

The Arab Spring and the Prolonged National Integration in Yemen; a Critical Discussion

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Abstracts

This study examines how the Arab Spring affects the national integration in Yemen. Despite the Arab Spring's bringing forth tangible democratic transitions through inclusive democratic elections in Tunisia and Egypt, it created a social and political divide more than the previous time through diminishing the likelihood of national integration in Yemen. Some scholarly debates ascribe Arab Spring to Yemen's lagging for national integration. However, others are on the opinion that Yemen never could realize a sustainable national integration due to its going through a perennial authoritarian or autocratic rule like some other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and a long territorial and ideological division, as well as manifold power-seeking sections. The Arab Spring just exacerbated the remaining disintegration. This study holds on to the latter consideration and firstly, discusses the pre-Arab Spring territorial and political schism in Yemen. Then, it examines facts that triggered political fragmentation and instability in Yemen during and in the aftermath of the Arab Spring leaving little hope for the country to step into a successful national integration in near future. The main aim of this paper is to illustrate how a regional or global event impact potential national integration of a country that is heavily divided socially, politically, and ideologically along with corruption and state controlled civil society.

Keywords: Arab Spring, National Integration, Divide, Yemen, Power Seekers

Arap Baharı ve Yemen'de Uzun Süreli Ulusal Bütünleşme: Eleştirel Bir Tartışma

Öz

Bu çalışma, Arap Baharı'nın Yemen'deki ulusal entegrasyonu nasıl etkilediğini incelemektedir. Arap Baharı'nın Tunus ve Mısır'daki kapsayıcı demo-kratik seçimler yoluyla somut demokratik geçişler getirmesine rağmen, Yemen'de ulusal entegrasyon



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olasılığını azaltarak ön önceki zamandan daha fazla sosyal ve politik bir bölünme yaratmıştır. Bazı bilimsel tartışmalar, Arap baharını Yemen'in ulusal entegrasyon için gecikmesine bağlıyor. Ancak diğerleri, Yemen'in diğer bazı KİK ülkeleri gibi daimi otoriter veya otokratik bir yönetimden geçmesi, uzun bir bölgesel ve ideolojik bölünme ve çeşitli güç arayışları nedeniyle sürdürülebilir bir ulusal entegrasyonu asla gerçekleştiremeyeceği görüşündedir. Arap Baharı, kalan parçalanmayı daha da şiddetlendirmiştir. Bu çalışma, ikinci değerlendirme üzerinde durmakta ve ilk olarak, Yemen'deki Arap baharı öncesi bölgesel ve siyasi bölünmeyi tartışmaktadır. Ardından, Arap Baharı sırasında ve sonrasında Yemen'de siyasi parçalanma ve istikrarsızlığı tetikleyen gerçekleri incelemektedir. Ondan sonra, Arap Baharı sırasında ve sonrasında Yemen'de siyasi parçalanma ve istikrarsızlığı tetikleyen gerçekler incelenerek, ülkenin yakın gelecekte başarılı bir ulusal entegrasyona adım atması için çok az umut bırakmaktadır. Bu makalenin temel amacı, bölgesel veya küresel bir olayın, yolsuzluk ve devlet kontrolündeki sivil toplum ile birlikte sosyal, politik ve ideolojik olarak büyük ölçüde bölünmüş bir ülkenin potansiyel ulusal entegrasyonunu nasıl etkilediğini göstermektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Arap Baharı, Ulusal Entegrasyon, Bölmek, Yemen, Güç Arayanlar

Introduction

Yemen has long experienced a rift between communism and nationalism (Sharqieh, 2011), and economic and political instability (Saleh & Manjunath, 2020). When the regional upheaval naming the Arab Spring overwhelmed Yemen, it became very difficult for it to tackle the shake. As the regimes of Tunisia and Egypt were changed through democratic transitions including holding general elections (Ottaway, 2014), the arrival and consequence of Arab Spring in Yemen cannot be considered same as those two countries. Besides, the other Arab states like Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait successfully could survive with the changing situation offering different incentives or suppressed opposition forces mercilessly (Abouzzohour, 2021). They became aware and tried to stop the Arab Spring from affecting them as soon as possible. In particular, the GCC states were shielded from the upheaval of the Arab Spring by strong "regional" cooperation, long-standing "hereditary oil Monarchies," use of oil revenue to protect the government from the public, and temporary foreign support from the United States and the European Union. (Aydin, 2013). However, in Yemen, some of the military sided with the anti-government protests in the streets, while others sided with the government (Brooks, 2017). Added to this is the resurgence of long-standing ideological divisions in Yemen. In addition, the conflict between the mercenary or paramilitary forces of Saudi Arabia (POMEPS, 2018) and Iran (Siyech, 2016) over their expansion of influence further provokes the political conflict within the country. Arab Spring's special appearance in Yemen inspired choosing the country as a particular case study. At present, the country has been turned into almost a failed state, making it very troublesome towards national integration in the future. The main aim of this study is to show how a state that has long been suffered by economic stagnation, political and ideological divide, is unable to cope with the impact of a regional development disturbing their national integration.

Literature Review

Dunbar (1992) looked at process, politics, and prospects of the unification of Yemen. Stevenson and Alaug (1997) studied how football was used in Yemen for resistance, integration, and identity. Their study showed that, football played role for national unity. For example, in 1992 when national team of Yemen scored against national team of Pakistan, fans of Yemen "shouted slogans in support of the team and unity" (p. 260).

Al-Mughallas (2013) investigated the lost chances of social cohesiveness in Yemen, notably between 1990—the year of Yemen's unification—and 2012. He also examined different challenges which hindered the country's social integration. He argues that, in addition to taking advantage of Yemen's social diversity, the country's ruling elites involved the general populace in their conflicts, strengthened the tribal system at the expense of other social groupings, and failed to construct an equal system for resource allocation and growth.

Issaev, Khokhlova and Korotayev (2022) discussed about Arab Spring in Yemen. They recognised events which developed in 2011 in Yemen as 'turmoil', not as 'revolution' and events which unfolded from 2014 to 2015 as 'a genuine revolution'. Hamidi (2015) examined the Post-Arab Spring national dialogues in Tunisia and Yemen. He used Jane Jenson's model on social cohesion to determine why Tunisia's national dialogue has been more successful than Yemen's in bringing about social cohesion.

Moreover, Juneau (2013) discussed developments of early days of uprising in Yemen which started in February 2011. He shed light on key actors, which includes elite groups and various groups, who were engaged in power struggle in the context of uprising to ensure their stakes. In a book chapter Juneau (2014) argued that, before the Arab Spring President Saleh established a complex system of patronage where different elite stakeholders were engaged. That's why institutions were weak. According to him, the Arab Spring altered the power dynamics among the regime's groups. He presumed that, elites would continue their fight to control the state which was not strong enough and threat of violence would remain with decline in the economy.

Alley (2013) evaluated security of Yemen after the Arab Spring. He argued that different armed nonstate players have stepped in to fill the growing security hole since the 2011 revolt, when the already frail military started to disintegrate. He also argued that, in the post-Saleh era, parties have competed for public support, financial resources, and territory control that ushered incidents of violence.

Most of the studies mentioned above focused either on pre-Arab Spring turmoil or impacts of Arab Spring while this study illustrates how a regional or global event impacted potential national integration of Yemen which is heavily divided socially, politically, and ideologically along with corruption and state controlled civil society.

Defining National Integration

Drake (1980, p-59) says that "national integration, which may be defined as the binding together of the various regions and diverse people of a country into a functioning and mutually interdependent national whole, is a fundamental need." He further argues that "national integration is essential so that resources, both human and material, can be mobilized for the greatest development possible. It is important also so that political stability, which is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for development, can be promoted" (Drake, 1980, p-59).

Moreover, 'national integration' regards the 'subjective feelings' of various 'social groups or historically distinct political units' to the nation. However, 'territorial integration' denotes establishing 'objective control' of 'central authority' over the whole 'jurisdictional' realm (Coleman, 1955, cited in Weiner, 1965). This study considers both the concept of territorial and national integration for explaining national integration as Yemen lagged in both respects and a national integration is not possible but the other.

Pre-Arab Spring Territorial, Ideological and Political Division in Yemen

Romans once called Yemen "Arabia Felix," which means "Happy Arabia." Since the 1960s, Yemen has been in a lot of trouble, with fights between royalists and Nasserists in the 1960s, nationalists and communists in the 1970s, different political groups in South Yemen in the 1980s, and between the south and north in the 1990s (Sharqieh, 2011). Since 2004, the Yemeni army confronted around six rounds of revolts in 'northwestern' province of Sa'ada that has 'long and porous' border with Saudi-Arabia and is an area populated with an economically marginalized Zaydi Shi'ite community (Noueihed and Warren, 2012).

Yemen's southern half traces the history back to the British colonial rule beginning in 1839 (Willis, 2009), while Northern Yemen started encountering the ottoman administration from the 17th century till withering the command of the ottoman governance in 1918 (Yaccob, 2012). Thus, different features of the south and north seem to have controlled the political landscape in Yemen in later days. When nomadic tribes in far northern Yemen across the border with Saudi Arabia attacked in 1918, the ottoman ruler pulled back and was replaced by an "imamate" that was friendly to the Ottomans, but it was also replaced by the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in 1962 (Yaccob, 2012). Moreover, south Yemen's declaration of independence in 1967 and formation of the Socialist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) fetched patronization of the then Soviet Union (Cigar, 1985). President Ali Abdullah Saleh was in charge of the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north since 1978 while President Haider Abu Bakr Al Attas and General Secretary Ali Salim Al Baid were in charge of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south since 1986 (Middle East Institute, 1963). Yemen, like Vietnam, Germany, and Korea, was torn apart on a national, linguistic, and cultural level by the start of the cold war. This happened when the US-led capitalism and the Soviet-led socialism came into conflict with each other (Xia, 2010).

The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in northern Yemen had Sana'a its capital under the 'Arab nationalist ideology' of Gamal Abdul Nasser. In the meantime, 'nationalist groups' revolted against the British colonial rule in the south Yemen in the mid-1960s followed by effective initiation of the 'People's Republic of south Yemen' in 1967. But in 1970, a "radical Marxist wing of National Front (NF)" came to power and changed the name of the country to "People's Democratic Republic of Yemen" (PDRY). Aden became the capital of the new country. This government closely approached the Soviet Union and other socialist nations. Thereafter, the Soviet forces' retreat from the country and unearthing oil reserves in the border area of south Yemen inspired two parts of Yemen to unification that finally happened in May 1990 under the umbrella of the 'Republic of Yemen' with Sana'a its capital. A combined economic and political effort from both northern and southern Yemen made a 'peaceful reunification' possible. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia as an influential power in the region also played a significant role in the reunification. However, this sense of togetherness was shattered during the civil war in 1994, which ultimately resulted in the northern forces triumph over the southern forces (Xia, 2010).

Moreover, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who served as President of Yemen prior to the Arab Spring, had connection with the 'Hashed tribal confederation'. For decades, the al-Ahmar family, Yemen's most prominent family, was Saleh's most important partner. Thus, Hashed tribes gained familiarity within a section of society of the country, with northern Yemen (Jamestown Foundation, 2011). It is worth noting that, Al Ahmar family has the strength of rallying thousands of tribal fighters from northern Yemen. Saleh's feeling of being a member of a tribe rather than Sayyidi dynasty (descendent of Imamet) and willingness of remaining in power for a long period of time prompted him to maintain strong tribe connection. This helped tribesmen to hold their rule in mountainous areas contributing enough for Yemen not being a state in real sense. However, the death of Abdullah al Ahmar (leader of the confederation) in 2007 and Saleh's efforts for his own son to be the leader of the confederation confronted Ahmar family's successor (Juneau, 2010).

Furthermore, in 2004, the Zaydi Shi'a Houthis, led by Bakr al-Din al-Houth, rose in the northern province of Sa'ada over 'political and economic' grievances, and the revolt quickly escalated into a violent battle (Durac, 2011, cited in Karakir, 2018). There was a prolonged period of armed conflict between the government and the Houthis until January 2010, when Saudi Arabia, which borders the Sa'ada state, inaugurated a range of air raids against the Houthis in revenge for cross-border incursions by the Houthis, leading to "the deaths of thousands and the displacement of tens of thousands of people" (Arimatsu & Choudhury, 2014, cited in Karakir, 2018, p, 126). They demanded decentralized power and a more balanced allocation of national wealth. The battle subsided, but 'northern' discontent grew with increasing number the unstable regions (Winter, 2012, cited in Juneau, 2013). It was widely believed that the northern part of the country controlled the administration, which has led to separatist and autonomy-seeking desires. Since 2007, these desires have been channeled more and more in the flag of the 'Southern Movement' or the 'Hirak' (Brehony, 2011, cited in Juneau, 2013). Finally, the situation was aggravated by the surges of the Arab Spring prolonging national integration in the country. The territorial and ideological division is sketched in brief below.

Time	Key event
1960s	Rivalry between Nasserists and royalists
1970s	Rivalry between communists and nationalists
1980s	Rivalry among different political factions in South Yemen
1990s	Rivalry between north and south

Source: *The Author*

Table 01. Pre-Arab Spring Territorial and Ideological Division.

Arab Spring and Divided Opposition

The Arab Spring firstly spread out in July 2011 in Tunisia. For the time being, it also waned to other Arab countries. Inspired by the protests in Tunisia and Egypt, Yemeni youths took to streets in almost every city of the country shouting slogans not only for justice, dignity, and freedom but also regime change and restructuring the existing political system. Meanwhile, Egyptian protesters succeeded in toppling President Husoni Mubarak from power on 11th February 2011 followed by immediate acceleration of protest in Yemen (Sharqieh, 2011), because the protesters could symbolize Egypt as an example of success. Though, in earlier days, a large number of protesters remained on the street peacefully opposing to President Saleh, the incidence of 18th March of killing 45 peaceful protesters and wounding hundreds of people by government security forces

(Finn, 2011), trembled the regime resulting in leaving Saleh by his key backers (Kasinof, 2011).

In April 2011, as the situation was getting worse, the USA and the UN got the Gulf Cooperation Council to agree to a deal that would have Saleh hand over power to Hadi within one month in exchange for Saleh and his family not being charged. Moreover, the deal proposed a framework for transitional government, a general election and framing of a new constitution. Notwithstanding main opposition parties' stance in favour of the deal, most of the street protesters denounced the clause of immunity of Saleh and his family urging Saleh's instant and unconditional passage to Saudi Arabia (Juneau, 2013).

President Ali Abdullah Saleh was injured by a rocket during prayers at his palace on June 3, 2011, as regime forces and opponent tribespeople fought. After the incident, the prime minister, deputy prime minister, and some other top government officials were transferred to Saudi Arabia for medical 'treatment'. These reveal noticeable exacerbation to an already severe collision (Londono, 2011). Sheik Sadeq al-Ahmar, was condemned for having his hand in the incidence ("Yemen President Survives", 2011). Though Saleh departed to Saudi Arabia for treatment, his son Ahmed took residence in the Presidential palace of Yemen giving a message to all opposite forces that he will delegate in his father's absence (POMEPS, 2012).

Moreover, on September 23, 2011, Ali Abdullah Saleh came back to Yemen after spending over three months in Saudi Arabia. This was fueling to worsen the conflict within different contending groups in Saana and other cities of the country. Saleh steered him in defiance of expectation by his most important ally, the US, and his neighbors in the Persian Gulf, that Saleh would step up signing a deal for handing over authority after his recovery from wound (Raghavan and DeYoung, 2011). But the UNSC passed a 'resolution' supporting the deal, and Saleh's backers from outside the country put pressure on him to start putting the plans into action. In fact, the task of uniting all power stakes including the Saleh clan and the street protesters was an unavoidable challenge for the Hadi government. Incidents of continuous violence in Northern and Southern Yemen in October and November of the year and subsequent losing control of the government over the countryside alarms the fragility of the government and disintegration of the state (POMEPS, 2018). Years after the Arab Spring began, diversified dynamics leading to political division requires a deeper study of Yemen.

Time	Key events
March 18	killing 45 protesters and wounding hundreds of people by government
April 2011	A settlement proposing Saleh's handover
June 3, 2011	The president, and a half-dozen other government officials were wounded by an explosion
September 23, 2011	Saleh came back to Yemen from Saudi Arabia
December 4, 2017	Saleh's killing by Houthi combatant

Source: The Author

Table 02. Key events of Arab Spring.

Factors for Political Schism During and After Arab Spring 'Defection' in ruling party and military

In March of 2011, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who was the chief of the 'Northern Military District' as well as the 'First Armored Division' declared that he would no longer be participating in 'General People's Congress' of Saleh (Issaev, Khokhlova, & Korotayev, 2022). After this, some other military personnels and high-ranked officers followed suit

and stated that they would not be dutiful to the president. The Ahmars sent the rebel forces to Sanaa to safeguard the protestors, and these men started patrolling in and around the major plaza of the city, as well as the Ministry of Defense, the Presidential Palace, and the Central Bank (Issaev, Khokhlova, & Korotayev, 2022).

But President Saleh did not end up alone in his position. On March 21, 2011, he announced the need to employ the military in order to normalize the state (Issaev & Shishkina, 2012b), and the following day, major general Muhammad Naser Ahmed Ali, Defense Minister of the state, orated the Yemeni mass on electronic media, assuring the President Saleh had the support of the armed forces. The defense minister vowed to defend the President against any undemocratic 'coup attempt', saying, "the Armed Forces will remain loyal to the oath given to God, the people, and the political leadership of President Ali Abdullah Saleh" (Novyze Izvestiya, 2011, cited in Issaev, Khokhlova, & Korotayev, 2022, p.692). It made a clear vacuum that inspired non-state actors to fill it in.

Moreover, after Saleh's deposition, an attempt to remove many of the remaining members of Saleh's clan from the military hierarchy started. This was done both informally through soldier protests in units led by Saleh's relatives and formally through a Military Affairs Committee established by Al-Hadi in December 2011. President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi dismissed more than 20 military officers in April and May 2012. Among them Yemeni Air Force commander Mohammed Saleh, the former president's half-brother, and Presidential Guard brigade commander Tariq Mohammed Abd'allah Saleh, the former president's nephew was included (Knights, 2013). In the same year in August, President Hadi limited the power of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh's son Brigadier General Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, who led the elite Republican Guards. By issuing decrees, President Hadi transferred the command of some Republican Guards' units to the Presidential Protective Forces, a newly formed force. Other elite Republican Guard units were assigned to other regional commands (Ghobari, 2012).

Vagueness and misgivings upon transition

Couples of questions were raised on the transition process like type of the leader of the transition process; devising of the process; nature of law during 'transition' period and future regime; and the process of distributing power and natural resources in post-transition period. These questions created acute vagueness and misgivings in the minds of Yemeni people (Gledhill, 2013). Each step of the mediation roadmap taken by the United Nations was viewed with suspicion from sections of Yemeni society (International Crisis Group, 2012), consequently accelerating social and political schism in the country.

External interference

The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia and directly intervened in Yemen, namely by operation 'Decisive Storm' on March 26, 2015, (POMEPS, 2018). In fact, the Saudi-led Arab coalition was triggered by Iran-endorsed Houthi rebels' taking control of the capital Sana and further moving towards Aden in September 2014. The Saudi-led attack created the largest humanitarian crisis in the world and a security vacuum that Al-Qaeda also came to fill in (Najjar and Al-Karimi, 2017).

Apart from that, Islamic State's (IS) began fighting a war against Iran-backed Houthi rebels. They carried out consecutive attacks in Houthi mosques in Sanaa killing and wounding a notable number of people declaring it a retaliation for the atrocities carried out on the Sunnis by the Houthis. Seemingly, Islamic state's attacks went in favour of Saudi Arabia as the latter was also leading coalition attacks on Houthi rebels. However, the situation took a turn while IS carried out an attack against Saudi-UAE joint forces

surprisingly on 6th October 2015. Later, another IS attack on 20 November 2015 on members of Mansur-al-Hadi government killed the governor of the city of Aden (the most important stronghold of Mansur administration) that withered the government forces' efforts to secure the city of Aden. From then on, IS continued their attacks on the interests of the Hadi government but failed to capture the territory as they did in Libya or as AQAP did in Yemen (Siyech, 2016).

Corruption

Before the Arab revolt, corruption was pervasive in every sector of Yemeni society, including the judicial system, the police, the public services, the land, customs, and tax administration, public procurement, and natural resources (Yemen risk report, November 4, 2020). According to Transparency International's (TI) "Corruption Perception Index" 2011, Yemen is ranked 162 out of 180 with a score of 2.1 out of 10. Moreover, it scored only 16 out of 100 and 176 out of 180 countries in 2022 (Corruption Perception Index 2022 of Transparency International).

Controlled Civil Society Organizations

Starting in the 1980s, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) sprouted up across the Arab world, including in Yemen, where autocratic governments had every intention of staying in power for decades and had taken few concrete moves toward political and economic liberalization (Elayah and Verkoren, 2019: 07). Also, the Arab countries where Islamic figures are involved in civil society organizations benefited from the third wave of democratization and the channel of foreign aids, which gave rise to a variety of democratic and human rights organizations. However, the appeal of CSOs in the area has dwindled as, beginning in the mid-2000s, and continuing to the present day, they have become organizations truly satisfying the interests of authoritarian rulers (Ibid). This research has shown that CSOs have the potential to significantly contribute to a peaceful and orderly democratic transformation; however, civil society in Yemen has been weakened by decades of war over political control. As a result, Yemen's long-standing authoritarian ruler was able to satisfy his own goals by dividing civil society organizations and coopting them.

Prolonging National Integration in Yemen

Ali Abdullah Saleh's departure to Saudi-Arabia made a vacuum that Houthi rebels came to fill up by providing 'security and justice' in areas where the state could not do the same (Akın, 2019). Besides, Houthi's taking side with Saleh and an anti-corruption stance gave them territorial gain and political victory in most cases. General People's Congress party of Saleh and the 'Houthis' became strategic partners against the Saudi-led coalition and its allies, including the US who was fighting in favour of Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi, a globally recognized government of the country (POMEPS, 2018). Major parts of Red Sea coastal areas of Hodeidah and parts of the southern uplands, including Ibb and limited parts of Tai also went under Houthi's control. But Ali Abdullah Saleh's killing by Houthi fighters on 4th December 2017 finally cut their relationship (POMEPS, 2018).

On December 13, 2018, in Stockholm, Sweden, the United Nations mediated a ceasefire agreement between the government and Houthi rebels, with the goals of resolving the situation in the coastal province, exchanging prisoners and detainees on both sides, and ending the Houthi siege of the central city of Taiz. However, observers argued the deal could not bring any fruitful progress as Houthi did not fulfil their

commitments (Ahmed, 2019). Moreover, the power sharing deal signed on 5 November 2019 in Riyadh (called as the Riyadh Agreement) between the globally certified government and the 'secessionist 'Southern Transitional Council' of the country seemingly got hope of progress. However, critics frustrated at the agreement saying it was an agreement between two Saudi partners consequently having no hope for benefit (Shaker, 2019). In fact, all these initiatives will benefit Iran-backed Houthi rebels that may exacerbate the situation more, causing further division between Sunni and Shia communities and prolonging likelihood for a national integration in the country.

Conclusion

This study argues that Arab Spring is partially responsible for prolonged national integration in Yemen. Because Yemen was territorially, politically, and ideologically divided for a long time when there was no central authority. Though territorial integration happened in May 1990, the 1994 civil war between northern and southern forces gave birth political and ideological conflict among various power-seeking sections and placed the territorial integration under the central government only on paper. This hindered national integration while Arab Spring ignited the remaining division and prolonged the likelihood of national integration more. Departure of Saleh to Saudi Arabia and handing over power to Mansur Al-Hadi created a hope for a democratic transition and a constitutional reform by an elected government. However, corruption, and ranges of internal conflicts among power seeking sections, both political and ideological, washed out that hope. The convincing point of this study is-Arab uprising alone should not take the responsibility for prolonging national integration in Yemen. Rather, it argues that holding all power in hands of Saleh and his nearest ones, a long-lived external sponsored network, corruption, and high control over civil society- kept the mass population of Yemen waiting to get such an opportunity of revolt against the 'authoritative' regime. A widespread insecurity paved ways to a variety of interest groups for seeking power over tribal areas of the country. Thus, different parts of the country went under control of diverse power seekers, making the country's different apparatus substantially broken down, and consequently entrenching complexities for national integration in the country. Though the son of Abdullah Saleh and his three nephews were deposed from the command of security forces, the political scenario of the country indicated that they could successfully remain in the field. In fact, Saleh was playing as a remote controller from Saudi Arabia since he was the *de facto* controller of his party and had an entrenched root in the political arena of Yemen. The party of Saleh remained an active role player in changing the political arena after the Arab Spring in Yemen.

This study argues that there is no notable hope in near future for resilience of the situation that is currently going on in Yemen. Nevertheless, a united effort by the United Nations (UN) and other regional mediators may bring ways for progress in the situation. The process of that initiative may include multiple steps: taking a uniform resolution in UNSC pressuring Saudi Arabia, Iran and USA to stop arms supply to various groups who attacked and killed civilians; framing an interim coalition government through ensuring the participation of all influential political and social entities-Houthis, supporters of Saleh, Hadi and others; organizing an inclusive national poll with the UN mediation; and generating mass opinion against the Al-Qaeda and the IS. However, first and foremost, a UN mediated state dialogue having all sections of the country is urgently needed. The task would not be so easy as different power-seeking sections of the country have different angles of interests. However, Turkey, Iran and Russia, the tripartite ally, along with Saudi Arabia, can put a joint effort to reach a political settlement in Yemen.

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Özet

Bu çalışma, Arap Baharı'nın Yemen'deki ulusal entegrasyonu nasıl etkilediğini incelemektedir. Arap Baharı'nın Tunus ve Mısır'daki kapsayıcı demo-kratik seçimler yoluyla somut demokratik geçişler getirmesine rağmen, Yemen'de ulusal entegrasyon olasılığını azaltarak ön önceki zamandan daha fazla sosyal ve politik bir bölünme yaratmıştır. Bu çalışma, ilk olarak, Yemen'deki Arap baharı öncesi bölgesel ve siyasi bölünmeyi tartışmaktadır. Ardından, Arap Baharı sırasında ve sonrasında Yemen'de siyasi parçalanma ve istikrarsızlığı tetikleyen gerçekleri incelemektedir. Arap Baharı sırasında ve sonrasında Yemen'de siyasi parçalanma ve istikrarsızlığı tetikleyen gerçekler incelenerek, ülkenin yakın gelecekte başarılı bir ulusal entegrasyona adım atması için çok az umut bırakmaktadır. Bu makalenin temel amacı, bölgesel veya küresel bir olayın, yolsuzluk ve devlet kontrolündeki sivil toplum ile birlikte sosyal, politik ve ideolojik olarak büyük ölçüde bölünmüş bir ülkenin potansiyel ulusal entegrasyonunu nasıl etkilediğini göstermektir.