyst to promote terrorist operations.

H₀₂: Terrorist groups' operations are hampered when military operations are well-coordinated and equipped with the requisite modern equipment.

H₃: Terrorist organizations' strength is lessened as youths become increasingly involved in security design.

H₀₃: As more youths are persuaded and affected by terrorist organizations, their actions become more intense.

1.7. Theoretical Framework

According to Powell (1994), neoliberalism is one of the two most important current approaches to international affairs. Neoliberal institutionalism (derived from the early work of Liberal Scholars in International Relations) is a method of studying basic concepts in international relations that claims that international cooperation between states is feasible and supportable and that such cooperation can help to eliminate conflict and disagreement. Liberal Institutionalists stress the importance of international institutions and regimes in supporting state collaboration, claiming that cooperation is viable and long-term, with prospects for growth and mutual advantages for all parties involved (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). Neoliberal institutions increase the cost of non-compliance by lowering operation expenses, gathering information, raising obligation integrity, constructing strongholds, supporting the standard of mutuality, stretching the future path, and ensuring harmonization of the agenda (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Poast, 2012).

However, liberal institutionalists have ignored several crucial concerns in international relations; for example, overcoming power politics has become a central issue since institutions reflect power politics. Neoliberalists overlook the fact that states want relative gains rather than absolute gain, which frequently conflicts with their international obligations, and this is a major reason why international cooperation fails. It is not always obvious if institutions have an independent effect on collaboration or whether they reflect a willingness to collaborate and conform among its members. This approach undervalues institutions' implementation and administrative powers: institutions are frequently meant to be weak in order to attract more members, and they

are particularly weak on matters of security rather than economics (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1996; Downs, Rocke and Lipson, 1984; Grieco, 1988; Mearsheimer, 1994; Von Stein, 2005).

This study seeks to fill in this gap, relying on Neoliberalist viewpoints to address the necessity for international collaboration to combat non-state actors' rebellious acts, which have resulted in long-term social, economic, and political sabotage in the Lake Chad region. The rationale for military cooperation across the borders of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria to effectively put an end to the spate of terrorist attacks will be explored in this study.

1.8. Scope of the Study

This study examines roles played by the military among the countries of the Lake Chad Basin Region in limiting terrorist groups' activities, specifically their (terrorists') access to weapons and information, as well as how poverty and economic factors have influenced the groups' ability to recruit new members to their forces.

CHAPTER TWO

THE EFFECTS AND ROLES OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COOPERATION IN CURBING TERRORISM

2.1. Concept of Cooperation

Individual collaboration is so important in one's existence that man can't survive without it. Man cannot associate without cooperating and cooperating in the pursuit of mutual objectives. According to Cooley (1909), Cooperation develops when men recognize that they are working toward a common goal. They have enough in common, including intelligence and self-control, to achieve their aim by cooperating. As a result, individuals or organizations collaborate to achieve their own or collective goals. Cooperation can be as simple as two people or organizations working together to achieve a common goal; in these cases, the collaborators are encouraged to work together and share the benefits. There is always a concerted endeavor toward a common goal in which all players have a real or fictional stake, whether voluntary or involuntary, direct or indirect, formal or informal.

Different states will want to cooperate in the areas where they have the biggest advantages. Their ability to do so, however, will be heavily reliant on the availability of proper institutional frameworks. As a result, the nature of the problem, the participants, and the available institutions all play a role in determining which course to take in a given situation. Many major international agreements are highly legalized: they take legal shape (treaties, as stated earlier), are believed to be legally binding on governments that accept them, and are implemented through legal language, procedures, and institutions. Furthermore, both proponents and critics agree that states follow through on their legal obligations (Henkin, 1979).

The state is not the only subject of security; social, ethical, religious, or otherwise cultural minorities, individuals with fundamental needs, or the world community or mankind are all subjects of security. As a result, security cooperation indicates that one of the most important goals, national existence, is dependent on the resources, intentions, and activities of other states, which is difficult to reconcile with the notion of security being ensured through self-help. Security cooperation has existed for a long

time and will continue to exist in the future. Even though the rivalry between the East and the West raged on, the expansion of cooperative efforts was critical.

2.1.1. Models for international cooperation

To meet the magnitude of new security challenges, particularly at the nexus of poor border networks that allow uncontrollable mass weapon proliferation in the hands of terrorists and non-state actors, some flexible and responsive models that draw on a broader range of partnerships among multinational military cooperation for effective and efficient engagement are as follows:

2.1.1.1. Substantive content model

The formation of "contextual" regimes within which national interests and identities can progressively coalesce via dialogue, persuasion, and learning is the most effective approach to international cooperation. This is most commonly used in international environmental agreements; for such normative convergence to occur, regime procedures must be seen as legitimate; thus, broad involvement on an equal footing is required (Brunnee and Toope, 1997).

2.1.1.2. Participation model

When there are incentives to defect, it is extremely difficult to preserve cooperation among big groups of people. Collaboration can only be sustained through enhanced monitoring and enforcement mechanisms because decentralized multilateral cooperation is so fragile. Because the majority of states are averse to such intrusive institutional frameworks (Downs, 2000).

2.1.1.3. Legalization model

Delegating more authority to legal institutions might sometimes help to strengthen legalization. To improve cooperation, it blends normative and rationalist tactics. Because the law can work both through the effect of incentives (e.g., through punishments, issue linkage, and reputational concerns) and through normative apparatuses, advocates of cooperation frequently want to entrench norms in law (e.g., legitimacy, persuasion, and internalization) (Gruber, 2000).

2.1.2. Types of cooperation

Individuals or groups work together to attain their individual or collective goals through cooperation; this individual(s) may be a state or a group of states. Therefore, it is an important aspect of this research. The following are the main types of cooperation in international relations.

2.1.2.1. Direct cooperation

People working together to undertake something they could do independently or in isolation is a common example of this form of cooperation. They do things jointly because it gives them a sense of accomplishment.

2.1.2.2. Indirect cooperation

A good example is a well-known concept of 'division of labor,' which is a principle that is entrenched in the structure of society revealed whenever individuals combine their differences for mutual satisfaction or a common purpose.

2.1.2.3. Primary cooperation

A common identification is used to reveal the membership of this type of collaboration, such as family, neighborhood, and friends. All members of the organization share, or are supposed to share, the rewards for which everyone works. Because cooperation is such a high-valued value, means and objectives merge into one.

2.1.2.4. Secondary cooperation

This kind of collaboration is formalized and specialized to a high degree. It is a defining element of modern civilization and is primarily found in social groups. Each fulfills his or her work, thereby assisting others in performing their tasks so that he or she might enjoy the advantages of his or her collaboration independently.

2.1.2.5. Tertiary cooperation

It could exist between two or more political parties, castes, tribes, religious groupings, and so on. It's commonly referred to as "accommodation." For adversarial aims, the two factions may collaborate and work together.

2.2. Concept of Military

A military, or armed forces, is a well-organized system that is commonly found within a sovereign state and is primarily geared to combat extraneous threats as well as internally fashioned vulnerabilities on a regular basis. It is coordinated and maintained within the state. The uniforms worn by its members make them easily recognized. Military branches, such as the army, navy, air force, space force, marines, or coast guard, can be added to the mix. Military history is thought to be ancient; the military focuses on the institution of armed force, implying that the military has existed since the first group of people banded together to defend themselves against an armed opponent. It is regarded as one of the well-organized environments in the world, and its activities are mostly dependent on people rather than technology. “Man is still the best weapon of war.” (British Army, 2006).

The principal goal of the military is to safeguard the state and its interests from armed attacks from the outside. It is the military's primary role to identify potential threats that it may be confronted with; as a result, intelligence collection becomes a focal point for the military to identify and counter problems as they arise. The military is an organization dedicated to defending a state and its interests from external armed threats, however, it also defends against internal armed threats. It is a highly structured military force that is sanctioned and maintained by an independent state. It has many branches: the army (land soldier), navy (sea soldier), air force, space force, marines, or coast guard; personnel are distinguished by their military uniforms, the military is often interchangeably used as armed forces, but with a degree of difference. The hierarchy is strictly controlled by rank, which is arranged in descending order of an authority.

2.2.1. Basic components of military operations

Military capability is ingrained in its structural arrangement, which determines its strength and ability to act either within its sovereign state or in international collaboration or alliances. Regardless of the type of state under consideration, the following points determine the power foundation of every military composition around the globe. Military operations are both cost-effective and strategic, necessitating

meticulous planning, financing, composition, and strategy. Therefore, military might and power are classed in the following manner.

2.2.1.1. Military funding

The value or worth of budgetary appropriation devoted by a state to raising and sustaining armed forces or other apparatuses required for defense commitments is known as military funding or defense budget (Hicks and Raney, 2003). Within the military, a military finance organization oversees the process of allocating resources. After that, the procurement unit is authorized to buy or contract (products and services) needed by the military.

2.2.1.2. Gender proportion in the military

The military is overwhelmingly male-dominated over the world, but the proportion of female members varies the chart below represents the gender proportion of the United States Department of Defense.

2.2.1.3. Military capability development

Military capacity building is a difficult task, perhaps one of the most difficult ever undertaken by mankind, owing to the fact that it necessitates strategic, operational, and tactical competence to counter any identified or perceived threat. All capability development activities are important in determining how military forces are used effectively in conflict, as well as the methods that will be used by the command to employ appropriate; skilled, fortified, and armed personnel to achieve the campaign's concrete goals and objectives (Dupuy, 1996).

2.2.1.4. Military logistics

When it comes to military concerns, distance is crucial. The shorter the distance, the more easily power may be brought to the theater of war. Due to the fact that supplying supplies to a ground force while still engaging in assault is easier (Boulding, 1962). This is the deployment of matured military capability in combat activities in a sufficient and spontaneous manner. This is the discipline of planning and carrying out military force mobility, supply, and maintenance. It is responsible for material strategy, procurement, stowage, distribution, evacuation, progress and disposal.

2.2.2. Types of military operation

A military operation refers to a state's or states' organized military actions in response to a developing scenario. These activities are intended to be a military strategy for resolving a conflict in the states' advantage. Combat or non-combat operations are frequently carried out for national security reasons. Military operations are classed according to the size and breadth of force employed, as well as the impact they have on the larger conflict. As a result, the common military operations during international military alliances are as follows.

2.2.2.1. Offensive operation

According to Wegener and Wegener (1976), during times of war, Offensive tactics are frequently used it is also known as an invasion. Offensive operations seek to change the course of events in their favor, and they frequently entail violence and force. Offensive operations, on the other hand, might be employed to prevent future conflicts; for example, deploying armed soldiers at civilian checkpoints in combat zones is one example. The movement to contact or attack (ambush, counterattack, ploy, and invasion), exploitation, and hunt are examples of offensive tasks. Offensive operations aim to capture, maintain, and exploit the initiative in order to decisively defeat the enemy. Offensive operation is characterized by surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity (Isby, 1981).

2.2.2.2. Defensive operations

Defensive operations are designed to minimize military casualties on our side of the battle while simultaneously laying the groundwork for a future offensive operation. During defensive operations, military soldiers will defend themselves, their area of operations (AO), and any property within the AO. Area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde defense are examples of defensive responsibilities (delay, withdrawal, and retirement). The subsets of defensive operations are planning, security, disruption, massing effects, and flexibility.

2.2.2.3. Stability operation

During tumultuous times, stability operations keep military situations together. Using psychological operations, overt displays of power, and military-to-military

coordination. Stability operations cannot be carried out in the midst of active conflict; instead, they take place before and after periods of active fighting. Stability operations include things like training local law enforcement officers, responding to local emergencies, and constructing community facilities. Military operations involving military troops providing safety and support to friendly noncombatants while suppressing hostile forces are known as stability operations as observed by Ginty (2012). Dennys (2013) noted that security, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, humanitarian assistance, and governance cum public participation are the major tasks of Army Stability Operation.

2.2.2.4. Support operations

This type of operation includes reacting to national catastrophes and disasters, is aimed to win wars, resolve conflicts, and promote peace. This operation can be utilized in conjunction with a stable operation as well as during defense operations. During times of necessity, support operations give reinforcement to local authorities, both foreign and domestic. It is often nonlinear and noncontiguous patterns, DSO and FHA are the two forms of support operations.

2.3. Civil-Military Cooperation

Interactions between society as a whole and the military; relationships between other government institutions and the military, and relationships between the military and other paramilitary organizations, are all examples of this civil-military relation (Nielsen and Snider, 2009). A military can turn on the government and demand that leaders be removed, or it can compromise the state's security by losing on the opponent(s). According to Feaver (1999), these features combine to create the "problematique" of the civil-military relationship: nations should ensure that the military is both submissive to civilian authority and effective in armed combat. Ample civil-military relations scholarship in political science is aimed at resolving some aspects of that fundamental challenge.

Huntington (1957) portrayed the inequalities between the two worlds as a result of military personnel's attitudes and views, who are mainly conservative, and civilians, who are mostly liberal. Therefore, for the civilian government to keep control, it required a piece of machinery to manage the military without infringing too much on

military prerogatives and causing criticism. The purpose of any military operation is determined by the civilian leadership, but the military will select the best means of achieving that goal.

Following the definition of Civil-Military cooperation by Bergner (1998), within its sphere of responsibility, the military institution creates proper links with the national and local establishments, noncombatant populace, transnational organizations, and the non-governmental groups.

2.4. Concept of International Cooperation

International Cooperation is a universal style of contact between two or more countries based on the sharing of scientific findings, production, trade, investment protection, and industrial experience. This does not imply that countries must unite under a single administration for administrative purposes. Through a three-century examination of international debt, Tomz (2012) argues that cooperation emerges under a state of international anarchy, which offers new light on many fundamental problems about international cooperation. He advances a reputational theory of government-to-government collaboration with overseas stockholders as well as how governments develop reputations among investors.

The potential for rule-making and institution-building, however frail and limited they may be, is given special consideration. According to this viewpoint, the lack of a Hobbesian "common authority to keep them all in awe" (Goodwin, 2020), does not hinder the formation of some effective joint international environmental restrictions. To strike out the terrorist groups from the zone under review, a call for international cooperation among the countries is a matter of urgency. This study will examine the level of international cooperation existing among the forces of these countries and where efforts are needed for an instrumental approach.

The study of international relations is differentiated not just by its content concentration, but also by its continued focus on cooperative, or at the very least rule-guided, arrangements (Lipson, 1984). In human affairs, conflict resolution mechanisms are important predictors of collective results. Some people believe that social institutions have a coercive nature, that subjects are forced to conform to institutional arrangements whether they like it or not. Rather, they believe that

international institutions, such as distinct regimes, are merely surface manifestations of underlying forces or processes that are vulnerable to change with every shift, (Young, 2019). Nonetheless, international cooperation has had a more positive influence than previously thought. In general, international relations refer to the relationships that form within a global society. International relations refers to a variety of social relationships that span more than one country's borders.

Coalition Special Forces, for example, was an important part of OEF in Afghanistan. Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, all contributed Special Forces to the operation, many of whom were placed under US command. They took part in a range of activities, including tracking down Al Qaeda and Taliban individuals fleeing the country, gathering intelligence, and providing advice to the Northern Alliance. These Special Forces not only relieved some of the strain on American Special Forces, but they also provided certain exceptional proficiencies in winter and mountain operations (Bensahel, 2006).

2.5. Nature of International Military Cooperation

This research is being conducted in order to address a number of assumptions concerning military cooperation in LCR in order to combat the rapidly rising terror groups in the region. Above importance, military cooperation in this setting is a cross-border approach to combating the insurgency, not a power struggle among the forces. Security cooperation has played a noteworthy role in this larger issue.

Military goals are things that, by their nomenclature, position, purpose, or usage, contribute successfully to military operations and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances prevailing at any moment, offer a clear military advantage. Article 48 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 emphasizes the basic rule “in order to safeguard the veneration for and fortification of the noncombatant civilians and their objectives, combatants must always distinguish between noncombatants and combatants, as well as between civil and military goals, and focus their efforts entirely on military actions.” In lieu of this, the primary aim of international military engagement is to ensure maximum protection of the harmless citizens of the affected area/zone.

Russett (1971) observed, that many times, states form alliances for military and security reasons rather than economic or social reasons. Territorial concessions, economic help, and legitimacy in the eyes of its own inhabitants have all come from the partnership. Formation, cohesion, maintenance, disintegration, and other aspects of wartime behavior. It would be unjustifiable not to differentiate coalitions based on their apparent goals. However, there have been other attempts to categorize alliances based on their role, behavior, degree of integration, or other factors.

2.5.1. Nature of international military cooperation pre WW I

Towards the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, the main European nations were divided between the Triple Entente (Allied Forces). Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy signed a treaty known as the Triple Alliance (Central Power). It was established, on 20 May 1882, and was renewed on a regular basis until it expired in 1915, during World War I, (Grenville and Wasserstein, 2013). The Triple Entente was founded by France, the United Kingdom, and Russia while, the Triple Alliance was founded by Germany, Austria–Hungary, and Italy, however, Italy stayed neutral in 1914. As the fight progressed, each group grew stronger. Japan’s neutrality ended in 1914 after forming alliance with the Entente, and Italy joined in 1915 (Torkunov, Wohlforth and Boris, 2020).

2.5.2. Nature of international military cooperation inter-war

The Allies and the Axis powers: During the Second World War (1939–1945), the Allies were an international military coalition; the UK, USA, Soviet Union, and China were the four main members by 1941. The Axis powers; Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and Fascist Italy, were led by Hitler (Dear and Foot, 2005).

Johnson (2016) presented, that the UK and USA had cooperated in a number of ways before they were formally allied, most notably through the destroyers-for-bases agreement in September 1940 and the American Lend-Lease program, which began in October 1941 and provided Britain and the Soviet Union with war materiel. Reverse Lend-Lease programs were implemented by the British Commonwealth and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union.

2.5.3. Nature of international military cooperation post-WW II

The NATO, is a military alliance made up of 30 nations. This group is responsible for the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed on April 4, 1949. It is a security treaty in which autonomous member states commit to defending one another in the event of an external assault (Cook 2017).

The Warsaw Pact was founded in Poland in 1955 as a counterbalance to NATO. The struggle was conducted on an ideological level and through proxy conflicts rather than a direct military clash between the two organizations. NATO and the Warsaw Pact both resulted in military force expansion and integration into their respective blocs (Reinalda, 2009).

Similar military organizations include:

Table 1. Some examples of International Military Cooperation

Names	Countries	Year formed	Objectives
AUKUS	Australia, United Kingdom, United States	15 September 2021	Under the terms of the agreement, USA and UK will assist Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines.
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, and USA Security Treaty	1951	To protect security of the Pacific
CSTO	Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan	15 May 1992	Collective Security Treaty Organization.
FPDA	Malaysia and Singapore	1971	Five Power Defense Arrangements.
Rio Treaty	America Countries	1947	Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security
IMCTC	Pakistan, Oman, Palestine, Nigeria, Yemen, United Arab Emirate and more	15 December 2015	Intergovernmental counter-terrorist Alliance of Countries in the Muslim World
METO/Bagdad Pact	Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the UK	24 February 1979	Middle East Treaty Organization, Military Alliance of the Cold War
NEATO	The United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan	1950s	Northeast Asia Treaty Organization. For collect defense in this region.
SCO	Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan	15 June 2001	Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Transnational political, economic and security alliance, in terms of geography and scope
South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone	Brazil and 23 countries	27 October 1986	To promote cooperation as well as the conservation of amity and strength in the South Atlantic
SEATO	Australia, Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, Pakistan, France, United Kingdom and the US	From 8 September 1954 to 30 June 1977.	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

2.6. Regional and Sub-Regional Military Cooperation

Regional organizations have typically been founded to achieve economic, political, or environmental goals; however, in recent decades, these organizations have gradually expanded their capabilities in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and post-war rehabilitation. According to Bailes and Cottey (1992), there are four primary prototypes of regional security that have a lot of relevance: alliance, collective security, security regime, and security community. The model is shown below as they presented it in their work.

- a) **Alliance:** Even a staunchly defensive alliance might raise threat awareness among its members rather than lower it. Internal opponents might be radicalized by anti-alliance coalitions, prompting them to seek external help. By creating confidence, an alliance, alternatively, should at the very least, reduce the likelihood of war.
- b) **Collective:** The term "collective security system" refers to a system aimed at preventing or winning the war. To function successfully, all states in a region or the entire globe must be included in such a system. When superpowers choose to work together, the strategy works well, but it fails when faced with major dangers. According to Cusack and Stoll (1994) using EARTH is a computer model to examine the possibility of collective security in a material world. Countries that subscribe to collective security philosophies have a better chance of surviving, according to this study.
- c) **Security Regime:** A security-related regime may cover general concepts like nonviolence and respect for existing international borders, or it may focus on specific weapon kinds and uses, or activities like military movements and transparency. They establish cooperative and usually positive state conduct norms, and they frequently provide procedures for implementing, promoting, and testing these norms.
- d) **Security Community:** Using EARTH (Exploring Alternative Realpolitik Theses) Cusack and Stoll also demonstrate that communal security practices improve the system's long-term survival. As a result, a security community is a group of governments whose members may be guaranteed that they will

not engage each other physical combat, but will instead resolve differences through other means. This model involves more frequent, long-term, and comprehensive communication than any of the other types.

2.7. Rules Guiding International Military Cooperation

Law is observed diversely nonetheless, "...ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean peoples shared a common belief that states relationships or interconnectivity should be conducted in line with established rules and principles." (Bederman, 2009, p. 115). Law is never just a tool for controlling current interference and the inevitable disputes of self-interested people, but one of the most important ways to understand the individual as a unit and the individual as a collective entity. However, only when actors work together to develop shared understandings can law exist (Mitchell and Hensel, 2007). International law is a set of principles that governs interactions between transnational operations among states and subjects of states, most notably States. International law is derived mainly through; treaties, customary and general principles. Armed forces are subject to three primary areas of international law: international human rights law, the law of armed conflict, and international criminal law.

The purpose of this law is to encourage the conduct of stable, consistent, and well-organized international relations. "International law sets prescriptive principles and a common charter for governments across jurisdictions in a variety of areas, such as war, diplomacy, trade, and human rights" (Slomanson, 2011, p. 4). It is critical to note that when cross-border issues arise, international law becomes a prerequisite rule that has a clear efficiency and effectiveness in managing those issues. In essence, international relations indicate that states acknowledge the existence of international law, as well as its authority and sanctions. The creation of the ICC, the ECJ's ostensibly rising jurisdiction, and the implementation and operation of WTO dispute settlement procedures all signaled strong legalization of world order resulting from the end of the Cold War, as international relations became more complex.

Guzman (2002) observed, unfortunately, International Law lacks a centralized authority and a higher legislature, as it is characterized by a primitive element of punishment and insufficient oversight over the correct application of rules in order to

evaluate their legitimacy as a fundamental principle is not subject to binding judicial jurisdiction.

As a result of the foregoing, integrating diverse military units (from various countries) into a single entity necessitates not rocket science, but rather a simple logic based on effective laws and rules guiding its operational code of conduct, which is derived from the harmonious unity of command and a strong sense of direction.

2.8. Formation of International Military Forces

Cross-border cooperation in all of its manifestations, including social, economic, political, intellectual, cultural, and others, can be regarded as significant and crucial to any type of continental and regional integration. Around the world, the act of effectively knitting together numerous adjacent states at the national, sub-national, and local levels has shown to be extremely successful. Extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, as well as torture, are grave human rights abuses, according to the United Nations General Assembly as every human being is today recognized as a legal person under international law (Article 1, United Nations General Assembly, 1948). As a result, having a well-established code of conduct for cross-border military activities is critical.

“Cross-border cooperation is seen as a crucial driving force behind closer cooperation between states. It is clear that intense networks between actors in the border region can lead to the generation of extensive networks of contacts and information...” (Grix, 2002, p. 12). Military cooperation is a formal alliance or pact between countries on national or international security issues. In the event of a crisis, members of a military coalition pledge to actively participate in and contribute to the defense of those in the agreement. There are numerous rules that govern their coming together, which are always subject to both regional and superregional organizations to which each member belongs. Cooperation “was created to promote the parties' respective nationalistic interests and to allow for coordinated military action if one of the parties became involved in a conflict in pursuit of those goals.” A collective security agreement is "focused primarily against aggression, not against anyone." It aims to reinforce the "balance of principle" rather than influencing any moving "balance of power.” (Tucker and David, 1992, p. 64).

Kuo (2019) viewed, treaties play an important part in the formation of trans-border military alliances or agreements. As a result, alliances are frequently focused on specific objectives that are meticulously stated in treaties. The treaty process creates a shared commitment and guarantee, which helps states avoid the "free ride" attitude. While the benefits and costs of a treaty vary depending on its particular provisions, this is at large because a state's ability to influence the terms and governance of a treaty is based on its power and independence as illustrated by Milewicz and Snidal (2016).

2.9. Challenges Facing International Military Cooperation

Due to a variety of factors, international military cooperation continues to face various dangers and challenges. It takes a scholarly approach to analyze and address these threats to a reasonable degree, if not totally. The biggest challenges to international military cooperation are as follows:

2.9.1. Lack of vision

The lack of vision caused by the arrangement, which has always emphasized the need for cross-border military cooperation, is a hard blow to its construction. Their operations are, for the most part, haphazard and poorly organized. A condition like this is marked by a lack of vision. Its emergency nature is situational action, which is poorly arranged and planned in advance, and which is carried out or founded as a result of a specific scenario.

2.9.2. Poor coordination

Another major issue affecting international military cooperation is a lack of coordination. It's a major worry to find a clear-cut of hierarchy due to its lack of vision. Stereotyping and prejudices arose as a result of variations in working patterns and a lack of awareness of the identities of the other's organizational/Countries forces, which posed significant barriers to cooperation (Wright and Foster, 2018).

2.9.3. External influences

Because IGOs frequently influence member state governments, they are unable to apply their own legislation, because, to significant resource restrictions, most governments are constrained in their ability to apply regime requirements to places

and activities within their authority. This is true for the vast majority of countries, particularly those in the developing world (Ataman 2003). Harmonization of contributing countries' policies, most notably their adherence to imperial ties. The developing countries have varied political, economic, and technological relationships with competing imperialists, which puts them at a disadvantage when it comes to military cooperation.

2.9.4. Cultural dimensions

Military operations necessitate cooperation and communication with other international forces as well as the general public. In this aspect, language and cultural awareness are critical. Linguistic skills and interpretation assistance are frequently missing, leading in a breakdown in intercommunication and a negative influence on the mission's overall success. Most people pay little attention to this, despite the fact that it is critical to any successful military campaign (domestic or international). Religious differences are a major source of anxiety; everyone's religious inclination takes precedence over the mission at hand, even if it means jeopardizing the collaborative effort. This is a major source of concern.

2.9.5. Geopolitical terrain

The topography of the battleground is illogical: Official accounts of force placements are always very generic and frequently purposefully wrong, despite the fact that the best maps show the situation with a high degree of clarity. Understanding war and international military cooperation require physiographic knowledge (Johnson, 1915). It is critical to increase military collaboration across borders, and it is necessary that they analyze the topographic nature of the area or battleground, because resilient forces always have a better understanding of the terrain.

CHAPTER THREE

THE LAKE CHAD BASIN AND INSECURITY

3.1. Concept of Terrorism

Since terrorism is a technique of insurgence, it is perhaps as old as war itself. Notably, the earliest systematic image of terrorism is traceable to the Sicarii – Zealots. According to Sorek (2008), he described, the Zealots were radical crusaders (politically inclined) C.70, Second Temple Judaism that aimed to incite Judea Province societies to revolt against the Roman hegemony and drive it out of the Sacred Territory by force of arms, resulting in the First Jewish–Roman War (66–70). When clear military triumph is unachievable, terrorism is the systematic use of violence to create fear in order to achieve political, economic, or/and social objectives. These methods aim to implant dread/terror in the public, forcing them to exert pressure on political leaders to achieve specific political objectives.

Terrorism is the use of unlawful force or cruelty against people or property with the intent of intimidating or coercing a government or its citizens to pursue political or social goals. Domestic and international terrorism are distinguished by law enforcement. According to Ben and George (2004) domestic terrorism originates in one and is carried out by her citizens acting independently. While the international trend is outside of a country's borders, terrorism linked to foreign governments or organizations exists. Terrorist attacks against foreign citizens from outside a country can take place anywhere on the globe.

Garrison (2004) opined, this term was first coined in the 1790s to describe how revolutionaries exploited terror to intimidate their opponents during the French Revolution. However, in this context, it is the use of violence by a state against its domestic opponents; as demonstrated by the Jacobin party of Maximilien Robespierre waged a Reign of Terror that included mass guillotine executions. Throughout the twentieth century, the phrase has been used most frequently to refer to violence used, directly or indirectly, towards governments in an attempt to overthrow an existing regime (John, 1989).

Terrorist organizations use terrorism to achieve, keep, or extend political control over society. Terrorists are people or individuals who commit acts of terrorism. Terrorism is seen as an alternative tactic for political tussle because of its use of violence, as opposed to other types of political competition commonly used in a political regime, such as campaigning and voting during elections at various levels of government and resolving conflicts through judicial proceedings (Schmid and Albert 1988). For “Terrorism is the use of decisive ferocity to attain political goals in its extensive definition. The phrase is primarily used in this perspective to allude to violence towards non-combatants during times of socio-political stability or in the context of war (frequently civilians and neutral military personnel.” (Wisnewski, 2008, p. 175).

According to Underhill (2014), terrorism is a long-term conflict involving irregular armed forces between a disaffected group and the state. Terrorist groups are notorious for their brutal and aggressive attacks against the state, which they carry out in the belief that they will not be able to achieve their objectives without resorting to violence (Obamamoye, 2016). Mobolaji and Alabi (2017) viewed terrorist demands are never made in a diplomatic, peaceful, or dialogic manner. According to Omede and Omede (2015, p. 2), Terrorism is defined by the following characteristics:

- a) Use of unlawful violence in the belief that violence will usher in a better system.
- b) Use of unlawful and various dangerous weapons.
- c) Motivated by political, religious, or ideological goals
- d) Secretive in membership recruitment and locations of residence
- e) Fewer in number than the larger society they attack
- f) Have strong wills and are willing to die for the course they uphold
- g) Most of the time, operate as syndicates

Combs (2000, p. 6) submitted, Terrorism has five key components: an act of violence, an audience, the development of a dreadful atmosphere, innocent sufferers, and political objectives or purposes.

To provide a long-term perspective on the historical evolution of terrorism, Rapoport (2006) adopts his well-known notion of 'terrorist waves.' He claims that technological progressions resulted in the rise of modern non-state terror in the 1880s. According to him, there have been four "waves" of international terrorism since the late 1800s: anarchist, anti-colonial, new left, and religious terrorism. The term "state terror," according to Hoffman (2006), refers to instances in which governments are directly involved in terrorist acts. Another perspective that needs to be mentioned is state-sponsored terrorism, in which countries are indirectly involved by giving terrorist organizations with financing, information, and logistical support. Terrorists, who operate under one radical ideology or another and often in well-coordinated splinter groups, must carry out increasingly dramatic, horrific, and public attacks to arouse and maintain public fear, whereas the goal of terrorism is to shatter the public's sense of security in places where they are most familiar.

3.2. Causes of Terrorism

Terrorism is caused by a variety of factors around the world, but this study focuses on the cause of terrorism in the LCBR. As a result, the searchlight will be fixated on the political (corruption, poor policy implementation), social (religious, social neglect), economic (rising poverty, lack of engagement, climate change), and border issue aspects.

3.2.1. Political cause of terrorism

Terrorism is aided by the government's inadequate and shaky policies, thus terrorism has a significant negative influence on people's behavior and is a major source of disruption in people's social, political, and economic lives. This section briefly examines the causes of terrorism as a result of political reasons, particularly as they affect most developing countries, including the region under consideration.

Corruption occurs when people in positions of authority or influence, such as executives or government managers, behave unethically. Corruption includes giving or accepting bribes or inappropriate donations, dishonest, under-the-counter transactions, election rigging, money laundering, and swindling investors. Alesina and Dollar (2000) observed that corruption can lead to a rise in criminal activity and organized crime in a community if left unchecked. Theft and diversion of public

monies and projects for personal gain by those in the upper echelons of society have resulted in a slew of agitations from below (the followers), with the mode of protest varying depending on the economic or demographic advantage of the area.

Corruption is a major menace all around the world, and it is at the core of many of the economic and political problems that have bedeviled economies and democracies in recent years.. One aspect of terrorism that receives much too little attention is the link between corruption and the success of terrorism. According to Asongu (2013), an increase in the level of corruption increases the number of terrorist strikes carried out in a country. This has influenced critical anti-extremism battlegrounds such as Afghanistan, Nigeria, Iraq, and Kenya, and has occasionally impacted anti-terrorism efforts.

Corruption encourages terrorism by undercutting counter-terrorism measures and providing extremists with easy access to resources, finance, and motivation. In the absence of change, abusive security forces, kleptocratic officials, and lawless local governments all contribute to extremists' endurance and success, allowing Boko Haram to hit the region's heart. Dasukigate refers to a \$2 billion arms deal in Nigeria that resulted in the embezzlement of the fund by the National Security Adviser's office, which was overseen by Colonel Sambo Dasuki, the former National Security Adviser to the then president of Nigeria, Dr. G. E Jonathan (Premium Times, 13 Dec. 2015, Court papers show how ex-NSA Dasuki allegedly shared the arms fund to cronies).

This typical framing is especially ironic in light of mounting evidence that corruption is assisting in the recruitment of many people into extremist organizations and is at the basis of many of today's security concerns (Chayes, 2015). Other ways in which the political rationale has accelerated the expansion of numerous violent groups across the world, notably in the Sahel Region, which includes the Lake Chad Basin, are government reluctance and lack of political participation, therefore,

3.2.1.1. Government's reluctance

A key aspect influencing the expansion and enhancement of terror groups' networks is the government's incapacity or reluctance to prevent terrorism. The lack of appropriate prevention by police and intelligence services allows the spread of such a plot.

3.2.1.2. Lack of political participation

Another factor that motivates people to commit acts of terrorism is a lack of political participation. Dissatisfaction is created by regimes that deny access to authority and persecute dissenters. As a result, grievances become essentially political in natural economic or economic justification.

3.2.2. Social cause of terrorism

As rising complexity on all levels of society and economy creates opportunities and vulnerabilities, social settings offer an intriguing mix of elements that is a significant permissive cause of terrorism. Terrorists benefit from sophisticated communication and transportation networks that provide easy mobility and publicity. The most direct cause of terrorism is the societal cause, which generally provides motivation and direction for terrorist groups; the existence of terrorism is often a sufficient reason. The use of violence against the government is sanctioned by social habits and historical traditions, making it politically correct; hence, societal myths, traditions, and habits permit the growth of terrorism as an established political custom. The following are some of the social factors:

3.2.2.1. Religious

Religion is the belief or feeling that we are connected to "the divine." When people pray or meditate, they may experience this form of communion. Religious principles are thoughts that believers of a certain conviction clutch to be true, such as the existence of reincarnation. The creation stories seen in various religions are another example of religious beliefs. Religious rituals, such as the confession of sins, are deeds or acts that are either mandated or expected of members of a particular organization (Barkan and Greenwood, 2003). According to functionalists, religion serves a variety of purposes in society. In truth, religion's existence, worth, and meaning are all dependent on society, and vice versa. Religion, in this view, fulfills a variety of functions, including providing answers to divine mysteries, providing emotional solace, and providing a space for social interaction and societal control. In 1915, Émile Durkheim (French sociologist, 1858–1917) religion is "a cohesive coordination of ideas and activities concerning consecrated objects."

Symbolic interactionism is a discipline of sociology that studies everyday life's symbols and interactions. It is founded on the notion that our surroundings are socially constructed. Before beliefs and experiences may be called sacred, members of a community must believe in them. The meanings of these symbols pique the interest of the interactionist school of thought; it is thought to be how humans make sense of their social environments. Many faiths encourage the belief that followers should be content with their current circumstances because they are divinely designed, according to conflict theorists. For ages, Christian institutions have utilized this power dynamic to keep the poor destitute and persuade them that they should not be concerned about what they do not have because their "true" reward (from a religious standpoint) will come after death. Matthew 5:12 (King James Version of the Bible) reads, "Celebrate and be overjoyed, for your reward in paradise is immeasurable, for they previously mistreated the diviners." Atran (2010) observed that the rational actor expectation is contradicted by empirical evidence. Persons who join the Jihad, particularly would-be "martyrs" (e.g., suicide bombers), are generally inspired by ideals that stem from small group underlying forces.

Conflict theorists also point out that persons in positions of power in religious settings can often impose customs, rituals, and beliefs by interpreting religious scriptures or claiming direct communication from God; Religion, according to conflict theorists, is an institution that contributes to the perpetuation of social inequity. The use of RCT to explain some aspects of religious behavior was first considered by Finke and Stark (1988), they assumed that is there a primal human desire for religion in terms of faith in a higher entity, a feeling of purpose in life, and believe in life after death? Religious explanations of these notions are regarded to be more fulfilling than scientific answers, which could explain why terrorist groups have maintained strong religious affiliations. As a pillar of their efforts, the religious connection has become far more vital to them.

Following the loss of notions like the divine right of kings and the advent of nationalism, terrorism has become increasingly based on anarchist and revolutionary politics in the contemporary period. Since 1980, however, there has been an uptick in religiously motivated terrorism (Rogers et al., 2007). Abubakar Gumi, the Grand Khadi of the northern region, began to propagate Salaist ideas in the 1960s. The Izala

movement arose in the 1970s, with its main characteristics being enmity toward Suis and Bida, or innovations outside the Quran's text. Basic characteristics of religious terrorism are the following:

- a) The culprits explain their violent acts by referring to religious literature.
- b) In making decisions, a clerical figure is considered.
- c) They recruit new members using a religious notion.

3.2.2.2. Social neglect

According to Mahmood and Ani (2018) Boko Haram has been active in Northeast (Borno State), Diffa region, Far North province, Lac region Nigeria, Niger Republic, Cameroon, and Chad Republic respectively, because these areas had limited dealings with the state in the past, which weakened their ties to power centers. The negligence has led to feelings of isolation and alienation from the state, resulting in a lack of general relationships. Physical, medical, educational, and emotional neglect are four sorts of neglect that contribute to the terrorist organization's ease in recruiting new members. Physical neglect refers to the failure to provide for a child's fundamental needs; inadequate or no supervision; failure to give basic food, clothing, and shelter. Medical Malpractice is the failure to offer medical or mental health therapy that is required. Educational neglect is the failure to educate a child or to meet the demands of a youngster with special needs, that is, failing to provide a formal and adequate education for the child. Emotional neglect refers to the failure to address the emotional needs of the vulnerable and give psychosocial support, as well as allowing the child to use alcohol or other drugs. Failure to provide a secure, loving, wanted, and worthy environment for the child.

3.2.3. Economic cause of terrorism

According to Zumve, Ingyoroko and Akuva (2013), they posit, "It is not surprising that the poor countries plunged with the precarious effect of corruption have become hotbeds of terrorism." The fundamental causes of terrorism around the world are economic deprivation, thwarting, and desperation; the official corruption and mismanagement of state funds have bred and entrenched a legacy of a susceptibility to engage in violent crime from a large fraction of the youths, particularly in

developing countries. The escalation effects of corruption can be seen in the acts of terrorism and other social vices that are common among youths.

Terrorism in South Asia was presented by, Akhmat, Zaman, Shukui, and Sajjad (2014), some investigative economic elements are more elastic in character, with revenue disparity accounting for the biggest percentage (1.242 percent), followed by population growth rate (1.2125 percent) and political instability (1.2102 percent). In this region, the unemployment rate has a roughly one-to-one association with the occurrence of terrorism. Rising poverty, youth unemployment, and climate change have all contributed to the ease with which violent groups in this region attract new members.

3.2.3.1. Rising poverty

Krueger and Maleckova (2003, p. 119) submitted, "...While our results are cautious and investigative, they propose that neither education nor scarcity has a direct, causal impact on terrorism." Another perspective illustrated by Jager (2018, p. 9) opined that "the fact that there is a link between economic insufficiency and terrorism in a certain area does not necessarily indicate that this conclusion is valid all over the world, particularly when there is ample indication signifying otherwise." Other scholars, on the other hand, refute this viewpoint and demonstrate the link between poverty and terrorism. Mitra (2008, p. 57) submitted that based on "investigative perceptive and strengthened by case studies from Latin America and a region in India one can settle that paucity can and does produce terrorist movement." Given the amount of research conducted in the LCBR, it is obvious that rising levels of poverty have aided the expansion of terror activities.

According to Ifeanyichukwu et al. (2020), 76.8% of Nigeria's population lives in poverty in the northeastern part; Adamawa (59 percent), Borno (70.1 percent), and Yobe (90.2 percent) have the highest poverty rates, and ironically, are the most afflicted by regional insecurity of the six states that make up the region. The outbreak of cholera in the region, according to the WHO, is the worst in a decade. Despite serious shortages of food, water, health facilities, shelter, and other necessities, relief materials from the US, partners totaled more than \$400 million in just 16 months plus over 14000 volunteers to vaccinate over 1.9 million (Borno State Government, 2017).

People are exposed to various sorts of persecution, coercion, and cruelty by security agents, who have also been accused of extrajudicial penalties and executions (Cole et al., 2017). The scenario is similar in northern Cameroon and eastern Niger, both of which have a history of structural violence. As a result, there is widespread and deep-seated animosity among the public, which has led to skepticism of the administration.

3.2.3.2. Unemployment among youth

Bagchi and Paul (2018, p. 9) argued, "...that while youth redundancy upsurges national or internal terrorism, it has no major influence on international or external terrorism." Some global development organizations highlighted these concerns; the UNSC (2015) in an undisputed agreement and adoption of the resolution on terrorizations posed by the radicalism of young people, due to the lack of meaningful economic engagement among youths as a vital driver of ferocity. In another instance, the same claim was echoed by a World Bank, ISIS (one of the world's most extremist groups) as the subject of a study. Even though 85 percent of the recruits had completed secondary school, many of them were young and had limited or no access to resources or work.

Ezedike (2011) designated the high percentage of unemployment and economic hardship in Nigeria has increased the problem of violent crime, driving many jobless young people, some of whom are graduates, into different deadly criminalities. Joblessness produces dissatisfaction among the unemployed, thus it becomes a source of insurgency. Insurgency conscripting may be high if economies are unable to supply a reasonable amount of jobs, particularly for low-skilled marginally employed people. Agree with the findings of Raul & Evelina (2012) it shows, that there is a link between the rate of youth unemployment and occurrence of violence, as measured by the number of victims and incidents.

3.2.3.3. Climate change

Existing vulnerabilities that serve as actual and prospective causes of terrorism are exacerbated by climate change. According to Busby (2018), concerns about the security challenges of climate change extends back several decades and continue to rise among security studies experts and policymakers. Climate change creates a fragility risk that includes; wild competition for local resource, livelihood insecurity,

and uncontrollable migration, extreme weather disasters, volatile food prices and trans-boundary water management, sea-level cum coastal degradation, and unintended consequences of climate policies.

Spadaro (2020) noted if these events continue to unfold, they will have the potential to drive humanity into a resource competition, affecting the overall security environment. If left unchecked, this could pave the way for climate change-related terrorism to emerge. Climate change will exacerbate threats by interacting with existing underlying causes of political, economic, and social instability. Poverty, underdevelopment, a scarcity of land, and land conflict are all powerful factors of migration. Climate change will limit economic options even further, putting a burden on river resources (such as fishing and agriculture) and government capacity to help displaced people.

Governments, military, policymakers, and academics around the world have been paying close attention to the probable links between climate change and insecurity issues (European Council, 2008).

3.2.4. Border issue

Porous border protection, according to Isyaku (2017), notably near the frontiers of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, enables easy weapon smuggling and terrorist assaults. This contributed significantly to the radicals in the LCBR's successful sequence of strikes.

Shelley et al. (2003) submitted that an offense becomes Multinational in nature if; it is committed in more than one national jurisdiction; if it is committed in one state but a significant percentage of its groundwork, planning, direction, or control occurs in another country; if it is organized in one state but involves a well-organized criminal gang that engages in illegal activities across multiple national jurisdictions; or if it is committed in one state but has significant consequences in another..

The porosity of Nigeria's and adjacent nations' borders, according to Olagbemi and Alabi (2017), makes it more difficult for security forces to manage the movement of people and commodities. As a result, transnational criminal networks are increasingly targeting West Africa as a significant worldwide hub for illicit drug transportation, wholesale, and rising production (Brown, 2013). Countless crimes are

committed across borders in West Africa, according to Ezeanyika and Ubah (2012). Abia (2013) also provided a context for the many sorts of crimes committed across borders; smuggling, drug trafficking, counterfeiting, auto theft, human and arms trafficking, money laundering, advanced free fraud, robbery across border, and, more recently, financial and hype-tech cyber-crime are among them, according to him.

Table 2. Dimensions of terrorism

Actors:	Actions	Consequences
Perpetrators	Mechanism of Attack	
i. Identification (Invisible / Identified)	i. Physical objects	a. Physical Infrastructure Damage.
ii. Organization (Celllike/ Identifiable Stat)	ii. Explosive	b. Biological harm to people, animals, and the plants.
iii. Belief (Motivation/Instrumental)	iii. Nuclear	c. Damage to the environment.
Motivation –	iv. Other Energy	d. Psychological Injuries.
Pure Anarchist, Political	v. Chemical	e. Social upheaval.
Religious, Ethnicity.	vi. Biology	f. Economic sabotage.
Instrumental –		
a. Not instrumental (non-negotiable)	Nature of Attack	
b. Highly instrumental (negotiable)	People – individual / Groups	
	Organization – Government	
	Corporate bodies	
	Schools/hospitals	
	Other Public places	
	Scope of Violence	
Victims:	i, Highly localized (Assassination)	
i. National Identity	ii. Multiple/Simultaneous	
ii. Foreign Expertrates	iii. Wide Spread/Continuous	
iii. Harmless Believers of other Faiths		
iv. Conflicting Groups	Degree of Violence	
	i, Non-Violence (Civil Disobedienc	
Third Parties:	ii. Non-Damaging (burning flags	
i. Same as perpetrators (but organized)	iii. Mild (Breaking windows	
ii. Sponsors of perpetrators	iv. Moderate (internet base	
iii. Hosts of perpetrators	v. Extreme (killings, arson	
iv. Collaborators		
v. Sympathizers	Degree of surprise	
vi. Unknown penetrated by perpetrators.	i. Total	
	ii. Accurately Warned	
	iii. Inaccurately/Falsely warned	

Source: Hammel (2002)

3.3. The Concept of Securitization and Security

3.3.1. Securitization

The process through which states identify threats to its national security is referred to as securitization in international relations. According to securitization theory, authorities that perceive risks to national security "securitize" such sectors by implementing security measures, frequently without public debate or democratic

process (Kilroy, 2018). Thus a process by which state actors convert regular political matters into "security issues" because it allows exceptional methods to be used in the name of security. Originally devised by Wæver (2015), on the one hand, securitization offers a new perspective on the long-running dispute between those who argue that dangers are objective (i.e., what genuinely constitutes a threat to international security) and those who argue that security is subjective (what is perceived as a threat).

Critical security approaches argue that "security" is context and subject-dependent and that it can even be harmful at, times. Paul (2005) designates; Critical security studies is a branch of security studies that uses critical theory to rethink and sometimes creatively challenge current security approaches' limiting focus. Because some people manage security while others maintain it, hence, security generates an uneven power relationship between people; an Arab-looking person has been deemed a dangerous "other" in the context of counterterrorism (Global War), and surveillance in Muslim communities has intensified since they are associated with terrorism because they fit a certain profile. When seen in this way, Surveillance becomes a regulator's security gear as well as a source of vulnerability. The theory of securitization developed from questioning the nature of security in situations like these, and it enlarged the notion of security to include items other than the state. A reference object is the vulnerable; entity that is endangered and desires to be safeguarded under securitization theory.

Theorists of securitization have recognized the following five sectors, according to Clara (2018):

The Economic Sector

The Societal Sector

The Military Sector

The Political Sector

The Ecological Sector

Each sector's unique threat is expressed as a threat to a reference object. In the social sector, for example, the reference object is identity, whereas, in the environment sector, the reference objects are ecosystems and endangered species. In the economic

sector, the reference objects are unemployment and poverty. In the military, the state remains the reference object. The aforementioned security phenomena assist us in comprehending the existential hazards linked with the various attributes of the respective reference objects.

3.3.2. Security

The field of security studies' continues to be of direct interest to the international education sector. It's important because current international concerns about terrorism invariably have an impact on certain groups and persons regarded to be a threat, including international observers. It is crucial because 'the conventional preoccupation with security from external military threats' sets the tone for defining security in a broad sense (Nesadurai, 2005). Security is envisioned as something that can be objectively assessed, supervise, and enhanced through objective and scientific research. Furthermore, security has a normative quality: it appears to be a desirable goal for which we should work hard. From this perspective, security is typically considered as a social state in which coercion or harm to a given object does not exist – or is unlikely to exist. Baldwin (1997) for example, aptly characterized security as a low prospect of impairment to acquire values. Similarly, for Krause and Nye (1975) the lack of acute challenges to the minimal tolerable levels of the basic values that a people consider vital to its survival. Security usually refers to defense against Hostile forces, although it can also refer to a variety of other things, security is the ability to be free of possible threats (or other forced change) caused by others. Security beneficiaries (technical referents) can include individuals and social groups, objects and institutions, ecosystems, or any other item or phenomenon that is vulnerable to damaging change

Hobbes (1946), in his book *Leviathan*, once observed without security, life of man is unsociable, deprived, horrible, ruthless, and dumpy; there is no place for commerce, no skills, no literacy, no social order; and which is worst of all, incessant terror, and peril of intense death. Economic security sources recommended that public policies and program initiatives must come through social interaction with all actors, not only government, business, and labor unions (Human Security Commission, 2003, p. 86) because these group does not often represent the larger people who are mostly vulnerable, thus, the poor should contribute to policies that address their needs.

According to Maslow's pyramid of essentials, if the physiological needs are achieved, the psychological need for safety or security takes over. Safety is commonly associated with physical security, yet the need for safety or security is mostly psychological, Norwood (2005). The most fundamental physiological needs of Maslow (1943), include air, food, and water. This implies that security is a product of social conditions rather than a fixed personality attribute. The link between sociology and psychology, on the other hand, shows that security cannot be adequately addressed from a single perspective. Cameron and McCormick (1954, p. 558), further illustrated by the claim that "individual insecurity is exacerbated by psychological insecurity resulting from a personality trait, independent of current external events and substantially determined by early, especially infancy, experiences."

Some security researchers regard the state (institution) as the major referent object of security, while others regard individual (citizens) as the primary referent. Whatever the case, one thing is definite and important: security of all aspects of mankind, including mankind himself, his surroundings, which includes territory as a basic component of a state, and all consumer goods. As a result, human security means ensuring the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human liberty and fulfillment. The study of international relations is primarily concerned with state-to-state relations. According to Jackson-Preece (2011), the state began as a security arrangement and continues to be so now. Stabilizing active paramilitary and combatants, employing anti-terrorism processes, ensuring civil and disaster defenses, expending intelligence to identify and counter external attack and domestic subversion, using diplomacy to strengthen alliances and separate threats, and using economic influence to boost collaboration and isolate or deteriorate politics, all consume a substantial sum of state resources. The relevant approach here is the eminent need that arises from the international cooperation of the countries in the Lake Chad Region to decisively defeat the Terrorist Groups intimidating and destroying the lives and properties of innocent people of this region.

3.4. The Historical Background of the Lake Chad Basin Region

Lake Chad is one of the largest bodies of water in Africa, a freshwater lake located near the Nigerian border in the far west of Chad, in the Sahelian zone of West-Central Africa, which is part of the Sahara desert; a semiarid strip of land dividing the

Sahara Desert from the humid savannas of equatorial Africa. Room (1994) submitted the country of Chad is named after Lake Chad. Chad gets its name from the Kanuri word "Sáda" which means "great expanse of water." The region comprises the countries around Lake Chad by 1000 BC people had been cultivating and raising livestock in the immediate area of this lake for at least eight thousand years. Permanent cities were built in the south of the lake around 500 BC, at the start of the Iron Age. Important trade routes passed across the Chad Basin on their way east and north through the Sahara. According to Decorse (2001), by the 5th century AD, camels were being used for trans-Saharan trade over the Fezzan or east into Darfur; where slaves and ivory were traded for salt, horses, glass beads, and eventually, weaponry, After the Arabs invaded North Africa in the 7th and 8th centuries, the LCR became more connected to the Muslim world.

Drake and Bristow (2006) presented that since the 1960s, when its shoreline was around 286 meters (938 feet) above sea level, Lake Chad has shrunk significantly. With the flooding of the wetlands areas, the size of Lake Chad varies dramatically from season to season. This lake was estimated to be 10,000 to 25,000 km² (3,900 to 9,700 sq mi) in size in 1983, with a maximum depth of 11 meters (36 feet) and a volume of 72 km³ (17 cu mi). Walker (2013) examines Toyin Falola's contribution to the historiography of the legacy of the Atlantic slave trade explained that trade and increased agricultural skills sustained the early kingdoms of the Kanem Empire, the Wadai Empire, and the Sultanate of Bagirmi, resulting in more developed towns. Kanem originated in the 8th century in the region north and east of Lake Chad. The Sayfuwa dynasty, which ruled this kingdom, converted to Islam in the 12th century. The Kanem Empire decayed, shrank, and was eventually conquered in the 14th century by Bilala invaders from the Lake Fitri region.

Its size had shrunk to fewer than 1,500 km² by 2000. (580 sq mi). Overgrazing in the lake's surrounding area caused desertification and a loss in vegetation, according to a research published in the Journal of Geophysical Research (Zeng and Yoon, 2009). Water News (2008) submitted that over the last 40 years, the lake's decline has most certainly been accelerated by rising demand for its water from the surrounding population; Farmers and herders need the water for their crops and cattle respectively, so they divert it continuously. Along with international tensions, inter-country

violence is on the rise among lake residents. The Lake Chad Basin is one of Africa's most volatile regions. Rudincová (2017) opined that the lake has dwindled to the point where it is now less than 90 percent the size it was in 1960. These environmental changes have major ramifications for the entire region, which includes Nigeria, Niger, Sudan, and Cameroon. These environmental risks could set off a chain reaction of major political upheaval.




Figure 1. Blue dot showing the Lake Chad

Source: Stevens (2017)

The Kanuri people were led by the Sayfuwa to the west and south of the lake, where they founded the Bornu Empire. The Bornu Empire flourished in the late 16th century, as observed by Falola and Heaton (2008), regaining parts of Kanem that had been captured by the Bilala. Bornu satellite states included the Sultanate of Damagaram in the west and Baguirmi in the southeast near Lake Chad



Figure 2. The countries of Lake Chad Basin
Source: Gaba (2010)

3.4.1. Ethnic formations in the lake chad basins

Lake Chad region covers a varied range of ethnic groups, including Borgor Fulani, Buduma, Chad Arabs, Fali, Hide, kanembu, Kanuri, Kotoko, Mafa, Masa, and Shuwa Arabs, to its immediate environment.

3.4.1.1. Borgor Fulani

The Borgor Fulani are the people who live over the Sudano-Sahelian belt, mostly host in the Chad Republic. Some pastoralist societies are fully nomadic, while others are semi-nomadic and rely on subsistence farming. These are mostly nomads who have lost their cattle owing to land grabs, transhumance corridor closures, and climate change. Indigenous women are particularly vulnerable to climate change's effects. In

traditional Borgor Fulani society, women are in charge of the majority of daily duties, including meal preparation, bringing water and firewood, and caring for their children's education and health. They also sell milk and other livestock products as part of their operations. When their communities are nomadic, they practice cross-border transhumance, following the seasons in search of water and pasture for their cattle (Priehodová et al., 2020).

3.4.1.2. The Buduma

According to the findings of Azevedo and Decalo (2018) submitted that this ethnic traditionally claims to be descended from the peoples of the Kanem-Bornu Empire. Many of Lake Chad's islands are home to the Buduma, a Nigerian ethnic group. Previously, they would frequently conduct violent raids on the cattle herds of their neighbors. They've evolved into a pleasant and humorous group of people who are open to new ideas. Even though their neighbors call them Buduma, which means "people of the grass," they prefer Yedina; coined from their language known as Yedina.

3.4.1.3. Arabs of Chad

The Juhayna, Hassuna, and Awlad Sulayman are the three "tribes" that make up the Arabs of Chad. Members of each tribe believe they are related through a common ancestor. Collelo (1988) observed, the Arabs of Chad are seminomadic, herders who roam the Sahel plains with their camels, horses, cattle, goats, and sheep. They were not state builders in Chad but rather converted their monarchs to Islam (in the instance of Wadai) or by conquest (in the case of Bagirmi and Kanem). Possession of camels and horses translated into military strength to their advantage.

3.4.1.4. Fali people

The Fali are mostly found in northern Cameroon's hilly regions, although some also dwell in northeastern Nigeria. The Bossoum, Kangou, Peske–Bori, and Tingelin Fali are the four major groups of the Fali people (Muhammad, 1999). The Fali are predominantly farmers and hunters known for millet, groundnuts, tobacco, okra, cotton and more are important crops (Fali, Ency. Brit. 2011). According to Neuwinger

(1996, p. 33), the Fali people are said to bathe their deceased in a plant decoction because they believe that plant development is crucial for fertility.

3.4.1.5. The hide group

The 'hide' is also known as 'xde,' but the Fulbe name them 'gra,' which means buddy and 'Man' in general. So far, no concrete historical findings for Hide or Tur/Turu have been discovered. Hide or 'xde' appears to be more prevalent in French, whereas Tur is more popular in English. Tur is a place name used frequently by Gwoza Hills communities. Populated with around 7100 dominantly Christians.

3.4.1.6. The Kanembu

They are Chadian ethnic group known as the Kanembu. They are supposed to be the Kanem-Bornu Empire's forefathers. The word Kanembu means "the people [bu] of Kanem." The population is expected to be 890,000 people. They speak the Kanembu language, which is descended from the Kanuri language, and many of them also speak Arabic and, increasingly, French, Bondarev (2013). Kanembu makes up the majority of Chad's merchants, making them one of the country's wealthiest ethnic groups. Shriner and Rotimi (2018, p. 804–812) submitted that Baggara Arabs make up 50% of the Kanembu.

3.4.1.7. Kanuri peoples

This group is mostly Sunni Muslims, with most tracing their ancestors to reigning lineages of the historic Kanem-Bornu Empire. Kanuri clans have traditionally been sedentary, farming, fishing the lake surroundings, and engaging in trade and salt processing, Idrissa and Decalo (2012). According to Laminu (2013), the Kanuri people are peculiar with their proverbs which is often used to scare or warn people away from doing something foolish or harmful, but they can also be lighthearted and encouraging.

3.4.1.8. Kotoko people

The Kotoko people are primarily found in the Chad Republic, their common language is Lagwan. They are noted for their long-canoe fishing, as well as agriculture. They descended from the Sao civilization. Kotoko people are also called, Mser, Moria,

Bara, Makaru with a population of 22,500 domiciles in Chad and over 56,000 across the border.

3.4.1.9. Mafa people

Mafa people also known as the Mafahay, an ethnic group dominant in northern Cameroon also other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, with Cameroon accounting for 300,000, as presented by DeLance et al. (2010, p. 234). They are mostly Moslems, and they are divided into three groups: mafa-west, mafa-center, and mafa-east. Traditional Mafa agriculture utilizes a variety of soil management techniques. Sorghum and pearl millet are stapled crops, as well as a wide range of other grains, leguminous and root crops, green vegetables, peppers, and fruits. They also have cattle, sheep, goats, and chickens (101LastTribes.com).

3.4.1.10. Masa tribe

The Masa people are a Chadic ethnic group also known as Masana, Banana, or Yagoua. The Moslem-Christian ratio is quite close, but animists make up the majority. They communicate in Massa or Masana.

3.4.1.11. Shuwa Arabs

They are mostly descendants of Arabized Fulanis, and they are an example of how old political institutions can survive in some parts of Africa. The Kanuri and Babur ethnic groups dominate the Borno state, with only a few Shuwa Arab ethnic groups present.




Figure 3. Immediate ethnic groups in Lake Chad Basin
 Source: Cerezo (2011)

3.4.2. The economic activities in the Lake Chad region

Being the largest lake in the Chad Basin, it provides water to several tens in million people in the four countries surrounding it; Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria. The primary sources of income are farming, livestock, and fishing. Rain-based agricultural production is only feasible in the southern belt, as observed by

Rangeley, Thiam, and Anderson (1994). Around Lake Chad and in the floodplains, farmers practice flood-recession agriculture. Isah and Wash (2021) submitted that at least 40% of the rural population in the LCR is poor, as well as, food shortages are a regular occurrence. The southern belt is the only place where rain-fed crop cultivation is possible around the Lake. In the riverine marshes, flood recession agriculture is performed. During each short rainy season, nomadic herders and their animals migrate to grasslands in the northern half of the region. When the dry season arrives, they return to the grazing lands near the lakes and floodplains, or to the savannas further south.

Fishermen from outside region had to obtain authorization and pay a stipend to use a quota of the lake, which was traditionally managed through a system in which respectively village had recognized rights over a defined portion of the river, wetland, or lake, governments only enacted a small number of rules and regulations. The Katagum River in Jigawa State, Nigeria, for example, a water management council collects a portion of each fisherman's catch and either reallocates it among the residents or sells it and uses the proceeds to fund the community projects (Kenmore, 2004).

3.5. Historical background of terrorism in Chad Basin region

Dowd (2015) presented that the lack of trust in political institutions and security agencies has resulted in a political system in which such dangers to stability are ignored until violence is inevitable. Walker (2012) observed, only until a state's leader is confident that such a threat cannot be used to his benefit will he directs action to be done against it. Because of security organizations' weaknesses, the only way they can deal with such threats is to use violence. Boko Haram arose as a result of these factors. According to the UNHCR (2022) reports, following years of bloodshed in northeast Nigeria (between military soldiers and non-state armed groups), it has moved to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, where significant human rights violations, extensive gender-based violence, forced recruitment, and suicide bombings continue.

Poverty, illiteracy, and limited socioeconomic growth characterize the Sahel area on the southern boundary of the Sahara desert, where people have faced food insecurity in the past year. Populaces have lost faith in their governments due to decades of political marginalization. Nagarajan et al. (2018) explained that the people's

resilience has been significantly impacted by the security situation. As a result of these factors, armed opposition organizations have come to dominate the region, and terror and the loss of livelihoods have prompted people to flee and migrate across borders.

Armed insurgency groups' insecurity, hundreds of thousands of people have been compelled to flee their homes, relocated from Africa's LCR. According to International Crisis Group report (2019) many of those kidnapped by extremists and subjected to atrocities are now living in refugee camps and displaced person settlements around the region. Some people tried to escape but were caught and died as a result of their injuries. After having their ears, breasts, or limbs chopped off, they would be left to die in the jungle.

The insurgent organizations have taken over significant swaths of land and have crippled the region's economy. Between January and April 2019, the INSO recorded 896 occurrences in the Lake Chad Basin region, including kidnappings, attacks, roadblocks, and bombs. They wreak havoc on crops and infrastructure, such as roads; making it impassable for traders to carry their wares. These measures have severe consequences of food security in a region where farming, fishing, and animal husbandry support a larger percentage of the population. According to the research, these industries have also been affected.

3.5.1. The rise of Boko Haram

Muhammed Yusuf founded Boko Haram in 2002 as an Islamic sectarian organization in northeastern Nigeria. The word Boko Haram is a Hausa that refers to “Westernization Is Sacrilege/Sin.” Arabic terms is Jamā‘at Ahl al-Sunnah li-l-Da‘awah wa al-Jihād meaning, “People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad” from 2015 this is called ISWA and ISWAP. After an event in which group followers were supposedly exposed to extreme use of force by security operatives and were unable to obtain an official investigation into the case, the group introduced outbreaks on forces posts and other government establishments, massacre scores of officers.

When the police were unable to handle the situation, the army was called in. Several hundred of Boko Haram members were killed in the succeeding Joint Military Task Force assault, which also demolished the group's headquarters mosque. Yusuf

and other commanders were caught by the military and turned over to the police. A few days later, the bullet-riddled bodies of Yusuf and his colleagues, including his father-in-law, Baba Fugu Mohammed, who had willingly given himself over to the police for questioning, were revealed in public; the organization, as well as others, were outraged by the police's extrajudicial act.

Boko Haram looked to be defunct, or at least inactive, after that tragedy until the following year, when a video was released in which Yusuf's deputy, Abubakar Shekau, declared himself the group's new head and threatened to avenge Yusuf and the others' deaths. This crusade of terror began with hit-and-run attacks on police checkpoints, seizing police officers' guns and forcing their way to the homes of local leaders who had cooperated with the police in Borno and Yobe through motorcycle raids. If they refused to leave, the people who had taken over the houses of fled Boko Haram militants were also slain. On Christmas Eve 2010, several explosives were detonated near churches and a market in two districts of Jos, Plateau state, killing dozens of people. Then, on New Year's Eve 2010, a bomb went off outside Abuja, killing ten people in a popular open-air seafood restaurant and market.

3.5.2. The front for change and concord in Chad

FACT's founder and leader, Mahamat M. Ali, has been a long-time nonconformist who first joined a rebel group at age of 14 years in 1978, essentially as a juvenile rebellious soldier. He has participated in Chadian rebellions against many administrations since then, as well as living as an outcast (in France) as an affiliate of the French Socialist Party. He was a member of the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), a rebel organization led by Mahamat Nouri that came close to deposing Deby in 2008 (Al Jazeera News 2021, Who are the FACT rebels and what are their goals).

The Goran tribe's fighters were the only ones in the group, but the Mahadi takeover in 2016 sparked clan differences – and fighting. As a result, three groups emerged: the UFDD, the FACT, and the CCMSR, which included fighters who split from FACT but whose political head Mahamat H. Bulmay was caught in Niger in 2017 and handed over to Deby.

The Front for Change and Concord in Chad was founded in Tanua in March 2016 by SG Mahamat Mahdi Ali with the sole purpose of overthrowing Idriss Deby's Chad's administration (TRAC, 2018). FACT began as mercenaries for several Libyan factions. President Idriss Deby was savagely wounded by this rebel group's bullets on April 20, 2021, and died as a result, Ramadane and Nako (2021). Aired on VOA (9 May 2021) that the Chad National Army declared victory over the FACT on May 9, 2021.

3.5.3. The Nigerien rebels

Cross-border banditry is a decades-old occurrence in south-western Niger, along the strip joining the divisions of Douthi and Madarounfa. However, it has converted increasingly to organized crime and violent in recent years. The attacks on Tahoua, near Niger's border with Mali, were previously blamed on militants belonging to the Islamic State (IS) group, according to a security source. This expansion can be attributed to several features, containing the 2011 Libyan catastrophe, worsening insecurity on the border states of north-western Nigeria, and the consequences of this neighboring zone on South-western Niger. According to Crisis Group Africa Report (2021) arms of war from Libyan stockpiles have been making their way down to meet part of the sub-regional request for weaponries, particularly from Nigerien and Nigerian felonious groups. As a result, the Libyan districts of Tahoua and Maradi have become important transit hubs for small arms and ammunition targeted towards Nigeria barons and West Africa at large.

3.6. ISIS in the region

The Islamic State has made inroads in Africa despite losing ground in the Levant. 07 March 2015, Shekau, the commander of the JAS (Boko Haram), announced signing an agreement with ISIS to supply new information on the caliphate's influence and operations. As part of its Charter, ISIS was important in reorganizing the Lake Chad Militants and provided them with substantial backing that reinforced their campaign (Ewi, 2015).

ISIS coordinated a large amount of support for ISWAP and Boko Haram. Technically, a group of six to eight "Arabs" commanded by Abu Obeidah spent a few months in the Sambisa forest training all of the ISWAP's unit commanders on strategy

and tactics courses (Int. Crisis Group Africa, 19 October 2020). In addition, ISIS serves as a philosophical and religious model for extremists in the LCR, with the former serving as an illuminator to the latter by instilling in them a feeling of religiosity that supports their violent actions. More frequently than not, financial, material, and food supplies are used to support the region's stronghold. ISIS also provides intelligence to Boko Haram and afterwards ISWAP in order to lead their attacks.

3.7. Herders and farmers conflicts

Nzouankeu (2021) observed Kousseri, Cameroon - rainfall levels surrounding Lake Chad in Cameroon have dropped, causing streams to dry up and escalating the conflict between farmers and herders over scarce supplies. Ahmadu (2011) presented that the region around Lake Chad has served as a battleground for these wars. Herders from other ecological zones, such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroun, were drawn to settle in the Nigerian lake basin's hinterlands because of the basin's economic possibilities for both farming and herding. Indeed, the conflict between newly arrived herders and their host farmers grew prevalent and widespread, causing a number of deaths and property destroyed.

The increased activities in Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria of the insurgent and jihadist groups (BH, Al-Qaeda, and ISWAP) have limited herders' mobility and shifted their pathways (Zucconi, 2019). Governments' inability to control insurgents and terrorist groups in both the Western Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin has had serious ramifications for people targeted by these groups as well as tensions between farmers and herders as natural resource competition, particularly for land and water, are major sources of conflict in the Lake Chad Basin.

3.8. Role of international interventions

Initiatives have been developed by international entities such as the UN, the AU, the ECOWAS, the LCBC, and many INGOs to address some of the difficulties that the region is facing. These programs include those aimed at reducing desertification and deforestation, as well as humanitarian, pastoralism, and insecurity through cross-border policy.

3.8.1. UN (UNDP)

United Nation Development Programme, (agency of the UN) presented the following Framework for a quick stabilization of the region UNDP Publication (31 August 2018);

Making development funds accessible 'early' (through a variety of sources; the EU, AFD, World Bank, Germany, the UK) and processing it more swiftly.

- a) Supporting and meeting the essentials of the vulnerable people, such as those affected by conflict.
- b) More adaptive programming is possible with more flexible development funds.
- c) At the local/community level, working with a broader range of partners and using various instruments.
- d) Regional and cross-border techniques are being used.

The results of a group effort; governments (The leadership and engagement of the federal, state, and local governments), in collaboration with humanitarian and development groups.

- a) Human capacity development and recruitment.
- b) Budget planning is both spatially integrated and participatory.
- c) Coherence and coordination have improved.
- d) New concepts for economic transformation that are both realistic and innovative.

3.8.2. The EU and UNDP

EU is assisting the UN Development Programme's (UNDP) 'Regional Stabilization Facility for Lake Chad' (RSF). Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger are among the countries that will profit. The total expected cost amount is derived from the Trust Fund of 5.000.000 EUR, with indirect administration with the United Nations Development Programme (main delivery channels 41000 – 41114). According to EUTF for Africa, Lake Chad (2019) internal security forces and law enforcement agencies of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad are direct beneficiaries. Institutions

for National Human Rights and civil society organizations in Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. Populations of the four states in the LCBR are indirect benefits.

The goal is to stabilize Lake Chad Basin's Boko Haram-affected districts. The specific goals are to promote population safety and security, as well as control over lake-bordering territories, and to improve Human Rights respect by Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies in the intervention zones.

3.8.3. The World Bank

There are considerable infrastructure gaps, limited access to basic services, and climate induced challenges and insurgent activities had a noteworthy impact on natural as well as human resources and livelihoods. Overall, LCR has a very weak development and economic indices, due to this, on May 26, 2020, Washington – The World Bank has granted \$346 million in IDA funding for two projects in the LCR, which is shared by the immediate border countries; Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.

3.8.4. German Government and WFP

1 June 2017, it was announced by the World Food Programme (United Nations) that the German government contributed US\$28.5 million to the UN's WFP to help more than 710,000 starving publics in the four-nation Lake Chad region, which is combating the Boko Haram insurgency. WFP efforts in Nigeria (€10.5 million), Cameroon (€5.6 million), Chad (€4.7 million), and Niger (€4.7 million) is supported by this contribution. The monies come at a critical time, as the upcoming lean season – the time between crops – is eroding people's resources and escalating hunger and malnutrition. Musa (2020) presented that, for the mental and psychological well-being of persons in the IDPs in the LCR, Germany has provided 60 million euros (about N2.7 billion).

3.8.5. African Union

The inaugural Conference on the Development of a Framework for Regional Cooperation was held in November 2017 by the AUC, (LCBC), and Development Partners (Stabilization Strategy). The Framework's purpose was to make collaboration easier for people. Shifting from active military involvement to the investigation of the

problem's roots and rationalization of multiple programs aimed at stabilizing areas in Nigeria where Boko Haram has a foothold. AUC & LCBC (2018).

AfDB News (30 Nov 2011) announced that the African Development Bank (AfDB), which invested USD 146 million in the GEF initiative, collaborated extensively on the program design with the five implementing nations (Central African Republic, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad). It asks for preservation of the lake's water and agro-sylvan ecosystems, as well as ensuring resource sustainability while meeting the demands of energy efficiency and food security. Recently (AfDB News 25 July 2018) the African Development Bank's Director-General for Central Africa Region, Ousmane Dore, told UN bodies and representatives of the west and central African UN missions that the bank will endure to backing an conservational resourcefulness to safeguard the shrinking Lake Chad, a source of water for millions of people in central and west Africa. The Bank has financed more than \$160 million for provincial schemes in LCR over the last decade to combat ecological and humanitarian concerns.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROLES AND EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE BATTLE AGAINST TERRORISM IN LAKE CHAD

4.1. The Lake Chad Basin Commission

Okpara et al. (2016) noted that, from historically this lake was the world's sixth largest inland water body until the 1960s. It has been critical to Western and Central Africa's social, economic, and cultural activities. The region, which spans 427,500 km², is made up of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria (Oyewole, 2015). The Sahel, a region with highly erratic precipitation, encompasses the populated area around Lake Chad, which is encircled by this perimeter (Chitra et al, 2018).

According to Magrin (2014), official trade links between countries in the Lake Chad basin are quite limited at only 6%, due to some of factors such as; Nigeria and Niger are ECOWAS members, while Chad and Cameroon are ECCAS members; the colonial partition along river lines had exacerbated border-related concerns, resulting in a slew of instability. To solve all of these issues, countries in the Lake Chad Basin devised a plan to work together to share hydro political gains for the benefit of their respective populace.

Ani, Jungodu and Ojakorotu (2018) pointed out that water is essential not only for human and animal but also for the survival of the ecosystem. For a multitude of reasons, the world's water supply is diminishing. Individual, organizational, and national manipulation of water to achieve multi-dimensional objectives resulted in aqua-conflicts among nations as a result of reduced water availability. Nonetheless, this study focuses on how the decrease in Lake Chad's water has caused social vices among concerned groups, primarily non-state actors, and how state actors can collectively end these rebellious activities in the region.

The LCBC (CBLT) was established on May 22, 1964, by the Heads of State of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, and is one of Africa's first basin institutions. Libya was incorporated into LCBC in 2008 while Sudan, Republic of Congo, and Democratic Republic of Congo have observer positions. LCBC was formed to promote

the long-term administration and usage of the lake and other water resources in the region, such as rivers. Ibrahim (2007) submitted that it is an intergovernmental agency that controls the basin's water and other natural resources thus, members agree to utilize the basin's natural resources cooperatively. The commission has \$1 million annual budget this is funded by member countries according to a formula: Nigeria has 52% of the vote, Cameroon has 26%, Chad has 11%, Niger has 7%, and the Central African Republic has 4% Sirte, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (FAO, 2008).

Nigerian authorities confronted by a full-fledged violent extremist groups in the country's northeast, which has taken control of a substantial chunk of this part of the country at times. Even though they are battling a shared enemy (the terrorist groups), each of the four countries has its own set of objectives. Cameroon, on the other hand, is faced with cross-border threats, despite having to repel well-planned and premeditated raids on its border garrisons on a few occasions. In each of the four countries, militants offer a different threat, making regional response coordination difficult. Chad, on the other hand, has concentrated on lake skirmishes and the defense of armed supplies passing through Cameroon's territory. In addition, Niger has conducted border containment operations and, in rare cases, bigger counter-insurgency operations in its own country and Nigeria.

4.2. Immediate member states and LCBC

According to Odada et al. (2005), organized nations such as the Kanem – Borno and the kingdoms of Biala, Adai, and Fezzan strove, with varying degrees of success to impose their political authority over the enormous depression known as Lake Chad before the entrance of colonial forces. Lake Chad, however, has served as a unifying element for the people who dwell around it since the arrival of Islam to the area in the 9th century A.D., and the establishment of the Kanem – Borno. Jauro (1994) observed that the late-nineteenth-century race for African colonies by European Power Blocks reshaped Lake Chad's narratives and its drainage basin.

The need for collaboration among the four riparian countries grew in the aftermath of the 1960s independence. The geographical position of member states in the basin informs their interests and dynamics in the commission, and their historical usage of the basin's resources informs the second. Beginning in the 1950s, Lake Chad

region was the site of the practical development of water and irrigation system (for farming) by multiple nations, including northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and the Central African Republic, all of which aspired to alter their agricultural systems, therefore;

4.2.1. Nigeria

This is the clear regional hegemon, funding more than a half of the LCBC's operational budget, playing a vital role in the organization's policy and institutional development. Nigeria is likewise a supporter of proposed inter-basin linkage of Ubangui River. Enlarging Lake Chad to its original boundaries will allow Northern Nigeria to reclaim access to the body's coasts, restarting the fishing industry in the north while also improving the country's agricultural self-sufficiency in the war-torn north.

4.2.2. Cameroon

Cameroon's hydro political position is unique in that it is incorporated between three main river basins: River Niger, Congo-Ubangui-Sangha, and Lake Chad basins, giving it a considerable substantial stake. As a result of this attitude, Cameroon has decided to commit at least some political capital to each of the three basin organizations.

4.2.3. Chad

Chad, with 50 percent of the lake within its borders, has the largest vested interest in the basin from a geographical standpoint. The lake is also only a short distance from the country's capital and most populous city. However, until the late 2000s, political instability and conflicts precluded the country from making large investments in the LCBC (Magrin, 2014). Chad, long regarded as an impoverished landlocked country in the Sahel, is progressively becoming provincial security player, not only in the close region but also advanced towards south in central Africa (International Crisis Group, 2016).

4.2.4. Niger

The Republic of Niger has only a limited hydrological interest in Lake Chad region but is more apprehensive with the basin's security network among the countries.

4.3. The duties of the LCBC

Article 9 of the Revised Statutes (1990) enumerates the following functions of LCBC

- a) To develop general regulations that will allow the full enforcement of the philosophies of the Commission outlined in its various conventions and its appended statute and ensure that they are applied effectively.
- b) To gather assess, and propagate information (data and statistics) on schemes proposed by the participant states, as well as to endorse strategies for collaborative initiatives and research in the Lake Chad region.
- c) To maintain handy communication among stakeholders in the maximum or effectual usage of the Basin's waters.
- d) To keep the Member States informed about the headway of the studies and activities in the Lake Chad basin as envisioned in the current Convention, at least annually, through organized and timely intelligence that each State should acquiesce to it.
- e) To develop a set of agreed norms for navigation and transportation.
- f) To draft staff guidelines and guarantee that they are effectively and efficiently followed.
- g) To scrutinize grievances and inspire the settlement of clashes and the perseverance of disagreements.
- h) To oversee the execution of the provisions of the existing Statute and the Convention to which it is annexed.

4.4. Structural and functional constraints of the LCBC

From its structure to its functions, LCBC faces various hurdles. Here are a few of these constraints:

- a) The Executive Secretary's post consolidates decision-making authority. Because power is not outsourced to Secretariat workers, the ES is virtually the single decision-maker, reflecting Abubakar Bobboi Jauro's lengthy stay in the office, which reinforced the role's discretionary powers, (Njeuma and Malaquais, 2014).
- b) According to Lemoalle and Magrin (2014), LCBC's staff's low competence to manage major projects, as well as the requirement to coordinate a large number of donor-funded initiatives, is due to the staff's frequent political recruitment, and recruitment methods and selection criteria are opaque. Leading to deficiencies in Planning, management, financial management, information management, communication, and others, as staff abilities are lacking.
- c) The LCBC is not participating in all key regional schemes and projects, such as road construction projects in Cameroon and Chad that include flood-prevention dikes, which have effects on water management.
- d) There is no instrument of evaluation of the Executive Secretariat's performance in terms of its objectives.
- e) Another difficulty is the random scheduling of the Conference of Heads of States and Governments, which is hypothetically designed to provide political guidance to the LCBC. Despite the fact that it was scheduled to meet biannually, only 14 sessions were held between 1964 and 2012. The MNJTF was reconstituted in 2012 to fight Boko Haram with a regional reaction, hence the 14th meeting was allegedly on topics that were not related to its primary mission (Théroux-Bénoni, 2015).
- f) The roles and responsibilities of Member States' ministries and entities dealing with Lake Chad's water and natural resources are not always clear, impeding assimilated water resource administration. The established structure for water supervision is frequently insufficient, and deprived water management in each member state makes the effective and efficient functionality of LCBC difficult.

- g) National water administrative policies and approaches (e.g., rules, action plans, performance pointers, deadlines, and more) in member nations are woefully inadequate, and a general absence of control mechanisms to limit irrational access to water usage and sanction breaches is evident.
- h) Only incompletely operational programmes to regulate water intensities.
- i) Hydro resource end-users are not appropriately sensitized, resulting in misuse.

4.5. Military cooperation in the LCB

The development of violent extremism throughout the region sparked efforts to coordinate regional security. The five member states of the Multinational Joint Task, a multinational military force certified by the African Union's PSC, are Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, also backed by external partners (Casola, 2020).

4.5.1. Multinational joint task force

This multinational security force carried out military operations in the LCR to combat banditry and encourage free movement of people and commerce cross-border. MNJTF is predominantly military, its headquarters is in N'Djamena, and its mission is to put a stop to armed conflicts (Musa, 2013). Armed gangs and common banditry thrived in the LCR before Boko Haram's fanaticism, as a result of the countries' weak security network and permeable borders. At the 8th summit in 1994, the LCBC countries decided to construct a unified security strength based in Baga-Kawa, Nigeria, in response to trafficking and illegal activity in the arena.

Akinrinde (2020) submitted that this move was caused by the realization that terrorist activities did not necessarily originate on Nigerian soil, as it was initially perceived by the neighboring states. During Sani Abacha's presidency, the task force was formed in 1994 as a purely Nigerian organization to "checkmate banditry operations and promote free passage" along the country's northern border. However, in 1998, the security operation was expanded to include other member states of the LCBC by establishing the MNJSF.

A solid approach for dealing with the many extremist groups that dominate LCR is contingent on only on military processes, but also on the ability of riparian countries

to advance the living standard of residents and have their reliance. This strategy, however, can be aided by a more effective unified force. Despite their opposition to full integration of their forces into the MNJTF, the Lake Chad states should assist the MNJTF in growing by better sharing strategies and intelligence, obligating soldiers to durable deployments, resolving funding issues, and increasing military human rights compliance.

According to Omenma (2019), leaders in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger initially reacted with caution and abjuration, regarding the organization as primarily a Nigerian issue and refused to accept that it had developed a foothold in their countries. Their apprehensions about the insurgency grew over time, with Chadian President Idriss Déby, who was concerned that the fighting was suffocating his country's economy, being the most vociferous (France 24, 2013).

In late 2014 and early 2015, the Lake Chad countries, along with Benin, reshaped the MNJTF in its current configuration. Musa (2013) submitted that they pledged a total of a little over 8,000 troops to the unified force. On March 3, 2015, the African Union approved the force, with a regional authority, LCBC, overseeing noncombat operations. The MNJTF built a crucial global framework to battle Boko Haram extremists, who were increasingly launching attacks across international boundaries.

The MNJTF's operational capacity was increased as a result of this reconfiguration, which was first determined by Nigeria (Zamfir, 2017). Until January 2015, the MNJTF was stationed in Baga, Nigeria, which was overtaken by Boko Haram assault. The MNJTF was placed under the political authority of the African Leadership and its African Peace and Security Architecture, and its military headquarters relocated to N'Djamena.

Abada et al. (2020, p. 43) stated the mandates of the MNJSF were as follows:

- a) Conduct military operations in the LCR;
- b) Check bandit activity;
- c) Allow unfettered movement of troops from member nations over the common border.

To build a nonviolent and protected environment in places where Boko Haram and other terrorist groups are active. Support to ensure the enactment of a program among the LCBC Member States, as well as Benin's comprehensive stabilization efforts in obstructed areas. Smooth public-spirited operations and the delivery of support to impacted inhabitants to the best of its capacity.

4.5.2. Phases of the multinational joint task force in the Lake Chad Basin (2015 - 2020).

The MNJTF initiated Gama Aiki I and II (Finish the Job, Hausa Language) in 2016 and 2017, respectively, to launch offensive strikes against extremist groups. Amni Faka (Peace at All Costs, Hausa Language) launched fresh offensive operations later in 2018. Yancin Tafki (Lasting Freedom, Hausa Language) was introduced in 2019 and Lafiya Dole will be introduced in 2020. (Long Tiger, Hausa Language). Each lasted a few months, even though they often struggled to consolidate gains they had made due to weaknesses in the response of some of the political class in the regional politics around Lake Chad Basin. Despite limitations, the troop helped weaken Boko Haram, by reducing its ability to hold terrain or to attack towns and large military facilities – extricating insurgents from their headlocks, freeing the captives under the terrorists, and securing border areas – though they simultaneously pointed out that many achievements were short-lived.

According to Alufoge and Duruji (2021), 2016 Gama Aiki I, between June and November 2016, held Borno State and other parts of the LCR. It involved combined military action from the troop contributing countries, Gama Aiki I operation was a tremendous success, leading to the recapture of Boko Haram-controlled territories. The forces were compelled to become more responsive as a result of this. Paragraph 2, United Nations Security Council report (7 September 2017) read in part that, "... in the fight against Boko Haram; the regional military effort led by the Multinational Joint Task Force and the national militaries of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria made significant progress. Huge number of Boko Haram terrorists, including a prominent commander, were recaptured when the Sambisa Forest was taken over by the MNJTF in December 2016." This is a pointer to the achievement of Gama Aiki I.

Table 3. MNJTF combat on the offensive

MNJTF	Sector or Mode	Place of Action	Date
Combined Operation	Sector III (Nigeria) Sector IV (Niger)	Douma, Assaga, Gashga, Dumba, Dagiwa, Dalgaa, Liwur, Daya	4 May 2020
Combined Operation	Sector I (Cameroon) Sector III (Nigeria)	Garai, Bulakesa, Bukar Maryam, Zanari, Wukgo	June 20
Combined Operation Operation Rufe Kofa (OpYT)	ISR & Air/Artillery Sector I	TCCs Madara Mountains. Sambisa Forest Firgi, Yale, Assa, Bama	2020 December 2017 – January 2020
Operation Colore Bohoma	Sector II (Chad)	Bohoma Tumbun Madayi	23 March 2020 – Mid April 202p
Operation Long Tiger (Lafiya Dole)	Sector III	Jikana Maimaloria, Gubio Bornoyesu, Damasak	January 2020
Operational Gudubasi	Sector III	Cross Kauwa to Gudubali	January 2020
Operation Akukabi	Sector IV	Chefima Wongo to Bukabrim Aru - kabi	7 March 2020
Operation Barrah	Sector IV	Boudoum, Bolori, Matori Gisum, Damasak	17 April 2020
Operation Visits	All Sectors	All Stations	MNJTF

4.5.3. Approaches adopted by MNJTF

4.5.3.1. Kinetic operations of the MNJTF

Woodward (2002, p. 150) in part reads, that the war council had been circling the core question for days: how long could they wait after September 11 before turning "kinetic," as they called it, against al Qaeda in a visible manner? The public was patient or appeared to be, yet everyone wanted something done. A robust military response—air and ground—would send a strong message to bin Laden, America, and the rest of the world. According to Noah (2002), "Kinetic" is an adjective that describes motion in ordinary usage, but its Washington meaning comes from its secondary definition, "active as opposed to latent." Killing people by dropping bombs and shooting guns is kinetic.

As a result, the MNJTF used a kinetic approach to suppress the extremists' outburst in the LCBR, which includes; air operations, improved amphibious capabilities, and the adoption of tactics, techniques, and procedures for the best possible operational outcomes. The usage of kinetic to combat insurgents is depicted in Table 4.1. Operation YancinTarki (OpYT) was successful in regaining important

terrain previously held by terrorist groups and displacing the enemies from their hiding places.

4.5.3.2. *Non-kinetic operations of the MNJTF*

"Kinetic activities are those carried out with the use of tangible, material weapons such as bombs, bullets, rockets, and other munitions." Non-kinetic acts include logical, electromagnetic, and behavioral actions, such as a computer network attack on an adversary system or a psychological operation targeting enemy forces. Non-kinetic acts include a physical component, their effects are mostly indirect-functional, systemic, psychological, or behavioral." (Lehto and Henselmann, 2020, p. 318). According to Casey-Maslen (2010, p. 9), "the term 'non-kinetic-energy weapons' is recommended as an overall category rather than 'non-lethal' or 'less-lethal.' However, just as there is no universally agreed-upon definition of what defines a "non-lethal" weapon, there is no singular universally adopted definition of what establishes an NKE weapon.

"As a result of the foregoing, the MNJTF focuses on community-based outreach. By method of sensitization, this seeks to stifle the recruitment and intention drive of dissuading would-be terrorist adolescents. Adoption of worldwide best practices for disarming, demobilizing, rehabilitating, and reintegrating terrorists who have surrendered. MNJTF collaborates with CIMIC to reach out to civilians. The Force Commander (FC), Major General Abdul Khalifah Ibrahim, delivered a lecture on Thursday, February 24, 2022 (National Defense College NDC Abuja) titled "Counter-Terrorism/Insurgency Operations and National Security in Nigeria: The MNJTF In Perspective" MNJTF.ORG 25/02/2022 (Retrieved 03/03/2022). The FC was emphatic on the need for multidimensional lines of the operation aimed at ending the conflict, rather than over-reliance on the military line of operation alone. As a result, he argued for a whole-of-society approach to resolving the insurgency and other security issues.

According to the African Union Commission's Chairperson's report on continental steps in Africa to prevent and defeat terrorism (Consideration of the Renewal of the Mandate of the MNJTF. AmaniAfricaNews 14 January 2022), Boko Haram launched around 33 attacks in the first half 2021, killing 175 people. Boko Haram remains Africa's most destructive terrorist group, with the biggest number of

victims in recent history, despite a decline from 2020 (59 attacks with 375 deaths in just a few days).

4.6. Some of the MNJTF Accomplishments

Despite the MNJTF's deficiencies in terms of composition, money, synergy, and intelligent information delivery, as well as poor border control. Hostility and noncooperation from the local community, little or no understanding of the theater of operation, and an endless number of hurdles, the force achieved a great deal, as follows:

- a) It enables the LCBR to work together more tactically.
- b) MNJTF has collaborated with other Lake Chad countries on several occasions, such as national armies, allowing for additional idea exchange.
- c) Despite disagreements among the governing and organizational structures, hindering training and finance. MNJTF showcase established platforms for contributor's money to flow into counter-insurgency processes.
- d) Donors have provided technical and logistic supports more than TCCs would have provided in a strictly bilateral relationship.
- e) The MNJTF serves as a foundation for the African Union to see itself through possibilities to disseminate continental body norms on troop behavior and compliance with international humanitarian law.
- f) The joint force has also provided chances for humanitarian players. They have used the MNJTF to talk to military personnel about how to contact with detained militants or other Boko Haram members, as well as, on how to ensure the safety of the civilians.

4.7. Challenges Facing MNTJF

The structural hitches inside the MNJTF, such as the force's military operations' weak chain of command, which is a source of concern, according to Giulia (2016). Jihadists routinely reorganize when forces dissolve due to their unequal loyalty to the force, as well as financial and planning challenges. On April 9, 2020, Chad's Debby criticized other Lake Chad counties' inaction against extremists, claiming that this left

Chad to do the majority of the work in both the lake area and the Sahel and that as a result, " henceforth, no Chadian soldier will take part in a military operation outside the terrain of Chad" (Chad: President Idriss Déby's Blows of Anger, Com', and Bluff in the Face of Jihadists, Le Monde, April 16, 2020).

Furthermore, the Force is characterized by poor intelligence gathering as a result of its poor structural layout, which has frequently jeopardized its success. Another illustration comes from Crisis Group International (2019), which cites an interview with an MNJTF member, who stated that the boat and night vision equipment needed on the lake to navigate the terrorist hideout "have sometimes no adequate plan to put such into use, due to poor foresight and internal communication."

According to Azzarone (2016) funding is a major impediment to the joint force's effectiveness; LCBRGs are poor governments with crippled economies typified by a low standard of living, which has a significant impact on the regional MNJTF's funding, rendering the operation primarily donor-dependent. Individuals contributed to saving the badly hit Boko haram LCBR despite the absence of funds from the UN and the late delivery of the EU pledge; this contributor enabled the MNJTF to achieve some victories in 2016 during their war against insurgents. Although the UK, France, and the USA's material, financial, then technical assistance were not provided.

The MNJTF's personnel structure is still poor, posing a threat to the combined force's ability to function. The uneasiness stems from the fact that MNJTF's units are from diverse military cultures and follow distinct creeds — communication is conducted in both English and French. Unlike the Joint Force of the Sahel (JF-G5S) between Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad (Francophonic African nations) was formed in July 2017. Hickendorff et al. (2017) submitted that the MNJTF was founded by the countries bordering Lake Chad with the purpose of eliminating the threat posed by cross-border related limitations. However, the formation of this force was fraught with difficulties, and while its success has yet to be seen, it paved the way for the new JF-G5S, which has not faced the same difficulties discussed by González (2017).

According to the Institute for Strategic Studies (2015), further obstacles facing the MNJTF include insufficient force size in contrast to terrain size and little or no topographic experience. Because there is no criminal justice system to support the

military response, the involvement of the AU, ECOWAS, and ECCAS is uncertain. MNJTF's departure strategy is also hindered by the fact that old regional rivalries exist.

4.8. Civil-Military Co-operation

Galulo (1964) argued in his famous book *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* that, to counter an insurgency, the COIN must gain the support and legitimacy of the local population, promote good governance, and maintain a sufficient number of security troops to consolidate the territory's peace. According to Bergner (1998), within its sphere of responsibility, CIMIC is how the military expertise creates official links with national and local administrations, the civilian population, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. This desire towards a peaceful continent culminated in the African Union's 2003's **Silencing the Guns in Africa Agenda**, which aims to stop all conflicts, conflict, and gender-based violence, as well as prevent genocide. UNDP has recommitted its partnerships, programs, and opportunities with the African Union to further the Silencing the Guns goal by 2030 by establishing the necessary conditions for Africa's transformative growth (UNDP AFRICA REPORT 23 FEBRUARY 2022).

4.8.1. Community – military cooperation in the LCBR

The military was primarily in charge of counter-insurgency operations throughout the early phases of Boko Haram's activity. However, as the war against terrorist organizations progresses, the need for continued civic and communal cooperation becomes vital. Community-military cooperation is evident in the founding of the Civilian Joint Task Force, which has been credited with some of Nigeria's victories against Boko Haram since 2013, or the security and vigilance committees in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

Residents in impacted areas are more aware of the topographies in which defense and security personnel operate, providing them an advantage in discovering or identifying violent radicals who may be living among residents. They can provide basic intelligence to officers who are unfamiliar with the linguistics, philosophy, or layout of the locations to which they have been assigned. Because the whole relationship between communities and the military is mutually beneficial, the defense

and security forces architect is designed to offer security and protection for communities to avoid interruption of their lives and livelihoods.

Through continuous encounters and enhanced communication, civilian-military trust must be established and maintained. Efforts in the LCBR to defeat the various insurgent groups would fail unless there is trust and complete support from local communities. The lack of trust between the two parties (on both sides), as well as the punitive acts conducted by violent extremists against communities that are seen working with security officers. While the military is suspicious of some communities and accuses them of aiding and abetting violent extremists and sabotaging military efforts, communities distrust the military for making broad accusations that can lead to human rights violations such as subjective apprehensions and confinement, forced evictions, and extrajudicial killings. Cooperation between these two sorts of actors was damaged due to this.

Some of the military methods and strategies against Boko Haram have only added to the suspicion. The military has tried to suffocate Boko Haram by restricting the group's access to vital supplies by banning human, vehicular, and even boat movements in specific areas and at specific times; these restrictions have hampered the transportation and use of certain commodities that are essential for civilian livelihoods, observed by Hoinathy (2021).

According to Olojo and Aniekwe (2021), in conjunction with local communities, the UNDP PVE Team in Addis Ababa assisted the MNJTF in developing strategic communication (StratCom) a narrative scheme for averting and refuting violent extremism. By instilling in military the value of excellent communication and community relations, which is critical to the military's ability to engage communities through effective communication. For more effective interaction, a community's comprehension of the military's hierarchical structure is also critical. Requests for coordination and reporting of military personnel rights violations, for example, must be directed to the appropriate office as well as the most senior officer with the applicable responsibility. Requests being misdirected or a top person being boycotted as a result of a misunderstanding of the ranks can stymie coordination efforts and harm goodwill.

4.8.2. Humanitarian-military cooperation in the LCBR

In the LCBR, this is the type of cooperation and coordination that occurs between humanitarian actors and military forces. The military cannot provide adequate security for a single large mission largely due to;

- a) Financial reason: Transporting humanitarian aid over several minor missions raises logistics expenses, such as the cost of fuel for humanitarian vehicles.
- b) Implications in terms of time: the military is incapable of providing appropriate security for a single large mission. This implies that missions take far longer than anticipated because one batch must return before the next can be transferred.
- c) The time and money spent switching from procuring humanitarian supplies to paying for logistics might lead to inefficient or misuse use of scarce resources.
- d) Like the community, the humanitarian actors were linked with some terror groups. The Nigerian army accused humanitarian groups of supplying food and drugs to Boko Haram members in 2019. In Borno State, some of these groups have been ordered to close their main offices and have been declared persona non grata (Reuters, 19 September 2019. The Nigerian Army claims that a non-governmental organization).

It has already been shown that substantial synergy between these two groups is required. Nigeria, for example, has passed legislation requiring aid organizations to deploy military escorts (Human Rights Watch. March 2020. Nigeria: army constraints are suffocating humanitarian initiatives.).

Table 4. MNJTF, CIMC NKE approach to win the fight against the insurgent groups

September 2021	Medical Services: free drugs, free health services	Kangaleri, Hamaka, Mora, Bibi, N'gouboua, Baga Sole, Manguno, Kaauiwa, Toumour, Kabelewa, Kagare
21 Dec. 2021	Food Distribution: rice, millet, couscous, salt, palm oil, more	Baroua (Niger) Pari
14 January 2022	Distribution of Medical facilities: wheelchairs, drugs, medical services	Monguno, Wulgo
4 January 2022	Distribution of Materials: T-shirts, books, school bags, school uniforms, school shoes, other writing materials.	Banguida, Bagana
2021 to 2022	Drilling and fixing of bore holes	Baga and Buduram communities of Kukawa Local Government Area (January 2022) Wulgo (20 Sept. 2021)
4-23 Dec. 2021	Football matches among youths	
24 Dec 2021	Christmas Party and Donation of gift items to Shallon Orphanages by the Force Commander (FC)	N'djamena
15 Dec 2021	Re-opening of an International Market which has been closed for 7 years due to insurgency.	Damasak International Market

4.8.3. Civilian joint task force in the LCBR

Civil militias can be organized to redress concerns and correct manifest inequalities in society, according to Waal and Ibek (2013). Civil Militia was defined by Schubert (2015) as "associations of individuals who have banded together for self-defense in times of disturbance," which accurately describes the Civilian Joint Task Force mission.

According to Tar and Bala (2020, p. 403), "Modern civilization has since relegated the Africa Traditional Security establishment and practice to the background, describing it as unscientific, crude, and unreliable from the context of their conspicuous links to charms, amulets, and mystical powers as well as the use of brute force against suspects. Despite the criticism, evidence has shown that security forces still relied heavily on them for their success." According to Reza (2020), Youths and vigilante groups formed the Civilian Joint Task Force in 2013 to support Nigerian security forces in their fight against Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria and to protect local communities from terrorist assaults.

"Governments of the several states afflicted by the Boko Haram crisis altered the groups and gave them new names, such as the Youth Vanguard in Borno, the Peace Group in Yobe, and the Sarkin Baka in Adamawa. Allowances and logistics were

supplied by the government as motivation. The military authorities are in charge of both oversight and training.” Reza (2020). The CJTF has served in a variety of functions, agreeing to a 2017 assessment by the International Crisis Group, spanning from Niger's mostly isolated monitoring groups to Nigeria's paramilitary or semi-autonomous combatants. They have helped to bridge the security gap in the region by providing local knowledge to overwork and under-pressure forces. They improved the military's response by making it more focused and efficient.

However, coming with loopholes too, the CJTF is reportedly implicated in extrajudicial executions in the northeast, according to reports. " Individuals who appear to be personnel of the Nigerian military and the Civilian Joint Task Force are shown cutting detainees' necks one by one and dumping them into mass graves; a state-sponsored militia," according to Amnesty International (2014). These charges are supported by the International Crisis Group (2017). The Nigerian government and military, on the other hand, have denied any such incidents. Sexual assaults and extortion of civilians and IDPs have also been charged against the CJTF.

4.9. De-radicalization

According to Ehiane (2019), counterterrorism necessitates both a harsh and a soft strategy, with de-radicalization being one of the soft options. In some countries where terrorists operate, this effort has been aggressive, sustained, and successful. Martin (2007) submitted, the Indonesian authorities used cultural reform to discover a technique that quickly transformed the mindsets of terrorist detainees. This cultural method was adopted to limit the growth of radical ideology and minimize the extremist tendency of convicts in jail due to a humanitarian attitude and established links. Aslam (2016) noted, that the Religious Therapy Program is a major de-radicalization project in Malaysia. Reeducation and rehabilitation are at the heart of the majority of the programs. Reeducation attentions on amending militants' dogmatic and mystical errors and sentiments, while rehabilitation is used to keep track on militants after they are released.

De-radicalized individuals often assist in countering terrorist groups or networks. During the "Emergency" of the 1950s in Malaya, the Malayan National Liberation Army, launched attacks against the government, security forces, and the

local population. Over 300 MNLA members surrendered or were captured, and were de-radicalized to the point where they volunteered to serve (Comber, 2008).

4.9.1. De-radicalization in Nigeria

The Nigerian government, according to Felbab-Brown (2018), has launched a defectors program (known as Operation Safe Corridor) for "repentant" low-risk male soldiers and a "low-risk" women's reintegration program, such as those married to the extremists or terrorists. The argument over reprieve and current clemency programs stemmed from the awareness that the counterinsurgency effort had failed and that criminals and victims were frequently mixed up. On February 19, 2020, a Nigerian legislator (Ibrahim Gaidam) introduced legislation to create the National Agency for De-radicalization schemes focuses on the rehabilitation and reintegration of repentant extremists.

The purpose of this measure is to promote and naturalize Boko Haram converts while also reducing Nigerian violent extremism. Given the Nigerian parliament's recent requests for additional military force to attack Boko Haram, this scheme is a serious step toward including de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs into the complete approach to clampdown any insurgency (Young, 2020). Nigeria governments at various levels have been working on de-radicalization for a long time, using three separate programs devised by different organizations:

4.9.1.1. In prison

The Prison Program assists militants who have been convicted of violent extremist crimes or who are awaiting trial. Imams offer classes on nonviolent interpretations of Islam, and vocational training is provided so that offenders can reenter society with a lower likelihood of relapsing to terrorism after serving their sentences.

4.9.1.2. Yellow ribbon initiative

Boko Haram-affiliated women, children and young people who are supported through psychosocial, behavioral, reintegration training, rehabilitation and reintegration programs.

4.9.1.3. Operation safe corridor

Nigerian military started Operation Safe Corridor in 2015 to assist the militant converts or ex-militants by deal with fanatical thought and providing trauma psychotherapy, resulting from erroneous religious ideology inculcated and trauma related effects (Shafa, 2018).

Table 5. De-radicalization schemes in Nigeria

	Jail Model	Yellow Ribbon Initiative	Operation Safe Corridor
Place	Abuja, Nigeria.	Societies in Borno, Nigeria	Short-term Facility in Gombe, Nigeria
Body Launch	Nigeria Govt. 2014	NEEM Foundation 2017	Federal Govt. 2016
Partakers	Extremist rebels	Vulnerable who had associated with the terrorists; Women, Children and young people	Surrendered extremists
Duration	Time spent in the prison	1 year	Between 16 weeks and 1 year.
Programme model	Dissuade repentant from returning to their former ways by combating religious doctrine and providing vocational training.	Psychological, behavioral, and reintegration training to assist them in overcoming their traumatic experiences	Combating religious ideology grievances and teaching repentant the right religion preaching for peace with the support of competent clergy

Source: Bukarti and Bryson (2019)

4.9.2. De-radicalization in Chad

The economy of Chad Republic is not as developed as those of the Cameroon and Nigeria. Between January and March 2016, some radicalist members, mostly Chad citizens, surrendered to the government. Since July 2016, Boko Haram fighters have surrendered in huge numbers as a result of persistent pressure from MNJTF soldiers. Over 1,000 Boko Haram fighters had surrendered up till March 2017. Women and children make up the majority of individuals who have surrendered and have been reintegrated into their communities under the supervision of district officials.

According to ICG, (Africa report no. 246, 8 March 2017), authorities, on the other hand, have failed to come up with a viable strategy for dealing with masculine converts. Till March 2017, over 300 males were brought to be in internment camps near Baga Sola in West Chad, with no clear plan for what to do with them.

4.9.3. De-radicalization in Niger

In 2018, the Niger government established a de-radicalization inter-ministerial group. The committee must evaluate how to reintegrate the militants, what sanctions are necessary (if any), and whose department is responsible. There has been less meaningful improvement. According to Max Bearak (2018), 132 former violent rebels who were known as "the contrite" were housed in a camp. Ex-fighters who have turned themselves in and against whom no additional indictments covered by immunity risk lesser prison sentences, according to laws passed till March 2019. This portion of the program that requires a legal foundation will be allowed to move forward, and the program will be fully functional.

4.9.4. De-radicalization in Cameroon

Cameroon appears to believe that military involvement is the only choice, unlike Nigeria, Chad, and Niger, which have embraced a peace-building program that gives amnesty to former militants. While amnesty has not always had the desired effects, it is undeniable that it is the only policy capable of reintegrating the thousands of warriors who have no option but to return home (Vincent, Funteh, Henri and Léa, 2017).

Despite this, Cameroon's army offered an amnesty, giving BH fighters in the country until December 31, 2017 to renounce or face a new attack by Nigerian and Cameroonian forces. The Cameroonian government lacks a vibrant strategy on how to deal with extremists (ICG, report no. 263, 14 August 2018)

4.10. Porous Military Equipment and Armed Smuggling and Control

The security sector has long struggled with a lack of appropriate quality and quantity of both lethal and non-lethal equipment. According to Postings (2019), in Nigeria, "Inadequate body armor and ammo," "tanks shot only twice," "armored carriers went for several minutes before overheating," "machine guns blocking," and "mortar bombs failed to detonate" were among the problems. These concerns are justified; a similar situation impeded Cameroonian security forces' early attempts to battle Boko Haram. Within the military, this issue is well-known according to research produced by the Nigerian Defence Academy, logistical deficiencies had a negative

impact on the performance of Operation Zaman Lafiya (Osakwe and Audu, 2017). The equipment used by soldiers (such as body armor, weapons, and night vision goggles) was sometimes antiquated, useless, or in short supply (ICG, 2016).

A government audit in Niger, for example, discovered that \$120 million was diverted owing to corruption in recent military gear purchase techniques (Aksar, 2020). On July 7, Cameroonian troops in the MNJTF, for example, shut down a key highway in the Far North to protest and attract attention to their charges that senior authorities had stolen money allocated for their welfare (ICG, 2017). Militants stormed a military camp in Jilli, Yobe state, on July 14, 2018; the tanks allocated to the base for the force were still being serviced elsewhere when the assailants arrived in vehicles painted in army colors and wearing army uniforms; the base machine guns were old and malfunctioning (Anyadike, 2018). Nigerian soldiers objected that with only 30 rounds and no food provisions, they could not hope to fight Boko Haram, a more capable armed opponent (VOA News. 4 September 2016. Certain soldiers of rank in the Nigerian armed forces are vending weapons to extremists).

The complexity of ISIS terrorists' weaponry and explosives in recent attacks, as indicated by security force seizures in northern Nigeria, is cause for concern. This section focuses on Boko Haram's arms smuggling efforts both inside and beyond the LCR, as well as how other African terrorist groups traffic arms. International trafficking is the smuggling of weapons across national borders. BH fighters have used stocking in products, loading in specially-adapted trucks, hiding beneath couriers' clothes, and tunneling for weaponry smuggling, similar to the global gun smuggling methods.

Table 6. Captured Boko Haram's sophisticated arms

Time	Location	Description of Incident
4/8/2013	Borno, Nigeria.	4 Toyota Vans, ten full of weapons were all captured by the MNJTF.
16/7/2012	Maiduguri, Borno, Nigeria.	8 assault weapons, and many rounds of ammo were found by JTF members.
31/7/2012	Town between Nigeria and Chad Republic.	Men of the Multinational Joint Task Force intercepted a Hilux vehicle carrying a variety of classical weapons inside the desert.

Source: Onuoha (2013)

According to Lichtenwald and Perri (2013), terrorist groups are not new to exploiting tunnels to carry guns, drugs, and other materials, and Boko Haram is no exception. Boko Haram, particularly in Borno State, has used similar tunnels to

smuggle weapons. Security personnel in the Bulabulin area revealed a vast grid of subterranean tunnels linking households and various trenches used by the non-state actors to trade Small Arms and Light Weapons in July 2013, (Soriwei, 2013), some of the tunnels and bunkers can contain more than a hundred individuals, allowing extremists fighters to hide and transfer SALWs around this area.

The Sahel (which encompasses the Lake Chad Basin Region) has been and continues to be a trade route/transit between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, as observed and submitted by Gaye (2018). Smuggling and trafficking thrive in areas with little state presence and extreme poverty, which has long been condoned or disregarded by the local authorities. On both sides of the border, populations in border areas engage in illegal activities through community-based networks. Jihadist groups thrive in these conditions, and intricate illicit trafficking rings with ties to international crime form throughout Europe, Asia, and Latin America.

Daniel (2014) noted that insecurity has allowed illicit operations to flourish in the LCR from North Africa, through the Sahel, allowing criminal networks to quickly adapt to internal and sub-regional geopolitical shifts. For example, 75 percent of the arms used by the extremists in the LCBR are smuggled from North Africa (Libya), entered the nation illegally through the Sahel (This Day, 9 June 2021, West Africa: Global Terrorism, Armed Struggle in Sahel, and Threat to Nigeria – Government).

According to Ojewale (2020), LCBR has a long history of arms trafficking; in 2013, thousands of AK-47 rifles were apprehended in Maroua, Cameroon. In early 2014, security forces apprehended one person attempting to transport hundreds of guns from Nigeria to Cameroon. In 2018, the military is said to have invaded a storeroom achieved by Cameroonian nationals and seized a cache of thousands of rounds of ammunition, an unknown amount of explosives, pistols, and cutlasses. Military soldiers captured and destroyed over 2 000 locally manufactured rifles, ammo, also other weapons that were purportedly being spread around Chad's and Nigeria's northern borders in 2019 (VOA News. 16 December 2019. Cameroon Military Seizes, Destroys Illegal Guns in North). Due to the LCR's inadequate border infrastructure, smugglers, hostage-takers, poachers, and suspected terrorists frequently used illegal firearms.

4.11. Information and Communication Technology

To better manage regional security growth, Oludare et al. (2015) submitted that, security agencies can use ICT to reduce duplication of work, protect information from misuse, and boost information sharing among themselves. As a proactive approach to combating insecurity, this entails placing each country's national data into a coordinated and aggregated database. Sensitization and lobbying for ICT-driven solutions to insecurity issues could thus be crucial in the country's fight against insecurity. In advanced countries around the world, birth and death registration, in addition to integrating many identifying projects, plays a vital role in maintaining national security, particularly when synchronized with DNA, facial recognition, and fingerprinting technologies that operate on ICT space. As a result, apprehending criminals in specified locations is straightforward. ICT plays a major role in increasing input and conscription, as well as advancing the movement's goals Karatzogianni (2006).

Indeed, BH movement mobilizes through digital media, and new media communication technologies have had a substantial impact on the organization's recruitment. The use of digital media by the movement's leadership stimulated the decision of the Nigerian government to shut down communication networks in five states (Maiduguri, Adamawa, and Yola, in 2021, Kastina and Zamfara). The use of new media technologies has become a part of the movement's tactical arsenal throughout time. Internet forums, for example, have become a means of expanding and recruiting followers (Connell, 2012). According to Gilsinan (2015) media comments and political discourse over ISIS's rise since 2014 show how the internet has become a recruiting hotspot. In response to the telephone shutdown, a Nigerian security expert said that the networks were suspended as part of a strategy to demobilize the dreadful groups (Daily Times, 2013, report online). According to Olabode (2018), while it was thought that shutting down communication networks would slow down the extremists' movement and operations, the approach proved fruitless as these rebellious actors found other means to get around the censorship on ICT platforms.

Effective and efficient administration of regional security, according to Effong et al. (2021), is highly dependent on the power accessible to reliable information.

Information technology is predicted to help handle better-quality data, statistics, and information sources, processing channels, and complexity, which will show a calculated and crucial role in the national security. Traditional crime and security authorities in the LCBR countries have operated and continue to operate predominantly in bureaucratic, paper-based styles, asphyxiating the information-sharing process. As a result, it's critical to acknowledge that old approaches to addressing problems necessitate a technology revolution according to Collins (2018) in his book *Contemporary Security Studies*.

According to Karatzogianni (2006), information technology will aid in determining who is who, where they live, if they possess what or not, and more. However, the lack of enough highly skilled ICT security personnel and the governments' (LCBR) hesitation in this area are important roadblocks to the deployment of ICT devices to combat the threat of terrorist groups in the LCBR.

CONCLUSION

A lack of coordination inside the Joint Force is one of the most serious difficulties facing the MNJTF, according to this study, which has limited its success. Not only has military collaboration in the Lake Chad Basin Region (LCBR) been hampered, but this thesis has also disclosed a previously unknown aspect that has impeded efforts to restore peace and fight extremist organizations entering the region. The MNJTF was also determined to have been established prior to the Boko Haram insurgency, although with no Lake Chad Basin member countries' acceptance outside of Nigeria. A multitude of causes, including financial, human, administrative, and other concerns, contribute to the hesitancy. As a result, it appears that there was a lack of coordination, allowing the extremists to launch their attacks early and efficiently. MNJTF was re-established in 2015 after the region's countries had had enough of Islamist attacks. The Benin Republic while not members of the LCBR; Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon decided to form a unified front to tackle the danger of rebel organizations.

The environment, economics, culture, and social coexistence of the people who reside near LCBR were examined in this research work. Marriage, religion, language, business, conflict, and a variety of other contacts had a long history between these people. The partition of Africa by the Europeans (Berlin, Germany 1884/85), however, altered the boundary, which currently divides predominantly along Francophone and Anglophone lines. This was a significant setback for the old boundary lines, which they had been obligated to follow up until now. This had a tremendous impact on how people in this area conduct their lives.

In addition to international military cooperation in conquering or limiting the growth of extremists in the LCBR, this study looked into the need for people of various colonial orientations to work together for the goal of restoring peace. This is due to the difficulties that porous borders present. Without a focus on border-related persons and their actions, this study would be incomplete. The relevance of local people in the LCBR's fight against insurgent groups was highlighted in this study. Most personnel on the MNJTF are unaware of the topographical structure as well as the linguistic

barrier. If appropriately included in MNJTF training and practice, modern ICT technologies could likely help to mitigate these flaws.

The "Unity of Command" (UoC) was also examined as a factor in the MNJTF's success against the radicals frightening the LCBR in this study. To have a clear sense of purpose, it is vital to develop a unity of command. The MNJTF, on the other hand, has a substantial deficiency in this area. The UoC is vital to any acceptable success in the struggle against extremist organizations, but the MNJTF's hierarchical or chain of command strength has been undercut by loopholes. Collaboration has been limited by the MNJTF's lack of sophisticated weapons, in addition to its financial limits. This study looked at how the LCBC's failings influenced all other efforts to restore peace in the affected areas, aside from border issues, money, linguistic or cultural difficulties, and structural deformation of the MNJTF. The LCBC's poor performance is to blame for the MNJTF's demise.

This study looked into how the communication gap between the locals and the MNJTF operatives affects the latter's success. The European powers' (1884/85) divisions were also underlined, as they influenced the boundary lines throughout the LCBR countries, providing several issues and risks to understanding the region and the extremists' domination, respectively. As a result, this study highlighted the region's vulnerability by suggesting the possibility of extremist elements escaping an assailable zone or country to the opposite side of the Lake Chad region, where opposition is little. These outcomes were overwhelmingly positive from 2015 when the MNJTF was reformed to include the four countries of the Lake Chad (Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon; and Benin, although not part of the LCBR), however, there were occasional hiccups. This research also found that when the MNJTF withdraws or disbands, it typically backfires, giving insurgent groups the upper hand and hindering the MNJTF from consolidating its wins.

The following are a set of findings and policy recommendations, as well as calls for more research and work.

Findings

1. Due to the nature of the border arrangement among immediate countries of the Lake Chad region as well as terrorist attacks in this fragile Sahelian

region, the Multinational Joint Task Force was established; operations and activities extended beyond one political jurisdiction, necessitating collaboration among the afflicted governments' international jurisdictions: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Hence, the necessity of border security, and collaboration among Lake Chad states through the MNJTF and the LCBC became very crucial.

2. Multinational Joint Task Force is linked to the Lake Chad Region's military architecture. Civilians, state national integrity, volunteers (combatants), and officials of both local and transnational non-governmental organizations are all protected by this unified force. MNJTF is dedicated to territories and sites of military objectives that are established by International Law when it comes to the geographical scope of operations.
3. Existence of the International Military Cooperation (MNJTF) among the Lake Chad region governments is beneficial in dealing with numerous violent strides operating in this region and, by extension, the Sahel zone. According to the study, the MNJTF has significant success fighting terrorists when they work together in the same spirit.
4. The violence in the Lake Chad Basin serves as a wake-up call to the region's socioeconomic and political decay. The governing classes' casual attitude toward the common people has resulted in terrorist unrest and various forms of turmoil. Because the terrorist and insurgency in the Lake Chad region is largely due to the failure of the governments of the various states to support and encourage the participation of the local community in the governance process.
5. The political factor in the various TCC to MNJTF activities has momentous effects on the later operations, therefore, discord and lack of coherency among the various forces, the latter operations become very vulnerable.
6. The MNJTF is underfunded, resulting in a lack of motivation in its efforts. The safety of officers confronting lethal violent organizations in this zone is jeopardized by numerous nations. The governments of various contributing countries have never taken security budgets as seriously as their personal

interests, and they frequently rely on international or global donors to help them provide for their military forces. There have been instances where an ideal appropriation was made to improve the military people of the MNJTF among the TCC, but the money did not reach the commanders, and the money was diverted somewhere along the way.

7. The MNJTF's relationship is largely hampered by their commitment to their domestic military program or objectives, as well as a language barrier, cultural disparities, and religious divide. Furthermore, the connection between military officials and the local population is frequently tense, and the level of suspicion between the military and civilians has increased the risk of MNJTF operations in the Lake Chad environment.
8. Absence of political will on the part of the four major states and armed groups to fulfill their full commitments, both at national and international levels, has resulted to a lack of adequate or effective control over terrorists in the region.
9. They say that the theater of war is the core of the conflict and that the better one understands it, the better off one is. The nature of the terrain in which the terrorists have an edge over the MNJTF officers in the struggle against them. This is partly owing to the terrorists' omniscient understanding of the topography, as opposed to the MNJTF members, who have little or no comprehension of the terrain.
10. The local community, which previously assisted the MNJTF as informants, is unwilling to cooperate because terrorist groups frequently come by and attack them for colliding with the MNJTF. Because they lack security backing, these individuals are unwilling to provide useful information regarding terrorist hideouts.
11. According to this research, all programs established are male-dominated, leaving little or no room for women to meaningfully participate in peacekeeping across borders in the Lake Chad Basin. Women are frequently portrayed as victims rather than solution providers. Both the military and the

civilian (paramilitary) put far less focus on women, and in this study, women are not allowed to participate in any way, either partially or completely.

12. The LCBC is unable to function due to a structural flaw. The LCBC has failed to achieve its goals and objectives due to variety of reasons; haphazard hiring practices; a lack of control functions in its mandates; reflects the level of corruption in the donating states; and a lot more.
13. The CJTF, which was formed as a result of the members' knowledge of the local geography and practices; this group could have done more to help the MNJTF succeed, but it is what it is.
14. The Lake Chad Basin's predicament is exacerbated by the lake's drying up. Governments pay less attention to the drying lake, which was a key source of income for residents in the area. The LCB's chaos of terrorism and instability was manufactured by the struggle for survival of the fittest.
15. The intelligence collection capabilities of the MJNTF are lacking. The TCC has failed to adequately equip and train officers in the usage of contemporary ICT equipment. Most of the time, the military relies on guessing or assumptions to determine their course of action, which has resulted in the loss and death of numerous MNJTF personnel. The MNJTF is ICT-challenged, which makes them vulnerable to terrorist ambushes.

Recommendations

1. The MNJTF should pay close attention to how captured or surrendered Boko Haram fighters are treated, ensuring that units quickly hand them over to civilian authorities. This will aid Lake Chad states in improving ties with the local population, who may otherwise witness troops abusing their youths.
2. It is critical to include the local population as a source of valuable information in order to objectively militate against the terrorists; this will go a long way toward ensuring the MNJTF's success in its mission. This can be secured by ensuring that the informants' lives and property are not jeopardized.

3. The MNJTF must be restructured, and its chain of command, which is at the heart of any military organization must be re-established. This is required in order to achieve victory against the region's violent gangs. The officers' morale stands out in their activities only when they sense the unity of purpose. Because of the nature of the MNJTF's establishment, the officers' national interests take precedence over their joint objective. The TCC faces a huge task in rebuilding this organization to match its international objective.
4. The TCC's reliance on foreign or international funders remains a major threat to the MNJTF's operations. To increase their level of commitment, the Troop Contributing Countries must first look inward (technically, financially, logistically, and materially). Making this a priority will undoubtedly improve the effectiveness of MNJTF officers; otherwise, the MNJTF's over-dependence on foreign funding typically results in lackluster operations.
5. There is a need for technical training in the area of ICT for MNJTF officers; this has become so critical that the use of cyberspace in warfare has had bigger effects than traditional tactics. The MNJTF might greatly benefit from the usage of technological equipment in their activities. Modern combat skill includes military reconnaissance, intelligence collection, surveillance, effective communication, proper coordination, and force application accuracy.
6. Because militarization alone is insufficient to counter-terrorist activity, this report proposes more research into the function of cooperation among the various nationalities that make up the border around Lake Chad. Their involvement should be focused on combating false preaching and educating the youth about the harmful beliefs that have contaminated their minds. Identifying the duties that the local populace needs to play, other than being informants, is a critical step towards winning over the terrorists in the LCR.
7. Governments in the Lake Chad region should be more concerned about the welfare of their citizens; various governments' neglect of the border region has left these people in a state of perpetual destitution, making it easier for

terrorists to communicate with and recruit members from the disadvantaged groups.

8. The governments of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger should learn from Nigeria's de-radicalization approach, which is critical for the reintegration of ex-terrorists and anyone associated with them.
9. The governments of the Lake Chad region should launch programs to lift the region's residents out of poverty, primarily through education for at least every child and assistance to women in engaging in meaningful trades, while men should be encouraged to engage in productive activities through government support. Governments must avoid corrupt behaviors and unnecessarily high governance expenses.
10. The drying lake is another spot that can provide locals with a breath of fresh optimism. The LCBC, which is in charge of this, has to be reorganized into a far more functional body, with a clear mandate and rigorous accountability to the people and governments of the commission. LCBC must ensure that the drying lake is safe and that the dried-up portion is viewed as an opportunity rather than a threat.

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