REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
ISTANBUL GELISIM UNIVERSITY
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Department of Political Science and Public Administration

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES TO THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION
AND ITS REFLECTION ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION IN THE LIBERATED AREAS.
" THE HOUSING SECTOR IN AZAZ AS A MODEL "
BETWEEN 2016 – 2022

Master Thesis

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that in the preparation of this thesis, scientific ethical rules have been followed, the works of other persons have been referenced in accordance with the scientific norms if used, there is no falsification in the used data, any part of the thesis has not been submitted to this university or any other university as another thesis.

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SUMMARY

This thesis research deal with understanding and analyzing Turkey's foreign policy approaches towards the Syrian revolution and its impact on the administrative organization represented by non-governmental organizations and local councils in the areas under Turkish tutelage, with an in-depth study on the reality of housing initiatives in the city of Azaz and the extent to which they observe safe housing standards, as the thesis showed that Turkey has taken an active approach in supporting the Syrian people and providing assistance in restoring life to the affected areas in northern Syria. Licensed NGOs in Turkey have also played a pivotal and important role in the absence of state institutions, by securing the necessities of life for the resident population and displaced persons in various sectors starting from building hospitals, health centers, civil defense, securing infrastructure, roads, agriculture, securing livelihoods and building residential communities instead of informal camps. Non-governmental organizations have become the main point of administrative organization in the absence of stable official institutions, and this does not negate the existence of weak local councils with weak resources and capabilities in liberated cities and villages, despite their autonomy, they are generally affiliated to the Turkish states near the Syrian border.

The thesis highlighted two main topics, the first topic focused on analyzing and understanding the role of Turkish foreign policy towards the Syrian revolution from the beginning of its launch in 2011 until 2020, and the second topic focused on studying the housing sector in the city of Azaz in the northern countryside of Aleppo as a model for the impact of the Turkish intervention on the administrative organization in the areas under Turkish tutelage, where the activity of the work of non-governmental organizations in the housing sector increased significantly, and this calls for a study The sector and knowing the extent to which it achieves safe housing standards. The historical and descriptive approach was used to understand Turkey's foreign policy approaches to the Syrian revolution, and 10 interviews were conducted with NGO officials, activists and the local council in the city of Azaz, with the aim of knowing, understanding and evaluating the reality of housing initiatives and the extent to which they observe safe housing standards.

ÖZET

Araştırma, Suriye devrimine yönelik Türk dış politika yaklaşımlarının anlaşılması ve analiz edilmesi ve bunun Türk altındaki alanlarda sivil toplum kuruluşları ve yerel konseyler tarafından temsil edilen idari organizasyon üzerindeki etkisi ile ilgilidir. Azaz şehrinde konut girişimlerinin gerçekliği ve güvenli konut standartlarını ne ölçüde gözlemledikleri üzerine derinlemesine bir çalışma ile vesayet, araştırmaların gösterdiği gibi, Türkiye Suriye halkını destekleme ve kuzey Suriye'deki etkilenen bölgelere hayatın yeniden sağlanmasına yardımcı olma konusunda aktif bir yaklaşım benimsemiştir. Türkiye'deki lisanslı STK'lar da devlet kurumlarının yokluğunda çok önemli ve önemli bir rol oynamıştır, hastaneler, sağlık merkezleri, sivil savunma, altyapı, yollar, tarım, geçim kaynaklarının sağlanması ve gayri resmi kamplar yerine konut topluluklarının oluşturulması. Sivil toplum kuruluşları, istikrarlı resmi kurumların yokluğunda idari organizasyonun ana noktası haline gelmiştir, ve bu, özerkliklerine rağmen, kurtarılmış şehirlerde ve köylerde zayıf kaynaklara ve yeteneklere sahip zayıf yerel konseylerin varlığını olumsuz etkilemez, genellikle Suriye sınırına yakın Türk devletlerine bağlıdırlar.Araştırma, iki ana konuyu vurguladı; ilk konu, Türk dış politikasının 2011'deki lansmanından 2020'ye kadar Suriye devrimine karşı rolünü analiz etmeye ve anlamaya odaklandı, ve ikinci konu Halep'in kuzey kırsalındaki Azaz şehrinde konut sektörünün Türk müdahalesinin idari organizasyon üzerindeki etkisi için bir model olarak incelenmesine odaklandı konut sektöründeki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının çalışmalarının faaliyetinin önemli ölçüde arttığı Türk vesayeti altındaki alanlarda, ve bu bir çalışma gerektiriyor Sektör ve güvenli konut standartlarına ne ölçüde ulaştığını bilmek. Tarihsel ve açıklayıcı yaklaşım, Türkiye'nin Suriye devrimine yönelik dış politika yaklaşımlarını anlamak için kullanılmış ve STK yetkilileri ile 10 görüşme yapılmıştır, konut girişimlerinin gerçekliğini ve güvenli konut standartlarını ne ölçüde gözlemlediklerini bilmek, anlamak ve değerlendirmek amacıyla Azaz şehrindeki aktivistler ve yerel konsey.

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ABBREDIVATIONS

PKK	**:**	Kurdistan Workers' Party
YPG	**:**	People's Defense Unit
AKP	**:**	Justice and Development Party
ISIS	**:**	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
NGOs	**:**	Non-governmental organization**S**
TCHP	**:**	Turkish Republican People's Party
US	**:**	United State
SDF	**:**	Syrian Democratic Forces
UN	**:**	United Nations
AFAD	**:**	Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency

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PREFACE

I would like to express my sincere gratitude for Associate Professor Mouhamed Bachir Diop for his invaluable efforts. Despite her responsibilities and hectic schedule, I was provided with extensive support which was vital in completing this study. The English language in all its richness fails to assist me in sufficiently defining the respect and appreciation I hold for her. Additionally, I extend my thanks to all the professors of the institute from whom I have learned more than I could imagine. On a final note, I cannot possibly forget to thank all the wonderful people who have stood with me since the very first day of my master's degree.

INTRODUCTION

Turkey's foreign policy towards the Syrian revolution is an important and controversial topic in international and regional circles. Since the beginning of the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the political relations between Turkey and Syria have witnessed important transformations and radical changes, and with the worsening of the Syrian crisis and its spread to neighboring countries, Turkey was forced to take several measures in an attempt to secure its borders and reduce the negative repercussions of the crisis on the Turkish interior. Over the past years, Turkey has played a vital role, working to support the Syrian armed opposition and provide humanitarian aid to displaced people and Syrian refugees. Moreover, Turkey is one of the few countries that has taken a firm stand in support of the Syrian people in their war against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, and is continuously working to find a political solution to the Syrian crisis by supporting international efforts. With the development of events in Syria and the escalation of the ongoing conflict there, relations between Turkey and Syria have witnessed great tension, as Turkey has been subjected to a number of terrorist attacks and military movements by the Assad regime forces. Despite this, Turkey continued to support the Syrian armed opposition and provide humanitarian aid to displaced people and refugees. Between 2016 and 2019, Turkey and the opposition factions launched a number of military operations in northern Syria, with the aim of establishing a safe zone to protect the Turkish borders and provide security and stability in the region, Turkish military operations in Syria included several stages, starting with Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016, which aimed to liberate the city of Al-Bab and the northeastern countryside of Aleppo, and those areas were liberated from the grip of ISIS. The following year, Turkey launched Operation " Ghason alzaytone ", which targeted areas in rural Afrin, and included liberating the area from PKK militias, which pose a threat to Turkish security. In 2019, Turkey, in coordination with the Syrian opposition forces, launched a military operation called "Nabaa Alsalam ", which targeted northeastern Syria, specifically the Cape Verde region, which was under the control of the Kurdish People's Protection Units. This operation aims to establish a safe zone that protects the Turkish border and contributes to security and stability in the region. During the period of military operations and beyond, northern Syria witnessed relative stability, especially in areas

that witnessed the three military operations, as this contributed to radical changes in the local administrative system. In the absence of government institutions in northern Syria, non-governmental organizations have come to play a pivotal role in providing basic services to the population in the liberated areas, and new local councils have been established in many liberated cities and villages, although these local councils are autonomous and manage their own affairs, they generally belong to Turkish states close to the Syrian border, such as Gaziantep province, Kilis province, Hatay province and Sanliurfa state. In light of this context, Turkey's relations with the administrative organization represented by non-governmental organizations and local councils in areas outside the control of the regime and under Turkish tutelage have become an essential part of Turkey's foreign policy in supporting the Syrian people and helping to restore life to crisis areas in northern Syria. The relationship with NGOs and local councils of the region was to provide material and logistical support to facilitate the management of liberated areas and provide basic services to the local population and displaced persons.

Areas outside the control of the Syrian regime that is under Turkish tutelage are among the places that are witnessing radical political, economic, and social transformations, and the city of Azaz in the countryside of Aleppo in northern Syria is a model for the extent of the impact of the Turkish intervention on the administrative organization and basic services in those areas, especially in the housing sector. Turkey is busy with an important role in providing assistance and support to the population and displaced people, and among the important files that capture its attention is the housing file. This file has witnessed a remarkable development after the escalation of Turkish intervention in the region, especially with the increasing presence of the regime and the emptying of opposition areas. One of the important events that constitute signs of Turkey's intervention in the housing file is the allocation of land to the displaced people of Ghouta before the actual displacement process began in 2017.

Operation Euphrates Draa and Ghason Alzaytone have fundamentally changed the file, and this became official after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan proposed at the UN General Assembly meeting in 2019 to establish a buffer zone on the Syrian border with a width of 30 kilometers. After confirming this influence, it became necessary for upcoming projects in the field of housing to obtain

the approval of the Turkish states, as each state is responsible for a specific area in northern Syria, relief crossings have been opened for each state, and coordination is carried out with local councils to distribute communal land according to their standards for institutions operating in the region. Permits are also granted to work on private lands, and the authorities facilitate financial transfers through the Turkish Postal Service.

The activity of NGOs working in northern Syria has increased, shifting from the shelter sector to the housing sector as the conflict has turned into a protracted conflict, forced displacement into prolonged forced displacement, the decline of formal governance structures, and the announcement of the start of the early recovery phase. It is therefore important to highlight the governance initiatives undertaken by these NGOs as implementers in the housing sector, and to evaluate them in terms of their achievement of safe housing standards capable of dealing with the grievances generated by the conflict, and maintaining social cohesion compatible with the requirements of development, without fueling the war economy. To be the main question? What is Turkey's foreign policy approaches to the Syrian revolution? What is its reflection on the administrative regulation represented by non-governmental organizations and local councils in the areas under Turkish trusteeship? What is the reality of housing initiatives in the city of Azaz, and do they take into account safe housing standards?

This thesis aims to analyze Turkish foreign policy approaches towards the Syrian revolution and evaluate its impact on the performance of local councils and non-governmental organizations in the areas under Turkish trusteeship through the use of the historical and descriptive approach, with a focus on the reality of housing initiatives in the city of Azaz and the extent to which they take into account safe housing standards through data collection and analysis of data using the descriptive approach and qualitative analysis, where the research was based on in-depth qualitative interviews with ten people in the Azaz region, and they are either Officials of local councils, officials of implementing organizations or activists in the city of Azaz.

The purpose of the study is to analyze and evaluate Turkish foreign policy approaches to the Syrian revolution and their impact on local councils and NGOs in

areas under Turkish tutelage, with a focus on housing initiatives in the city of Azaz and the extent to which they observe safe housing standards. The study aims to understand Turkish foreign policy regarding the Syrian revolution and how it affects local governance and NGOs in areas under Turkish control. Turkey's political approaches and foreign policies adopted to achieve strategic goals and interests in Syria will be studied .n addition, the study will focus on housing initiatives in the city of Azaz by implementing projects by non-governmental organizations and in coordination with the local councils of the Turkish states, and studying how they are implemented and their impact on the quality and safety of housing in the region, and the standards followed in these initiatives and the extent to which they meet the needs of the population and provide a safe and sustainable housing environment will be reviewed.

The importance of the thesis is to understanding the foundations and guidelines of Turkish foreign policy regarding the Syrian revolution, understanding this policy that contributes to the analysis of the goals and interests that push Turkey to intervene in Syrian regions and support local councils and NGOs, Assessing the impact of Turkish foreign policy on the performance of local councils and NGOs in areas under Turkish trusteeship helps determine the actual results and effects of that policy. Their impact on local decision-making, the provision of basic services and the development of local communities can be analyzed. The thesis helps assess the quality and effectiveness of housing initiatives in the city of Azaz and the extent to which they observe safe housing standards. The strengths and weaknesses of these initiatives can be identified and recommendations made to improve them and meet the needs of the local population, and contribution in the academic research**.**

The thesis relies on the historical and descriptive approach to understand the Turkish foreign policy towards the Syrian revolution, as this approach is considered the most appropriate to achieve the objectives of the study and understand developments and changes over time. The study will use the available literature and relevant data to analyze Turkish foreign policy and clarify important trends and changes. As for understanding safe housing initiatives, research steps will consist of desk research and literature review, as well as data collection through interviews with relevant participants in local councils, NGOs and activists. These interviews will be

conducted in depth to explore their experience and insight on housing initiatives and how they meet safe housing standards. Using these methodologies and research steps, the study will be able to analyze and evaluate the impact of Turkish foreign policy on the performance of local councils and NGOs in areas under Turkish trusteeship, in addition to understanding the reality of housing initiatives in the city of Azaz and the extent to which they observe safe housing standards.

This thesis assumes that Turkey's foreign policy approaches to the Syrian revolution are based on achieving Turkey's strategic and security interests, including ensuring stability on its southern border and securing its areas of influence. These approaches are reflected in the performance of local councils and NGOs in Turkish trust areas by influencing their powers and freedom of movement, and Turkish interference in local planning and decision-making processes. In addition, housing initiatives in Azaz city are attempting multiple objectives including providing housing for displaced people and improving living conditions but may face challenges in observing safe housing standards given the complex economic and security conditions in the area.

CHAPTER ONE

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES TO THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION

1.1. Turkish foreign policy towards Syria 1990 – 1999

The follower of Turkish foreign policy over the decades notes that secular Turkey, with a Muslim majority, has turned in its policy towards the West, with its membership in the Council of Europe in 1949, its active participation in NATO in 1952, and the Western orientation on Always, and the Ankara agreement was signed between the European Community and Turkey in 1963, in which they reached an agreement on the possibility of Turkey's future accession to the European Union, and it continued its relentless pursuit within the framework of its long-term strategy to become a member of the European Union(Waled, 2006, p. 20).

During the 1990s and since the end of the Cold War, which began with the collapse of the eastern camp (the Soviet Union and its allies), Turkish policy did not witness a major shift towards Syria. The latter's support for the rebel Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey, which led to relations between the two countries entering an imminent war that almost ended in 1998. As for water, Turkey's huge water projects raised the concerns of Syria and Iraq about the acute shortage of water which may result from these projects.

1.1.1. Kurdish issue

Despite the security agreement signed between Turkey and Syria on April 17, 1992 in which it was stated that "the two parties condemn terrorism, whatever its direction and source, including state terrorism. They decide to fight it jointly. And to take the necessary measures not to grant shelter or passage to targeted terrorist activities" against one of the two parties in the territories of the two states and not to allow members of the organizations that one of the parties declares that it is prohibited to reside, live, pass, organize, meet, propaganda and train in the territories of each of the two states.

The Turkish side expressed its concern about the terrorist activities of the PKK in detail, and the Syrian side stated that it considers the party an illegal organization in Syria(Waled, 2006, p. 231), but Turkish President Ozal on September 6, 1992 accused Iraq and Syria of supporting the PKK when he said: The main target of terrorism is the dams that we built on the Euphrates River and others. When we started building the

Ataturk Dam, the spark of terrorism was sparked. Do they want to suffocate us and cut off our water? We will not harm, in any way, the people in Syria and Iraq. They want to weaken Turkey(Waled, 2006, p. 232).

He also came back in another place and clearly and accused Syria, Iraq and all Arabs, describing them as enemies when he said: "There are enemies who do not want us to grow and grow. When we built the Keban Dam, the resurrection of Iraq and Syria took place, and when we built the Ataturk Dam, the Arab world came out against us, but God is with us(Waled, 2006, p. 278).

These direct accusations by the Turkish side against Syria in particular had two main motives. The first is that Turkey wanted to bargain with Syria and dampen its repeated demands regarding the fair distribution of the Euphrates water in accordance with international law, by creating problems with it and accusing it of supporting Turkey's instability by harboring and supporting elements. Kurdistan workers' party. The second is that the Turkish president was sure that Syria could influence the leaders of the rebel party to reduce or stop military operations against the Turkish army, as well as push them to leave the Syrian-Turkish borders into Turkey, which would facilitate the mission of the Turkish army to eliminate them.

The increase in terrorist operations of the PKK in Turkey and the worsening internal situation in Turkey prompted the Turkish government to bargain with Syria by promising it to reach a solution to the problem of water distribution that satisfies all parties, during the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister to Damascus and his meeting with the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in January. January 1993, and his promise to reach a final solution to the water problem before the end of the year(zeynep oktav, 2003, p. 105).

However, the Turkish forces carried out large-scale military operations in the period 18-28 May 1997 inside Iraqi territory (Mosul), which extended as far as the Syrian-Iraqi border, which raised Syria's fears that these operations were part of an American-Israeli scheme against it, so it declared its rejection of these operations, as its foreign minister announced Farouk Al-Shara on June 21 and July 13th:The basic problem of the Kurds is inside Turkey and must be addressed within it, and that others should not be blamed, and that Syria is concerned about the unity of Turkey and its territorial integrity and has no interest in anything else, but there are those who move the Turkish military establishment

(Israel) to tense the atmosphere with Syria without any justification(Waled, 2006, p. 291,292).

Turkey's escalation towards Syria has reached its limit and the war between the parties has almost erupted following statements by Turkish leaders accusing Syria of supporting the rebel PKK in southern Turkey (moubayd, 2008, p. 3). Syria has sought to put pressure on Ankara by supporting this party to respond to its demands regarding the equitable distribution of the waters of Tigris and Euphrates from Turkey.

1.1.2. Water

The water issue between Turkey, Iraq and Syria has emerged since the 1980s. This issue has been at the heart of the Syrian-Turkish dispute since then until recently, despite the principles of the 1966 Helsinki Convention on the Use of International Rivers' Waters and the Rehabilitation of Upstream, Downstream as an Integrated Water Line, which cannot be separated as constituent parts of the International River(Aydın, 2015, p. 89). Through this Convention, both Syria and Iraq consider the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to be international rivers and sought a final agreement on them and the formation of an international commission for the rivers; Similar to the Danube and Congo rivers and the cessation of unilateral use of their waters, a reference to Turkey, which considers the two rivers to be transboundary, and that no one has the right to decide how(Kurdish Human Rights Project, Downstream Impacts of Turkish Dam Construction On, 2002, p. 21).

Utilization of riverine water because it is considered an infringement of its sovereignty, the concerns of both Syria and Iraq in this regard were confirmed by the statements of the Turkish Prime Minister, Suleiman Demirle , at the launch ceremony of the Ataturk Dam in July 1992. "The waters of Euphrates and Tigris of Turkish waters and their sources are Turkish resources, and oil wells are owned by Iraq and Syria. We are not telling Syria and Iraq that we share their oil resources, and they are not entitled to say that they share our water resources. It is a question of sovereignty, that this is our land and we have the right to do what we want(zeynep oktav, 2003, p. 78).

The Turkish Prime Minister has been aware of what he says and is assured of it and is not afraid of what might result from this statement because Turkish politicians have pursued a realistic perspective in their foreign policy. They have always sought force, so they are never interested in the conflict that may result from such statements with their neighbor's, in accordance with the factual interpretation of the nature of relations between

States, which is their natural state of conflict and the primary objective of security. Turkish leaders have therefore tended to link the issue of water to security issues throughout the 1990s. When addressing the negative consequences of Turkey's water policy, the biggest loser of this policy is Syria and Iraq, so that after the construction of the Turkish dams in the framework of the GAP project, the Syrian and Iraqi territories were severely dried up and affected the agricultural sector in both countries(Waled, 2006, p. 26).

For example, Syria's annual flow of euphrates decreased from 32 billion to 23 billion m3. In a statement in January 2002, the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs criticized Turkey's water policy when he said, "Water is life. Many analyses explain that water is a cause of conflict in the region. We believe that water can be a cause for cooperation, coordination and peace in the region, but the GAPT project has very bad repercussions on Syria's environment. In the last five years, more than seven million Syrians have been deprived of arable water and drinking (Labkie, 1994, p. 56).

In 15 September 1997, Turkish President Suleiman Demirle declared that Syria and Iraq's insistence on dividing Euphrates and Tigris waters into three equal sections was unacceptable. and its adherence to the three-stage plan it had proposed earlier aimed at the rational use of water resources from the two rivers, Turkey also refused to respond to repeated Syrian and Iraqi demands for meetings of the tripartite water technical committee not held since 1992 and Turkey's refusal to settle the water problem with Syria and Iraq in accordance with the principles of international law, By insisting that the Tigris and Euphrates are Turkish rivers and are not subject to the principles of international law(Cizre, 2008, p. 190).

Turkey's concern that these rivers belong to it, not internationally, did not come from a vacuum but was aimed at using them in its policy towards the States of the region (Hazaa Al-Bayati, 2000, p. 41,42). Turkey wanted to use water as a pressure sheet on poor neighboring States to this important natural resource through political bargaining. The visit of the Turkish President "Ahmed Najdt Cesar" to Syria is considered in the framework of the funeral decrees of the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in June 2000.

The beginning of the improvement of relations has reflected the Turkish view that Syria after Hafez al-Assad will remain open and that establishing good relations with Syria after Hafez al-Sad will lead to effective influence in the Middle East region as a whole, because Syria's position in the neighboring countries has a beginning to improve

relations . Five months later, the Syrian Vice President's visit to Ankara came in early November of the same year (Awad, 1998, p. 163). Where the latter held talks with the Turkish leaders pledged through the Hasoria and Turkey to work on the drafting of a declaration of principles agreement that helps to guide their relations , this exchange in visits and in an official form and at a time when everyone was waiting to fight the war between the two countries in light of the escalation in relations between the two parties, came to disappoint everyone who believed (Israel and The United States in particular) that Syria and Turkey should connect them after that escalation(Nouraldaen, 1998, p. 84).

Since the agreement between the two sides was reached on 20 October 1998, and the commitment of Syria to expel the members of the PKK , the Turkish foreign policy toward Syria has witnessed a moderation , and the relations between the two countries witnessed a breakthrough on all commercial, security, economic and political levels, especially from 20 October 1998 to 19 June 2002 (Kurdish Human Rights Project, Downstream Impacts of Turkish Dam Construction On, 2002, p. 78).

This breakthrough was represented in more than 12 mutual visits by delegations and political, military and economic officials, most notably the signing of a security and military cooperation agreement in September 2000, and it is worth noting that economic cooperation between the two countries has improved significantly, as the volume of trade exchanges between the two countries reached 724 million dollars military cooperation has also witnessed a remarkable development, on June 19, 2002(Özatay, 2007, p. 90).

General "Hassan Turkman" signed an agreement with the Turkish military leadership agreement on military cooperation between the two armies during a visit to Ankara, this agreement includes cooperation in the field of military training and exchange of visits of officers and students of military colleges and the common military art in the fields of defense industry, and this agreement represents a fundamental shift in relations between the two countries, which It is about rebuilding trust between the two side. This agreement was very important for the Syrian side, after years of military concern Pinterkia and Arrell, especially in the years of the Syrian-Turkish crisis, Syria was among the enemies allied against it. After this agreement, Syria gained the most important military ally in the region, because of Turkey's strategic and military advantages that can benefit Syria(Özatay, 2007, p. 89).

1.2. Turkish foreign policy toward Syria 2000-2010

The visit by Turkish President "Ahmed Najdt Cesar" to Syria within the framework of the funeral decrees of the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in June 2000 is the beginning of the improvement of relations has reflected the Turkish vision that Syria after Hafez al-Assad will remain open and that establishing good relations with Syria after Hafez The dam will lead to effective impact in the Middle East as a whole and that is because of Syria's position in the neighboring countries, beginning to improve relations , five months after the visit of the Syrian Vice President to Ankara in early November of the same year, The latter held talks with Turkish leaders, during which Syria and Turkey pledged to work on the drafting of a declaration of principles agreement that helps to guide relations between them, this exchange in visits and in an official form and at a time when everyone was waiting for the war between the two countries in light of the escalation in relations between the two parties, came to disappoint everyone He believed (especially Israel and the United States of America) that Syria and Turkey would no longer be bound by the escalation (Cizre, 2008, p. 179).

1.2.1. Cooperation and openness instead of tension

After the victory of the Islamic "Justice and Development" party in the legislative elections in 2002 and has been in power in Turkey since then and until 2011, The Turkish-Syrian relations witnessed a great rapprochement, reached a high degree of coordination and cooperation, and after the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the Syrian and Turkish parties considered it necessary to change their policies toward each other and coordinate their positions to face the US support for the Kurds in northern Iraq and stressed the need for the unity of Iraq. The Turkish-Syrian position toward the war on Iraq was consistent, with both heads of state (Ahmed Najdt Cesar (Turkey), Bashar al-Assad (Syria)) condemning the US invasion of Iraq.

The visit of the Turkish Prime Minister "Abdul Ghoul" to Damascus in early 2003 to confirm Turkey's desire to consolidate its relations with Syria, as this visit aimed to mobilize support to prevent the war on Iraq. In response to this visit came the visit of the Syrian Foreign Minister "Walid al-Moallem" to Ankara on 13 January (Aybet & Güney, 2015, p. 79). President al-Assad affirmed his desire to open all doors of dialog and cooperation with Turkey in all fields, stressing the need to work to prevent the war in Iraq and explaining the repercussions of that war on the region.

In 2004, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad paid a visit to Ankara, the first visit by a Syrian president to Turkey since the Ottoman era, during which he signed three agreements (the Agreement on the Prevention of Double Taxation, the Agreement on the Protection and Promotion of Investment, and finally the Agreement on the Tourism Protocol. In December 2004, Erdogan visited Damascus and six months after that visit, "Erdogan" criticizes the US pressure on Syria and accuses it of its involvement in the instability of Lebanon after the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, during this visit, the two sides agreed to create a free trade zone between the two countries and coordinate in the fields of economy and environment, and Turkish President Ahmed Najdt Cesar visited Syria in April 2005 and stressed that Turkey stands by Syria against the accusations against it regarding the Lebanese crisis. He also called on Bashar al-Assad to speed up the implementation of the provisions of UN resolution No. 1559, which called for the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon and the non-intervention of Syria in the internal affairs of Lebanon (moubayd, 2008, p. 78).

1.2.2. Economics in the service of politics

In June 2003, a Syrian government delegation headed by "Issam al-Zaim" and included Syrian businessmen visited Turkey, and on 9 July, Issam al-Zaim signed with Mr. Idrissi Yamantork, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Turkish Cyrus Company, a memorandum of understanding to establish a joint company aimed at the implementation of contracts for the construction, renovation and expansion of cement and fertilizer plants, sugar refineries and infrastructure works. Turkish-Syrian relations reached the peak of economic coordination in 2007, after the growth of trade exchange between the two countries between the years 2003-2002, by 37% and the volume of Turkish investment, as Turkey is the largest foreign investor in Syria, in 2006 Turkey's exports to Syria amounted to 620 million dollars. Syria's exports to Turkey amounted to $400 million, the highest value since 2003 (Aybet & Güney, 2015, p. 79). Syrian-Turkish economic cooperation succeeded and produced good political results.

Relations between Turkey and Syria culminated in the cancellation of the visa and the opening of the border between the two countries in the summer of 2009 after the countries announced the establishment of a free trade zone in 2007. The year 2009 also witnessed an important event for the two countries where they organized military exercises in the month of April In December, the Turkish-Syrian Cooperation Council

was announced that the parties' announcement of the establishment of this Council came at a time when both parties were looking to play a regional role in the Middle East, They realized that they must coordinate their foreign policy towards the region's issues so as not to contradict s relationship ", which may cause a rift in their relationship to bite them, on the one hand. On the other hand, Turkey's realization that its membership in the European Union might take more time, and in order not to stay in the waiting room for too long, it felt that it should play a regional role outside the European Circle, which had led it to consolidate relations with both Syria and Iran, because they were in its view regional powers, and it had to pay for that consolidation by adopting positions of Positive in favor of Syria, Iran and Palestine against Israel, Turkey's strategic and historical ally(Djavadi, 2016, p. 2).

1.2.3. Turkish mediation in Syria

The Syrian-Turkish relations achieved mutual trust between the two parties, allowed Turkey to play a mediating role in the Syria negotiations with the United States of America, and was Ariel, The Turkish efforts to mediate between Syria and Israel for indirect peace negotiations between the two sides have succeeded in reaching a Syrian-Israeli peace that directly or indirectly reflects on Israeli peace with the Palestinians and Lebanon, and the first round of these negotiations was held indirectly in Istanbul in May 2008. The Israeli Prime Minister tried in November 2009 to downplay the Turkish mediation in his visit to Paris, where he asked the French President "Nicolas Sarkozy" to convey a message to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad that the Israeli side wants direct negotiations with Syria without conditions and without Turkish mediation. However, the Syrian president, in his visit to Paris in the same month, stressed that Syria does not talk about preconditions, but about rights that will not be waived, and renewed Syria's adherence to the Turkish role and indirect negotiations (Djavadi, 2016, p. 4).

Turkey has also contributed to the change in the hostile mutual outlook between Syria and the US, and Ankara has played an important role in dismantling the Syrian isolation and preventing the American targeting of Syria through the use of the European French channel. The good relations that have characterized Turkey since the AKP took power with all the countries of the Middle East and the European Union, and the traditional historical relations with the United States of America and the Ariel won it the

confidence of all, allowing it to play a distinctive regional role in resolving disputes through the mediation mechanism (Nouraldaen, 1998, p. 10).

1.3. Turkish foreign policy toward Syria between 2011 and 2021

With the first flame of the Syrian revolution, the dominance of its tracks on Turkish foreign policy, which saw the political and military support of the Syrian revolution as a golden opportunity in anticipating the natural time period to enter the place of the leading state in the region, has clearly emerged. However, the developments did not go as desired by Turkey's foreign policy plans, which predicted the fall of the Assad regime in a few weeks or months, forcing it to change its strategies on the Syrian crisis over and over again.

1.3.1. Turkey and the Syrian revolution during 2011-2012

A group of students wrote slogans on the walls of Daraa streets and were arrested by the Syrian authorities, and soon after some of the marches demanding reform, and then it evolved into a demand for regime change. While the regime tried to deter these demonstrations by military force, it found that political, security and economic reforms were necessary to calm the street, canceled the state of emergency, released some detainees, and then passed a law allowing demonstrators to demonstrate under legal controls, but the demonstrators did not find these reforms sufficient. They considered that the continuation of the demonstrations would be in their favor as the heads of other regimes collapsed, but events did not proceed as hoped; Because the popular revolution turned into an armed clash that took the country into an internal war that continues to this day. In terms of the Turkish position, he recorded a clear divergence compared to his position on the other Arab Spring revolutions, while it manifested itself only in humanitarian diplomatic media support for the other Arab Spring revolutions, it wore a military and logistical support for the Syrian revolution. It must be noted that the shift of the situation was not immediate, but was after Turkish attempts to resolve the crisis through diplomatic mediation, which was manifested in the visits of former Turkish Foreign Minister "Ahmet Davutoglu", the latest of which was the visit that took place on August 2011. Where he was received by the Assistant Foreign Minister of Syria, "Abdel Fattah Amora," not the Foreign Minister, which reflected a bad picture of the direction of relations between the two parties.

Turkish support for the Syrian revolution was manifested at the beginning of its launch by following the policy of "open door" toward Syrian refugees, including political opponents and militants, allowing the opposition to establish its political office and arms in Istanbul (such as the office of the Syrian National Council and then the National Coalition of Syrian opposition forces), The sharp media attack on Assad's person and regime, manifested in speeches by former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has finally intensified its efforts around the grouping of international powers toward the Assad regime to topple him. Despite this Turkish ambition, the position of the Turkish government on the Syrian revolution was initially characterized by balance and diplomatic persuasion, as the Justice and Development Party tried until mid 2011 to use diplomatic channels to contain the Syrian crisis with points to ensure the Syrian people their desire for freedom and democracy. At the same time, high-level media and diplomatic cables were sent to the Syrian regime, calling on it to heed the demands of the people. Turkish media reported at the time that following the Turkish foreign minister's visit to Syria, Prime Minister Erdogan addressed Assad, saying: "In the holy month of Ramadan, let people go out into the street and if you want to repel them, use rubber bullets as the worst possibility." (Kinalitubuk, 2014, p. 43) .

The Turkish and Syrian sides have drawn a road map for moving together toward a solution, but when the Assad regime was unable to control the popular demonstrations, it resorted to excessive force, which the international arena faced with a strong reaction and denunciation of the use of such force against peaceful popular demonstrations. The Assad regime did not take any Turkish, regional or international warning into account, and went on to use force against the people, accusing those who went out to the streets of "terrorists" or "germs" (Al-Soudai, 2017, p. 1). Following Assad's use of excessive force, Turkey has expressed its strong condemnation, calling on international organizations to deal firmly with the Syrian regime's "crimes". On August 11, 2011, Erdogan addressed the Syrian regime, saying: "I do not like empty chatter. I want to say something from the heart. The sea is running out, the road that has been taken is endless, the blood spilled cuts the link between you and your people (jazeera, 2017, p. 3).

Every drop of blood drives the international community to take precautionary measures against you." The Turkish side expected a positive response from Assad after this speech, but Assad did not meet with any positive verbal or actual response, Davutoglu

stated on 15 August 2011, that "the conversation with the Syrian regime is over", as this statement indicates that Turkey has reduced the level of its diplomatic relations with the Syrian regime; To put pressure on him and to listen to the demands of the people. What encouraged Turkey at the time to move toward lifting the siege imposed against the Syrian regime was the issuance by the Arab League, at its meeting on November 27, 2011, of a resolution approved by 19 of the 22 countries, imposing political and economic sanctions on the Assad regime Turkey has been increasingly enthusiastic about imposing sanctions on the Assad regime because the resolution sets a precedent, as the Arab League has never made such decisions against any Arab regime ('uwzdamir, 2015, p. 2)

Turkey's enthusiasm for action against the Syrian regime has barely faded, until it has flared again, following the announcement by the US of its full support for the sanctions imposed by the Arab League, and Turkey announced, on the eve of the camping of this atmosphere clothed in the cloak of the Assad regime on Turkish-Syrian relations. On a number of the sanctions it has taken against the Assad regime within the framework of a program announced by Davutoglu, the most important of which are: Stopping the mechanism of high-level strategic cooperation until the power of a legitimate regime respectful of its people, freezing the property of persons close to the Assad person, who are proven to be involved in criminal acts against the people. Preventing them from entering Turkey, including businessmen close to and supportive of the Assad regime on the same list, stopping the sale and transfer of all types of military materials to the Assad regime, preventing any international transfer of arms to the Syrian regime by air, territorial waters and Turkish territory, On the observance of international law in the process of prevention, stop the deliberative and commercial activities with the Central Bank of Syria, freeze the financial assets of the Syrian government in Turkey, stop the cross-borrowing operations between Turkey and Syria, and finally suspend the implementation of the agreement of financing the Turkish state bank "Exim Bank" for infrastructure projects in Syria.

It is clear from the above-mentioned resolutions and from the applications made by Turkey to help Syrian citizens that it seeks to harass the Assad regime without harming Syrian citizens by its decisions.

It wanted to help the Syrian people without exposing them to the harassment that could result from imposing a political and economic blockade on the regime by establishing shelter camps on both sides of the border between Syria and Syria, and

providing humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees coming to it. In fact, Turkey's political decision had high economic costs, as both sides had converged significantly before the events in Syria erupted.

The Syrian regime did not comply with the Turkish decisions, and responded to them in kind, taking a number of decisions, such as freezing the agreements to build free trade zones, and raising the customs tax on Turkish goods, which will be introduced to Syria within the framework of the project to support the reconstruction of rural areas, by 30 %. The amount of oil sold to cars in Syria with Turkish figures is limited to 50 liters only, large trucks 600 liters, small trucks 550 liters, large buses 400 liters, and small buses 200 liters, to be sold one liter for 80 Syrian pounds. A transit tax was imposed on Turkish trucks in Syria going to Turkey by multiplying the weight of the cargo by the road distance and multiplying the total by 2%.

Perhaps the most prominent reasons behind Turkey's rush to manage the Syrian revolution through a political entity: (Kinalitubuk, 2014, pp. 54,55).

1. Regional international dimension: The harmony between its positions and those of the US, especially since the US appeared to be a strong supporter of the Arab Spring revolutions, and the shock that struck the US as a result of the sudden emergence of the Arab Spring revolutions made it look for a bridge to manage those revolutions. In particular, the Syrian revolution that erupted near the "Israeli" border, and against Russian-Iranian influence, before the nuclear deal. Turkey, seeking to establish solid bases in Syria that counterbalance Iran's influence in Iraq since the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in 2008, has sought to exploit this harmony to its advantage. Many reports stated that in Turkey, the US saw the ideal bridge in the management of these revolutions.

2. Strategic political dimension: the establishment of a Syrian regime to serve its interests in opening up to Middle Eastern countries as a strong historical model with an active role in the ongoing policy process in the Middle East, to say to everyone that Turkey with a glorious history has returned with its solid diplomatic weight to the international arena.

3. Economic dimension: Political openness needs economic openness, and Syria is one of Turkey's main ports towards Arab countries.

4. An ideal humanitarian dimension: Based on the idea of a political representative of the Syrian Revolution, the process of resolving it in favour of the Syrian people is accelerated, making its human and material losses less.

5. Social Management Dimension: Each community has a center and a follow-up flak. This community may have several centers, but there remains one that is strongest in the management of community flakes, i.e. citizens, civil society organizations, profit companies, etc. This center manages society by relying on ideological influence, economic control, soft persuasion and other means. Turkey cannot manage the Syrian Revolution without this center, which must have the above methods. Turkey's attempt to manage the Syrian Revolution in order to ensure its interests was demonstrated by the idea of establishing the Syrian National Council, which was established primarily by the Muslim Brotherhood in Istanbul on 2 October 2011. To achieve greater influence, Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood were keen to involve certain community figures and destinations in its establishment. Perhaps the intellectual convergence between Turkey's ruling party and the Muslim Brotherhood, and Syria's most regular Brotherhood, are the key factors in Turkey's push for the Brotherhood to take over the Syrian Revolution, which the US also wants to manage across Turkey, showing at the end of 2011 the Syrian Revolution, an international regional local equation of the Syrian Revolution path. path of one based on an indirect bridge management equation, where the US relied on Turkey, while Turkey relied on the Muslim Brotherhood.

One of the most significant events that further complicated Turkish-Syrian relations was the direction of the Assad regime, on 2 January 2012, to empty the Syrian consulate in the city of Gaziantep in its entirety, which complemented its closure, which began on 26 December 2011.

As a means of exerting pressure on Assad, the then Turkish Foreign Minister "Ahmad Davutoglu" stated that every Syrian who was sick of the Assad regime's rule could come to and stay in Turkey, and that this move seemed not to be in Turkey's interest, with approximately 4 million Syrians coming to Turkey. In response to Turkey's sharp statements, on 26 March 2012, the regime moved towards the closure of the Turkish Embassy, at which time it was reported that Turkish Ambassador Omar Onhoun had to return to Turkey from Beirut by sea route (Beljic, 2012, pp. 99,100).

The Syrian regime's "al-Hula massacre", on 25 May 2012, was one of the events that contributed to widening the gap between the parties. Turkey responded to the massacre with sharp statements. In response, the regime refused to take responsibility and accused the armed opposition forces of its perpetration. The Turkish government was not

convinced by the justifications of Assad, and in line with the reactions of some Western and international countries, in particular the responses of the Arab League and the United Nations represented by its Special Envoy Kofi Annan, Turkey decided, on 30 May 2012, to completely sever its diplomatic relations with the regime and expelled representatives of the diplomatic regime operating within its territory.

The tension between the two sides did not stop, but rather escalated in the wake of the Syrian regime's shooting down of a Turkish fighter on 22 June 2012, claiming that the aircraft penetrated the country's sovereign airspace. Following investigations by the Turkish Government, it emerged that the aircraft carrying two aircraft had fallen as a result of the pilot's loss of control following the explosion of one of the ground-based anti-aviation missiles near their aircraft.

The Turkish government considered that it needed more to form a deterrent force for the Syrian regime, and proceeded to expand the scope of the "rules of military engagement" against Syria, which ordered an immediate response to any attack originating in Syria. It also increased the size of its military forces on the border between the two countries.

A day later, on 4 May 2012, the Turkish government obtained a parliamentary decision qualifying it for intelligence military operations outside the border (jazeera, 2017, p. 6). On 11 October 2012, the Turkish Air Force stopped one of the Syrian Airlines civilian aircraft and exported some of the aircraft's holdings. In response to this event, the Syrian regime announced on 14 October that it was closing its airspace to Turkish civil aviation.

In mid-July, when some rockets landed on the border town of Shanli Orfa, Akja Kalah, which killed 5 Turkish citizens, Turkey carried out its first operations in applying "rules of engagement" and "reciprocating", targeting some Syrian military positions. Turkey apparently lost hope that the Syrian regime would reverse its military operations, declaring on 15 November 2012 that it recognized the "National Coalition of Syrian Revolution Forces" as the sole and legitimate representative of the Syrian people (Dhabi, 2012, p. 2).

1.3.2. Turkey and the Syrian Revolution in 2013 – 2014

Turkish-Syrian relations were linked to the course of the revolution. The continuation of the revolution resulted in the parties' continuing reluctance to engage in intense political and military competition. Expressing opposition to the ruling party's

policy on Syria, on 7 March 2013, a TCHP body went to Damascus to meet with Assad and discuss the crisis. During its meeting with the Turkish body, Assad stressed that he strongly opposed the Turkish government's policy towards his country and demanded that the Turkish people stand up to this policy.

The rampage between the two sides continued, showing the surface more clearly through the " Rihaniyah bombing" of 11 May 2013, which killed 52 and injured 130 Syrian citizens. Following investigations by the Turkish Prosecutor's Office, it was found that the operation was carried out by 33 Syrian citizens associated with Syrian intelligence; Noting that 2 of the accused persons were arrested, the operation was carried out through the detonation of two car bombs. These operations were assessed in a timely manner as the courage of Assad as a result of the US lack of genuine desire to overthrow his regime.

In the wake of the successive bombings that hit Rihaniyah, Turkish citizens swooped against Syrian refugees, attacking their shops and homes and denouncing the Turkish Government's policy on the Syrian issue; The societal divide over the Syrian crisis is a real threat to Turkey's stability and security. Hence, the AKP - Turkey's ruling party - has begun to feel that a speedy solution to the Syrian crisis must be found before its political, economic and social consequences for Turkey worsen.

On August 31, 2013, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that there was a need for international military intervention against the Syrian regime, stressing that such intervention must be long-term (Alwafad, 2013, p. 1). At the end of 2013, the United Nations indicated that Turkey had sent approximately 47 tons of weapons to Syria, responding to these statements by the then Turkish Defense Minister, Ismat Yilmaz, by indicating that these weapons were light, the purpose of which was training rather than fighting (Kinalitubuk, 2014, p. 77).

The year 2013 constitutes a detailed year for Turkey. That year saw a clear reduction in Turkey's near-total control of the Syrian Revolution. Turkey's control over the Syrian Revolution has diminished as a result of the role of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, The most organized movement was among Syria's other opposition forces. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea ", which had emerged as the best to manage the revolution after having advanced several political initiatives and projects to establish a pluralistic democratic system in Syria prior to the Syrian Revolution, It benefited from widespread popular sympathy for Islam's political thinking, which Turkey wished to make administer the Syrian Revolution by pushing it to contribute to the establishment of the

Syrian National Council, which took control of a large part of its offices, 8 months after the Syrian Revolution began.

At the beginning of 2014, specifically on 17 January 2014, the Turkish government held a meeting with the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, to discuss the decision to participate in the Geneva 2 talks and to address the most important issues that could be raised during the conference (Habeb, 2014, p. 4). On 2 September 2014, Turkey closed its border crossings with Syria after 70,000 Syrian Kurds fled into its territory, coinciding with some clashes between Turkish forces and Syrian Kurdish militants, as if it were a declaration of the failure of the "open door" policy.

On 2 October 2014, in recognition of the magnitude of the dangers surrounding Turkey, the Turkish Parliament of the Army approved the entry into Syrian and Iraqi territory, as well as allowing foreign forces to use their territory to fight ISIS, which was in force for one year, to be renewed while the need arose. (Kinalitubuk, 2014, p. 108) On 9 October 2014, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Chaouchoglu called on US-led coalition forces to mobilize ground forces to fight ISIL, indicating that air strikes might not be enough.

The Turkish government came under intense pressure during 2014, accused of cooperating with ISIS. On 20 October 2014, Turkey opened its borders to Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces to cross into Syria through its territory, with the aim of fighting ISIS in the city of Ain al-Arab, Kobani. In response, ten days after entering Peshmerga, the Syrian government accused Turkey of "violating its sovereignty" by allowing "foreign" Peshmerga forces to enter across its borders into the city of Ayn al-Arab (NEWES, 2014, p. 1).

1.3.3. Turkey and the Syrian Revolution between 2015 -2016

Turkey's intervention in the Syrian crisis during this year has shifted from indirect to direct intervention reflected in reality by sending ground forces into Syria's borders, or by summoning the leaders of the factions active in Syria to Ankara, and directly coordinating with them the course of the fighting. In the context of intensive negotiations with the US, Turkey, on 20 February 2015, was able to persuade the US to sign an agreement containing the principles of the Syrian Opposition Forces Education and Training Programme, but the disagreement between the two parties over the axes of the program's implementation kept it merely on paper (Duran, 2016, pp. 181,182)

On 16 May 2015, the Turkish Army shot down a Syrian Regime Army helicopter, under the pretext of penetrating Turkish sovereignty, thereby confirming that Turkey remained determined to target and bring down the Syrian Regime. After failing to reach a genuine agreement on the formation of an army of the opposition that would fight ISIL and the regime alike, it opted for a path to upgrade its cooperation with Qatar and Saudi Arabia, constituting through that cooperation the "Fatah Army" on 24 March 2015, which was formed from several factions active in the Syrian arena, most notably; The Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham, Jund al-Aqsa, Legion of al-Sham and Ajnad al-Sham.

On 28 May 2015, the Fatah Army was able to completely liberate the city of Idlib, considering Turkey a "popular victory against an autocratic regime." While Turkey was planning to expand Fatah's movement towards Hama Kurdish protection forces moved towards the town of Tall al-Obeid, in the city of Raqqa, On 16 January 2015, it was able to expel ISIL forces from the Turkish border. And here is the real threat to Turkey's national security, The Turkish government announced that it was fully aware of the Kurdish forces' plans to establish a Kurdish belt along the Turkish-Syrian border. And stressing that it will take all possible measures to curb those movements (Duran, 2016, p. 199).Turkey apparently wished it had not helped the Kurdish forces to advance towards and control the "Kobani" Arab eye. With the launching of Russia's military intervention in Syria, on 30 September 2015, at the request of the Syrian regime, Turkey's plans were turned upside down. After the Russian intervention, Turkey not only lost the opportunity to bring down the regime, but began to lose its policy of economic cooperation avoiding political rage with Russia, as Russian aircraft penetrated their sovereign airspace on 5 October 2015 (Salami, 2017, p. 13).

In parallel with its field action, it participated in the Vienna talks held from 14 to 15 November 2015, aimed at achieving a ceasefire, and initiating a political process to bring an end to the war in Syria through the Geneva 3 talks, which were to be held at the end of December of that year.The conference took place with the participation of 17 countries, led by the US, Russia and Iran, as well as the European Union, the United Nations and the League of Arab States. On the margins of the 20 Summit held in Antalya, Turkey, on 15 November 2015, Turkish and international media hinted that Turkish Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin had reached a preliminary agreement on the authority's transition process in Syria, without including Assad (Net, 2016, p. 1).

While Turkey has endvoured since the beginning of the crisis to overcome the impact of the Syrian crisis on its vital diplomatic and economic relations with Russia, it has not been able to do so, and its relations with Russia ended up deteriorating following the shooting down of a Russian warplane by Turkish forces on 24 November, under the pretext of penetrating Turkish airspace. Subsequently, Turkey lost the opportunity to target Kurdish or ISIS forces, in view of Russia's promise to target any Turkish aircraft entering the Syrian border. It began in 2016, and this year's description of the "Year of Concession and Trend towards National Security and Peaceful Negotiation Only" may almost bring us closer to the corrects descriptions of Turkey's position on the Syrian crisis. The Turkish insistence on the Syrian regime's overthrow and dissipation of the Kurdish protection forces in Syria was proven, targeting, on 13 February 2016, positions of the Kurdish YPG in areas stationed in northern Syria.

The Syrian government accused the Turkish government of "continuing to support the terrorist group directly". In the light of its desire to form an instrument of pressure on international forces and to hinder the movement of the Kurdish protection forces, which have become unable to stop them as a result of the deterioration of their relations with Russia, Expansion of its cooperation with Gulf States that intersect it with certain objectives Some Saudi military aircraft were taken to the Ingirlik base in Adana, Commenting on that event, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Chaouchoglu explained that his country and Saudi Arabia could launch a ground campaign inside Syria.

On 14 February 2016, the Syrian regime demanded that the Security Council immediately intervene to halt Turkish shelling of Kurdish positions, considering it a "flagrant violation of its sovereignty".In the midst of heated tit-for-tat offensive rhetoric between the two parties, Turkish Foreign Minister Chaoosahoglu returned to calm the pace by stating on 22 February 2016 that a ground military operation in Syria was not on the table, stressing that some media waving it was "misleading and manipulating (Salami, 2017, p. 22).

In early July 2016, Turkey felt isolated and unimpressed in the course of the solution following several international meetings. As Geneva in February, Vienna, and the Kerry Lavrov meetings, Russia is calling for the restoration of military contacts between the two countries. The trend towards a political solution to the Syrian crisis, and to strengthen that step, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Chaoosh Oglo held a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

Following Mevlut Chaoosh oglu's visit to Russia, as part of Turkey's attempts to restore relations.On July 13, 2016, Turkish Prime Minister Ben Ali Yildirim confirmed that Turkey was seeking to develop good relations with Syria, as part of its objective to improve relations with its neighbours, and was classified as a historic turning point for Turkish policy towards Syria, which was pressuring all forces to overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad (Salami, 2017, p. 32).

One of the most notable steps taken by Turkey during 2016 was Operation Euphrates Shield, which developed through the achievement of a Turkish-Russian reconciliation, thereby gaining the Russian position wishing to attract it under it control in its favor.

The operation proceeded in cooperation between Turkish army forces and some FSA forces Led by "Al-Sham Legion", "Sultan Murad Brigade", "13th Division ′ " Ahrar Al-Sham Movement "and East Lions", The Turkish Government announced that the most important stated objective of the operation was to secure the Turkish-Syrian border by freeing border towns from the grip of ISIS. securing Turkish cities from the flames of war in Syria, The Syrian Democratic Forces, whose backbone is the Kurdish protection forces, are blocked s territory ", from the seizure of border areas and the construction of a corridor linking its Kinuna in Aleppo to the Rabda east of Euphrates, thereby ensuring the unity of Syrian territory. and preventing a new wave of displacement and easier delivery of assistance to civilians (Hamira, 2017, p. 4).

The erosion of rebels' domination of Syrian territory began with the fall of the city of Aleppo in the grip of Russia, the regime and Iran. Its downfall has had a number of non-main reasons, including the lack of eligibility of leadership leaders of combatants, factional infighting, understandings between some faction leaders and the regime on the one hand, and with Turks on the other, and factional mis planning. However, the main reason for its downfall, in fact, was Turkey's withdrawal of a large part of the factions from a militia to join the Efrat Shield fighters and its threat to those who participate in the fighting effectively against the regime in a militia, as the duration of the break between 29 and the fall of two processes (Hamira, 2017, p. 6).

1.3.4. Turkey and the Syrian Revolution between 2017 and 2020

On 24 January 2017, the development of Russian and Turkish relations has succeeded by pushing for the start of meetings with representatives of the Russian Federation. Iran, Russia, Turkey and convened a meeting called the Astana Meeting in Kazakhstan's Capital between Representatives of the opposition and representatives of the

system. But the Conference has produced nothing to mention, and it has come up with general items on the face that are in line with international agreements. But what has been proven in the Conference is Turkey's ability to press against it (shorbajie, 2017, p. 3)

Turkey has now entered the conflict as a party and as a military force in Syria. It embraces the National Coalition of Forces. Revolution and opposition, the interim Government and most members of the Negotiating Committee. On May 4 2017, Russia, Iran and Turkey agreed to ensure and monitor Syria's ceasefire regime and the establishment of de-escalation zones. Republic of Korea, the results of which encouraged 1 sponsoring States to hold the second round of discussions in the name of Astana 2, where Russia, Iran and Turkey had begun a way to end the armed conflict in Syria that had since lost the regime of Assad.

Syria has been divided into downsizing areas as an interim measure aimed at stopping the fighting, and the parties' commitment by not attacking each other, distributing the equipment to the population, restoring the infrastructure's operation, and setting up points between areas of the regime's control and that of opposition factions (Salami, 2017, p. 45).

The Syrian factions have been forced to implement the Plan of Areas for De-escalation under pressure from the Turkish Government, which is supported by Russian aerial bombardment and from among the areas for de-escalation, opted for the installation of an Idlib prefecture and set up a 12-cupboard border.

As a result of Russia's Turkish understandings, Russian troops withdrew from the two pardons to the end of the lifting. Then Turkey carried out its second military campaign on January 20, 2018, called Operation "Ghason Alzaytone ", which targeted control of the Afrin region, where the operation lasted about two months and resulted in control of the Afrin region and around it, i.e., about 280 cities and villages, which were forcibly withdrawn from the Afrin region and were not able to control the genetic concentration of the US.

On October 9, 2019, the third military operation, Operation " Nabaa Alslam " (Salami, 2017) was launched. In northeastern Syria, launched by pro-Ankara factions with the support of the Turkish army with the aim of establishing a safe zone and displacing Kurds from the area, following an American withdrawal from the Syrian border - Turkey, by decision of US President Donald Trump, caused the loss of several areas of the SDF that were under its control and altered the map of the conflict in areas of North and North-

East Syria, after "SDF" resorted to Russia to conclude agreements to prevent Turkey from further penetrating into the territory under SDF (abas, 2017, p. 1)

1.3.5. Turkey and the Syrian Revolution after 2020

After 2020, Syrian-Turkish relations witnessed several shifts and developments, as there were political, security and economic conflicts and tensions between the two countries in previous years, but in 2020 the situation changed dramatically due to several factors. At the diplomatic level, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke about the need for cooperation between the two countries in fighting terrorism, and it was agreed to reopen the border crossings between Turkey and Syria to facilitate the movement of trade and goods (Alabi, 2022, p. 2). The "Rihaniya" crossing has been reopened, and since then Russia has been trying to achieve a political settlement in Syria and is working to improve relations between Syria and Turkey by mediating on some political and security issues. In March 2021, a high-level Turkish delegation visited Damascus and met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in an effort to improve relations between the two countries. This was the first such visit since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011 (Alabi, 2022, p. 8).

In May 2021, Turkey and Syria agreed to open a new border crossing between the two countries, the "Jalawan" border crossing, to facilitate the movement of trade and goods between the two countries. At the military level, Turkey continued in 2021 to fight Kurdish militants in northern Syria, and the region witnessed several battles between the two sides, especially in Afrin governorate.Russia was not the only party to seek mediation between Turkey and the regime, with Iran making an offer in July 2022 to reform the relationship between the parties (Shawabkeh, 2022, pp. 2,3).

In December 2022, however, Russian mediation began to make progress with the announcement of a tripartite meeting at the level of defense ministers and the formation of a mechanism to deal with contentious issues. Turkey's response to Russia's mediation without Iran reflects Moscow's ability to offer a quid pro quo that Tehran does not have the capacity to provide, and may not only relate to the requirements of the Syrian issue, and the Turkish side stresses that the relationship with the regime is organized within the political path of 2254, thus taking into account the international position (Shawabkeh, 2022, p. 5).

Attempting to mitigate the hostile regime's behavior, and the gains of accepting Russian mediation are Turkish targets still under talks, it is early to appear as practical actions, and the position of the US will certainly be influential in any communication or relationship with the regime, as well as the expectation that the regime will not abide by and remain in its conduct.

CHAPTER TWO

ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION UNDER TURKISH TUTELAGE

2.1. Protracted conflict, prolonged forced displacement

The activity of NGOs working in northern Syria has increased, shifting from the shelter sector to the housing sector as the conflict turns into a protracted conflict, forced displacement into prolonged forced displacement, formal governance structures shrink, and early recovery is announced. Therefore, it becomes important to highlight the governance initiatives undertaken by these NGOs in the housing sector and to evaluate them in terms of their achievement of safe housing standards capable of dealing with the grievances generated by the conflict, and maintaining social cohesion compatible with the requirements of development, without fueling the war economy. To be the main question:

What is the reality of NGO housing initiatives as an administrative organization in the city of Azaz, and do they take into account the standards of safe housing**?**

This question branches into the following questions:

1. What are the standards for the governance of safe housing in the context of protracted conflict?
2. What is the peculiarity of the reality of northwestern Syria? Within the context of a protracted conflict?
3. To what extent do these organizations' housing initiatives in northwestern Syria take these standards into account?

The open-source literature and reports of UN organizations assume a written form of conflict that ends with a peace agreement and a legitimate government recognized and dealt with by the international community, thus establishing a clear division of responses to forced displacement as a result of the conflict between three responses (Navarro, 2022, p. 44).The first is short-term absorption: an emergency relief response that begins with the first displacement and continues as the conflict continues. The second is adaptive medium-term: responses to support early recovery, the restoration of destroyed shelters and attempts to create conditions for the return of displaced people. The third is a long-term change response: housing and resettlement of displaced people comes after the end of the conflict (Mahama, 2011, p. 88).

The absorptive response is managed by the UN and local relief organizations, providing shelter and basic needs, and funded by relief program grants. While the long-term change response to housing governance requires institutional, planning, and logistical capabilities at the state level, it is usually managed by the legitimate government that resulted from the end of the conflict, with the assistance of UN organizations, and financed by loan or grant programs according to specific agreements (Ahmad Sukkar, 2021).

What this literature is concerned with if the conflict turns into a protracted conflict without a sustainable peace in the foreseeable future is partial housing operations, such as the restoration of destroyed housing as part of early recovery. Housing operations are more widely regarded than post-conflict reconstruction, which the international community is supposedly reluctant to do in protracted conflict situations so that they are not vulnerable to exploitation by parties to the conflict to consolidate military gains, and use them as a machine to support demographic engineering and support the networks of an already existing war economy, which could make a durable solution to the conflict remote (sultan, 2003, p. 16).Therefore, the recommendations contained in this literature need to find mechanisms to project them on the complex reality in cases of protracted conflict that has produced a state of unstable political and security reality, the spread of war economy networks, and prolonged internal displacement, and this is the current case of Syria (Cubitt, 2013, pp. 91,112).

Protracted conflict results in the phenomenon of prolonged forced displacement, starting with batches of displaced people living in the cities to which they moved and on their outskirts, and continuing to establish camps in various lands in safer areas, and with the conflict reaching a dead end, the return of the displaced and their access to their original homes becomes impossible in the foreseeable future, and they are stuck in an emergency but it becomes semi-permanent, there is no stability and no return. This greatly affects their options for integration with the local community and the search for livelihoods, and increases dependence on relief assistance that may not last as long as conflict and displacement. This protracted situation also results in the atrophy of the political effectiveness of displaced communities, making them more vulnerable to exploitation by parties to the conflict and the agendas of actors. The humanitarian economy is also growing, which may not always be effective in meeting the needs of the

displaced and governed in a rational and sustainable manner, adding to the disadvantages of an unsustainable war economy (Ugochukwu, 2015).

With the continued demand for housing, an internal housing market emerges within the security, political and economic dynamics of the protracted conflict, to carry out peaceful projects on a larger scale of early recovery, and less than reconstruction, which raises questions about the impact of these dynamics on the agendas of these projects and their adoption of a sustainable development plan, and about their impact on the map of actors in the housing market and the beneficiaries of projects .This response to housing demand is a hybrid response, as it does not follow the criteria for early recovery responses to housing needs, nor does it respond according to a comprehensive plan developed and supervised by delegated bodies with representative legitimacy of stakeholders, and with sufficient capacity and experience. That is, it is a response with a short-term absorptive emergency relief methodology and tools, implementing projects that require a changeable and long-term response with a sustainable methodology, development planning tools and the ability to examine and assess risks. This problem, therefore, raises questions about the institutional and knowledge capacities of actors to carry out this type of response, and whether the projects implemented take into account the resulting pressures when responding to displacement shocks. Through research here, we try to find out whether housing responses to forced displacement turn into forced settlement and stabilization of the new demographic reality, which may cause the emergence of informal housing in the geography hosting displacement, and complicate the conflict into an inter-conflict in it.

2.2. Grievance Management and Conflict Prevention

A large part of the conflict at the social level in northern Syria is urban, so any spatial policy that creates physical housing that does not take into account the roots of existing conflicts, inter-community conflicts outside the binary (regime-opposition), and conflicts floating on the periphery, lead to the emergence of urban agglomerations of communities that bear these grievances, thus complicating the current conflict inevitably (Gurung, 2022, pp. 26,39). Awareness of this while managing emergency responses, early recovery, and reconstruction make them important tools in conflict resolution, increasing the capacity of communities to recover from the effects of current conflict, prevent its complexity, and revitalize their political effectiveness.

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Host communities bear the burden of receiving forcibly displaced people and, while at some point are cooperative in their support operations, prolonged displacement and lack of resources will lead to a sense of long-term injustice. The relief support resources for the displaced, if they continue, will increase their dependence on them, and their sense of entitlement to them, which establishes a sense of injustice among the local community, which hosts the displaced without receiving assistance, despite its urgent needs for it as well (Gyawali, 2020, pp. 45,56). If relief aid ceases and there are no plans to integrate them into the local economy and provide them with livelihood opportunities, relations between them and the local community will turn into competition for already scarce resources. In the near or distant future, which will turn their relations into pressure that turns into conflict. The nature of the political economy in protracted conflict zones is centered on the war economy model, which permeates many economic activities, including housing. The war economy model controls networks supplying resources and building materials, contractors and human resources to carry out construction, de facto forces interfere in the selection of beneficiaries of housing projects, and the right to property is transformed into a commodity that can be used as a financial resource (Robert, 2003, pp. 45-55).

2.3. Analysis of the map of the actors of the housing process

In the standard case of post-conflict housing governance actors' analysis, local actors are divided into community, local authorities, the private sector, and the national government. Although community is not a legal capacity, identifying community leadership and marginalized, conflict-affected and vulnerable elements is key to representing the community and communicating its needs to policymakers, project

implementers and supporters. Be aware that local authorities may not have the legitimacy and mandate to represent communities. As for the analysis of the private sector, it contributes to the development of controls and guarantees so that the housing market does not turn into a purely profitable market that depends on purchasing power and contributes to inflation. In the event of a conflict end, housing governance in the context of integrated reconstruction is managed by a national government and it becomes important to understand the responsibilities of its multiple institutions and their ability to coordinate. Analysis of the map of external actors contributes to knowing the supporters of the housing process and their willingness to finance it, and to understand their conditions in return and their intentions to continue supporting. In the case of protracted conflict and the resulting hybrid response to housing demand, the question of actor analysis becomes a more complex process. These actors often do not have formal status, and their local economic, social, and security networks overlap with regional networks. In order to map the actors, it is important to answer the following questions:

1. Who makes the decision to carry out the housing process?
2. On what basis is this decision made to start the process?
3. What is the extent of the local mandate and legitimacy of these bodies?
4. Do they have the institutional and human capacity and skills to perform this work?
5. How prepared are they for this type of long-term intervention?
6. What are the sectors that manage the housing process: (private sector, public sector, organizations)?
7. Which local authorities are involved in the management of the housing process?
8. Who are the project contractors?
9. What is the source of supply of construction materials?
10. Who are the financiers of the housing process?
11. What are the mechanisms, channels and conditions of financing?
12. What is the share of funding from the rest of the projects?

Figure 1.Case Analysis

2.4. Safe Housing Governance

Safe housing takes into account the pressures and shocks that contributed to the old conflict, and prevents its complexity into a new conflict that generates other waves of displacement, maintains social cohesion between host communities and the forcibly displaced, by involving them in all stages of decision-making, implementation and monitoring, contributes to building a new social contract between them, secures spatial justice for communities among them through adequate housing, gives security to property rights, takes into account the most vulnerable and affected groups, prevents integration into society, and does not discriminate between beneficiaries based on Equitable access to services and livelihoods for residents rather than enhanced dependence on relief assistance through rational spatial development governance, and the housing economy deviates as much as possible from the existing war economy by

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strengthening local funding and implementation networks, transparency in decision-making, and empowering representative local authorities. The table below shows the details of the housing projects implemented in the Azaz area:

Table 1.List of housing units in the Azaz

Nb	The name of the organization	project name	Nb of housing units	Project state	The number of beneficiaries	Year	The month
1	Sham Al Khair Human Association	Al -Rahma residential village	1026	Done	1026	2019	March
2	Molaham volunteer team	Parisha Project	212	Done	212	2020	February
3	Molaham volunteer team	Torhha project	176	Done	176	2020	April
4	Al-Taakhe Humanitarian Association	Almahba village 2	275	Done	275	2021	November
5	Molaham volunteer team	Aziz Al Sakani Project	472	Done	472	2021	January
6	This group of my voluntary life	Al -Hikma village	138	Done	138	2021	July
7	This group of my voluntary life	Al -Hayat Village 1	200	Done	200	2021	March
8	The World Relief and Development Community (Anser)	The village of Seed of Palestine	94	Done	94	2021	September
9	The World Relief and Development Community (Anser)	The land of hope	95	Done	95	2021	September

10	Qatar Charity Association	Residential City	1400	processing	8800	2021	July
11	Sham Al Khair Human Association	Kuwait Al - Rahma Village	380	Done	380	2021	September
12	Molaham volunteer team	Kut residential project	240	processing	240	2021	February
13	Molaham volunteer team	Tamra residential project	120	processing	120	2021	February
14	Molaham volunteer team	Sawasia project	144	processing	144	2021	June
15	Ataa Humanitary Relief Association	The third residential gathering	800	Done	800	2021	June
16	Grass Good Human Association	Balad Al - Khair village Kuwait	104	Done	104	2022	May
17	Al-Taakhe Humanitarian Association	Brotherhood village 6	252	processing	252	2022	September
18	Molaham volunteer team	Inspiring pegs project	280	Done	320	2022	February
19	Molaham volunteer team	Inspiring village project	378	processing	378	2022	November
20	Palestinian Al -Falah Charitable Association /Syria Branch	Habib Rahman	204	Done	204	2022	February
21	Cahatin Association	Residential Village Project	400	processing	400	2022	September
22	Human Abel Organization	Shelter project "Friendship Camp"	272	processing	272	2022	January
23	Mahmoud Aziz stood up	Dar Al - Surwar Residential Complex		processing		2022	May

24	White Hands Association	Basma residential village	256	Done	256	2022	March
25	Elaf Association for Relief and Development	Housing units	135	Done	135	2022	June
26	Al -Bunyan Al -Marsous Humanitarian Association	Al Salam residential village	400	Done	400	2022	March
27	Al -Bunyan Al -Marsous Humanitarian Association	Doha residential village		processing		2022	October
28	Rahama Association	Peace Society Residential Association	400	Done	400	2022	May
29	Rahama Association	Peace Society Residential Association	400	processing	400	2022	July
30	Ataa Humanitary Relief Association	Work	4500	processing	4500	2022	April
31	This group of my voluntary life	A sample of Amal	480	processing	480	2022	May

2.5. Spatial Development Governance

The urban nature of conflict requires acknowledging the complexity of urban reality in the first place before making interventions, so the governance of housing forcibly displaced people in a place cannot be separated from the governance of sustainable urban development in that place and its broader geographical context, so that it achieves spatial justice that does not constitute pressures that push new conflicts.

This recognition includes considering broader contexts, whether formal and informal systems governing that place, the economic context and securing decent livelihoods, or the social context and the provision of services, and analyzing the characteristics and capabilities of the urban site, such as its proximity to municipal

service centers, infrastructure capacity, educational services, community centers, local markets, environmental capabilities and the uses of surrounding land, whether forestry, agricultural, industrial, archaeological sites, environmental reserves and groundwater basins.

2.5.1. Construction and community cohesion

Housing should not be seen as simply building physical housing for those who will inhabit it, but rather as building a new society integrated with the surrounding social context. Therefore, one of the basics of this social structure is the involvement of direct stakeholders in undertaking these projects at all stages of decision-making, starting from assessing needs and damages, selecting beneficiaries, then planning, passing through implementation, managing the project after its completion, and the evaluation and development process.

Stakeholders here should not be classified only on the basis of the dichotomy of displacement and host, but their demographic reality of them must be understood to reach stakeholders at the most accurate levels, through the analysis of social structures to reach common sectors, understanding social sensitivities, the nature of community leadership, and formal and informal systems in it, and considering visible and blocked members of society, who are the most affected and least access to services usually, with the aim of making inclusive housing policies that involve and represent all these sectors in the housing process.

The housing process therefore manages to build a social contract between different stakeholders within a comprehensive recovery process that re-establishes the public sphere, establishes community mediation and decision-making mechanisms, creates a climate of communication between different groups of society, increases its resilience to face pressures and shocks, reduces local conflict, anticipates potential risks and creates mechanisms to confront them.

The community participation process also includes a survey of the capabilities of local communities to provide human resources to carry out housing projects, whether skilled or unskilled labor, and studying the possibility of raising these capabilities through training and vocational programs. It also includes studying their

needs to provide opportunities to develop economic projects to provide decent livelihoods and access to services and the local market.

CHAPTER THREE

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND KEY PEOPLE CRITERIA

3.1. Housing economy as a war economy

3.1.1. Funding

Is part of the funding of organizations allocated for the construction of housing or the imposition of royalties on those projects, in favor of a military faction/ influential leader in the city, meaning that the organization is not allowed to establish a housing project until after paying the known 'bribes, royalties'....Are organizations working in the housing sector in the city obligated to deal with remittance offices or money changers affiliated with an influential faction/leader?

3.1.2. Informal networks

Does the faction or influential leaders in the city have a role in prioritizing housing projects for organizations or construction areas 'property', interfering with workers working on the project, controlling the process of granting licenses and permits to work in the field, or lobbying for the allocation of apartments/residential blocks for the benefit of faction members or affiliates, how is the matter done? Does the faction have a role in determining the contracting company (construction)?

3.1.3. Supply chain

Where do raw materials for housing projects come from, do influential factions or leaders care about the iron/cement/sand-gravel quarries? Are organizations obliged to contract with specific traders affiliated with an influential faction/leader to supply these materials? Are tax/royalties levied on building materials used by organizations to build housing projects?

3.2. Spatial management

1. What was the decision to undertake the housing project and by whom? How was this decision taken mechanism? Has coordination been made with local or external bodies to carry out the project and obtain authorization to carry it out? What are these entities?

2. Does the organization have cumulative experience in the field of construction projects, and what is its profile? Does it have specialists or experience in the housing sector, (engineers, urban planners, housing experts? etc.) What is their contribution to the project?

3. What are the criteria on which the project was based? (Standards of location and land use, standards of infrastructure of communication and transportation, services, and facilities)

4. How was the decision made to build on this particular land? Has the place been approved according to a land use plan or plan?

5. What is the source of livelihood for the beneficiaries of the project? Have measures been taken to reduce their dependence on aid by taking into account livelihood security during project planning? Does the site include job opportunities for them, and how far are their sources of livelihood from the project?

3.3. Community Cohesion

1. What was the nature of the ownership of the land before the project? (title deed papers etc.) and what is the nature of the transfer of ownership to carry out the project? (Buying agar) and how is it registered?

2. What is the nature of the contract with the beneficiaries? How are their rights guaranteed and their property preserved? How is the issue of ownership transfer dealt with?

3. To whom is the project owned and managed after it is delivered? What is the role of the Foundation after the completion of the residential complex and the delivery of apartments to its beneficiaries?

4. What are the criteria for attracting beneficiaries of housing units, and have stakeholders from the beneficiaries and the local community been involved in decision-making in the various stages of the project (planning, design, implementation and distribution of apartments, livelihood security, and the method of managing the project after handover)? And how was it done?

5. Does the project have social facilities and public spaces? On what basis were these facilities selected and designed? Does it take into account the needs of women and children? Do you take into account people with special needs?

6. Did the entire process of carrying out the housing project take into account the facilitation of social ties and relations between the residents and between them and the surrounding community? How was that? Did there be disputes between them during the project? What was its cause and how was it resolved?

Table 2. Key Person Criteria Table

Nb	Entity	Standards	The number of completed interviews
1	non-governmental organizations	Licensed by the Turkish government, director of the organization. One of the officials of the artificial projects in the association. The association implemented or started implementing at least one residential project.	5
2	Local councils	The Chairman of the Council or his deputy. Director of Licensing or Technical Services, Director of the Reconstruction Office (responsible for granting licenses or who organizes the housing sector)	2
3	Beneficiary	From the village actress committee Not an employee in the association	2
4	Civil activist	A resident of the city of Azaz. Region elders. Age over 18 years old. Interest and knowledge of the conditions of the concerned aspect. The ability to communicate. Representative of civil society.	1

Interviews were conducted with 10 key people located in northern Syria, selected based on the above criteria through communication via WhatsApp or using Zoom, where each interview almost exceeded about an hour and a half.

CHAPTER FOUR

INTERVIEW ANALYSIS

4.1. Housing Economy as a War Economy

I focus on understanding the role and nature of the link between the housing economy activity sponsored by humanitarian organizations and the war economy under the civil and military management of the studied geographical area, and what are the ramifications of the housing economy by focusing on three main axes: financing and its mechanisms, formal and informal networks, in addition to the supply chain. The war economy did not remain the monopoly of the Syrian regime only, but that became the supreme goal of the leaders during the past years, distributed and divided on the Syrian geography based on the authorities of the matter in it, each authority has its own work methodology, differs according to its location, and with the flourishing of charitable housing projects greatly It is remarkable in opposition areas. It has become necessary for us to research this and find out whether housing projects adopted by humanitarian organizations indirectly contribute to supporting the war economy and prolonging the conflict.

In order to provide the reader with a general understanding of war economics, we could not help but borrow from the research paper issued by the Berghof Foundation under the title "The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation", in which it presents a number of basic features of war economics, especially civil wars in which power struggles with power. armed groups. In the Syrian case, these patterns were present in each of the regime areas, the opposition areas, the Autonomous Administration areas, and other areas, as each area belongs to regional and international powers. These features can be summarized as:.

First, it involves destroying, or circumventing the official economy, and the growth of informal and black markets, which leads to the obliteration of the lines between sectors and formal and informal activities, and even that criminal. Second, in such wars, looting, extortion and intentional violence against civilians prevails in order to take control of the fighters on profitable assets, on commercial networks and expatriate transfers. Third, the war economy is decentralized and controlling

production and exchange, and legitimate or illegal exploitation of profitable natural resources grows. Fourth, the war economy involves the prosperity of the networks of armed groups, and the growing smuggling and cross -border trade networks, so these operations are in favor of mercenaries and arms merchants, which may each have a firm interest in the continuation of conflict and instability.

And by focusing on the war economy of the liberated areas, the Turkish military operations after 2016 (Draa Euphrates, Naba Alsalam and Ghason alzaytone) contributed to a gradual relative stability not only at the civil level but also at the military level, as Turkey had a role in organizing these factions under the name of "the National Arm " And part of its official resources is through monthly salaries paid by the Turkish government, and the other part is from the allocations for customs duties imposed on commercial goods that pass through the official border crossings between Syria and Turkey, where the meeting took place and it was agreed in the month of November 2019 that the allocations for the crossings go back to the councils Local military factions (the National Army) and the Syrian Interim Government.

In spite of this, but these resources were not sufficient for the leaders of the factions in order to impose their control and consolidate their influence, according to a report published by the Middle East Direction Center, in which some illegal resources mentioned some of the national army factions, as economic offices for the development of financial resources and business administration, and the maintenance of real estate properties , And the goods are evaded to and from the region, and they are in deals between local producers on the one hand and the merchants and companies in Turkey on the other hand.

The economic networks of the military factions are formed from unofficial partnerships with many merchants, brokers and smugglers. The opposition factions have shown special attention to two economic sectors, achieving a rapid profit with a relatively low and low -end investment: real estate and trade/smuggling.

4.1.1. Financing

Most of the humanitarian associations operating in the liberated areas interested in implementing housing projects in particular, they have major external offices licensed as non -profit institutions in Turkey that supervise their monitoring

'Association of the Societies of the Turkish Ministry of Interior', and most of the Syrian associations licensed have credits from the foreign donor state Some of the licensed and approved societies obtaining financing for their projects or implementing the projects of foreign authorities such as Kuwait and Qatar through licensed societies in Turkey and have an executive team in the Syrian interior, where they transfer project funds to the association's accounts in Turkey directly and then transfer from the association's account to the account of the actor. Inside the Syrian, some of the associations depend in its resources to collect donations by official banking methods.

In 2020, the Turkish authorities opened the branches of the Turkish Post and Shipping Corporation (PTT), distributed in 11 Syrian cities, the most important of which are Azaz, Al -Bab, Jarablus and Afrin, where local and technical organizations operating in the north of Syria were forced to transfer through the deployed post branches, where external transfers reach the association's accounts In US dollars, it is reported in the management of association , the money is transferred from the US dollar to the Turkish lira, and then the association transfers the amount in Turkish lira to the account of one of the representatives of the office inside the country, where 1% of the transfer value is deducted before receiving it, not to mention the time difference between the transfer and the receipt in light of the changes in the prices of the Turkish lira and its collapse, from After receiving sums at home, after the difference, you are forced to transfer the amount from Turkish lira to US dollar to preserve its value first, secondly, most of the material dealers at home pay in dollars or its equivalent in Turkish lira.

Although Turkish banks deducted and exploited the money of housing projects and others in an official and announced manner, no direct or indirect intervention was observed to the fait accompli, whether from the national army factions or other local authorities in the process of transferring the funds.

4.1.2. Informal Networks

The deteriorating security situation encourages public exploitation by informal or official networks towards the work of the working humanitarian organizations, for example in the city of Idlib and its countryside under the control of the Tahrir Al - Sham, the Salvation Government, through the Ministry of Development, imposes on

any work of a relief project estimated at 20 % of the total. Implementation materials, where no humanitarian association can implement any project without a direct book issued by the Coordination Office in the Ministry, and in turn provides lists of the names of the targeted camps based on the first book issued by the Statistical Directorate. While the coordination mechanism varies in the liberated areas of the opposition authority between local councils and operating organizations, for example in the implementation of charitable construction projects by organizations, the work of the local council is limited to issuing a formal license only is not obligated to standards and construction conditions without conditional approval from the benefits, and the work of the council is limited By sending a technical observer with the intention of the supply to the project by deducting a salary paid by the executing association.

Non-governmental organizations rely on the local council by nominating lists of beneficiaries, which the council counts at the end of the project by placing names of members of the military factions, especially at an estimated rate of 30%, in coordination with the security office of the Levant Front, which is responsible for the region. The mechanism for imposing names and proportions on the association differs based on its size and reputation in northern Syria.The matter did not stop at that, especially since some of the local organizations operating in the city of Azaz suffer from some youth of the region on the residential project who have good relations with the local council or military factions with the aim of imposing a royalty (monthly salary) on the association and in return, he runs all its work in front of Official and non -official authorities.

Even on the Turkish side, the organizations operating in the north, especially those who have external offices in Istanbul, are keen to hold memoranda of understanding with an organization that benefited with the aim of obtaining an ear to enter and exit the border crossings from the project, but this is done on the terms, standards and interventions of the benefit (the coordination body of the Turkish government in the north of Syria) In details of the start of the selection of the land and ending with the selection of beneficiaries, most of the local organizations are not dependent on benefiting a lot and are satisfied with a license from the local council,

and depends on the collection of the ear entering from other crossings based on projects other than housing.

4.1.3. Supply chain

The city of Azaz ranked second in the economic prosperity after 2018, based on the early recovery index issued by the Imran Center for Strategic Studies, where the housing and construction sector had the largest share in the city's progress, whether through the Inchian projects implemented by charitable organizations or private contracting companies, where he poured The focus of organizations on building projects in the region is ..... between 2020 - 2022. Because of the lack of basic raw materials for construction, they are imported from Turkey, where their trade has been limited to brokers (financial offices of dominant factions) or traders with the affluent minority, where a published study entitled 'The local economy recovery in North Aleppo' issued by the Middle East Direction Center to The acquisition of the Levant Front (controlling the Azaz area) on cement laboratories, sand quarries and stores to sell imported building materials, build buildings, commercial and tranquility in several areas in northern Syria. Most of the associations in the city of Azaz prefer to buy directly from the supplier due to the close prices, speed of receipt, and availability of all materials. They do not want to import materials directly from Turkey, although they will be exempted from crossing taxes, whether from the Turkish crossing or the Syrian crossing, for the aforementioned reasons. With regard, the implementation of Projects is approved by charitable societies, either through their engineering staff or through contracting with a private contracting company, and in the first case, contracts are made with suppliers of building materials directly, whether from merchants in the region or outside, at local market prices and exclusively in US dollars or its equivalent in the local currency.

4.2. Taking into account spatial management

The camps in northeastern Syria began an emergency response to forced displacement as a result of military operations from 2012 to 2013, with civil initiatives that were soon organized by international organizations with their local partners, stationed in the most stable places at the border strip, far from the points of engagement

with the regime forces and what was under ISIS control, and it is established on private agricultural lands in return for a fee, or on communal lands.

He draws the features of this response as relief and emergency, aiming to shelter the displaced temporarily pending the end of the conflict, and that it prevents their stability so as not to contribute to the settlement and complication of the conflict, which makes its criteria It is commensurate with the assumption of its short life, not its durability, and this is reflected in its simple infrastructure, the nature of its light construction materials, and the choice of its location, which is often not suitable for permanent housing. Therefore, international organizations prohibit building with sustainable materials, and if they allow walls made of solid materials, they prohibit pouring roofs.

However, the conflict in Syria, which has become protracted, has increased the suffering of the displaced, who have resided in the camps longer than their expected life, as a result of their temporary standards, such as the narrow spaces of the tents and their close proximity to each other, and common services such as toilets and bathrooms, many problems such as low privacy and security, and the establishment of unemployment and dependence on aid to earn a living.

The shift to construction instead of temporary shelter was not a clear decision from a specific party. Rather, it went through several stages since the years 2015-2016-2017 after the intensification of waves of forced displacement resulting from the emptying of the areas that the regime-controlled from its opponents and those who refused to remain under its rule therein, and the inability of the camps to Absorbing their numbers, and the lack of a solution to the conflict in the foreseeable future. The transition from light camps to solid structures was in response to the needs of individuals to expand their tents, and to protect themselves from natural factors, neglecting international standards that prohibit the construction of solid roofs.

Then the organizations took the initiative to collect donations from networks of sympathetic supporters outside the international system with strict standards to prevent construction, in order to replace light tents with what might be called " concrete tents" or similar caravans, and prefabricated facilities, in order to alleviate the poor conditions that the camps live in throughout the year. While some local groups

that have been displaced en masse, such as those displaced from Homs and Douma, have established self-supporting groups or kinship networks of expatriates.

.   While some local groups that have been displaced en masse, such as those displaced from Homs and Douma, have established self-supporting groups or kinship networks of expatriates. As a result, the Turkish government, which has control over the land, decided to establish homes for the displaced to prevent them from entering its territory, and to open the door to the possibility of the return of Syrians under its temporary protection.

4.2.1. Local coordination and the Turkish role

Several events are mentioned in reference to Turkish intervention in the housing file along with the rest of the files after the increased density of the discharge of the regime's opposition areas, including what dates back to 2017, where he mentioned the start of allocating lands to the two Mujahrers of Ghouta before the start of the actual displacement, as was the operations of the Euphrates Shield, and Ghosn The olives are two points in the change that occurred on the housing file, and this became official after Erdogan's proposal at the United Nations General Assembly meeting in 2019 a buffer zone with a width of 30 kilometers on the Syrian border.

After confirming this influence, it became obligatory to carry out the projects, taking approval from the Turkish governors of the states of Hatay, Clas, Gaziantep, and its urp according to the jurisdiction of each of them in a specific Syrian region, where relief crossings have been opened for each of them, and they coordinate with the local councils distribute the common lands according to their standards The institutions must work in it, give permissions to work in private lands, and facilitate the financial transfers for them through the Turkish Post service and may be subjected to the work without this coordination to impeding the authorities.

As for the coordination on the ground, after obtaining the approval of the governors, it was transferred to the Turkish governmental Avad Foundation, after the Turkish intervention in the shelter and housing file was through the Turkish Red Crescent Foundation as an actor among the other actors on the ground. This transition took place with the obligation and direct supervision of the Turkish government to the

Turkish and local institutions, so it is the arm of the Turkish Ministry of Interior, which is familiar with the movements of the institution and financial associations, and can control its work without security risks .

AFAD undertakes the implementation of its own housing projects and infrastructure support for projects of other institutions, and coordinates with the local councils and the rest of the institutions - Turkish and local - operating on the ground to supervise them and control their work by sending technical observers sometimes. However, the environment and nature of these relations is not clear or controlled, as the decision is Turkish with shrinking or expanding margins, and is linked to employees with broad powers, who are subject to periodic change, which disturbs the stability and consistency of decisions, and opens the door to moodiness and corruption.

The actual project decision arises either from the desire of the supporter in coordination with one of the organizations working in the housing sector for the displaced, or at the suggestion of one of these organizations to him according to the needs registered with them, and it was not noticed a detailed role for the local councils in the projects of the organizations established or in the management of the file of the displaced, as it is coordinated with them in parallel with Turkish governors and AFAD, which is considered as notification only, the councils have no role in any standards that control the design or implementation. Sometimes it is limited to obliging the executing institution to hire a paid observer from the local council, or to assist in providing lists of those in need of housing at other times.

4.2.2. The problem of how organizations work

The de facto situation is characterized by the fragility of the existing administrative and political structures, the lack of a unified database, and the lack of recognized central authorities, from legislative ones that enact laws to executive ones that control them. This fragility begins with regulating the housing file in general, and even protecting the working elements in the organizations during their dealings with camp residents who lack confidence in the de facto actors who manage their affairs.

Due to the loss of this regulatory framework and the reference governing the work of organizations specialized in shelter rather than housing, each of them adapts

in its own way to the variables, and this leads to several problems, and chaos in all projects resulting from these organizations assuming the responsibilities of the absent state. It serves large segments of society, with various projects and sectors, in the health sector, public health, shelter, securing livelihoods, and others. It is a greater burden than the capabilities of its structures, expertise and method of work, which usually carry out several projects that suit the structure of the organization within a general framework and strategic plans determined by the state and regulates their implementation, which leads to conflict of these projects in the event of a lack of coordination, such as the implementation of construction before infrastructure, or the initiative of light construction without carrying out a comprehensive study. This was contributed by the absence of a reference body, as well as the absence of the authority on which this authority is imposed legally and procedurally. He stated that the role of the United Nations was negative in this direction, as it does not have sufficient flexibility to deal with a dynamic reality that is not codified by its considerations, and it has been exposed that it follows agendas that do not want stability for the region to continue the humanitarian labor market in it.

This organizational and political chaos leads to an imbalance of priorities, ending up with the priorities of funders, which vary and sometimes conflict as a result of their personal, institutional, or governmental agendas. These supporters tend to focus on these agendas, making sure that funding is disbursed according to them rather than undertaking a thorough study of needs, further complicating reality. Some of these agendas also do not want stability in the region, as they constitute a free space for the war economy and the humanitarian economy. Institutions that adopt the method of public support are liberated from these agendas, and it becomes easier for them to become independent with their decisions, which will not deviate from the limits imposed by the fait accompli.

The housing scene in northern Syria is punctuated by gaps in the total expertise needed to manage it among the direct actors in it, whether by the Turkish de facto authorities and their affiliates, the interim government, or local government bodies. The gap on the Turkish side is that its management of these areas is carried out through the Ministry of Interior and its governors, the AFAD Foundation, and the intelligence institution, which has not and does not undertake housing policy-making in its country

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of origin. As for the Syrian bodies, there are gaps resulting from the loss of central authority, including the gap in the legislation necessary to regulate housing projects, and the subsequent expropriations and compensations, a funding gap for compensation and construction, an administrative gap from the necessary institutions, and a gap in expertise that, even if available, is outside the real land system. The interim government does not have actual authority over these areas to implement any plan - if any - and local government bodies are based on regional representation that does not include all stakeholders in the housing file, and its service structure has not developed to the size of such a file, as for academic and union institutions with experience ,The aforementioned gaps have made its role nothing more than advisory and voluntary at the request of the project implementers, without legislation making it a reference for controlling work.

4.2.3. Lack of expertise in organizations

The active organizations do not have housing expertise, as the sum of their original experiences revolves around temporary shelter for the displaced, and the criteria for the projects they establish are derived from the shelter projects such as the OCHA standards and others. While some had prior technical and engineering experience in effectively executing and finishing construction, or experience to adjust contractors, many other organizations developed their operational expertise through trial and error.

Some of these organizations hire local or expatriate housing experts through their public relations rather than as key elements within their cadres, but the obstacles to the general environment in which they work prevent the implementation of the experts' recommendations, as housing needs strategic plans to be implemented outside the limits of the organizations' authority.

4.2.4. General Criteria

All projects evaluated by organizations lack permanent reference criteria for the establishment of housing projects, as each organization and each project are based on different diligence from those in charge of it according to the context, the organization's ability and awareness of housing conditions, and the pressure of funders. This is in line with the fait accompli on the one hand, and under justifications for

surrendering to it on the other hand, such as the absence of an alternative, and that what is being built is better than tents in any case, it has been better accommodated, and that the intentions are good, and that what is being built is alternative housing, or temporary, or shelters with the intention of returning soon.

These efforts often led to the first phenomenon that can be called 'concrete tents', expressing that the main difference between the camps and these communities lies in the replacement of light tent material with solid ones, while the unsustainable emergency relief approach remained dominant in the scene and affected the spaces, population density, proximity of housing, the nature of infrastructure and the choice of place. However, the danger of these concrete tents is lower. They are unattractive to the real estate market, and are less likely to expand around them because they are uninhabitable without compulsion, and they are not difficult to remove if a decision is made.

As for the second phenomenon, it is residential suburbs with floor buildings, which, although they are built with better construction and technical standards, do not take into account the standards of sustainable urban management, as they expand with lands that are not prepared for construction, such as forestry, agricultural land or others. This may threaten to form random hotspots far from the necessary strategic planning, and difficult to remove and correct**.**

4.2.5. Infrastructure, Services and Facilities

While the planning and implementation of infrastructure generally fall on the responsibility of local authorities according to a pre-prepared organizational plan that takes into account their service capabilities, most of the organizations' projects were established outside the organization, so it fell upon them to plan and service their own infrastructure, whose quality varied between bad and good according to the organization's experience, diligence and funding.

However, despite the high quality of implementation and technical standards in some of them, the location of the project, its distance from the basic service networks and transportation, and its limitation to serving the project itself independent of a general plan, reduces the sustainability and feasibility of this in the long term.

Because municipal services for these complexes are not covered by local authorities, the entrepreneurial organization took care of them or in partnership with other organizations. The services include the removal of technical inequities that varied in the quality of their implementation and disposal according to the experience of the organization, as well as the collection and dumping of waste that does not always end in official landfills prepared for this purpose. Private companies usually supply electricity to the complex once the organization has already installed a grid there, and it may sometimes use solar energy. The cell phone network and internet were also depending on the private server and its coverage of the area.

While the care of roads within the project varied according to the organization, methodology and funding, project sites relatively or completely remote from the organization caused poor access to the public road network served by means of transportation. The roads that connect them to the public road network may often be dirty, their behavior varies according to weather conditions throughout the seasons, and they may lack lighting. Transportation is limited to personal vehicles as they become available, informal taxis, or 'signaling' passing cars on nearby roads.

As for the facilities, most of the communities included mostly mosques, and the clinics and schools were according to the size of the gathering, the experience of the organization and the desire of the supporter, and these facilities are often managed by the implementing organization according to its ability or from a partner organization. The organization may assign other buildings to facilities that are diverse in nature cultural or commercial, often a method for which they are advertised.

4.2.6.   The influence of the supporter on the decision

The absence of a general legal and regulatory framework, and the absence of the legislative and executive authority capable of codifying and implementing it, led to the emergence of the supporter as a direct influence on the nature and standards of the projects established. This impact was direct through the imposition of criteria by supporters that correspond to their orientations and interests, or through the tendency of organizations to find the most appropriate formula to win this support.

The supporters and their conditions vary from support from UN organizations that do not usually support housing projects in areas of unending conflict, support from

groups and individuals from Arab and Gulf countries in particular that encourage the establishment of these projects, but without clear criteria or standards closer to the charitable logic and the logic of zakat and charity banks, which in their opinion may not intersect with development banks, Turkish support, whose implementation channels are often limited to Turkish organizations, and public funding that some organizations specialize, so that their margin of independence is large by setting their standards for these projects.

Housing projects constitute a system that is unusual for most of these supporters in terms of the nature of the work, its minimum standards, its distant impact, and its cost allocated to the individual or family, which is very large compared to the cost of what was previously supported in terms of food baskets or sponsorships for widows and orphans. This contributed to attempts by organizations to ration costs to make them attractive to supporters and to convince them of the organization's ability to manage these large sums, which perpetuated competition among them. It also contributed to the imposition of supporters of their agendas and vision that do not intersect with the needs of reality, thus neglecting sustainability standards in projects.

4.2.7. Criteria for choosing a place

The most important criterion in the organization's choice of location revolves around the financial cost of its acquisition, which is according to the market if its acquisition is a purchase of private property, and about the organization's willingness to deal with de facto forces, if its acquisition by appointment of a public owner is under its control. This led to the fact that most of the projects were built on land that was no longer habitable outside the organization, due to the high prices of land within it. Private land was agricultural and subject to bargaining for price hikes, and the public was uninhabitable without a comprehensive reclamation plan. Some organizations try to consider other criteria besides the cost of land, such as its proximity to service centers and facilities such as schools, universities, markets, hospitals, the asphalted road, and others. But these standards are diminishing as lower-priced land moves away from other urban centers.

The fact that the criterion for choosing land revolves around the cost of its acquisition threatens to lead to a random public scene in the housing sites and to exceed

criteria such as environmental safety, proximity to natural hazards such as floods, and to combat points of operations, which threatens the security and lives of the project's residents, as well as the destruction of agricultural land, whether through the current project or its possible expansions, or the reluctance of its owners to cultivate it because they want to sell it for housing due to its high price. Actual destruction of some forests in the area and water pollution have also been recorded.

4.2.8. Source of livelihood

Most organizations do not prioritize IDPs' livelihood projects in their standards and planning for housing projects, as most organizations see the utmost importance of improving the housing conditions of the displaced so that any other issue is postponed until afterwards. Many of the displaced people remained dependent on the food baskets provided by the organizations. As for livelihood projects, they came - if any - on the margins of housing, such as their daily employment within the work of the organization in general, and as workers in the construction of the building if their expertise is appropriate, or in other works announced, or in the facilities that have been opened within the complex.

Otherwise, it is left to the individual initiatives of the beneficiaries and the opportunities they can obtain within the conditions of the place, so many of them worked in farming according to the season, or did small individual projects inside or outside the camps, such as sewing, portering, and street vendors .

The displaced generally live, whether inside the camps or even when moving to new projects, in difficult living conditions that, with their large number, have led to the creation of a market of cheap labor and the movement of individuals abroad to finance the family that remained, as mentioned cases of exploitation such as the recruitment of mercenaries to fight outside Syria, and cases of transformation into begging and some illegal work.

4.3. Community Cohesion

Community cohesion is a key aspect of the housing sector, as it aims to provide quality housing to the most vulnerable groups and strengthen social ties and ties between residents and surrounding communities. Property rights are one of the most

important elements of community cohesion in this context. In the context of property rights, the principles of community cohesion include the registration and transfer of ownership of land purchased in the names of the members of the working group of the company or association that manages the project. The necessary documents are extracted from the real estate authority of the local council, without the help of any paper from other government institutions of the system.

Upon completion of the project, property rights are assigned to the association through an internal paper of the association, and there is an official paper and an oral agreement between the local council and the association on the use of the common land. Waqf lands are also availed by paying a nominal rent. It is also important to discuss beneficiary criteria for community cohesion in the housing sector. These criteria include the nature of the contract concluded with the beneficiaries and how to guarantee their rights and preserve their property. After construction, the properties are allocated as commons, where ownership is shared among the beneficiaries according to the project. Usufruct contracts that grant beneficiaries the right to use and benefit from real estate, while ownership remains with the association responsible for management.

The criteria for beneficiaries are determined according to the conditions specified in the contract, and they are regularly monitored through data scanning and collection, and records are updated based on any change in the beneficiary's personal status. Community cohesion in the housing sector is characterized by the diversity of assets and the diversity of the social fabric, as the project provides basic facilities, and the people of the neighboring area participate in providing additional facilities such as cafes and others. The communities are characterized by their proximity to the city center and the grouping of displaced people from different families and their different backgrounds, with the aim of promoting diversity and inclusion. The project management process facilitates communication and cooperation between the local population and the beneficiary community, and social relations and connections are facilitated through a local department of senior management and the interaction and cooperation of the local people to meet their needs.

4.3.1. Property Rights

Property rights in community cohesion in the housing sector include the registration and transfer of ownership of land purchased in the names of the members of the working group of the organization. Then the transfer of ownership in favor of the association as an endowment project, and the necessary documents are extracted from the real estate authority of the local council. No paper was used from other government institutions of the system. Upon completion of the project, Between the local council and the association, there is an official paper on the use of communal land. There is also the use of lands belonging to the endowments by paying a symbolic rent.

### 4.3.2. Criteria for selecting beneficiaries

The criteria of beneficiaries in community cohesion in the housing sector include the nature of the contract concluded with the beneficiaries and how to guarantee their rights K. Usufruct contracts are concluded that grant the beneficiaries the right to use and benefit from the property, while the ownership remains affiliated with the responsible executing association. It is not allowed to buy and sell apartments in these projects, but loan contracts can be drawn up for a specific period that are automatically renewable. The criteria for beneficiaries are determined according to the conditions specified in the contract, and they are regularly monitored through data survey and collection. Any change in the personal status of the beneficiary must be reported, and records are updated accordingly. The design and filling out of forms are adopted by the beneficiaries to ensure accurate documentation and control of the information of the beneficiaries.

4.3.3. Social Connections

There is a diversity of origins and a diversity of the social fabric. Basic facilities are provided in the project, after which the people of the neighboring area will provide additional facilities such as cafes and others. Communities are close to the city center and IDPs from different families are mixed and not separated in certain areas, but different situations and backgrounds are integrated. There are lounges that take into account special needs cases and take into account financial needs. However, there are no formal social facilities available in the project.

Thus, the conclusion with regard to the societal fabric in the housing sector can be summarized as the project aims to integrate different communities and provide basic

facilities, while additional social facilities depend on the initiative of the people of the neighboring area. Special needs situations are also taken into account, but formal social facilities are not available in the project. The process of carrying out the housing project was facilitated to strengthen social ties and relations between the residents and between them and the surrounding community. Interaction and cooperation by local people occur to meet their needs. There is communication and cooperation between the local community and the beneficiary community through the organization, and in the event of conflicts, reconciliation attempts occur and communication with the relevant authorities to intervene. The project may face some challenges and disputes, but they are resolved directly and through committees and communication with the public security of the region.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The thesis dealt with the study of the Turkish position on the Syrian revolution since its outbreak until 2022, and Turkey's role in the Syrian revolution through the use of the historical and descriptive approach, and the reflection of Turkish foreign policy on the administrative organization was studied by conducting 10 interviews with active people in the Azaz region between December 2022 and February 2023, and the results of the research showed Turkey's decisive role in supporting the Syrian opposition and providing political, military and humanitarian support to the liberated areas. Turkey has also enjoyed significant influence on political and military decisions in the region. Turkey's foreign policy towards the Syrian revolution has relied on a multidimensional strategy. This strategy focused on providing protection and support to communities in liberated areas and strengthening their capacity to organize and manage.

Turkish foreign policy has led to the formation of a new administrative organization in the liberated areas directly selling Turkish provinces, the formation of local government structures and progress in the reconstruction and development of the housing sector. Financial and technical support from Turkey has also contributed to strengthening local capacities and achieving sustainable development in the housing sector. Turkey's foreign policy faces multiple challenges towards the Syrian revolution, including the complex security and economic situation in Syria. In addition, Turkey must address issues related to societal cohesion and sustainable development in liberated areas.

1. Turkey's decisive role in supporting the Syrian opposition and providing political, military and humanitarian support from the beginning of the Syrian revolution, in addition to achieving relative stability in the liberated areas.
2. Turkey hosted Syrian refugees fleeing the repression of the Syrian regime, where the number of refugees, according to the statistics of the Turkish Ministry of Interior, about 3 and a half million refugees, allowed these refugees to work officially by issuing work permit permits, in addition to the refugee's ability to establish a legal commercial company.

3. Turkey hosted the opposition forces from the beginning of the Syrian revolution to the date of moment from political forces, military forces, activists and opposition media channels such as Orient, Syria TV and Aleppo Now channel.

4. Turkey has shown its cooperation by opening crossings between northern Syria and the Turkish interior, such as Bab Al-Hawa Crossing, Bab Al-Salama Crossing, Al-Hamam Crossing, and Al-Rai Crossing to facilitate the exchange of commercial and economic movement and allow the entry of international, regional and local organizations to enter and exit the crossing.

5. Turkey supported the housing sector by supplying raw materials of building materials, whether cement, gravel, or sand, without any tax fees, and facilitating their transfer from its land to northern Syria.

6. The Turkish foreign policy towards the liberated areas contributed to achieving relative stability in the liberated areas, whether the Idlib region, the Ghason Alzaytone areas, the Draa Euphrates or the Nabaa alsalam, which contributed to the economic and social recovery of the regions, from statistics and monthly reports issued by Syrian Arab research centers on early recovery in the opposition areas.

7. The liberated areas witnessed a movement of economic and development achievement and remarkable activity in many sectors, the most important of which are electricity, water, sanitation, industry, trade, housing and reconstruction . The report shows the distribution of projects among towns and cities between 2018 and 2021, where the city of Azaz ranked second in the number of projects.

8. Facilitating the issuance of licenses for Syrian non-governmental organizations in Turkey, opening bank accounts, giving work permits and entry and exit permits to and from the liberated areas, in coordination with the AFAD Organization (Disaster and Emergency Authority), especially if we compare the experience of Syrian organizations in neighboring countries such as Lebanon and Jordan, where countries have prevented the issuance of work permits, permits and even the issuance of an association license in the name of Syrians.

9. The governmental organization AFAD focused heavily on organizing the housing sector in order to ensure a safe and dignified environment for the voluntary return of Syrian refugees.

10. The role of the governmental organization is essential, as it coordinates with local councils and local Syrian organizations licensed by the government regarding the communal lands suitable for construction, sends technical observers to the project and has statistics on the needs of the liberated areas.

11. The directives of the Turkish government towards Turkish international organizations to work in northern Syria in the construction of housing projects through the organization of the Humanitarian Relief Foundation, Human Rights and Freedoms, the Turkish religious endowment, which contributed to the construction of more than 3000 housing units in multiple areas.

12. The housing economy has not contributed to supporting the war economy and has no major role in prolonging the conflict due to the Turkish government's control of PTT remittances. With regard to the supply chain of materials, the crossings have contributed to the easy entry of all necessary building materials.

13. The mechanism of work of organizations negatively affects the criteria for carrying out projects, as they depend on donor funding and project planning separately, making them truncated and not integrated in the temporal, spatial and institutional context. Organizations are forced to compete in attracting support, which negatively affects the quality of projects. This may cause infrastructure to be ignored and engineering priorities not to be respected.

14. Results show that priority should be given to improving housing conditions and providing employment opportunities for IDPs, as there is dependence on food and other assistance by housing beneficiaries.

15. The study found that there is a strong correlation between community cohesion and the housing process. The direct involvement of stakeholders in all phases of housing projects, in addition to providing safety and stability, and promoting cooperation and solidarity, has been found to contribute to building prosperous communities. The study showed that replacing the traditional view of housing as mere physical structures, with its understanding as a process of building socially integrated communities, leads to positive results. Achieving

community cohesion requires taking into account the diversity and needs of populations, promoting dialogue and inclusive participation, strengthening community capacities and providing opportunities for sustainable development. Manage the housing process on the basis of a social contract, involve stakeholders in decision-making, and provide the necessary support and services.

Recommendations

1. Housing policies in northern Syria should take into account the roots of existing conflicts and the grievances that have arisen from them, and focus on achieving social justice and promoting community cohesion, including for host communities and displaced persons.

2. Housing operations should classify, anticipate and assess the potential negative impact of projects on local communities, through a comprehensive understanding of the nature of conflict and the complex relationships within it, including demographic issues, long-standing grievances and local sensitivities

3. Housing operations should seek to strengthen the capacity of communities to recover from conflict and resolve grievances, through managing grievances and enhancing the political effectiveness of affected communities.

4. Strategies must be developed to integrate forcibly displaced people into the local economy and provide them with livelihood opportunities, in order to avoid their increased dependence on relief assistance and to promote a balance between local communities and the displaced.

5. Housing policies should contribute to enhancing the transparency and accountability of the management of housing resources and projects and enhancing the participation of local stakeholders in decision-making processes.

6. Housing policies should transform the right to property into a tool to promote societal and economic development and enhance people's access to housing projects and basic services.

7. Local authorities, international organizations and civil society should strengthen cooperation and partnership in the field of grievance management and strengthening local governance.

8. These recommendations should be implemented in a research framework that analyzes the local, political and economic factors at stake, and assesses their impact on housing operations and grievance management in Syria.

9. Engage local stakeholders and forcibly displaced people in decision-making, implementation and monitoring, to ensure fair representation and promote transparency and accountability.

10. Promote the building of new social contracts between host communities and displaced persons, by promoting positive interaction and communication and enhancing mutual understanding and cooperation.

11. Ensure adequate and safe housing for displaced persons and host communities, with a focus on property rights and spatial justice, and the provision of basic services and necessary infrastructure.

12. Promote sustainable local development, provide employment opportunities and decent livelihoods for affected communities, and reduce dependence on humanitarian aid.

13. Strengthen local governance and empower local authorities representing the community to achieve sustainable development and effectively implement safe housing policies.

14. Housing projects should be designed and implemented with the participation of direct stakeholders at all stages, providing safety and stability, and encouraging cooperation and solidarity in society. Diversity and social inclusion must also be understood, social structures and social sensitivities analyzed to achieve community cohesion.

15. Achieving community cohesion in housing requires building a social contract, guiding the process with community participation, enhancing community communication and mediation, and increasing community resilience to challenges.

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