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Department of Political Science and Public Administration

THE ROLE OF THE USA IN THE YEMENI CRISIS
(2011-2022)

Master Thesis

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Supervisor

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that in the preparation of this thesis, scientific ethical rules have been followed, the works of other persons have been referenced in accordance with the scientific norms if used, there is no falsification in the used data, any part of the thesis has not been submitted to this university or any other university as another thesis.

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ÖZET

Bu araştırma, 2011-2022 yılları arasındaki Yemen krizinde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin çok yönlü rolünü, Amerikan çıkarlarını anlama, çatışma taraflarıyla ilişkilerini ve krize genel etkisini anlamaya odaklanarak incelemektedir. Çalışma, Amerika'nın Yemen'e müdahalesinin temelinde yatan motivasyonları ve stratejileri ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlayan dört araştırma hipoteziyle yönlendirilmektedir.

Postkolonyal teoriyi bir teorik çerçeve olarak kullanarak, araştırma Yemen krizinin çeşitli boyutlarını ve tarihsel bağlamını, kabile çatışmalarını, mezhepsel ayrılıkları ve Yemen içinde birlik ve bölünme projelerini keşfetmektedir. Çatışmanın karmaşık dinamiklerine ışık tutmak için yerel, bölgesel ve uluslararası aktörleri de içeren ana tarafları analiz etmektedir.

Tarihî Amerika-Yemen ilişkilerinin kapsamlı bir şekilde gözden geçirilmesi ve krizin farklı dönemlerinde ABD'nin pozisyonunun analizi yoluyla araştırma, Amerikan katılımının evrilen doğasını ortaya çıkarmaktadır. ABD'nin el-Kaide'yle mücadele etme ve İran'ın genişlemesine karşı koyma çıkarlarının, Yemen'e müdahalesinde önemli etkenler olduğunu göstermektedir. Ayrıca, araştırma, ABD-Suudi müttefikliklerinin ve genel jeopolitik manzaranın Amerikan eylemlerini şekillendirmedeki önemini vurgulamaktadır.

Araştırmanın bulguları, formüle edilen hipotezleri doğrulamaktadır. Çalışma, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin el-Kaide'yle mücadeleyi önceliklendirdiğini ve işbirliği yapacak yerel ortaklar aradığını destekleyen H1'i desteklemektedir. Araştırma, Amerika'nın Yemen krizine müdahalesinin Suudi Arabistan ve Körfez ülkelerindeki çıkarlarından etkilendiğini doğrulamaktadır (H2'yi desteklemektedir). Ayrıca, araştırma, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Husilerle hassas bir denge kurduğunu, varlıklarını Suudi Arabistan'ın Amerikan korumaya bağımlılığı için kullanarak desteklediğini ortaya koymaktadır (H3'ü desteklemektedir). Son olarak, araştırma, ABD'nin küresel navigasyonu ve ticaret güvenliğini sağlama amacını onaylamakta ve uluslararası nakliye rotaları ve ticaret yolları konusundaki stratejik endişeleri tanımaktadır. Bu, H4'ü desteklemektedir. Bu araştırma, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Yemen krizindeki hareket noktaları ve eylemleri hakkında değerli içgörüler sunarak çatışmanın karmaşıklıklarının daha derin bir anlayışına katkıda bulunmaktadır. Bulgular, Amerikan çıkarlarının, ittifaklarının ve jeopolitik düşüncelerinin Yemen'e olan müdahalesini

şekillendirmedeki önemini vurgulamaktadır. Araştırma, Yemenli güçlerin rehabilitasyonu ve desteklenmesi, silah kaçakçılığının önlenmesi, istihbarat paylaşımı, diplomatik angajman ve sürdürülebilir insani yardım gibi alanlarda ABD politikası için öneriler sunarak sona ermektedir. Bu öneriler, Yemenli çıkarları önceliklendirir ve Yemen'de istikrar, birlik ve çatışma çözümünü teşvik etmeyi hedeflemektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: ABD çıkarları, ABD ilişkileri, El-Kaide, Husi isyancılar, Körfez ülkeleri, Postkolonyal teori, Yemen krizi.



SUMMARY

This research examines the multifaceted role of the United States in the Yemeni crisis from 2011 to 2022, with a focus on understanding American interests, relationships with conflict parties, and its overall impact on the crisis. The study is guided by four research hypotheses that seek to uncover the motivations and strategies underlying US involvement in Yemen.

Drawing on the postcolonial theory as a theoretical framework, the research explores the various dimensions of the Yemeni crisis and its historical context, including the tribal conflicts, sectarian divisions, and the unity and division projects within Yemen. It analyzes the key parties involved, including local, regional, and international actors, to shed light on the complex dynamics of the conflict.

The research uncovers the evolving nature of American engagement through an extensive review of historical US-Yemeni relations and an analysis of the USA's position during different periods of the crisis. It reveals the influence of US interests in combating al-Qaeda and countering Iranian expansion as significant drivers of its involvement in Yemen. Additionally, the research highlights the importance of US-Saudi alliances and the broader geopolitical landscape in shaping American actions in the region.

The findings of the study validate the formulated hypotheses. It demonstrates that the United States prioritizes fighting al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and seeks local partners to collaborate with, supporting H1. The research confirms that US involvement in the Yemeni crisis is influenced by its interests in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, supporting H2. Furthermore, it reveals how the United States maintains a delicate balance with the Houthis, leveraging their existence for Saudi Arabia's reliance on American protection, supporting H3. Lastly, the research confirms the US's aim to secure global navigation and trade safety, recognizing the strategic concerns regarding international shipping lanes and trade routes, supporting H4.

This research provides valuable insights into the motives and actions of the United States in the Yemeni crisis, contributing to a deeper understanding of the conflict's complexities. The findings emphasize the significance of American interests, alliances, and geopolitical considerations in shaping its involvement in Yemen. The research concludes by offering

recommendations for US policy, focusing on areas such as rehabilitation and support for Yemeni forces, prevention of arms smuggling, intelligence sharing, diplomatic engagement, and sustainable humanitarian assistance. These recommendations prioritize Yemeni interests and aim to promote stability, unity, and conflict resolution in Yemen.

Key Words: AQAP, Gulf countries, Houthi rebels, post-colonial theory, US interests, US relations, Yemen crisis.



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ABBREVIATIONS

CCS	:	Congress Research Services
GCC	:	Gulf Cooperation Council
JMP	:	Joint Meeting Parties
NDC	:	National Dialogue Conference
PDRY	:	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
PNPA	:	Peace and National Partnership Agreement
STC	:	Southern Transitional Council
UAE	:	United Arab Emirates
UAV	:	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, drone
UK	:	United Kingdom
UN	:	United Nations
UNSC	:	UN Security Council
UNSE	:	UN Special Envoy to Yemen
UNSG	:	UN Secretary-General
US	:	United States of America
USAID	:	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	:	World Food Programme

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I fervently hope that the research, though a small part, will contribute to addressing part of the crises and challenges faced by my beloved country. May this work serve as a testament to my unwavering love for my wonderful and beautiful country.

PREFACE

In the midst of global intricacies, where geopolitical interests intersect and conflicts unfold, this research embarks on a journey to dissect the United States' role in the Yemeni Crisis. The aim is to unravel the intricate threads that weave together a story of alliances, ambitions, and consequences, shedding light on a crisis that transcends borders and resonates with global implications.

Navigating the labyrinth of historical contexts and contemporary complexities, this study seeks to unveil the motives and impacts of American involvement in Yemen. It reflects an unwavering commitment to objective inquiry and a determination to understand a crisis that has left an indelible mark on both Yemen and the world. Acknowledging the inherent limitations and potential biases of research, this study transparently discusses these constraints. It underscores the commitment to truth and recognizes that every piece of insight uncovered contributes to a larger puzzle, fostering a culture of ongoing analysis and exploration.

This research stands on the shoulders of mentors, supporters, and contributors, reflecting a collective effort that drives academic exploration. It is a dedication to Yemen's resilience, acknowledging the trials it has endured throughout history. It aspires to offer a better understanding of the crises that have befallen this nation and to contribute, however modestly, to their resolution. At its core, this work serves as an invitation to engage in thoughtful dialogue, encouraging a critical examination of the intricate dynamics that shape our world. It honors the pursuit of knowledge, the diversity of perspectives, and the transformative power of research. With an open spirit, let us embark on this exploration of the Yemeni Crisis and the multifaceted role of the United States within it.

Musheer MOQBEL

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND OF STUDY

1.1 Introduction

The United States of America emerged as a major player in world events during World War II and its aftermath, as it became the leader of one of the two world poles in the face of the Soviet Union, which faded in the early 1990s, to produce a unipolar world system dominated by the USA. Since then, it has dealt with existing world conflicts as a current or future threat to American hegemony, but it justifies its political stances or military moves in front of its people and the international community as necessary moves to defend American national security. It is also always interested in balancing active forces to serve American interests, so it expresses concern about some repressive regimes or extremist groups and sometimes escalates to confrontation, but it overlooks others to do so.

While demonstrating itself as the foremost protector of world peace, which must play a role in every critical issue that appears on the international political agenda, to shape the future of the American nation from its perspective. No other country is better equipped to navigate the challenging geopolitical currents of the twenty-first century: we continue to have the best military in the world, spending more on defense than the seven countries combined; and our economy continues to be the most innovative and adaptable in the world. These benefits are neither automatic nor permanent, but they do provide a window of opportunity for us to create a new international order before others do it for us (Burns, 2020).

And, because the Middle East region has been one of the most conflict-ridden in the last half-century, the United States of America has placed a high value on the region, as evidenced by the presence of the Fifth Naval Fleet in Bahrain and the establishment of massive military bases in Qatar, the Emirates, and, finally, Saudi Arabia. Here the study mentions two of the five illustrative principles outlined by President Biden – partnership,

deterrence, diplomacy, integration, and values – to guide U.S. engagement in the Middle East over the coming decades:

1. Partnerships: The United States will support and strengthen partnerships with countries that subscribe to the rules-based international order, and we will make sure those countries can defend themselves against foreign threats.

2. Deterrence: The United States will not allow foreign or regional powers to jeopardize freedom of navigation through the Middle East's waterways, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, nor tolerate efforts by any country to dominate another – or the region – through military buildups, incursions, or threat. “The political situation within Yemen has catapulted to the top tier of U.S. national security concerns over the last several years as it has become more directly linked to both the problem of international terrorism and the need for future stability in the Arabian Peninsula. On the terrorism front, the December 25, 2009, attempted bombing of a U.S. passenger aircraft in Detroit, Michigan, by an individual trained by Yemeni terrorists was a particularly clear warning to the United States about the dangers of neglecting this geopolitically important country. Yet, this near catastrophe also underscored the need for careful consideration of U.S. policies regarding Yemen.

This requirement may be especially clear when one considers the chain of events that might have been set off had there been a successful terrorist strike in Detroit in which hundreds of Americans were killed. Apart from the human cost of such a tragedy, the U.S. leadership would have been under enormous pressure to respond in a way consistent with the level of public outrage associated with the event. Public pressure might well have existed for military intervention in Yemen with U.S. ground combat troops. Such an intervention is something that the present work insists would infuriate virtually the entire Yemeni population, regardless of the objective merits of the U.S. case for the offensive use of U.S. ground combat forces. In approaching this analysis, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill quotes then Central Command Commander General David Petraeus in an April 2009 statement that the al-Qaeda threat across the Middle East is weakening except in Yemen.

In Yemen, the threat still seems to be growing well over a year following this prescient observation. Additionally, while the terrorism threat alone requires an intensive

U.S. interest in Yemen, it is not the only reason why an understanding of current Yemeni issues is important for the U.S. national interest. An intermittent insurgency by Zaydi rebels in northern Yemen and an expanding secessionist movement in southern Yemen are also serious problems that may have important implications for the wider Arabian Peninsula. Unfortunately, while these problems are straightforward, their solutions are not. Dr. Terrill also points out how deeply distrustful most Yemenis are of any foreign military presence on their soil and how quickly clerical leadership in Yemen will characterize any U.S. bases in Yemen as colonialism, which the population is required to resist by their religion. The U.S. challenge is, therefore, to help Yemen destroy al-Qaeda without deploying large numbers of U.S. troops in that country while encouraging a peaceful and lasting resolution of the government's problems with the northern Zaydi tribesmen and the "Southern Movement," which calls for an independent state in the south.

All-important U.S. policies on Yemen will have to be coordinated with Saudi Arabia, which is Yemen's largest aid donor and plays a major role in Yemen's politics. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate on this important subject as our nation continues to grapple with a variety of problems associated with the future of the Middle East and the ongoing struggle against al-Qaeda. This analysis should be especially useful to U.S. strategic leaders and intelligence professionals as they seek to address the complicated interplay of factors related to regional security issues, fighting terrorism, and the support of local allies. This work may also benefit those seeking a greater understanding of long-range issues of Middle Eastern and global security. It is hoped that this work will be of benefit to officers of all services, as well as other U.S. Government officials involved in military and security assistance planning." (House, 2022).

There are many hot issues in the Middle East, the most pressing of which is the Yemeni crisis at the moment, owing to Yemen's geopolitical importance and the participation of many countries in the region, directly or indirectly, in this war. The United States of America has played several roles in the Yemeni crisis, beginning with logistical support for Decisive Storm was initially launched by Saudi Arabia to deter the Houthi militia backed by Iran. "The United States has a complex role in the Yemeni crisis, both

as a major arms supplier to the Saudi-led coalition and as a mediator in diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. "(The New York Times,2020). "The American position on the war in Yemen has been shaped by a complex set of factors, including the need to maintain its strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia, concerns over the Iranian nuclear program, the fight against al-Qaeda, and Yemen's important geostrategic location" (Terrill, 2012)

The second chapter will cover the history of the Yemeni crisis, its causes, and motivations, whether regional, ethnic, or religious, as well as clarification of the parties to the conflict on an international, regional, and local level. while the third chapter will discuss the American position on the crisis and an attempt to understand the motivations of that role based on official positions of American authorities, as well as conducting interviews with some of Those interested in Yemeni affairs, the data will then be analyzed in the fourth chapter of the thesis before concluding with recommendations and proposals in the fifth chapter that other researchers can use, as well as the possibility of sharing it with concerned authorities in the Yemeni government

1.2 problem statement

Without a base for a potential political solution, the Yemeni crisis entered its eighth year of conflict. The crisis had some historical precedents, including the six wars between the state and the Houthi militias, the demand for independence from the north by numerous southern movements after the events of the summer of 1994, as well as starting of the February 11 revolution against Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime. The events culminated in the Houthi takeover of the capital, Sana'a, on September 21, 2014, and the subsequent flight of President Hadi's internationally recognized government to Saudi Arabia, which launched Operation Decisive Storm, an alliance to restore Yemeni legitimacy. Many external powers have tried to influence the Yemeni crisis to obtain a greater share of post-crisis Yemen.

The most prominent of these countries was the United States of America, which considers Yemen a vital part to achieve its strategic goals in the Middle East. Although Yemen and the United States share many interests, the most important of which is securing the international trade route, fighting al-Qaeda, and finally confronting the Iranian expansion that disturbs its Gulf allies in the region, some consider that there are

shortcomings in the study of the American role and its impact in the Yemeni crisis, which makes it the subject of study in This thesis.

1.3 Purpose of study

The Purpose of the Study is possibly the most important sentence in your dissertation. It guides the focus of your research in conjunction with the Problem Statement, it influences your research questions, methodology, and data analysis (Tippins, 2020).

As a result, our research will concentrate on:

- 1- Understanding US interests in Yemen.
- 2- Determining US relationships with Yemeni conflict parties.
- 3- Exploration of the United States's role in the Yemeni crisis.

1.4 The significance of study

The United States of America is widely acknowledged as a dominant global power in terms of military, economic, and other aspects. Its active participation in various global issues cannot be denied. The Middle East, in particular, is considered a region of strategic significance in the context of American hegemony. Yemen, due to its geopolitically advantageous location, is a crucial part of this region.

This study aims to examine the American role in the ongoing crisis in Yemen and to understand the nature of this role. The study will seek to comprehend the reasons and justification official US authorities provide for their actions and positions. Additionally, it will analyze the perspectives of the Yemeni elite on the American role, and whether it was beneficial or if alternative actions could have been taken. The study will also aim to identify American interests in Yemen and how they may be utilized to support the legitimacy of the Yemen government and bring an end to the coup by the Houthi militia. American interests in Yemen include the country's strategic location and its proximity to important shipping lanes. As the US is a major global economic power, it is important for them to ensure the stability of these shipping lanes and to prevent any disruption in global trade.

Furthermore, the study will also explore the impact of the American role on the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. The ongoing conflict in Yemen has resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis, with millions of people in need of aid. The US has been providing humanitarian assistance to Yemen, but the scale of the crisis is far beyond the ability of any single country to handle it. The study will examine if the American role in the crisis has been effective in addressing the humanitarian needs of the people of Yemen. In conclusion, this study aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the American role in the Yemen crisis. It will examine the reasons and justification provided by official US authorities for their actions and positions, as well as the perspectives of the Yemeni elite on the American role. Additionally, the study will aim to identify American interests in Yemen and how they may be utilized to support the legitimacy of the Yemen government and bring an end to the coup by the Houthi militia. It will also analyze the impact of the American role in the humanitarian crisis and the role of other international and regional players in the crisis.

1.5 Research Questions

A study or research scientist project's goal is to answer a research question. Despite the methodological instrument (s) used to collect data, every study is designed to answer one or more questions. Data collection and analysis will be required as part of the investigation, and the methods used to do so will vary significantly. Good research questions are narrowly focused and specialized to improve knowledge in a specific field (Mattick et al., 2018).

As a result, the following are the research questions that this study aimed to answer:

- 1- What are the key American interests in Yemen and how do they influence the dynamics of the Yemeni crisis?
- 2- How does the United States view the different parties involved in the conflict in Yemen?
- 3- What are the factors that affected the position of the United States in the Yemeni crisis?
- 4- What strategies and approaches has the United States employed to address the Yemeni crisis and how effective have they been?

- 5- How has the United States engaged diplomatically with regional and international actors to mitigate the Yemeni crisis and promote conflict resolution?
- 6- To what extent has the United States played a role in exacerbating or mitigating the Yemeni crisis?
- 7- How does the United States view the unity of Yemen and division projects?
- 8- How did the US-Saudi relations affect the US's role in the Yemeni crisis?

1.6. Research Hypothesis.

The research hypothesis is a strong, brief statement that serves as the foundation for your research. The express aim of a hypothesis is to predict the findings, data, and conclusion of your paper (Deeptanshu D & Shubham Dogra, 2022).

The study will examine the four hypotheses listed below.

- H1: The United States gives priority in Yemen to fighting al-Qaeda and is looking for a local partner to collaborate with.
- H2: The involvement of the United States in the Yemeni crisis is influenced by its interests in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.
- H3: The US keeps the Houthis alive as leverage for Saudi Arabia's reliance on American protection.
- H4: The US's role in Yemen aims to secure global navigation and trade safety.

1.7. Theoretical / Conceptual Framework

1.7.1 The post-colonialism Theory

The word "post-colonial" is used to refer to all cultures impacted by imperialism from the time of colonialism to the present, according to Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin's early definition of the term (1989, p. 2). "Postcolonial theory is a critical lens through which to understand the contemporary world and how the legacies of colonialism continue to shape global politics and power relations." (Loomba, 2005)

Post-colonialism examines how societies, governments, and peoples in the formerly colonized regions of the world experience international relations. The use of 'post' by postcolonial scholars by no means suggests that the effects or impacts of colonial rule are now long gone. Rather, it highlights the impact that colonial and imperial histories still have in shaping a colonial way of thinking about the world and how Western forms of knowledge and power marginalize the non-Western world. Postcolonialism is not only interested in understanding the world as it is but also as it ought to be. (Sheila Nair. Dec 8, 2017). Political scientists utilize post-colonialism theory as an analytical framework to comprehend the ongoing effects of colonialism on formerly colonized nations.

The theory is centered on how these nations' former conquerors still have an impact on their political and economic decisions, particularly in times of war. This viewpoint emphasizes how frequently war is employed as a tactic to protect the interests of conquering powers. The foundation of post-colonialism theory is the notion that the political and economic environments of former colonial nations are still shaped by colonialism. The colonizing powers successfully established exploitation and control structures that still impact people's lives in these nations today.

The theory also contends that the relationship between the colonizing powers and the colonized countries still exists and has a substantial influence on the nations' present political and economic circumstances. The manner that post-colonialism theory describes how the interests of the colonizing powers are frequently given precedence over those of the colonized states is one of its most important features. This is demonstrated by the frequent use of force in conflicts to protect the economic and strategic objectives of colonizing powers. The theory addresses several significant issues concerning the colonizer and the impacts of colonialism:

1.7.2 Hybridity

Denotes the amalgamation of cultures and identities that ensues from the impact of colonialism. Hybridity can be regarded as a means for the subjugated populace to oppose and undermine colonial authority through the formation of novel hybrid identities that contest the hegemony of the colonizer's culture. Hybridism can serve as a means for

marginalized communities to generate alternative cultural expressions that challenge the authority of the nation-state and imperialistic forces.

The notion of the Orient as an enigmatic and alluring entity is a product of Western imperialism. This construct, in turn, engenders a milieu for the emergence of hybrid identities as a reaction to the colonial encounter (Said, 1979).

while Gilroy posits that the emergence of hybrid cultural forms within the African diaspora serves as a means for black individuals to resist and subvert the dominant culture of the nation-state (Gilroy, 1993).

1.7.3 Client regimes

The term pertains to the persistence of colonial power structures beyond the cessation of formal colonization. This is achieved through the establishment of governments that are subordinate to the former colonizers. The phenomenon frequently results in the utilization of resources in an exploitative manner and the subjugation of underprivileged communities and has constituted a significant catalyst for numerous postcolonial hostilities.

According to the academic James Petras, client regimes refer to political entities that assert their independence but depend on a foreign power's patronage and protection, leading to significant influence on their decisions and policies (Petras, 2003). The emergence of such a political system is frequently attributed to the imposition of colonial power structures, as previous colonizers endeavor to retain authority over resources and political sway. Additionally, the backing of client states by previous colonizing powers has the potential to exacerbate instability and strife within postcolonial communities, as they may intercede to safeguard their interests or uphold dominance. According to (Mazrui, 1986), client regimes result in a persistent state of tension and discord between the governing authority and the governed populace, as well as between the foreign sponsor and the general public.

1.7.4 Democratic deficit

Pertains to the disparity between democratic ideals and the actuality of political involvement and representation in societies that have undergone colonization. The present

shortfall is a result of the aftermath of colonialism, which has resulted in numerous postcolonial communities having insufficient democratic institutions and practices.

Robert J. C. Young expounds on the concept of the democratic deficit in his literary work titled "Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction." According to Young, the democratic deficit is a consequence of the imposition of foreign political systems and institutions by colonial powers on postcolonial societies. This imposition may not be congruent with the cultural and political contexts of these societies, thus leading to a deficiency in democratic practices. Consequently, the adoption of democratic practices could potentially be perceived as an external imposition and may not be entirely accepted by the populace.

1.7.5 Tribal Conflicts

"The concept of the tribe is a colonial invention that was employed as a means of fragmentation and control. He further contends that tribal disputes ought to be interpreted as a reaction to the colonial inheritance of cultural and ethnic division, Dipesh Chakrabarty posits in his work titled "Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference". The significance of tribes in the context of colonialism, particularly in terms of their involvement in both collaboration and resistance against the colonizers, is a crucial area of study. According to Mahmood Mamdani's work titled "Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism," the inability of colonialism to suppress pre-colonial identities in Africa can be interpreted as the inadequacy of the colonial state (p. 8). According to Mamdani, the failure of the colonial state to completely assimilate tribes into the colonial system resulted in their ability to preserve their political structures and modes of opposition.

Nevertheless, the indigenous tribes also participated in cooperative efforts with the colonizers, as exemplified by the Indian tribes in North America. According to Vine Deloria Jr.'s "Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto," tribal chiefs served as a pre-existing aristocracy, serving as a crucial intermediary between the indigenous population and white political figures. In exchange for their services, these chiefs were granted personal wealth and authority over their respective communities (Jr & Wilkins, 2000)

1.7.6 Hegemony

"Hegemony" is a central concept within post-colonial theory that addresses the dynamics of power, dominance, and control in the context of international relations and global systems. It refers to the domination of one group, state, or culture over others, often extending beyond mere military or economic control to encompass social, cultural, and ideological influence. In the context of post-colonial theory, the concepts presented by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt in their work "Empire" and their discussion of imperialism shed light on the intricacies of hegemony within the contemporary world order. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt's book "Empire" explores the concept of a new form of global power structure in the modern world. Unlike traditional imperialism, which was characterized by the direct control of one nation-state over others, the authors argue that "Empire" represents a decentralized, networked, and transnational system of control. This form of dominance is marked by the interplay of various actors, including multinational corporations, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and even individuals. "Empire" reflects a shift from the traditional Westphalian system of nation-states to a more complex and interconnected global order.

One of the key features of this new system of power is the idea of "imperialism without an emperor." In traditional imperialism, there was a clear hierarchical structure with a dominant colonizing power at the top. In "Empire," however, power is distributed across a multitude of actors, making it difficult to pinpoint a single dominating force. This decentralized nature of power leads to a different kind of hegemony—one that operates through networks of influence rather than direct control. Within the framework of post-colonial theory, this notion of "Empire" and the concept of imperialism without a clear emperor emphasize the complexity of modern hegemony. While traditional imperialism often involved overt colonization and exploitation, the contemporary dynamics of power involve a more subtle and pervasive form of influence. This influence extends not only to economic and political realms but also to cultural and ideological domains.

1.7.7 Ethnicity

Refers to the collective cultural customs, convictions, and principles of a specific community of individuals. Ethnicity is frequently conceptualized as a socially constructed

phenomenon that is influenced by historical and political variables, such as colonization and the imposition of prevailing cultural standards. Anderson (1991) posits that ethnicity is formed through communal cultural practices and symbols that are perceived as integral to a broader community. Ania Loomba's work titled "Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge" explores the construction and imposition of ethnicity by colonial powers. According to Loomba's (1998) analysis, the discussion surrounding ethnicity during the colonial era was a result of racial categorizations, endeavors to establish a societal ranking, and the strategy of fragmentation and control that were emblematic of European imperialism. Loomba posits that ethnicity is not an innate or intrinsic trait, but rather a societal fabrication that is enforced through colonialism and other mechanisms of authority.

1.7.8 feeding the Conflict of Ideologies

Pertains to the intentional exacerbation of pre-existing cultural and religious disparities within colonized societies by colonial powers, as a means of preserving their authority and dominance. The tactic of utilizing division and governance was frequently utilized to instigate conflict and fragmentation among diverse factions, thereby impeding their ability to unite and mount a resistance against colonial governance. The act of fueling the clash of differing ideologies has resulted in the continuation of sectarian aggression and political turbulence across various regions of the globe. According to Achille Mbembe, a political theorist, in his literary work titled "On the Post Colony," the outcome of such manipulation is the division of societies along irrational and deeply ingrained lines, which poses a challenge to the unification of people and creates a shared vision for the future. According to Mahmood Mamdani, a political scientist, in his book titled "Citizen and Subject," ethnic and religious identities have been utilized as distinguishing factors in numerous colonial and postcolonial contexts. Consequently, this has resulted in the establishment of power structures, prejudicial practices, and marginalization.

1.7.9 Class and sectarian conflict.

Frequently, it emerges as a consequence of the arbitrary demarcation of borders by colonial powers and the establishment of artificial divisions among diverse ethnic and religious factions within a singular nation. The partition of India in 1947 led to the

establishment of distinct states of India and Pakistan and caused extensive sectarian violence and displacement. The ethnic conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda illustrates how colonial powers contributed to the formation of ethnic divisions that ultimately resulted in violent conflict.

Moreover, it has been argued that external factors, including but not limited to previous colonial powers or global organizations, may intensify these disputes by favoring one faction over another, as Frantz Fanon, a postcolonial theorist, observes in his work "The Wretched of the Earth."

1.7.10 Decolonization

Refers to the systematic reversal of the impacts of colonialism, to reinstate authority to the individuals and communities who were colonized. The notion of decolonization is intricately associated with the notion of emancipation, as it entails disentangling oneself from the political, economic, and cultural frameworks that were established by colonizers. The process of decolonization encompasses not only political aspects but also entails cultural and intellectual dimensions. Linda Tuhiwai Smith, in her publication "Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples," posits that the process of decolonization involves the retrieval of indigenous epistemologies, ontologies, and practices (Smith, 1999). As per Smith's perspective, the process of decolonization encompasses more than just attaining political freedom; it also entails the revival of cultural and intellectual customs that were repressed during the colonial era.

1.8 Scope and Limitation of the Study

This study will investigate the Yemeni crisis and the role of the United States in it from 2011 to 2022. The (Gilroy, 1993)e study will focus on the actions and policies of the United States government and its impact on the ongoing conflict in Yemen. To gain a deeper understanding of the subject matter, the study will include a collection of evidence and official statements, as well as interviews with four Yemeni officials and experts in Yemeni affairs. These interviews will provide insight into the perspectives of key actors in the conflict and their experiences with the United States' involvement.

CHAPTER TWO

THE YEMENI CRISIS BETWEEN THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

2.1 Understanding the Idea of Crisis

Within the realm of international relations, crises encompass a complex tapestry of internal state crises and external crises, serving as pivotal moments that demand astute decision-making from political leaders. As articulated by Alexander George, an internal state crisis can be delineated as a critical juncture marked by disruptions within a nation's social, political, and economic fabric, often stemming from factors such as political volatility, social unrest, economic turbulence, or governance dilemmas (George, 1991). The inherent complexity of internal state crises necessitates leaders to meticulously evaluate options and strike a nuanced balance between preserving national cohesion and charting effective solutions. In tandem, external crises, triggered by diplomatic frictions, territorial disputes, or geopolitical strategies, introduce an added layer of complexity into the crisis landscape. Managing external crises compels leaders to deftly handle challenges posed by international counterparts, demanding diplomatic acumen and strategic finesse to protect national interests while preventing escalation. Striking this equilibrium holds implications not just for the crisis-stricken nation but also for global stability and regional dynamics. Analyzing how navigating these dual challenges sheds light on the multifaceted nature of crisis management in the realms of foreign policy and international relations.

These challenges can manifest in various forms, including but not limited to economic inequality, political instability, social unrest, and cultural dislocation. As Deepika Bahri notes in her book "What is Postcolonialism?" "Postcolonial nations are plagued by crises, frequently caused by the processes of colonialism itself, which have left deep-rooted economic, political, and social disparities". State crises can take various forms and arise from multiple factors. Economic crises, for instance, occur when a state experiences a downturn in its economic activity, leading to financial difficulties, high unemployment rates, and inflation. Political crises arise when there is a breakdown in the political system, such as political instability, corruption, and authoritarianism. On the other hand, social crises result from social and cultural issues such as inequality, poverty, and discrimination.

Additionally, environmental crises arise from issues such as climate change, natural disasters, and resource depletion. It is important to note that these types of crises can often intersect and exacerbate one another, leading to further challenges for states and their populations.

These crises can have serious consequences for a country and its people, and they can be difficult to resolve. However, there are various methods for dealing with and managing political crises. Negotiation and compromise are one way to deal with political crises. "Negotiating is the process by which adversaries explore their differences and seek common ground." (Lewicki et al., 2020) Negotiations can involve a variety of stakeholders, including government officials, opposition leaders, and civil society representatives, and can include concessions and compromises on all sides. Another way is to use economic and social policies to address the root causes of the crisis." economic and social policies can play a critical role in shaping the onset and severity of crises, as well as determining the conditions under which they are resolved (Haggard & Kaufman, 1997). Policies to stimulate economic growth, reduce poverty and inequality, and improve access to education and healthcare are examples of such policies. A third way involves the use of force and military intervention, which should be used with caution. "The use of force is morally justifiable only in self-defense or in defense of others from imminent harm," writes Helen Frowe in her book "The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction." Military intervention can be used as a last resort after all other options have been exhausted, but it can also result in increased violence and suffering (Frowe, 2016). Finally, a fourth approach is diplomacy, which is typically used in conjunction with the other approaches. Diplomacy, according to G. R. Berridge's book "Diplomacy: Theory and Practice," is "the peaceful management of relations between sovereign states." Diplomacy can involve the use of various tools to manage conflicts and resolve disputes, such as negotiation, mediation, and economic sanctions.

2.2 The Yemeni Crisis Historically

The effects of colonialism extend far beyond the end of formal colonial rule. As the Indian historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued, "Colonialism is not a finite event that can be relegated to the past; it is a continuing process that shapes the present"

(Chakrabarty, 2000). One of how colonialism continues to shape the present is through the perpetuation of conflict in former colonies. Many of the conflicts that are currently taking place in these regions can be traced back to the legacies of colonialism. For example, in Africa, conflicts between ethnic groups can often be traced back to the arbitrary borders that were drawn by colonial powers, which ignored pre-existing ethnic and cultural boundaries (Mamdani, 1996). In addition, the imposition of colonial rule often involved the suppression of local languages, cultures, and religions, which can contribute to ongoing tensions and conflict (Fanon, 1963). Yemen has a long and complicated history, dating back to ancient times, with conflicts and power struggles. Yemen was ruled by several powerful kingdoms in ancient times, including the Minaeans, Sabaean, and Himyarites. These kingdoms were known for their wealth and prosperity, as well as advanced government and trade systems. Yemen has long been a target of foreign ambitions due to its strategic location and resources. Yemen's ancient kingdoms traded with the Roman and Byzantine empires, and later with the Persians and Ottomans. The Greek historian, Strabo, once wrote that "Arabia is the only country that produces frankincense, myrrh, cassia and cinnamon, and every other kind of spice."

Yemen was annexed by the Ottoman Empire in the 15th century and ruled as a province for several centuries. Yemen served as a strategic base for Ottoman expansion in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean regions. As the Ottoman historian, Taeschner wrote: "Yemen is the key to the Red Sea and the Red Sea is the key to the world." The British and the Ottoman Empire competed for control of the region in the nineteenth century, with the British establishing a protectorate over the country's southern half. In the early 20th century the Mutawakkilite kingdom was created after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the end of Ottoman rule in the region, and The kingdom was initially recognized by the British, who were the dominant colonial power in the region at the time.

The kingdom faced several challenges and internal conflicts. King Yahya was assassinated in 1948, and his son, Ahmad, took the throne, conflicts continued until the outbreak of the civil war in North Yemen, which lasted from 1962 to 1970. The war was fought between royalist supporters of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom, which was the ruling government in northern Yemen, and the republican forces that overthrew the monarchy and established the Republic of Yemen. According to the book "Yemen: Unknown

Arabia" by Tim Mackintosh-Smith, the war was "a rehearsal for the greater Arab dramas of the following decade" and "a testing ground for Cold War ideologies and proxy struggles."

In the 1970s and 1980s, the new government faced several challenges, including economic instability, political divisions, and a separatist movement in the south. In 1978, a group of leftist officers staged a coup and established the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), which lasted until 1990. According to "Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes" by Christopher M. Davidson, the PDRY government was "a unique experiment in socialist government in the Arab world" and "a thorn in the side of the conservative Arab regimes in the Gulf." The two countries officially unified in 1990, but tensions between the North and South persisted. In 1994, a civil war broke out between the northern and southern factions, with the north emerging victorious. However, the South remained restive, and there were several attempts at rebellion in the following years. According to "Yemen: The Resilience of a Nation" by Helen Lackner, the civil war "left deep wounds that have not yet healed" and "reinforced the North's sense of superiority over the South."

2.3 Saudi Arabia's Political Tutelage

The concept of guardianship, or the exercise of power by a neighboring country over a weak state, is a common phenomenon in international relations. This practice has often been justified by the need to protect the weaker state from internal instability or external threats. Postcolonial theory argues that colonialism did not end with the departure of colonial powers. Rather, it continues to manifest itself in various forms, including economic domination, cultural imperialism, and political intervention. Neocolonialism, or the continued exercise of power by former colonial powers or their allies, is one of how colonialism continues to shape international relations. Two years after its founding in 1932, the KSA fought the Imamate in Sana'a and took over the provinces of Najran, Jizan, and Asir on renewable 20-year agreements. Relations with the Imamate, British-controlled Aden, and the Protectorates remained stagnant for decades while the KSA remained destitute.

Unsurprisingly, the KSA opposed the 1962 founding of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and, even more, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), the only

socialist state in the Arab world. In an era when republicanism was rising and monarchies were overthrown (in Iraq, Egypt, and Libya) and colonies in the Third World gained independence and became republics, they were republics, by definition, challenging monarchies. Monarchs considered themselves endangered in the 1960s. The KSA publicly backed the Imamist/royalist side in the 1962–1970 YAR civil conflict. Half a century later, when sectarianism is so frequently asserted to be the cause of tensions, it is worth noting that the KSA supported a Zaydi Shi'a monarch against a Sunni republican regime. The KSA began assisting Zaydi tribal leaders in northern Yemen, especially the powerful Hashed and Bakeel tribal confederations, throughout this battle. After the Imam's fall, the KSA backed Sana'a's central authority, keeping the Yemeni state weak and in a struggle with northern tribal groups. Thus, the KSA established "divide and rule" mechanisms.

The KSA supported exile groups diplomatically, financially, and in the media and encouraged violent incursions into the PDRY during the PDRY's 23 years. After 1976, diplomatic relations improved, but the KSA still hated the PDRY regime. The KSA did not welcome Yemeni unification in 1990, as it perceived a united Yemen with a large population as a threat. President Saleh of the YAR and YSP Secretary General al Beedh expedited the process because they believed the Saudis and domestic opponents would attempt to stop unity.

Four years later, in the 1994 civil war, the Saudis helped the southern separatist movement it had previously rejected as "atheistic communists" to reestablish independence. The KSA neglected to recognize Ali Salem al Beedh's separatist state in Aden in May 1994, which may have saved it. Saleh subdued the separatists within weeks. Until 2011, Saudi policy towards Yemen was under the control of Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz who managed the Special Office for Yemeni Affairs from which he selected beneficiaries for Saudi subsidies. Its annual budget reached USD 3.5 billion (Lackner. 2022).

In the following years, with different princes in charge of the Yemen file, King Abdullah's regime reduced its detailed involvement in Yemeni affairs. With millions of Yemenis living and working in Saudi Arabia, Saudi-Yemen relations have a strong popular element. First, Yemenis in the KSA, legally or illegally, relied on their wages for

their and their families lives until recently. Remittances, far more than foreign development funding, supported the Yemeni economy. Living under Wahhabi culture also shaped Yemenis' ideologies daily. Egyptian and Sudanese teachers funded and supported the Yemeni educational system in the 1970s and 1980s, spreading Islamist culture in their towns and villages. In addition, Saudi-trained religious cadres operate across Yemen, even in Zaydi regions where the famed Dar al-Hadith was founded in 1980, establishing a center of Sunni fundamentalism in the heartland of Zaydism. Regardless of Saudi ideology, decades of hardline Islamism promotion in Yemen and other nations will take time to fade.

2.4 The Battleground for Foreign Ambitions

Yemen has been a destination for foreign ambitions and conflicts for centuries. Its strategic location at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, at the crossroads of three continents, has made it a coveted prize for empires and powers throughout history.

The Aksumite Empire's invasion of the Himyarite Kingdom during the 4th century CE serves as an instance of foreign incursion and strife in Yemen's past. According to the historian Ibn Khaldun, the Aksumite invasion was motivated by the Himyarite Kingdom's control of the lucrative trade routes between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. He writes, "The Aksumites attacked the Himyarite Kingdom... because the latter controlled the two seas, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, and all the ships from the East and the West had to dock at its ports." Also, the Ottoman Empire's incursion into Yemen during the 16th century CE is an additional instance of external aspirations. The Ottomans sought to gain control of Yemen's ports and trade routes, as well as to spread their influence over the region. As the historian Eugene Rogan notes, "The Ottomans regarded Yemen as a valuable prize, strategically located at the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula where it guarded the entrance to the Red Sea and thus the sea route to Mecca and the Indian Ocean."

The British also had a clear presence in Yemen, particularly in the port city of Aden, which they controlled until 1967. According to a journal article by Gabriele vom Bruck, "British colonial rule had a profound impact on Yemeni society and the country's political trajectory, particularly in the south of the country, where Aden was located." In the 20th

century, Yemen's strategic location continued to attract foreign interests. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union competed for influence in Yemen, with the United States supporting the Yemeni royalists and the Soviet Union supporting the Yemeni republicans. The historian Charles Schmitz explains, "Yemen's strategic location at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, adjacent to the oil-rich Gulf region, made it an important Cold War battleground. The United States viewed the Yemeni monarchy as a valuable ally, while the Soviet Union supported the Yemeni republicans, who sought to overthrow the monarchy."

2.5 The tribal dimension of the conflict

Post-colonial theorist emphasizes the need to understand the complex relationships between tribal identities, state-building, and conflict resolution. It highlights the importance of recognizing the diversity and complexity of tribal identities and working to create inclusive political systems that can accommodate these differences. In Yemen, the main traditional social unit is the tribe.

They are considered entities recognized by the ruling authorities, they have their cultures, traditions, and gunmen. The Yemeni tribe rules its territory according to a set of conventions and principles that control its movement and connections with other tribes. Many tribes act like Western civil society organizations in state decision-making (Pridham, 1984: 205). Muhammad Al-Dhaheri, a professor at the University of Sana'a, believes that Yemeni tribes are similar to states in that tribal sheikhs lead their tribes and protect their rights. Tribes, like governments, may form political and economic alliances. Each tribe has its territory, defining its boundaries with adjacent tribes. Each tribe has culture, military ideals, and military men who are its army.

Yemeni clan power has many explanations. Starting with political reasons related to the modern state's failure to meet many of the demands and material needs of the majority of Yemen's population, from education, social institutions, health, and infrastructure, to social reasons that sometimes outweigh the state's strength. Geographic factors, which let Yemen's tribal social order survive. It is difficult for the state to extend

its authority to it. Geography also shaped tribal lifestyles. Mountain people were more attached to the tribal system than the state, while coastal plain people had more dealings with the state, which organized irrigation, defended exposed population centers, organized trade, and so on (Gradi 2018). According to a 2013 UNESCO report, Yemen's rural illiteracy rate was 70%, while the urban rate was 38% (Mars 31/8/2013). Poor education perpetuates traditional institutions in political upbringing and traditional values in political culture, including tribal loyalty and belonging (Hassan 2004: 27).

The Zaidi imams opposed modernization that would change the power relations between the sect, tribe, and Mutawakkilite family. They thought that true modernization would erode these ties and destroy their underpinnings (Al-Salahi, 2012: 36). In the 1974 revolution headed by Ibrahim al-Hamdi, prominent tribes supported the June 13 corrective movement that overthrew President Abdulrahman Al-Iryani. Several military leaders and tribal sheiks allied to oppose Al-Iryani's efforts to establish a civil state and limit their power (Al-Salahi, 38: 2012).

The tribe has also played a role in Yemen's contemporary political history, as in the assassination of President Ibrahim al-Hamdi (1974-1977 AD) in 1977 AD while attending a luncheon at Ahmad al-Ghashmi's home. Al-Hamdi had begun to restructure the army to be free of tribalism, which was approved by the April 27, 1975 resolutions when Al-Hamdi abolished the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, led by Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar. In June 1978 AD, President Ahmed Al-Ghashmi (1977-1978 AD) was assassinated by detonating a bomb in a bag that was brought into his office at the General Command of the Army, The military establishment and tribal sheikhs were accused of planning the assassination.

Beginning with his ascension to power in 1978, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh worked to revitalize the tribe, which had declined in importance since 1962, by connecting with tribal leaders and offering financial incentives, authoritative roles, and military designations. The Yemeni tribe participated in popular uprisings during the 2011 Yemeni youth movement. Hashid and other Yemeni clan sheikhs supported the popular revolt, a huge blow to Abdullah Saleh's authority, the tribe's affiliation with the government ended

with this repudiation of the reigning administration, the revolution grew, demonstrations mounted, and Yemeni tribesmen joined sit-in squares in the main cities.

2.6 Tragic Transformation: From Political Strife to Sectarian Warfare

One of the central claims of postcolonial theory is that colonialism frequently created artificial divisions between various religious or ethnic groups, which were then exploited to divide and govern these nations (Mamdani, 2001). Furthermore, colonialism frequently entailed imposing Western-style political institutions and values on these societies, which were not always compatible with local traditions and practices (Chatterjee, 1986). On the surface, it appears that Yemen has always been a hotbed of sectarian warfare. The majority-Muslim population is divided into a Sunni majority and a large Shia minority (about 35-40 percent) of the Zaydi Shia sect, whose imam presided over the historic Zaydi imam of North Yemen from 897 until the Republican revolution in 1962. The religious divide between Shiite and Sunni Islam has not traditionally been significant in Yemeni politics, as those who argue against applying a sectarian framing to the current Yemeni conflict have frequently emphasized, that tribal and other identities arguably have more influence than sectarianism. Inter-marriage between Sunnis and Zaidis has grown commonplace, except for the more conservative Shiites. Until recently, people of different sects prayed in the same mosques without hesitation, and most Yemenis took religious cooperation and mingling for granted. It is also claimed that the Zaidi branch of Shia Islam is more similar to Sunni Islam than other Shia sects, such as the Twelver branch prevalent in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. 15 Historically, some Iranian clergy refused to acknowledge the Zaidis as a genuine member of the Shiite religious community.

The Yemeni civil war of the 1960s, in which Saudi Arabia was strongly involved, is an example of sectarianism's traditionally restricted involvement. While Riyadh is currently fighting the Houthis, the majority of whom are Zaidis, the Sunni monarchy supported the Zaydi imam against the Republicans at the time. When the Houthis took control of the Saada region in the 1990s, Yemen had six cycles of strong fighting between the Yemeni regime and the Houthis in the decade preceding the Arab revolutions. However, it was difficult to say the Shiite/Sunni divide. Because President Saleh was a Zaydi supported by the Saudis at the time. Also, sectarianism was not prevalent in the

early days of the 2011 Arab protests that ended Saleh's 33-year dictatorship. Not only were the Houthis and the Sunni Islamists (The Yemeni Congregation for Reform) on the same side in the demonstrations, but they also managed to work together on several subjects in the National Dialogue Conference. However, it is possible to comprehend how sectarianism became one of the many facets of Yemen's post-Arab uprising conflict, while a sectarian schism became more visible after the Houthis took control of Sana'a, Mansour Hadi, Saleh's successor as president, is a Sunni who is associated locally with the Islah movement and the Salafists and is supported regionally by a Saudi-led coalition of Sunni-ruled countries (UAE, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain). The Houthis, in turn, got moral and, to a lesser extent, material backing from Iran, and some analysts even alleged that there are Afghan Shiites in Yemen and that Hezbollah is training the Houthis in Lebanon. 21 As a result, what was not initially a sectarian struggle took on a sectarian character.

85% of Yemenis, according to Zogby, are concerned about rising sectarianism. 18 As sectarian language has become more visible among various actors who refer to themselves and their opponents in sectarian terms, Opponents describe the Houthis as "twelve Shiites," part of a "Shiite sectarian offensive," and "the new Hezbollah in the Arabian Peninsula" or "Iranian puppet." The Houthis also refer to their opponents as "takfiris," a term associated with extremist Sunni Islamism, or "ISIS," or adherents of the so-called Islamic State (19). Another major aspect of sectarianism's growing prominence in Yemen has been the use of the sectarian card for non-sectarian reasons. Many observers have convincingly argued that the main players at the local level were initially motivated by issues familiar from other political conflicts, such as regime survival and grievances, and competition for power. However, when it comes to how these actors attempt to pursue their interests the parody of sectarianism becomes more obvious.

When Saleh, a Zaydi himself, was trying to quell the Houthi rebellion in the decade leading up to the Arab uprisings, he tried to delegitimize the Houthis by portraying them as 'Iranian-backed Shiites' fomenting sectarian strife. (23) When Hadi came to power in 2012 and was later deposed by the Houthis, he revived this discourse to delegitimize the Houthis, organize the Sunni majority, and get backing from (Sunni) Gulf powers. Focusing on local elites through a pragmatic perspective is thus useful in drawing attention

to the reality that their motivations for deploying sectarian language may be tied to traditional political difficulties rather than religious conflicts.

2.7 Yemen's North and South: A Tale of Unity and Division

"The colonial powers often deliberately fostered regionalism and ethnic and linguistic divisions, thus setting the stage for future conflict and undermining the possibility of a strong and unified postcolonial state.". Several studies have explored the relationship between colonialism and separatist movements. For example, in "Theories of Secession" by Margaret Moore, the author argues that colonialism was a significant factor in the emergence of separatist movements, particularly in Africa and Asia. Similarly, in "Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria" by Toyin Falola and Adam Paddock, the authors explore how the British colonial government supported separatist movements in Nigeria, leading to violence and instability in the region. The issue of the south in Yemen is still "stuck" and returns to the fore from time to time, although its roots preceded the establishment of the modern Yemeni state, where the southern issue is considered one of the most prominent problems that the Yemeni state faced in its contemporary history, as well as one of the most challenges that affected harmony and harmony between Yemenis in the two parts of the state, noting that the unity in its current form came after the establishment of the modern state after the departure of colonialism.

The roots of the southern issue in its political aspects can be traced back to the 1930s AD, when the regions of southern Yemen consisted of scattered and feuding sheikhdoms and sultanates that lacked a unified entity, making it easier for Britain to occupy the most prominent of its regions Aden, in 1839. The British annexed the sheikhdoms surrounding Aden in the 1920s as a precautionary measure to prevent the Zaidi imams in the north from storming Aden, then established the Federation of the Emirates of South Arabia in 1959, which included 21 sheikhdoms in southern Yemen. The liberation revolution broke out in southern Yemen in October 1963, and revolutionaries managed to assassinate British High Commissioner Kennedy Treviskis on December 10, 1963, forcing Britain to withdraw its forces from Aden in 1967. And the People's Republic of South Yemen was established under the leadership of President Qahtan Al-Shaabi.

Border violence erupted between the states of North and South Yemen in 1972, against the backdrop of efforts to unite the two entities. The southern president, Abdel Fattah Ismail, and the northern president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, began talks in late March 1979, which concluded with signing the unity accord and forming a joint constitutional committee to design a blueprint for a unified state. There were many conflicts and coups between the leaders of the southern state, which at the time was known as alzumra and altughma, which caused fierce wars that made everyone see unity as a refuge from those wars. Many understandings between the two parts of Yemen, including allowing entry and exit with the national card, establishing a joint oil exploration area, and disarming borders, were reached in May 1988, reducing tensions and restoring unity.

On May 22, 1990, the two parts abruptly merged, and Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected president, with Ali Salem Al-Beidh as his deputy, and proposed a new constitution, which was approved in a vote in 1991. On May 5, 1994, a significant civil war erupted between Yemen's two halves, and its effects lasted till today.

It killed between seven and ten thousand people and resulted in the North's victory and the departure of Southern leaders outside the country, including Salem Al-Beidh, who resided in the Sultanate of Oman. By the end of the 1990s, voices began to emerge calling for reversing the course of unity, particularly from some Socialist Party leaders, but Saleh refused and issued slogans such as "unity or death." The true comeback to the Southern cause, however, came with the formation of the Southern Movement in 2007 with the formation of the Military Retirement Association in southern Yemen to demand their rights.

At first, the Southern Movement raised slogans against the ruling regime and called for reforming the path of unity, but it quickly evolved from a protest movement against the marginalization and exclusion that Southerners face more than Northerners into a growing civil rebellion movement not only against Ali Abdullah Saleh's rule but also against Yemen's continued unity.

Following the outbreak of the Yemeni revolution and the widening circle of unrest that swept most Yemeni cities, including the southern ones, calling for Saleh's departure and the regime's overthrow, the movement announced through its Secretary-General at

the time, Abdullah Al-Nakhbi, that it would temporarily suspend its demands for secession and join the demonstrations and protests that were sweeping the country and being called for by Yemeni youth. The opposition then joined in, represented by the Joint Meeting Parties. However, some factions of the movement did not accept this proposition and continued to call for secession, and members of the movement withdrew from the opposition's National Council for Revolutionary Forces, believing that the inclusion of Southerners in the council was unjust.

With the launch of the Yemeni Dialogue Conference on March 18, 2013, two factions of the movement, the Conference of the People of the South and the Independent Southerners Bloc, decided to participate, while other factions refused. The Yemeni National Conference concluded its work on January 25, 2014, after taking turns, extending and delaying, and the Yemeni presidency confirmed at the time that the conference's documents would include a just and comprehensive solution to the southern issue within the framework of a unified state on a federal and democratic basis by the principles of justice, law, and equal citizenship, and that the conference's outputs and documents would include The goal of the dialogue conference is to "address the grievances of victims of political conflicts, within the limits of the state's capabilities and the framework of the principles of transitional justice and national reconciliation."

After the Houthis took control of Yemen and expanded southward, the southern powers became involved in their resistance, and Yemeni parties, including forces loyal to the government and the Southern Movement, were able to liberate Aden Governorate from Houthi control on July 17, 2015, and the city of Aden became a temporary capital. Yemen's state and the temporary headquarters of several ministries and administrative organizations. On May 11, 2017, the former governor of Aden, Aidaroos Al-Zubaidi, and his deputy in the new council, the dismissed Minister of State Hani Bin Brik, announced in the city of Aden the formation of the "Presidency of the Southern Transitional Council", to administer the southern governorates, and a week later, the Southern Movement tasked Zubaidi with forming a political leadership to oversee and represent the South.

The new council is made up of 26 people, led by al-Zubaidi and his deputy, Ben Brik, "who are known for their closeness to the UAE," with the governors of the southern

governorates, except Abyan, as well as personalities and leaders from the southern movement's currents and components. The Yemeni presidency stated in a statement following a meeting with President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi and his advisors in the presence of Prime Minister Ahmed Obaid bin Dagher that it categorically rejects the formation of the Southern Transitional Council to manage and represent the south. The Gulf Cooperation Council urged "all components of the brotherly Yemeni people, at this delicate stage, to reject calls for division and secession, rally around legitimacy, extend state authority, and restore security and stability throughout Yemen." The Cooperation Council underlined its support for UN efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Yemeni crisis, by the Gulf initiative and its implementation mechanism, the results of the national discussion, and Security Council Resolution No. 2216.

In a statement, the Council also urged Yemenis to "return to normalcy so that the Yemeni people can complete the implementation of the outcomes of the comprehensive national dialogue that dealt with all Yemeni issues, including the southern issue," noting that all efforts to resolve the southern issue "must be carried out through Yemeni legitimacy and Yemeni consensus represented by the national dialogue outcomes." Later, southern Yemeni leaders denied any connection to the Southern Transitional Council, which was announced by the dismissed governor of Aden, Aidaroos Al-Zubaidi, following a statement from the Yemeni presidency calling on the personalities named in the statement establishing the council to declare their positions.

Following that, the Transitional Council engaged in multiple rounds of conflict with government forces, interspersed with Saudi mediation, which eventually resulted in the formation of a presidential council of eight people, the majority of whom were military leaders, including Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, the head of the Southern Transitional Council, but the tone of the demand for secession is still present through the actions of the council members and their media.

CHAPTER THREE

THE YEMENI CURRENT CRISIS

3.1 The nature of the current crisis

The current crisis in Yemen has its roots in the economic deterioration and the blockage of the political horizon before 2011, which led to the outbreak of the revolution that overthrew the Saleh regime and led to the rise of President Hadi, whose government was surrounded by a series of internal political turmoils that ended with the Houthi coup against power.

The crisis escalated into a full-scale civil war following the intervention of the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia, which aimed to restore the Hadi government to power but also resulted in widespread destruction and suffering. The failure of post-colonial states to address underlying grievances and inequalities within their societies. Many former colonies were left with weak and corrupt governments, with little legitimacy or ability to provide for their populations. This has led to the growth of armed opposition groups, often based on ethnic or religious identities, which have challenged the authority of the state (Fukuyama, 2004).

3.1.1 February 11 Revolution

The concept of a "puppet regime" is often used to describe governments that are installed or supported by a foreign power and serve its interests, rather than those of the people they govern. In many post-colonial states, puppet regimes were put in place by former colonizers as a means of maintaining control over the newly independent country. The revolution against these puppet regimes can be seen as a manifestation of post-colonial theory, which seeks to understand the ongoing impact of colonialism on formerly colonized societies.

As the Algerian revolutionary Frantz Fanon wrote in his book "The Wretched of the Earth," the struggle against colonialism does not end with the departure of the colonizer

"Colonialism is not a machine capable of thinking, a body endowed with reason it is naked violence and only gives in when confronted with greater violence." Yemen saw a popular revolt in 2011 known as the February 11 Revolution, often referred to as the Yemeni Revolution. The uprising was a component of the Arab Spring movement, which caused widespread turmoil and protests throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The Arab world's thirst for reform, freedom, and an end to corruption was reflected in the Yemeni revolution. Widespread discontent with President Ali Abdullah Saleh's administration, which had been in place for more than 30 years, served as the catalyst for the revolution.

The majority of the demonstrators were young, educated, unemployed people who sought an end to political oppression, corruption, and poverty. The protestors were inspired by "Together we fight against poverty, corruption, and injustice," according to a report in *The Guardian*. Also, they demanded increased social justice, economic opportunity, and political freedom. The Tunisian and Egyptian upheavals served as inspiration for the demonstrators, who used social media to organize and mobilize. The Saleh government violently suppressed the revolt, using security personnel and thugs who supported the regime to scatter the protesters. Hundreds of protestors were killed as a result of the government's "brutal and violent" response to the demonstrations, according to a *New York Times* article.

The demonstrators persevered nonetheless, and they grew in number. On February 11, 2011, tens of thousands of people demonstrated in Sana'a, the country's capital, and other cities, calling for Saleh to step down as president. The pressure on Saleh mounted as key allies, including military leaders, tribal leaders, and members of his party, began to defect to the opposition. Saleh suffers a string of major defections after protesters were gunned down in Yemen" According to *Al Jazeera*. (2011, November 24), Saleh decided to stand down and hand over authority to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, as part of a settlement mediated by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The United States and other Western countries supported the GCC agreement because it was considered a method to stop the situation from getting worse.

Yemen's history was changed forever on February 11, when the people rose in a revolution that overthrew Saleh, brought attention to Yemen's long-standing issues with

injustice, unemployment, and poverty, and represented their yearning for change and a better future. As a result, there were imbalances that the Houthis and the conference eventually used to capture control of the capital, Sana'a. With their coup in 2014, the Houthis filled it. The current tragedy was also set in motion by the revolution.

3.1.2 Houthi coup

The emergence of militias in many former colonies was a response to political, economic, and social instability, often arising from the legacy of colonialism and the failure of postcolonial governments to provide for their citizens. Foreign intervention has also played a role in the development of militia power in former colonies. Western powers have a long history of supporting militias to advance their interests, often to the detriment of the local population. For example, in Afghanistan, the United States supported the Taliban in the 1980s to resist Soviet occupation but later found themselves fighting against the same group after the September 11 attacks (Rubin, 2019). The Houthi coup refers to the rebel group's 2014 takeover of Sana'a, the nation's capital, and the incarceration of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, who eventually escaped their control. The Houthis are a political and armed Zaydi Shiite movement also known as Ansar Allah. from Yemen's northern Saada Governorate. Since 2004, the group has taken part in several insurrections against the government.

According to the book "Yemen: What Everyone Needs to Know" by Asher Orkabi, the Houthis saw the power vacuum created by the 2011 revolution as an opportunity to gain more power and influence. The Houthis secretly allied with Saleh and took advantage of the weak and divided government led by President Hadi, in addition to Saleh's men in the state, to create many problems in the capital, Sana'a which the Houthi group used as justifications for marching towards the Sana'a and controlling it. They also took control of many major cities and other government institutions, effectively toppling the internationally recognized government. Because the Houthis' move essentially toppled President Hadi's internationally recognized government, it is frequently referred to as a coup.

The Houthi capture of Sana'a "represented the culmination of a decade-long power battle between the Houthis and the government," according to a Middle East Eye story.

The Houthis took over as the main political force in Yemen as a result of the coup, which changed the country's political landscape. The international community condemned the Houthi capture of the capital city and President Hadi's subsequent forced exile, which sparked the current situation. The Houthi seizure of Sana'a, according to a BBC article, "pushed the country to the verge of civil war." Following the entry of the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia in 2015, the situation in Yemen rapidly deteriorated and the crisis turned into a full-fledged civil war.

3.1.3 The Arab Coalition led by Saudi Arabia

The Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia refers to the military intervention of several Arab countries in the Yemen civil war in 2015 to reinstate President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi's internationally recognized government and crush the Houthi rebels. Saudi Arabia serves as the coalition's main leader, but it also consists of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, and Kuwait.

According to Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the coalition launched a military intervention in Yemen to restore the internationally recognized government of President Hadi, who had fled to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia but rescinded his resignation in September 2015 and returned to Aden. The coalition viewed the Houthis as a threat to regional stability and an agent of Iran which they charged with supporting the Houthis.

The initial intervention of the Arab coalition caused the Houthi and Saleh forces to retreat in front of the legitimate forces, and many areas were liberated, whether in the south from Aden towards Lahj and Al-Dhalea or in the north from Marib and Al-Jawf towards Sana'a. Another agenda began to emerge among some coalition parties, leading to instability in some areas of legitimacy, particularly those in the south under the supervision of the UAE, as well as incorrect air strikes that sometimes-targeted forces loyal to it or civilians in Houthi areas.

The coalition's intervention in Yemen was criticized by human rights organizations and the international community because of its impact on civilians and the humanitarian crisis, calling on the coalition to deal with greater responsibility for these actions and address their consequences.

3.1.4 The Emergence of the Southern Transitional Council

The fragmentation of former colonies is a recurring theme in post-colonial theory, which argues that the division of countries along ethnic and linguistic lines was often encouraged and supported by colonial powers. This fragmentation has led to ongoing conflicts and instability in many former colonies, as different groups compete for power and resources. One of the key ways in which colonial powers supported the fragmentation of countries was through the use of divide-and-rule tactics.

By playing different groups against each other, colonial powers were able to maintain control over their colonies and prevent the emergence of a unified opposition. This often involved promoting certain groups over others or exacerbating existing ethnic and linguistic divisions. The emergence in 2017 of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a group seeking independence for southern Yemen, was a significant development in the crisis two years after the Arab coalition intervened in Yemen. According to Peter Salisbury, a Yemen expert at the International Crisis Group, the STC "emerged out of a long-standing secessionist movement in southern Yemen." The movement has historical roots dating back to the 1960s when North and South Yemen were separate countries. After the two Yemeni states merged in 1990, tensions between the north and south remained, resulting in a brief civil war in 1994.

According to its leaders, the Southern Transitional Council was formed in 2017 in response to what they saw as the failure of the internationally recognized Yemeni government to address the needs and concerns of southern Yemen. "The Southern Transitional Council argues that the [Yemeni] government is corrupt and incompetent, ignores the interests of the south, and that southerners are underrepresented in national politics," according to Reuters. While others saw it as a political ploy to hide the UAE's moves to control the coasts and islands of Yemen and to establish an area governed by the militias associated with it and refuse to recognize the Yemeni government - and the Yemeni government had earlier canceled an agreement with the UAE to manage the port of Aden and started talks to transfer the management of the facility to a Chinese company, which endangers the Emirati strategy - to be the first controller of the region's ports.

The emergence of the STC has complicated an already complex conflict in Yemen. The group has clashed with both the Houthi rebels and the Yemeni government, which it sees as illegitimate. In August 2019, the STC seized control of Aden, the temporary capital of the Yemeni government, sparking fears of a new civil war. While the group has legitimate grievances and represents the aspirations of many southern Yemenis, its actions have also threatened the stability of the country and the region.

3.1.5 The Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council, led by Al-Alimi

The resignation of Yemen's president, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and the formation of a presidential council marks a watershed moment in the Yemeni conflict. On April 7, 2022, a new presidential council of eight members was formed. It was established in Riyadh following Saudi and Emirati consultation, or possibly under pressure. Several Yemeni politicians who were present said they were not involved in the discussions and were only brought in to sign the power transfer document.

They assumed the document had been drafted by Saudis and Emiratis. These Yemeni politicians expressed concern that members of the new council would not feel accountable to Yemenis. The council members were chosen based on three criteria, according to these Yemeni political figures: geographical distribution, ties to armed groups on the ground, and a relationship with either Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. For example, the council includes four Northerners and four Southerners, as well as four members backed by Saudi Arabia and four members backed by the UAE.

Many observers are concerned that the decree did not specify a term for this council; members' terms end only with death, disability, or resignation. With an open term, the council could become a source of polarization and division over time. As the highest political authority in a deeply divided state, the long-term collective rule may end up reinforcing rather than alleviating the country's fractured realities. There are also concerns that the council's success is overly dependent on its members' ability to coordinate and balance Yemen's relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Given the history of competition among Yemeni groups allied with these two countries, this is a risky

approach. The Houthis were referred to as "Ansarallah" in the decree establishing the presidential council. They were referred to as a party to be included in negotiations rather than a rebel group or militia. With the formation of the council, Hadi was deposed, which was one of the Houthis' demands. Furthermore, the formation of the council acknowledged the war's military powers, which the Hadi government had refused to do, insisting that they disarm and withdraw from cities. This could pave the way for the Houthis, like any other armed group currently represented, to join the council.

The council marks a watershed moment in Yemen, bringing an end to the era following Yemen's unification in 1990 when recognized political parties were the only legal forms of political participation. This council is the first political body to reflect the war's dramatic political and military changes: political parties' power has waned, and religious-sectarian and regional armed groups have risen to prominence. The formation of the council also symbolizes regional powers' influence on Yemen, which, in addition to hosting a toxic swirl of internal conflicts, has increasingly become a battlefield for other people's conflicts. Yemen's local powers have lost a significant amount of their autonomy, complicating conflict resolution.

Yemeni political parties, for example, Islah and the General People's Congress, have become linked to regional powers - Saudi Arabia and Turkey for Islah, and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman for the GPC. Furthermore, the Houthis are now more influenced by Iran than they were before the war. External powers have also backed other groups, including the Republican Guards led by Tariq Salih and the Southern Transitional Council led by Aidarous al-Zubaidi, both of which are backed by the UAE. Because these groups are armed, future political differences will most likely be expressed through weapons rather than elections or other forms of government.

3.2 Parties of the Yemen Conflict

The post-colonial theory argues that the colonizer's support for the emergence of more than one force is often motivated by the colonizer's desire to maintain control over the newly independent nation, by preventing the emergence of a unified opposition that could challenge their interests. The colonizer can create a situation in which multiple

factions emerge, each vying for power and legitimacy. This fragmentation weakens the nation-state and makes it more vulnerable to external influence. To identify the active parties in the Yemeni conflict, the study will focus on the three dimensions of the Yemeni conflict, which are the local parties, the regional parties, and the international parties. Under each item, there is a detail for each active party.

3.2.1 Local parties

3.2.1.1 Yemeni legitimacy

Yemeni legitimacy was represented by the government of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi is one of the main players in the Yemen conflict. Hadi took office following the Arab Spring in 2012 and was elected President in early 2014. He was seen as a unifying figure in Yemen at first, but his government quickly became embroiled in the ongoing conflict. On the ground, the force supporting the government of President Hadi consists of the parties supporting the legitimacy, led by the Yemeni Rally for Reform and part of the General People's Congress, in addition to the Salafis and some tribal sheiks.

President Hadi's government was supported by a coalition of Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the international community, including the United States. Because of the complexities of the Yemeni situation, President Hadi's government faced several challenges, including the Houthi alliance with the Saleh regime to overthrow the government, the Emirati role in seeking the secession of southern Yemen, and the deterioration of economic and humanitarian conditions as a result of the ongoing conflict.

“The Saudi Arabia-led coalition is trying to restore President Hadi’s government through military force. However, the conflict in the north has become increasingly sectarian, with the Houthis portrayed as proxies of Iran and the government and its allies portrayed as representatives of Sunni interests, and in the south a territorial struggle between allies Hadi and the Transitional Council”.

After rounds of conflict between the Yemeni parties loyal to the Arab coalition and rounds of negotiations in Riyadh, it was reached that Hadi would step down from power and a presidential council would be formed representing the supreme powers on the ground to resolve the existing differences and return the compass of the conflict towards the Houthis, but this has not witnessed real progress so far.

3.2.1.2 Houthi militia

The Houthis are a clan from Yemen's northwestern province of Saada. They follow the Zaydi school of Shiism. Zaydis account for approximately 35% of Yemen's population according to some reports. Yemen was ruled for 1,000 years by a Zaydi imamate before being overthrown in 1962. Since then, the Zaydis have struggled to reestablish their political authority and influence in Yemen. Feeling threatened by state-funded Salafist preachers who established a base in Houthi areas, the Houthi clan launched a movement to revive Zaydi traditions in the 1980s. However, not all Zaydis support the Houthi movement. For more than a decade, Houthi insurgents have clashed with Yemen's government. Since 2011, the Houthi movement has grown beyond its Zaydi roots to become a broader anti-government movement. The insurgents have also started calling themselves Ansarullah."

The Houthis rose to prominence in the aftermath of Yemen's 2011 revolution and power vacuum. The group took control of the capital, Sana'a, in 2014, sparking a full-fledged civil war against the Yemeni government and a coalition of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia. Human Rights Watch stated that "the conflict has created one of the world's worst humanitarian crises, with millions of people at risk of starvation and preventable disease." The Houthi movement has been described as a confluence of political and religious ideologies, with the group aiming to establish a Shia state in Yemen.

Human rights organizations, however, have widely condemned the group's actions, with Amnesty International reporting that "Houthi forces have committed serious abuses, including arbitrary detention, torture, and enforced disappearance of people they perceive as opponents." The weapons in the Yemeni army's warehouses that were raided or seized in 2014, including ballistic missiles, were the first source of the Houthis' vast military arsenal. They also acquired weapons through extensive smuggling, which is a task carried

out by specialized international networks in exchange for money and is one of the key sources of arming the Iran-backed group.

The Houthis were also able to obtain Korean, Russian, or Iranian-made missiles through the smuggling routes that the Revolutionary Guards have mastered, and they have also succeeded in introducing developments and modernizations on them with their capabilities. And Iran's role cannot be overlooked in transferring technology to DeveDeveloppons for the Houthis, as well as using experts from the Lebanese "Hezbollah" to carry out that mission.

3.2.1.3 Southern Transitional Council

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) is a key player in Yemen's conflict, which has been ongoing since 2015. The council's beginnings date back to before Yemen's unification in the 1990s when southern Yemen was a separate entity. The Transitional Council advocates for Southern independence, capitalizing on the complaints of the Southern people, which are reflected in their absence from prominent positions in the combined state. After its official foundation in 2017, the Southern Transitional Council has grown to become one of the most powerful organizations in southern Yemen. Since 2015, the UAE has provided financial and military support to the Southern Transitional Council as part of its drive against Islamist organizations.

The UAE also has commercial interests in Yemen's southern area, which is rich in natural resources and ports. According to Michael Knights, an analyst at the Washington Center for Near East Policy, the UAE's ultimate goal is to establish a permanent presence in southern Yemen, which might eventually partition the country. In addition to serving its security and economic aims, the UAE will gain more control over the critical Bab al-Mandab Strait, a vital sea passage for oil tankers and other commercial boats.

While the Southern Transitional Council desires independence for the south, the Yemeni government insists that the country must remain together and that the right to self-determination can be discussed once the Houthi coup is defeated. When the Southern Transitional Council declared autonomy in southern Yemen in November 2019, deadly fighting ensued between the two parties. Saudi Arabia intervened to put an end to these clashes, as the Yemeni government and the Southern Transitional Council signed the first

Riyadh Accord, which intends to end the conflict and establish a power-sharing structure. The deal, however, was not fully implemented, and conflicts between the two groups persisted. Yemeni journalist Ahmed Naji claims "The implementation of the Riyadh Agreement has not been straightforward. There is a lack of trust between the two groups, and they have quite divergent perspectives on Yemen's future."

Fresh clashes erupted between the Yemeni government and the Transitional Council, which ended in the November 2020 signature of the second Riyadh Agreement. The agreement aimed to expedite the execution of the articles of the first Riyadh Agreement, as well as to integrate Transitional Council forces into Yemeni Ministry of Defense forces. The deal was viewed as a positive start toward resolving the conflict in the liberated territories.

The execution of the second Riyadh Agreement, however, was delayed, followed by the withdrawal of the (Transitional Council) from the government in February 2021, resulting in a tense situation once again. As a result, the Riyadh consultations came to form a presidential council of eight leaders, including the Transitional Council's head, and southern leaders were formed to terminate the coup first, followed by a solution to the southern crisis. However, achieving consensus on a single vision inside the Presidency Council is regarded as a serious issue due to the Council's composition of members with diverse beliefs, necessitating sincere pressure from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on all parties to settle the conflict and restore the state.

3.2.1.4 Tariq Saleh's forces

Tariq Saleh is the nephew of the late Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who fought alongside him in the December 2, 2017 uprising against the Houthis, and managed to escape after Saleh's defeat and go to Shabwa governorate, passing through the capital Aden to the western coast, where he began forming a military force to confront the Houthis (Reuters. 2017) These forces are considered among the forces supported by the UAE financially and militarily and are not subject to the authority of President Hadi.

Tariq Saleh referred to these forces as the National Resistance or the Guards of the Republic, and it includes several battalions and specialized military units that entered the battlefields and front lines alongside the Giants forces and the Tihama brigades on April

19, 2018, achieving quick victories. And control of large areas until the joint forces reached Hodeidah and stopped there because of the Stockholm Agreement that stopped that campaign.

He directed Tariq Saleh to make this military and popular resistance a political component away from the General People's Congress, which is divided on more than one side, through the formation of the Political Bureau of the National Resistance, which was considered an advanced step to put a foot for it in any future political settlements, which were later made by including him as a member of the Council. presidential leadership (Gregory D. Johnsen. 2021)

3.2.2 Regional Parties

3.2.2.1 Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia's involvement in the Yemeni crisis has been crucial in shaping the conflict's course. The country has played a key role in sponsoring the Gulf initiative to end the division in 2011, which aimed to establish a national unity government that would include all political factions in Yemen. "Saudi Arabia's sponsorship of the Gulf initiative was an important step towards resolving the political crisis in Yemen" (Bennett, Christina, 2013.). In 2015, the Yemeni President requested Saudi Arabia's assistance in fighting Houthi rebels, who had taken control of large parts of the country.

Saudi Arabia responded by launching Operation Decisive Storm. The operation aimed to restore the Yemeni government's authority and push back the Houthi rebels. According to a report by the RAND Corporation, "Saudi Arabia's military intervention was a significant escalation in the conflict and contributed to the prolongation of the war" (Alireza Nader. 2015)

As a result of Operation Decisive Storm, some militias were established in the liberated areas. These militias were often accused of human rights abuses, including forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern about the human rights situation in Yemen and called for an investigation into the militias' actions. Saudi Arabia's role in the dispute

between the Yemeni government and the UAE regarding the Transitional Council and the elites has also been significant.

The UAE supported the Transitional Council, which sought to establish an independent state in southern Yemen, while the Yemeni government was opposed to it. Saudi Arabia played a mediating role between the two sides, but tensions between the Yemeni government and the UAE persisted. According to a report by the International Crisis Group, "Saudi Arabia's inability to resolve the dispute between the Yemeni government and the UAE has contributed to the fragmentation of the coalition fighting the Houthis." Support for the Yemeni army declined after 2019.

The war had become increasingly costly, and there were reports of corruption and mismanagement within the Yemeni government. According to an article in Al Jazeera, "Saudi Arabia's support for the Yemeni army declined due to concerns about its effectiveness and the widespread corruption within the Yemeni government." The decline in support for the Yemeni army contributed to the prolongation of the conflict and the continued suffering of the Yemeni people. Negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis are underway. The talks aimed to end the conflict and establish a peaceful solution to the crisis. According to a report by Reuters, "the negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis were seen as a significant step towards ending the Yemeni crisis." Saudi Arabia's role in these negotiations will be crucial in determining the future of the Yemeni crisis.

3.2.2.2 United Arab Emirates (UAE)

As a member of the Saudi-led coalition of Arab governments and a key regional actor in the Gulf, the UAE has been an active participant in the Yemeni crisis. The UAE has contributed military, diplomatic, and humanitarian assistance to the coalition's efforts in Yemen to restore President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi's internationally recognized government. "The UAE has been a crucial participant of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, giving military, diplomatic, and humanitarian support to the coalition's actions in the country," according to a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report.

However, the Emirati role in Yemen quickly became disastrous and destructive, as Abu Dhabi succeeded in undermining the elements of the legitimate authority, which led

to the elimination of what remained of the state's presence in the vital Yemeni geography in southern Yemen by supporting southern militias, the most important of which is the Southern Transitional Council, and re-starting the war according to its agendas. Aiming to limit the aspirations of change and reduce the role of the forces of political Islam, it also succeeded in building solid local tools as agents to protect its influence on the Yemeni coasts, islands, and ports.

About the file of the war on terrorism, the UAE sought to invest in the state of international concern about the stereotyped image of the threats posed by terrorist organizations in Yemen, to enhance its influence through its local tools that it established outside the structures of the Yemeni state, including security belts, elites, and anti-democratic Salafist groups, in addition to attracting The legacy of the former regime and its empowerment of vital parts in the Yemeni geography, as well as the attraction of several officials in the government of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi.

3.2.2.3 Egypt

Egypt has been a staunch supporter of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, offering military and logistical assistance. "Egypt has dispatched navy vessels to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to join the Saudi-led coalition in its naval blockade of Yemeni ports," reports the Jamestown Foundation in its book, *The Battle for Yemen: Al Qaeda and the Fight for Stability*. This assistance has been important in reducing the ability of the Houthi rebels to get weapons and supplies from Iran. Egypt's engagement in the Yemen conflict underscores the country's broader regional policy to counter Iranian influence in the Middle East.

3.2.2.4 Qatar

On the other hand, Qatar initially joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen but later withdrew its support due to the Gulf crisis, which erupted in 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt severed diplomatic ties with Qatar, accusing it of supporting terrorism and aligning itself too closely with Iran. As a result, Qatar's troops withdrew from Yemen, and relations with the Saudi-led coalition deteriorated. According to Middle East Eye, "Qatar's withdrawal from the Yemen crisis highlights the widening schism between Doha and Riyadh." The Qatari involvement was later defined by its criticism of

the coalition's failures, as well as its support for individuals on the side of legitimacy who was well-known for opposing Saudi meddling. Some commentators even questioned Qatar's backing for the Houthis, claiming that it was done to spite Saudi Arabia and to keep Saudi Arabia focused on the Yemeni war and away from the Saudi-Qatari disagreements. To the greatest extent possible.

3.2.2.5 Oman

has played a unique role in the Yemeni Crisis as a mediator between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels. As the BBC reports, "Oman has been careful to maintain good relations with all sides in the Yemen conflict and has acted as a mediator between the warring parties." Oman has hosted several rounds of talks between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels, including a meeting in 2019 between Houthi leaders and U.S. officials. Oman's efforts to broker a peaceful resolution to the conflict reflect its traditional role as a regional mediator and its desire to prevent further instability in the Gulf region.

There were doubts about Omani facilities in smuggling weapons to the Houthis because the National Army forces seized a group of shipments that came from Oman and were destined for the Houthis carrying pieces of weapons, including parts for drones. Then this was confirmed by the report of the international expert group at the beginning of 2023 that there is an Omani company And a Yemeni company involved in the transfer of weapons from Omani territory to the Houthis.

3.2.3 International Parties

3.2.3.1 USA

Relations between Yemen and the United States have been complicated, with a variety of diplomatic, economic, and security concerns. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), one of the world's most dangerous terrorist organizations, has been the main impetus behind US strategy toward Yemen. In addition to its conflict with AQAP, the US has substantial economic interests in Yemen. "The United States and Yemen have a robust economic connection that is mostly based on oil and gas exports" (Sharp. 2015).

The US and Yemeni economies have both suffered as a result of the Yemeni civil war's disruption of oil exports and production. Furthermore, the United States has been a member of the Quartet, an international group comprised of the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia aiming at finding a peaceful settlement to the crisis. Furthermore, the US has provided logistical and intelligence support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. According to Foreign Policy magazine, "the United States has contributed intelligence, air refueling, and logistical support to the coalition."(Timothy Robbins, Hijab Shah, and Melissa Dalton. March 2018).

Besides its support for the Saudi-led coalition, the United States has also declared support for the Yemeni government, which has been recognized internationally as Yemen's legitimate authority. "We support the legitimate government of Yemen and its efforts to restore stability and security to Yemen, terminate the Houthi insurrection, and address the danger posed by AQAP," Terrill, W. A. (2011). Observers of the American role in the Yemeni crisis are divided between those who believe that Washington ignored the Houthis' severe human rights violations, which frequently outstrip those of Al-Qaeda. Due to its focus on counterterrorism operations against AQAP and its unwillingness to take a direct part in the Yemeni crisis, the US has been accused of being complacent with the Houthis.

The US has been reluctant to completely engage in Yemen's conflict because of its worries about the humanitarian catastrophe and the possibility of a protracted battle, according to research by the Atlantic Council. Because of the Houthis' numerous human rights breaches, including their use of child soldiers and targeting of civilian infrastructure, some opponents have accused the US of being complacent about them. "The US has been complacent with the Houthis which has allowed Iran to increase its participation in Yemen and pose a substantial threat to US interests in the area,"(Knights, 2019)

Others argue that America opposes the Houthis, assists the coalition and the legitimate government, and turn a blind eye to abuses against civilians committed by the Arab coalition through erroneous air strikes. "The Houthis' persistent aggression against Yemen's government and neighbors, as well as their ties to Iran, undermine regional stability and pose a serious threat to American interests in the area," according to the US

Department of State. The White House announced at the start of Operation Decisive Storm that US President Barack Obama has authorized logistical and intelligence assistance in support of a Saudi-led military action in Yemen to defeat Houthi rebel forces (Reuters. 2015).

3.2.3.2 UK

The UK has had a long history of involvement in Yemen, particularly in the southern part of the country. In 1839, the British established a protectorate over the port city of Aden, which later became the capital of the South Yemeni state in the 1960s. This historical relationship has played a role in the current crisis. As part of the Quartet, which also includes the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, the UK has been involved in diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict in Yemen. However, it has also been shared in arming the coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, that is fighting the Houthis. The UK has been vocal in its opposition to the Houthis, whom it views as backed by Iran, and has called for an end to their military operations. However, it has also been criticized for its position on the coalition, "the British government has long been uncritical of the Saudi-led coalition's actions in Yemen, despite the coalition's well-documented war crimes"(Jones. 2022).

On the other side, some analysts argue that Britain has been negligent in applying political pressure to the Houthis and has refused to label them terrorists. They ascribe this to the UK's policy of using al-Houthi as a bargaining chip with Gulf allies. Al-Houthi is regarded as a party with whom an agreement can be established based on historical experiences in the mid-twentieth-century understandings between the United Kingdom and the Mutawakkilite state, the roots of the Houthi movement. The UK's involvement in the Yemeni crisis has been a source of controversy and criticism. While it has been part of diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict, it has also been accused of arming the coalition and turning a blind eye to human rights violations. The UK's position on the conflict is complex, as it balances its historical ties to Yemen with its current alliances in the region.

3.2.3.3 United Nations (UN)

The United Nations (UN) has played a significant role in the Yemeni crisis, working to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict and alleviate the humanitarian crisis. The UN has issued several resolutions regarding the Yemeni crisis, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the protection of civilians, and the resumption of peace talks. According to a report by the UN Secretary-General, "The UN has been working tirelessly to find a peaceful solution to the Yemeni crisis and address the urgent humanitarian needs of the Yemeni people." However, the UN has also been critical of the Houthi rebels, who have been accused of obstructing peace talks and failing to comply with UN resolutions. The UN has classified Houthi leaders as obstructors of peace, which has led to sanctions against them. "The Houthi leaders' continued obstruction of peace talks and failure to comply with UN resolutions has led to the imposition of sanctions against them." (Alragawi. 2021).

Moreover, some critics have accused UN envoys of being too indulgent with the Houthis, which has hampered the peace process. According to a report by Alislah Net "UN envoys to Yemen, 10 years of Houthi failure and intransigence" (Alaraby. 2021) The UN has issued several resolutions related to Yemeni affairs, reflecting the international community's concern about the ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis in the country. Resolution 2216, passed in 2015, called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the resumption of peace talks. The resolution also imposed an arms embargo on the Houthi rebels and their allies, calling on all parties to comply with international humanitarian law.

In addition, the UN has issued several resolutions calling for the protection of civilians and humanitarian aid workers in Yemen. Resolution 2286, passed in 2016, condemned attacks on hospitals and other medical facilities, calling for an end to such attacks and for those responsible to be held accountable. The resolution also called on all parties to allow safe, unhindered access for humanitarian workers to provide aid to those in need. Moreover, the UN has established several mechanisms to address the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates the delivery of humanitarian aid to Yemen and advocates for the protection of civilians.

The UN Special Envoy for Yemen, currently Hans Grundberg, works to facilitate negotiations between the parties to the conflict and find a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Furthermore, the Stockholm Convention, which was signed by the Yemeni government and the Houthis in 2018, has been criticized for failing to address the root causes of the conflict and for being too focused on short-term measures. According to a report by the International Crisis Group, "The Stockholm Convention has been criticized for failing to address the underlying causes of the conflict and for being too focused on short-term measures, such as the exchange of prisoners and the opening of humanitarian corridors."

3.3 Aspects of the Yemeni Crisis.

3.3.1 Military Aspect.

An important contributing reason to the ongoing conflict has been the military dimension of the Yemeni issue. Since the Houthi rebels seized over Sana'a, the nation's capital, in 2014, the armed conflict has increased into a full-fledged civil war, with numerous factions vying for dominance of the rule. According to The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) organization's article "Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering," seven years old, has turned into a proxy war: Iran-backed Houthi rebels, who overthrew the Yemeni government, are pitted against a multinational coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The article also emphasizes the military's significant role in the conflict, with both the Houthi rebels and the Yemeni government relying on military force to achieve their objectives.

The Yemeni map is divided into four major powers: the national army, which operates on behalf of the legitimate government with the support of the Arab Coalition, controls Marib province, most of the southeastern provinces, and parts of the southwestern province of Taiz. Meanwhile, the Houthis control Sanaa, the northern governorates (including al-Jawf, which borders Saudi Arabia), and the rest of Taiz. The Houthis are also closing in on Marib from three sides: Nihem to the east, Sarwah to the south, and al-Jawf to the north. The Southern Transitional Council governs Aden's interim capital and the governorates of Lahij, Dalea, Abyan, and Shabwa to the east of Aden. Tariq Saleh's National Resistance is the fourth force, with influence stretching across western Yemen between Mokha and Hodeidah, the latter of which is shared with the Houthis.

According to News Online, the national army suffers from a noticeable lack of equal armament and capabilities in its battle with the Houthi militia supported by Iran with drones and advanced qualitative weapons that flow to the group through the port of Hodeidah and the Red Sea from Iran and Hezbollah, in contrast to the reluctance of the coalition countries in the possession of the national army of advanced weapons that enable the army Whoever decided the battle in a shorter time, due to considerations related to the special agenda of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, according to the statements of military leaders in the national army.

At the same time, the coalition provides broad support to the Transitional Council and Tariq's forces, even though they have not engaged in a confrontation with the Houthis in the last three years, indicating a clear tendency by the coalition to weaken the Yemeni army's capabilities in the face of the militias in the north and south. Based on the previous indicators, it is difficult at present to resolve the war in favor of the Yemeni government and the national army, which threatens to exacerbate the crisis in its economic, humanitarian, and political aspects.

Yemen: Areas of control and conflict




Figure 1 Yemen: areas of control and conflict

3.3.2 Political Aspect

"The task for postcolonial theory is to develop a framework for understanding the historical, social, and political dimensions of colonialism and their ongoing impact on the postcolonial state "According to Achille Mbembe. This requires not only an analysis of the past but also a consideration of current political realities and the potential for new models of governance that can address the unique challenges facing former colonies. The origins of the present political crisis in Yemen can be traced back to the onset of the Arab Spring uprisings. On February 11, 2011, Yemeni youth emulated their counterparts in other Arab nations by calling for political and economic reforms.

Subsequently, the requests progressed towards a call for alteration of the governing system. Numerous actors participated in the revolution, with the Joint Meeting Parties being the most significant which encountered a political impasse with the Saleh regime following the 2006 elections and perceived Saleh's desire to pass on power to his son Ahmed. Subsequently, Lieutenant General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, commander of the First Armored Division, and the sons of Abdullah bin Hussein, who are the primary sheiks of the Yemeni tribes, joined the movement.

This development generated considerable tension, resulting in some minor confrontations in Al-Hasaba and Arhab. The Gulf states, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and operating within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council, found it imperative to intervene through an initiative known as the Gulf Initiative. According to the Gulf Initiative, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi assumed the position of power, however, the mechanisms of power remained under the control of Saleh. Saleh covertly collaborated with the Houthis to depose Hadi and regain his former position of authority. Following a series of sporadic confrontations, the Houthis successfully gained control of Sanaa, prompting Hadi to flee to Saudi Arabia and appeal for intervention to reinstate Yemeni legitimacy., this development marked the onset of a fresh phase of conflict in Yemen.

Following the launch of Operation Decisive Storm by Saudi Arabia, which was carried out with the support of a coalition of ten Arab nations, political factions became divided into two groups. The first group was comprised of the political council in Sana'a, which included the Houthis, the Sana'a conference led by Saleh, and several socialist and

Nasserite leaders. The other group was represented by the Yemeni government, which is widely acknowledged on an international level and is headed by Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi the General People's Congress in Riyadh, along with the Islah Party and other Joint Meeting Parties, was also involved in the representation. Following a year of conflict, both factions convened in Kuwait to engage in diplomatic discussions aimed at achieving a political resolution to terminate the hostilities.

However, the negotiations proved unfruitful due to the Houthi-Saleh coalition's obstinacy and their failure to adhere to the mandates outlined in the United Nations resolutions. After significant development, Saleh declared disengagement from the Houthis in December 2017, following a series of clashes between the Houthi military and Saleh's forces. The Houthis aimed to diminish Saleh's authority in Sana'a, but Saleh declined and opted for a confrontation that culminated in his demise, the defeat of his troops, and the escape of Tariq Saleh to the western coast, where he subsequently established his military units. The Republic's Guardians, with the backing of the Emirates, engaged in a conflict against the Houthis seeking retribution for his uncle. Tariq didn't recognition of the Hadi government until a later point in time. During the same year, the Southern Transitional Council was established. This council is comprised of southern forces that receive support from the Emirates. Their primary objective is to demand the secession of the southern region and gain control over Aden and the surrounding southern governorates. The Southern Transitional Council has engaged in numerous confrontations with government forces, punctuated by intermittent agreements brokered by Saudi Arabia, including the Riyadh Agreement and its subsequent iteration, the Mechanism to Accelerate the Riyadh Agreement (also known as Riyadh Agreement 2).

Regarding the active forces present on the terrain, they can be categorized as follows:

The Yemeni government, led by Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and currently transformed into a presidential council headed by Rashad al-Alimi along with seven other deputies, The government had international recognition and is backed by Saudi Arabia, It comprises the General People's Congress Party (Riyadh branch), the Islah Party, and other political parties. The group's concentration is in Marib, Taiz, and some regions in Al-Jawf, Al-Bayda, and Al-Dhalea. Its primary objective is to safeguard Yemen's unity, territorial

integrity and eradicate the Houthi coup. Subsequently, the government intends to address contentious matters, both in the north and south. However, their political aspirations have been eclipsed by the military conflict, and they have been unsuccessful in establishing a government with the ability to either travel back to Sanaa or offer fundamental assistance to individuals residing in the liberated regions.

The Houthis are a religious group that adheres to the Zaydi Shiite sect and maintains close ties with Iran. They are recognized as a rebel movement that opposes the internationally recognized government and is known to be backed by Iran through the provision of advanced weaponry and oil derivatives. They take control of a big part of northern governance after the military units of the Yemeni government withdrew at the end of the year 2019. The Houthis possess a clear political agenda, which involves the establishment of a Shiite state. This objective has been pursued by the group since their uprising in 2004. The political aspirations of the Houthis are intricately connected to their Shiite Muslim minority identity, within a Sunni-majority nation.

The Southern Transitional Council is a political entity that identifies itself as an extension of the southern movement, currently governs a significant portion of southern Yemen, and is regarded as the dominant force in the region. The council possesses a well-equipped military and exercises control over Aden, Lahj, Al-Dhalea, Abyan, Shabwa, and parts of Hadramout Al-Mukalla. Its primary political objective is to establish a sovereign state in the south, which is financially, militarily, and politically supported by the United Arab Emirates. The UAE shares the council's ambition of establishing a state in southern Yemen governed by affiliated militias, which would enable it to achieve its strategic interests, to be the strongest actor in the region's ports.

Tariq Saleh established his forces after he escaped from the Sana'a battle in December 2017. These forces received backing from the United Arab Emirates as Tariq relocated to the region that was subsequently designated as the western coast. This region encompasses portions of the southern area of Taiz City and the city of Hodeidah. Additionally, numerous brigades affiliated with the giants' forces joined Tariq's forces. The aforementioned forces refrained from pledging their loyalty to the lawful government

until a tardy stage and established the Political Bureau of the National Resistance as a political entity that acted as a representative of these forces.

3.3.3 Economic Aspect

In many former colonies, the extraction of resources and wealth by colonial powers left little for local economies to thrive on. Postcolonial scholar Frantz Fanon writes, "The colonial economy was organized solely to produce and export raw materials and cheap labor to the metropolis" (Fanon, 1963). This system resulted in the exploitation of local populations and the enrichment of colonial powers, with little regard for the long-term economic health of the colonies. Another major component contributing to the Yemeni people's suffering is the economic side of the Yemeni crisis. The Houthis' capture of the Central Bank of Yemen's assets in Sana'a in 2016 had a significant impact on the Yemeni economy.

The Central Bank is in charge of regulating the country's monetary policy and is the major organization in charge of paying government employees' salaries. The relocation of the Central Bank to Aden in 2016 exacerbated Yemen's economic predicament. The decision was intended to shield the bank's assets from the Houthis, "the government accuses the Houthis of exhausting Yemen's foreign reserves, which have plummeted from \$4 billion in early 2015 to a current \$1.1 billion"(Mohamed Sabry & Emam Muhammed. 2016). The relocation of the Central Bank to Aden in 2016 exacerbated Yemen's economic predicament. The decision was intended to shield the bank's assets from the Houthis, "the government accuses the Houthis of exhausting Yemen's foreign reserves, which have plummeted from \$4 billion in early 2015 to a current \$1.1 billion"(Mohamed Sabry & Emam Muhammed. 2016).



Figure 2 The Central Bank of Yemen in Sana'a

The relocation of the Central Bank to Aden in 2016 exacerbated Yemen's economic predicament. The decision was intended to shield the bank's assets from the Houthis, "the government accuses the Houthis of exhausting Yemen's foreign reserves, which have plummeted from \$4 billion in early 2015 to a current \$1.1 billion"(Mohamed Sabry & Emam Muhammed. 2016). The inability of the Yemeni government to export oil and gas has further contributed to the economic catastrophe. Yemen was a significant exporter of oil and gas before the conflict, but the conflict has severely impacted the country's ability to export these resources, resulting in the government's inability to pay military and civilian salaries, leading to widespread frustration and anger among the Yemeni people, who have been struggling to make ends meet.

The collapse of the Yemeni currency against the dollar has also been a big obstacle. The Yemeni riyal has lost about 250% of its value since the beginning of the conflict. High living costs, particularly food prices, have compounded the economic situation, with many Yemenis struggling to purchase essentials. The conflict is inflicting enormous economic losses, and the World Bank claims that Yemen's economy is on the verge of collapse. A comprehensive strategy is needed to solve Yemen's underlying economic

problems as the bank believes that the conflict has caused the country's GDP to decline by about 50% since 2015.

3.3.4 Human aspect

Unquestionably, the most damaging component of this protracted battle is the humanitarian side of the Yemeni Conflict. The death toll keeps rising, and countless people have been imprisoned or made disappear. “The war had already caused an estimated 377,000 deaths, including at least 131,000 from indirect causes such as lack of food, health services, and infrastructure” (UN. 2023). Tens of thousands of Yemenis have also been forcibly abducted or imprisoned, many of whom have experienced torture and other types of abuse. Since 2015, a protracted battle between the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRG) and the de-facto authority (DFA) (also known as the Houthis) linked with Iran has resulted in a serious economic and humanitarian disaster.

On April 2, 2022, the opposing parties agreed to a ceasefire mediated by the United Nations (UN), which ended on October 2, 2022. More than three months after the ceasefire collapsed, the UN envoy for Yemen said that "we are witnessing a potential step change" in the conflict's trajectory, even though the situation remained "complex and fluid" Reuters (2023).

Significant gains in humanitarian circumstances, on the other hand, are dependent on ongoing international assistance and the parties' commitment to permit humanitarian access and commit to a political settlement.". Yemen will need humanitarian aid for an estimated 21.6 million people in 2023. The Humanitarian Response Plan for Yemen (HRP) 2023 estimates that \$4.3 billion is needed to reach the 17.3 million most vulnerable people in need of humanitarian assistance.

Scale of humanitarian crisis in Yemen




Figure 3 Scale of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen

Figure 2. Graph showing the scale of devastation in Yemen since the war began in 2015

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and those seeking to return, Muhamasheen, people with disabilities, migrants, and refugees all confront numerous risks in Yemen. The HRP 2023 includes three strategic goals centered on "life-saving activities, resilience contributing to long-term solutions, and the importance of protection."

3.3.4.1 displacement

According to the 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan, an estimated 4.5 million people, or 14% of the population, are displaced in Yemen. The majority of them have been moved multiple times over the course of several years. The 2023 HRP states that "natural hazards and disasters doubled related displacement in 2022, damaged public and civilian infrastructure, and impacted the delivery of essential services." Heavy rains and floods affected approximately 517,000 individuals in 2022, resulting in over 160,000 new and secondary displacements between July and September of that year.





Figure 4 Internally displaced population in Yemen

More than seven years of conflict have resulted in Yemen enduring one of the world's worst humanitarian crises, in which 70 percent of the population rely on aid for their survival and millions have fled their homes. As of March 2022, 4.3 million Yemenis are internally displaced.

Many conflict-affected families don't have formal rental agreements and face threats of eviction. Nearly 40 percent of internally displaced people live in informal displacement sites where access to basic services is largely inadequate or non-existent.

Proportion of displacement sites by adequacy of basic services



Adequate: At least 70% of the site population have access to functional service.
Inadequate: Less than 70% of the site population have access and/or service is not functional/irregular.
Non-existent: Service not available within about 30 minutes' walk of the site.
 Source: Yemen CCCM Cluster

Figure 5 Proportion of displacement sites by the adequacy of basic services

Yemen ranks third among the most susceptible nations to climate change and least equipped for climate shocks, with an INFORM Climate Change Risk Index of 8.1 for 2022, following Somalia and South Sudan. An estimated 1.65 million displaced individuals live in substandard circumstances in 2,431 displacement camps. "Due to the focus on emergency response, the scale of housing destruction, and other issues related to homes, land, and property, durable shelter solutions for those living in displacement sites and areas of return are minimal" (OCHA. 2022).

3.3.4.2 Marginalized groups

Discriminatory cultural views against women's movements, economic and social involvement, and participation in politics are ingrained. Yemen is listed among the lowest five nations in terms of women's economic engagement, political empowerment, and educational achievement in the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Report 2021. According to a survey completed by Mwatana Organization for Human Rights on

August 30, 2022, occurrences of gender-based violence rose throughout the first seven years of the war (the time covered by the study). The authors discovered that people who were victims or survivors of gender-based violence were also often denied educational chances, which is especially significant considering Yemen's dearth of educational possibilities in 2022.

The Muhamasheen (the Arabic word for the Muhamasheen) is a Yemeni minority group that makes up around 10% of Yemen's population. They have traditionally faced prejudice, social isolation, restricted access to public resources, and overlapping identities like displacement and/or women. Almost 40% of Muhamasheen women do not attend school, and gender-based violence against Muhamasheen women is more common.



Figure 6 Marginalized Groups in Marib

An estimated 678,000 displaced individuals with disabilities face many risks and hurdles to aid. Older persons, like those with disabilities, experience stigma and social isolation, as well as a greater danger of being abandoned and separated from their relatives and caretakers during migration. According to HelpAge International's March 2023 report, growing food costs disproportionately impact the aged, and "many older women are also limiting food intake so that their children and grandchildren can eat more instead."

Children are suffering greatly as a result of the humanitarian catastrophe. According to UNICEF, "the current humanitarian crisis in Yemen has increased the vulnerability of

children and women to exploitation, violence, abuse, child labor, killing, maiming, recruitment, use of children by conflict parties as combatants and in various support roles, domestic violence, and gender-based violence." Child marriage causes psychological suffering.

3.3.4.3 Education

Due to conflict-related damage and interruption, an estimated 8.6 million school-age children need educational help. Over 2,700 schools have been demolished, partly damaged, or converted to non-educational usage. The problem is exacerbated by the 2022 floods, which devastated 368 schools and disrupted the schooling of approximately 1.5 million school-age children. Almost 2.7 million children are not attending school, with females accounting for 47% of that figure.



Figure 7 Students in a destroyed school in Taiz

Figure 8 Taiz-Yemen-oct-Yemeni-school-destroyed by war-city-children-still-studying-there.

3.3.4.4 Food scarcity

Food insecurity is one of the most pressing issues for Yemenis, exacerbated by economic constraints, climate change, rising diesel fuel costs, and food imports. According to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), between October

and December 2022, 17 million Yemenis endured acute food insecurity. The IPC acute food insecurity scale includes five levels: no or minimum (Phase 1), confirmed It (Phase 2), crisis (Phase 3), emergency (Phase 4), catastrophe, famine, or probable famine (Phase 5).




Figure 9 Map showing The IPC acute food insecurity scale. Source: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations.

Yemen has 17 million people that are highly food insecure, with 3.5 million severely malnourished. Because of a budget deficiency for many operations, the program's activities are carried out at low levels, impacting millions of individuals. The Ukraine conflict has resulted in worldwide rises in commodity prices, exacerbating already terrible socioeconomic conditions and food availability. In comparison to 2021, the cost of the basic food basket jumped by 42% in territories controlled by the legitimate Yemeni government and 27% in areas controlled by the Houthis, OCHA. (20 Dec 2022). The 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan states that "food insecurity is one of the main drivers of increased protection risks, specifically child protection and gender-based violence (GBV) issues, forcing people into harmful negative coping mechanisms." Climate shocks and

catastrophes increase the country's food insecure status. Yemen faced moderate to severe drought conditions and an extraordinary spike in temperatures between January and June 2022, impacting all farmed regions. In Yemen, food security and hunger are mostly a matter of budget, not food supply. Without a ceasefire between the warring parties and increased financing from donors in the second half of 2022, the food security situation would deteriorate.

3.3.4.5 Health

Over 80% of Yemen's population lacks access to food, clean drinking water, and decent health care. People's access to health care has been hampered by Yemen's protracted war and economic deterioration (OCHA. 30 November 2022). In March 2023, Laila Baker, the UN Population Fund Arab States Regional Director, said, "Today, there is practically no health care system." Hospitals, infrastructure, and equipment have been destroyed, and health personnel have been laid off in large numbers. Today, one woman dies every two hours during pregnancy and delivery for causes that might nearly totally be avoided with better access to care."

According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview in Yemen for 2023, "the system for monitoring the availability of health resources and services, updated in 2022, reveals that 49% of health facilities are either partially or not functioning due to a lack of staff, funding, and energy, as well as a lack of medicines.", supplies and equipment, long distances to health facilities, unavailability of the required type of service, and inability to afford the costs are major stumbling blocks. The World Health Organization (WHO), in collaboration with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Health Cluster, highlighted "an increased risk of starvation and severe acute malnutrition" as one of the most significant health issues in its July-August 2022 summary report. Concerns of a similar kind.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE AMERICAN ROLE IN THE YEMENI CRISIS

4.1 Historical US-Yemeni Relations.

“Yemen was divided into two countries before its unification in 1990: North Yemen and South Yemen. The Cold War and the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union affected Yemeni-American relations during this period. North Yemen, a country characterized by its mountainous terrain and authoritarian rule, maintained a policy of isolationism for much of the twentieth century, largely due to the xenophobic tendencies of its rulers. (Prados, 2005).

“This policy may have been intended to suppress internal dissent and exert strong control over the population. However, the emergence of the Cold War and the search for allies by superpowers, combined with some minor efforts by Imam Ahmed to open the country to assistance, education, and trade, gradually eroded Yemen's isolationism. In contrast, Aden was more of a city-state than a nation, and as such, its multicultural inhabitants, which included British colonialists, non-Adeni Arabs, Indian bureaucrats, and Somali laborers, were exposed to a wide range of new ideas, products, and movements. However, like the tribal hinterland of North Yemen, the rural areas surrounding Aden remained largely insulated from international political trends and developments” (Prados, 2005).

4.1.1 Historical US- North Yemeni Relations.

“The U.S. wasn't involved in the region of the Arabian Peninsula until the 20th century when the United States became officially and persistently involved in Arabia and Yemen in particular. This is in contrast to the dozens of European countries and enterprises that had established colonies, treaties, and trade stations by the 17th century” (Macro, 1968). “U.S. diplomatic ties with North Yemen did not begin until 1946; even then, Washington decided against establishing a permanent presence in the region. Slowly, a relationship blossomed as the United States, concerned about the spread of Marxism across the developing world, particularly North Yemen, reached out to Imam Ahmed's administration” (Faroughy, 1947).

Despite objections from Europe and China, the United States began a range of missions, including oil exploration, scientific study, and archaeological excavation (AlRashid, 1985). The United States sent an economic and diplomatic mission in the late 1950s to promote an understanding of the Eisenhower Doctrine and evaluate possible avenues for future foreign aid (MACRO, 1968).

“Despite Yemen's pleas, military assistance was not contemplated at the moment. In 1959, when Taiz was the capital of Yemen, the United States established a legation there apparently to learn more and counteract growing ties between Yemen and the Soviet Union. Drought relief was supplied in the form of food aid via a concurrent aid program launched by the US International Cooperation Administration. The United States maintained a level of influence in Yemen throughout this time, after the two countries established diplomatic ties, contacts gradually increased, however, the degree of participation on the part of the United States did not approach what it is now. Three months after the September 26th revolution that toppled the Zaidi Imamate and erected a republican state in Yemen, the United States formally recognized the country as a republic on December 19, 1962.

To promote regional stability and defend US main interests in Saudi Arabia, US "recognition as a tool of policy" was viewed by British resident advisor in Mukalla Harold Ingrams and others. On the other side, Zabarah saw the recognition as a reaction to counteract communist influences and provide the United States the power to reconcile all parties in the coming civil war. Even though the United States monarchical, pro-Western, Arabian allies, notably Saudi Arabia and Jordan, may have had good reason to prefer a different course of action, the fact remains that the United States recognized a revolutionary Arab regime with ties to Nasser” (The Egyptian Policy in the Arab World: Intervention in Yemen, 1962-1967, 1983).

Because of the revolution, Egypt and Saudi Arabia found themselves on opposite sides of a regional battle that began as a civil war between royalist and republican forces in Yemen. While mediating an end to Egyptian and Saudi involvement (Resolution of the Yemen Crisis, 1963). “The United States also launched development aid initiatives via the newly formed United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to boost

support for its mediation efforts. These initiatives included the construction of the 225-mile, \$22 million Sana'a-Taiz-Mocha highway, the \$33 million Kennedy Memorial Water Project in Taiz and other water systems, the funding of scholarships and technical training missions, and the provision of surplus food stores for the alleviation of hunger. The new republic's capital, Sana'a, was chosen in 1966, and with it came the relocation of the embassy.

A disappointed President Abdullah Salal said he "anticipated more compassion from such a prosperous nation." (Badeeb, 2021). "The American government was certain that it would not provide Yemen with any kind of military assistance. However, it did try to reassure Saudi Arabia and show Egyptian and Soviet officials that it cared about the stability of the Kingdom. A US Air Force squadron was sent to the Kingdom, the Saudi Air Force was strengthened, and a limited naval presence was maintained in the area just beyond the horizon to achieve these goals. Over time, regional politics helped to shift the balance of power in Yemen's complex political landscape. Egypt rethought its engagement in Yemen after the June 1967 conflict with Israel and started pulling its forces out around that time" (Badeeb, 2021). "Another consequence of the conflict was that on June 6, 1967, the Yemeni leadership broke ties with the United States in the name of Arab nationalism.

During this time of upheaval, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were the two most prominent external players in North Yemeni politics, intervening heavily by giving military aid in the form of both financial support and actual ground soldiers in the case of Egypt.⁷² They battled each other in a proxy war, both physically and ideologically.⁷³ Even if they didn't take part militarily, countries like China, the Soviet Union, and Germany still provided substantial humanitarian help" (International, 1978). The United States' involvement, on the other hand, was minimal, and diplomatic ties were severed in 1967. In June of 1972, Secretary of State William P. Rogers paid an official visit to Sana'a, the capital of North Yemen, to restore diplomatic ties between the two countries. From 1973 through 1990, when a new deal with USAID was formed, resources were put toward improving health care, schools, farms, and water systems.

A Peace Corps presence also helped revitalize the USAID initiative. It was also the United States' goal, as stated by David Ransom (Deputy Chief of Mission 1975–1978), to

get the Saudis on the side of the central government and discourage them from aiding the northern autonomous tribes. North Yemen, with its shaky centralized government, attempted to find a medium ground between the two powerful outside actors—South Yemen and Saudi Arabia—that vied for influence there. (Ransom, 2007)

Programs to promote academic and cultural interchange between Yemeni and international participants were launched on a broad scale for the first time. Many of the projects that took off in the late 1970s could trace their origins to Public Affairs Officer Marjorie Ransom, who was instrumental in bringing them to fruition. The Yemen-American Language Institute (YALI) and the American Institute for Yemeni Studies (AIYS), both funded by the United States government, were formed or formalized under her presidency. AM IDEAST, the third group, was founded two years later. According to Bill Helz, YALI's director of courses, "YALI has been an integral component of US public diplomacy efforts in Yemen over the past 28 years," with many leaders in the Yemeni government having attended YALI to improve their English skills and an increasing number of people applying for financial aid to attend. As a result, YALI is held in high regard across Yemen (Stevenson, 2003) (Prados, 2005).

“But U.S. help included more than just international grants and student exchanges. North Yemen's armed forces were bolstered and equipped by Saudi Arabian cash in 1975 according to a trilateral military assistance agreement created by the United States. U.S. aid to North Yemen included military instruction, air support, and supplies for use on the ground.⁹² The extremist rule in Aden has long made Saudi Arabia uneasy, thus the Kingdom made sure South Yemen would not take the upper hand in the fight and jeopardize its southern flank. In addition, the United States 1976 established a program to provide North Yemeni officers with access to US Armed Forces service schools as part of its International Military Education and Training initiative” (Saving the American Scholarship Program in Yemen: A Good Investment for the US, 2003).

“During the border confrontation with South Yemen in 1979, President Carter authorized the sale of \$400 million in military equipment to the Northern administration, a considerable increase in the trilateral assistance program. Washington, seeing the war within the global framework of the resurrected Cold War and anticipating a possible

triumph by the Marxist dictatorship of South Yemen, aimed to strengthen the North's capacity to resist any offensive from the South. The United States prioritized Saudi rather than Yemeni stability, as seen by its limited interactions with the Yemeni government and its preference for working with Saudi officials. An aircraft carrier task force was also sent to the Red Sea to act as a deterrence, which helped to alleviate Saudi concerns” (Kostiner, 1990). “Due to concerns that North Yemen's military growth may have unforeseen consequences for the Kingdom, the Saudis scaled down their generous assistance package to Yemen after the brief border war concluded.

The Saudis' tight grip on weaponry supplies angered the Yemenis, so they took unilateral steps to establish a measure of autonomy from their affluent benefactor” (Halliday, 1999). So, despite US pressure and South Yemeni efforts to sever the connection, the Saleh administration continued its ties with the Soviets. Contrary to the United States, which demanded immediate payment in full, the Soviet Union gave the North Yemenis \$600 million in military assistance between 1979 and 1981 on generous credit terms (Haldane, 1986).

With Ali Abdullah Saleh's election as president in 1978, North Yemen had a period of relative calm for the first time in its history. There was a strengthening of diplomatic ties as a result of reciprocal visits between Yemeni and American authorities. Saleh visited the United States in the years leading up to Yemen's unification in 1990. President George H.W. Bush visited Yemen in 1986.¹⁰³ Maintaining cordial ties with Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, and the Soviet Union was a tricky political balancing act that Saleh sought (Background Note: Yemen, 2022).

In 1990, the United States was formally supporting the Saleh administration with around \$42 million in development aid yearly, even though American military commitment had significantly decreased (Haldane, 1986). Washington's unofficial presence in Yemen was maintained via the Hunt Oil Company and other private firms. A dramatic shift from influence to engagement on the part of the United States occurred in the two decades leading up to Yemen's unification. However, AMIDEAST Yemen's Country Director claims that the Yemenis see this period as a shining moment in

American-Yemeni ties since the diversified, continuous, and increasing participation was generally positive (1Bidwell, 1983)

4.1.2 Historical US- South Yemeni Relations.

“Since Aden became a Crown Colony under direct British administration in 1939, U.S. ties to the southern part of the nation are better described as bilateral ties with Britain. As well as performing ordinary consular functions, the United States consulate in Aden also made reports on developments in the southern tribal sheikhdoms, North Yemen (before an embassy was created there), and the rest of the Arabian Peninsula” (AlRashid, 1985). “When the British evacuated Aden in 1967, they took with them not only their personnel and backing for local rulers and sultans but also their development aid and economic assistance.

There was a struggle among local organizations to fill the void, and the NLF emerged victorious. The United States kept its consulate in South Yemen open during the period of unrest and factional infighting that preceded Britain's evacuation. On December 7th, not long after South Yemen proclaimed its independence, the United States formally recognized the new nation and raised its consulate to the rank of embassy. After the British left Aden in 1967 and the Persian Gulf in 1971, the United States became more involved in the area to safeguard its large oil supply and to balance off the region's communist dominance. However, ties between the United States and South Yemen were tense” (Halliday, 1999).

“Amid mounting economic and political difficulties, South Yemeni leaders were unable to gain any external help from the United States and instead accused Washington of plotting to destabilize the country's newly established republic. South Yemen severed ties with the United regimes on October 24, 1969, after a revolution shifted the leadership to the left and it sought closer alliances with other radical Arab regimes.⁸¹ However, South Yemen did not have a particularly close relationship with the Soviet Union at the time, and as a result, bilateral relations with South Yemen went from normal and limited diplomatic influence to full disengagement and the severing of formal connections during this period” (Halliday, 1999).

For twenty years, the United States and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen had no formal diplomatic ties or official interactions. South Yemen was promoting Marxism and radical Arab nationalism, while the United States, which had moved into the Gulf to replace the departing British, was concerned with containing the spread of communism and ensuring the stability of the region. The United States views South Yemen as a state sponsor of terrorism, and South Yemen views American actions, such as the blockade of the Straits of Bab al-Mandeb and the subsequent American naval deployment, the construction of a massive naval base in Diego Garcia (March 1973), the growth of American military interests in Oman, and the United States' unwavering support for Saudi Arabia as a threat to its sovereignty. In addition, the USSR included South Yemen in its sphere of influence by the late 1970s, even though South Yemen had not previously been a Soviet satellite. Aden called the United States the "sweetest adversary of the Arab revolt," and diplomatic relations between the two countries were tense at best (Halliday, 1999).

“Representative Paul Findley of the United States did make two unofficial trips to the country, the first on behalf of an imprisoned constituent and the second as a stopover, Findley brought with him on his first trip two "diplomatic persons" Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State, and John Negroponte, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. According to Alfred Atherton, the United States as a whole wants to improve relations with the Arab countries. During this first trip, Findley met with President Salim Rubayya Ali and came away persuaded that Ali was also making overtures to the Washington administration. However, the US government made no effort to open up communication. After Findley's first visit, several factors worked to further distance the two countries from one another.

Regional developments, such as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's opening to the United States, a more active US role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a shifting conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977-78). Bolstered South Yemen's interest in reestablishing dialogue with the United States. There were supposed to be exploratory talks between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Foreign Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen Mohammed Motie after Ali and Findley met at the UN headquarters in New York in 1977, but by the time of Findley's second visit to Aden in

1978, they had not taken place” (Halliday, 1999). “Nonetheless, before Findley departed South Yemen, President Ali asked him to convey his congratulations to President Carter, please let him know that the Democratic Republic of Yemen and the United States value their cordial and productive relationship, we share President Carter's interest in cordial ties with all nations, it's a good policy in our opinion. We think it's important for our ties to become stronger. In response, Carter set up a meeting time.

The US team led by Joseph Twinam arrived in Sana'a on the same day that Ali was removed from office and executed by Marxist hardliners. Despite pleas from South Yemen for a resumption of the mission, the American group has gone home. As efforts at detente between the United States and the Soviet Union sputtered, the United States' stance against the Marxist regime hardened even more. A resumption of regular ties is unlikely because of the border battle that broke out thereafter, which the United States backed” (Halliday, 1999).

“Terrorism emerged as a key issue in US foreign policy during the Carter administration, according to Washington, South Yemen supported terrorist organizations including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), despite Findley's pleadings, the government has not even entertained the idea of changing its position on South Yemen, US State Department official Robert Pelletreau acknowledged that the Saudi position on the matter had some impact on American policy. United States leaders ignored warnings that the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen is not the Gulf's "preying wolf," but rather a tiny, impoverished, underdeveloped nation surrounded by what it sees as hostile neighbors, the impression of absolute enmity would seem preferable to even the prospect of any personal presentation of the American perspective in Aden, regardless of how little its possibilities of effective persuasion.

Aden and Washington had little motivation to rebuild diplomatic relations after the 1986 revolution, but South Yemen had begun carefully courting states outside the Soviet bloc. Halliday argues that, although remaining neutral throughout the crisis, the United States gained a deeper insight into the Southern regime's vulnerabilities and how best to exploit them (Halliday, 1999). “The United States, however, maintained its primary focus on South Yemen within the framework of its position as a Soviet proxy. The United States

and South Yemen officially resumed diplomatic ties on April 30, 1990, long after the Cold War had ended and the union between the two Yemen was approaching. However, no steps were taken to reinstitute an embassy. In conclusion, throughout the twenty years of Marxist administration in South Yemen, engagement between the United States and that country was negligible at best. There were essentially zero bilateral ties and zero interaction” (Ransom, 2007).

4.1.3 The Yemeni Unity

4.1.3.1 From Union to secessionist war: (1990-1994)

“Unifying Yemen was a challenge at first, the new state had to combine two different political systems, two different economic systems, and two different populations, all while dealing with an unanticipated international crisis: Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. A member of the United Nations Security Council, Yemen voted against a resolution authorizing the "use of force" to remove Saddam Hussein's troops from Kuwait. To sum up, Yemen was against the Iraqi invasion but against the United States strategy to stop it. The fallout from tacitly endorsing Saddam's government was immediate and devastating. The neighboring Gulf kingdoms saw Yemen's attitude as a betrayal of their monarchical governments, and they evacuated roughly one million Yemeni expatriate workers (Ransom, 2007). “It wasn't enough that the newly united country had to deal with the large flood of these returning employees; it also had to do so with less regional and international help than it had before.

After providing significant assistance to the Yemeni government for years, Saudi Arabia cut off those funds and instead started supporting opposition groups, such as Northern tribes and Islamist organizations. Humanitarian aid (PL-480 food assistance programs remained until 1994) was the only exception to the approximately \$50 million yearly cut in US funding. In FY 1991, the budget for USAID was reduced to \$2.9 million, and although it was restored significantly in future years, it was ultimately eliminated in 1996. However, the United States publicly backed Yemen's "watershed" legislative elections in 1993 and provided financial backing to the National Democratic Institute

(NDI) to aid in the country's fledgling democracy. The Fulbright Program, the Young African Leaders Initiative, and the Association of International Educators, all remained in the country. Furthermore, the United States expressed requests for dialogue and the preservation of a cohesive country when civil conflict broke out between Northern and Southern Yemen in May 1994. It did not back the separatist government in the south, the "Democratic Republic of Yemen," and it did not interfere when Saudi Arabia pleaded with it too. During this turbulent time, the United States engagement waned significantly. Unlike in 1990, when the United States presented a big but benign presence, it had a far smaller role by 1994" (Ransom, 2007).

“After years of multipronged involvement, the United States has altered its policy toward a strategy of isolating and undermining the Yemeni state while also offering certain incentives. Other Western contributors and Persian Gulf governments, most notably Saudi Arabia, withdrew their support, amplifying this strategy. There was a plan for this drastic cut in funding and presence to undermine the central government and provide room for other domestic players to exploit.” (Brown, 1997)

4.1.3.2 Between the War of Secession and the Revolution: (1994-2010)

“The years following Yemen’s civil war were just as difficult as the initial period of unity. Yemen had to face the difficult task of reconstructing the south and beginning in 1995, it started to implement a series of IMF-sponsored initiatives designed to help its economy transition to the global economy. In addition to floating the Yemeni currency, the government slashed subsidies on staples such as bread, milk, and petrol. Riots in major cities ensued as angry citizens protested a five-fold increase in the price of bread. During this period, the United States continued to reduce the scope and depth of its engagement with Yemen, especially in the field of development assistance.

The Peace Corps presence had been terminated with the commencement of the civil war and it was subsequently decided that the internal security situation did not permit its reestablishment. USAID terminated its mission in 1996; however, residual funds for a Global Training for Development (GTD II) project from 1990 were administered by a USAID representative based in the US Embassy. AMIDEAST managed the final portion

of these funds from 1998 to 2000; in September of that year, the USAID representative office was closed and the last USAID programs were terminated” (Prados, 2005).

“The US government maintained limited educational exchange programs, including the Humphrey Fellowship and the Fulbright Scholarship.¹⁴² ESF grants helped fund an expanded Fulbright program and Ambassador Barbara Bodine (1997-2001) was able to utilize revenues for limited assistance programs. Engagement in the form of military aid and cooperation, however, increased dramatically mainly as a result of Ambassadors David Newton and Barbara Bodine’s efforts to recreate the Yemeni-US relationship, the United States set up a de-mining project and negotiated a refueling agreement for the US Navy ships in Aden Harbor.

The de-mining project was to provide the Yemeni military with funds, equipment, and training through 2005. The US government saw several benefits in such an arrangement: it kept its engagement with Yemen limited as it sought to deflect some of its critics for its failure to support the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. The de-mining program also brought in additional donor nations and agencies, UNDP and Germany used it as a vehicle to expand their engagement with Yemen” (Prados, 2005).

“The 1999 naval refueling agreement was urged by Ambassador Newton (1994-97), promoted by General Anthony Zinni (head of the US Central Command), and implemented during Ambassador Bodine’s tenure (1997-2001). Refueling—a minor source of income for Aden’s port, an opportunity to “show the flag,” and a way of boosting strategic bilateral relations was not done extensively but it was to have serious and unintended repercussions when suicide bombers attacked the USS Cole in October 2000 while she was refueling in Aden’s harbor.

Yemen burst dramatically into the international news when the USS Cole, an American destroyer refueling at Aden under an agreement enacted in 1999, was attacked in Aden’s harbor by a suicide boat. Seventeen sailors were killed, nearly forty were wounded, and the Cole was so seriously damaged that she had to be returned to the United States aboard the Blue Marlin, a Norwegian ship designed for transporting oil derricks. American military and other investigative forces arrived at the scene in a manner that upset Yemeni authorities and may have contributed to subsequent difficulties that the

investigation would encounter. American investigators remained in Aden for several months but eventually evacuated after receiving credible security threats” (Prados, 2005).

Although the web of involvement in the Cole bombing may never be fully known, eventually, some individuals associated with it were brought to trial and American authorities believe that al-Qaeda played a role. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks and in response to Bush’s proclamation that “you’re either with us or against us,” President Saleh proclaimed his support for America in its war on terrorism initially, however, Yemen did little to combat potential terrorism.

US policymakers saw the country as a minimally useful ally because of the government’s inability to extend its control to all portions of the country. Indeed, the country’s rugged terrain and porous borders made it an ideal hiding place for al-Qaeda cells (believed to be present in Yemen). During the latter half of 2002, the United States deployed FBI experts, Special Forces units, and military advisors to train security forces, improve border security, and establish a coast guard.¹⁵⁴ Pressure was put on Saleh to stop subsidizing Islah-run schools and to expel expatriate Muslims studying at Yemen’s religious institutions (Prados, 2005).

“In November 2002, Saleh acquiesced in a covert US operation in which a CIA-operated Predator (an unmanned aerial vehicle or “UAV”) destroyed a Land Cruiser carrying suspected Bin Laden associate and al-Qaeda operative Ali Qaed Sanan al-Harhi. By the end of 2002, the United States had helped Yemeni ports implement computerized tracking systems for passengers and cargo that were networked to American command facilities for monitoring arrivals and departures. Notwithstanding the increased assistance, there have been some setbacks in the war on terror during this period, a suicide attack near the Yemeni port of Mukalla on the French supertanker Limburg believed to have been carried out by an al-Qaeda cell, resulted in a drastic reduction in shipping and a sharp increase in maritime insurance rates.

A diplomatically embarrassing incident occurred in December 2002, when Spain apprehended a freighter carrying SCUD missiles from North Korea to Yemen. Yemen protested that it had ordered these missiles some time ago and promised that it would not be ordering any more. The United States, unable to find a suitable legal precedent for

apprehending the cargo, reliant on Yemen as a partner in the war on terror, and busy cultivating local support for action against Iraq, asked Spain to release the ship (Prados, 2005).

US involvement in Yemen has not been limited to strictly military and security assistance. In June 2003, USAID reestablished its mission in Yemen (closed since 1996). Charged with administering a \$10-20 million annual budget, USAID Yemen is focusing on primary health care, basic education initiatives, food and health care security, and democratization and civil society initiatives. It is evident that US engagement with Yemen has increased dramatically since 2001 and has been both more extensive and more varied than at any previous time. A US Embassy Sana'a publication reports that US government assistance to Yemen for the years 2001-2004 exceeded \$290 million, making the US the largest national development provider in Yemen.

Unfortunately, America's invasion of Iraq served to diminish some of the potential goodwill that might arise from this multifaceted involvement, a majority of the world's population, including Yemenis, was strongly opposed to the invasion. Although the United States has won over the Saleh regime, the "hearts and minds" of Yemeni citizens have, if anything, been hardened, it will require a substantial and sustained effort to redirect current perceptions of the United States in Yemen. (USAID Reopens Mission in Yemen, 2003).

4.2 The position of the USA during periods of the current conflict.

The United States became a dominant player in the Middle East in the aftermath of World War II when it emerged as the world's most powerful economy and military power. America's involvement in the region took many forms, including the establishment of military bases, the provision of economic and military aid to allied countries, and the direct intervention in conflicts. Over time, this involvement gave rise to a system of neo-colonialism, in which the United States exercised significant economic and political influence over the region without formal colonial control. Scholar Mahmood Mamdani argues that "neo-colonialism functions by maintaining unequal power relations between former colonial powers and their former colonies and perpetuating economic exploitation in the Global South" (Mamdani, 2018).

4.2.1 The Position of the USA (2011- 2015)

This particular stage was highly significant as it was intricately connected to the Yemeni revolution and the ensuing reactions from all involved factions, ultimately resulting in the emergence of the present-day conflict.

4.2.1.1 The Arab Spring in Yemen

Change in Yemen: the Arab Spring “ Obama and his national security team have long had a profound skepticism of President Saleh, which only deepened as Saleh's grasp on power weakened after he entered office. Saleh had worked with the Bush administration to create a counterterrorism unit inside Yemen's armed forces and provide it with training and equipment. The National Security Bureau of Yemen, under the leadership of one of Saleh's nephews, received funding from the United States. However, after the al-Qaeda attack on the US embassy in 2008 and an argument between FBI Director Robert Mueller and the Yemeni president during Mueller's visit to Sanaa, resentment for Saleh reached new heights” (Gillman 2011).

“The United States saw an opening for a new government that might become a more reliable ally not long after the first street protests started in 2011. In this light, it's important to remember that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton intended to go to Sanaa at the start of 2011. Clinton met with Saleh and the heads of the opposition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) in Sanaa when the street turns demonstrations were at their height. She discussed the need for increased collaboration in the fight against terrorism with Saleh, but Saleh did not provide a clear response. After the United States expressed its desire for a new partner in Yemen in January 2011, JMP leaders mobilized to demand Saleh's removal a month later in February 2011, as the wave of "Arab Spring" rallies reached the beaches of Yemen. This provided them the assurance they needed to begin calling for Saleh's resignation. From 2010 until 2013, Gerald Feierstein was the U.S.

Ambassador to Yemen and perhaps the most powerful American diplomat during the "Arab Spring" in Yemen. Feierstein has extensive experience handling security problems in Muslim nations and working with the United States military. He served as the State Department's chief deputy assistant for programs in the Office of the Coordinator of

Counterterrorism from 2006 to 2008. The Bush administration and the Obama administration both conducted drone strikes along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, during the period he served as deputy chief of mission in Pakistan from then until 2010” (Day, 2020).

In light of the increasing CT actions in Yemen, Obama elevated Feierstein to the role of ambassador. Following the 2011 beginning of the GCC diplomatic effort, Feierstein had an important part in the discussions that ultimately resulted in Yemen's transition plan. At the center of the GCC agreement were the provisions for amnesty for Saleh and his family, which enabled Saleh to continue to serve as the leader of the General People's Congress (GPC), and the appointment of Saleh's vice president, Hadi as temporary president. the US was allowed to maintain the "special operation" forces they had helped train, which aided US CT strategy, and the military leadership transition went off without a hitch. These two factors bolstered the US CT strategy (Day, 2020).

4.2.1.2 The political transition period and national dialogue

Hadi's posture after 2011 favored the United States since he was more open than Saleh to allowing foreign military involvement. To the east of Aden, in the province of Abyan, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had built a regional administration structure known as "Ansar al-Sharia,".

“Hadi, with the help of CIA advisers and local tribal militia, was expelled during the spring and summer of 2012. In September, Hadi set off for New York to join other world leaders at the United Nations General Assembly. During a meeting with President Obama, he promised full cooperation in the fight against AQAP. Later, during a public event in Washington funded by the Atlantic Council, Hadi highlighted the number of AQAP militants who had been killed or captured. Hadi has also praised American use of drone-launched missiles inside Yemen (McCormick, 2012). Hadi's unwavering backing for American drone use, a position that Saleh never accepted, persuaded authorities in Washington that Yemen had a model ally. Hadi warned American audiences that if Yemen's transition is not successful, the country would degrade to a situation worse than Somalia's or Afghanistan's.

Obama shared Hadi this view, and he put complete faith in Hadi to lead the country smoothly into a new administration. As a consequence of the aforementioned events, an unhealthy degree of reliance developed, Hadi's small group of close friends and family, and his dependence on Obama's support prevented him from attempting to build larger local coalitions, the temporary president of Yemen felt more isolated and powerless as a result. As Yemen entered its transition period, the United States reduced its involvement in the Sanaa-based National Dialogue Conference (NDC).

In a May 2018 interview, Karen Sasahara claimed that American diplomats avoided taking part in the most important political activities of Yemen's transition to avoid giving the impression that they were driving the National Dialogue Conference (NDC). With the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) delayed due to a lack of agreement on a quota-based distribution of delegates, Feierstein played a pivotal role in arguing for the presence of marginalized groups including women and youth. The inability to enlist the participation of southern HIRAK was a major reason for the delay. The Southern HIRAK leaders decided not to take part in the NDC and instead worked toward their aim of "Southern independence" (Day, 2020).

"Because it wants Yemen to remain a cohesive state, the United States is opposed to HIRAK's stance, during the lengthy delay leading up to the March 2013 start of the National Dialogue Conference, Feierstein urged Hadi to designate new representatives for the southern provinces of Yemen instead of The Southern HIRAK leaders. One of the G-10 ambassadors who were instrumental in Yemen's transition, Feierstein became the "godfather" of the country's military reforms. According to Feierstein (Feierstein, G. Personal Interview, April 2018), this transformation was a natural outcome of the United States ten-year engagement in the formation of Yemen's "special operations" groups. With President Hadi's assistance, the U.S.

Embassy in Yemen has been working on unifying Yemen's military forces since 2012" (Day, 2020). "This method made it easier to break down the "stovepipes" in the prior structure that allowed for the independent leadership of military organizations. Changing the goals of Yemen's military training was also essential, as was the dismissal of high-ranking officials like Ahmed, the son of former President Saleh, who oversaw the

Republican Guard. To make the aforementioned effort a success, Feierstein reached out to the US Central Command in Tampa, Florida. The United States then sent a commander named Ralph Groover to work in Yemen.

Ambassador Feierstein identifies three obstacles to military reform. An April 2018 interview with Gerald Feierstein revealed that many Yemeni leaders put personal gain ahead of the well-being of their country” (Day, 2020). Feierstein tried to solve the persistent problem of "ghost soldiers" in the Yemeni armed forces, where fictitious individuals serve under false identities.

4.2.1.3 The Houthi Coup and the Launch of Decisive Storm.

“In his book "The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World," historian Vijay Prashad addresses colonial powers' support for militias in postcolonial governments. He observes that such assistance frequently undermines the creation of a strong state, which may be perceived as a challenge to the interests of former colonial powers” (Husain, 2009). Before the Houthi rebels seized the main military post in the city of Amran in early July 2014, Ambassador Tueller had spent more than a month at the US embassy in Sanaa. The U.S. has expressed renewed alarm and urged the Houthi government to refrain from employing force. The next month, the Houthis set up "peaceful" protest encampments near Sanaa, suggesting they commanded considerable attention. While peaceful demonstrators gathered, Houthi leaders plotted a coup with the help of Saleh's loyal military. As soon as they arrived in the city in the middle of September, the Houthi and Saleh factions prioritized attacks on General al-Ahmar's headquarters and home residence” (Day, 2020).

Following the capital falling Tueller assisted Saudi authorities in arranging for the general's safe departure from the country. Feierstein, who remained involved in Yemeni issues at the State Department despite the Houthis' seizure of Sanaa, said that the latter's conduct has caused worries in Washington, DC. Nonetheless, “President Hadi repeatedly assured the United States that the rebels posed no threat to his government (Feierstein, personal conversation, June 2019). According to an interview with Karen Sasahara that took place in May 2018, suspicion of the Houthi rebels inside the embassy was far lower before the Houthi-Saleh takeover. The US counterterrorism effort prioritized regions south and east of Sanaa, rather than the northern region, and this had a role. After the coup

in September 2014, Ambassador Tueller supported UN envoy Benomar's efforts to negotiate a political settlement, which led to the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA). Tueller thinks (based on an interview he made in May 2018) that Saleh and the Houthi leaders didn't adhere to the terms of the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) to secure power in the future administration.

Tueller argued that the United States policy was motivated by a desire to hasten the remaining measures of the 2011 GCC agreement's "implementation mechanism" and a desire to ensure that a new administration is led by technocrats with the expertise to improve public services for the welfare of the populace. According to Tueller, the aforementioned strategy is the most effective method to stop the Houthi-Saleh coalition from undermining progress gained since 2011" (Day, 2020)..

Tueller concluded that Saleh and the Houthi leaders will impede the implementation of the GCC accord. So he thought it was critical to implement the agreement's provisions as soon as possible before they could plot their next move. The American embassy helped the newly elected technocratic administration of Prime Minister Khaled Bahah in the fall of 2014. Ambassador Tueller said that the government just needed a few wins to gain the support of the people and weaken Saleh and the Houthi leaders' grip on power. In its support for President Hadi, the US embassy suggested speeding up the translation of the NDC's recommendations into a new constitution's wording. Hadi was required to submit the draft constitution for approval before conducting a nationwide referendum on the mechanism for implementing the GCC accord. Finalization of the version occurred before the end of the year. After Hadi's office manager Ahmed Bin Mubarak urged its implementation in the middle of January 2015 Houthi soldiers seized him.

They then locked President Hadi and Prime Minister Bahah up in their residences. Amid a worsening political crisis, Hadi and Bahah announced their resignations on January 22nd, 2015. "After the transition in Yemen failed, there were two main concerns: how to handle relations with Houthi rebel leaders, and how to keep the US embassy and its personnel safe. There was a disagreement between Ambassador Tueller and his senior staff and President Obama, his national security team, and State Department authorities in the winter and spring of 2015 about whether or not to keep lines of communication open

with Houthi leaders. After 75 machine gun rounds damaged a staff vehicle on New Year's Day 2015, without injuring any passengers, security at the US embassy in Sanaa came under scrutiny. A Sheraton hotel served as the staff housing for the embassy for several years, and its employees lived in a secure enclave between the embassy and the hotel. The protected region was off-limits to the public as long as Saleh remained in power in Yemen (Day, 2020).



4.2.2 The Position of the USA (2015- 2022)

4.2.2.1 Obama's Balancing Act: Navigating the Yemen War and Iran Nuclear Deal

While President Obama's national security officials in Washington often counseled Tueller to develop diplomatic connections with the Houthi leadership in Sanaa to avert full-scale violence in Yemen, it is clear that Tueller and his staff disagree with this advice based on their experiences in the country. (Anonymous former National Security Council senior staff member, personal interview by Ju).

Tueller said that he and the embassy "answered queries from Washington, not vice versa," and that there was a lack of understanding of the situation in Yemen on the part of the White House. Tueller didn't think it would be productive for his new "embassy" in Jidda, Saudi Arabia to communicate with the Houthi movement. Because of continuing diplomatic discussions with Iran regarding the JCPOA nuclear pact, Obama and his White House aides were hesitant to fully embrace the Saudi operation in Yemen. Bruce Riedel claims that as late as January 2015, US government officials in Washington admitted having an "intelligence connection" with the Houthis.

“Given the history of tension between the United States and Saudi Arabia, it is crucial to examine the interplay between the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the events in Yemen during the spring of 2015. During the "Arab Spring" of 2011, when Saudi Arabia pleaded with the Obama administration to prevent the overthrow of Arab regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, tensions between the two nations first started to rise. At the start of Obama's second term in January 2013, the relationship was on the verge of breaking down when he failed to hold Syria to his "red line" regarding the use of chemical weapons there, opting instead to negotiate a deal with Russian assistance to secure the removal of more than 90% of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal. Obama's decision to relinquish ambitions to remove Bashar al-Assad from power in Damascus and pursue direct negotiations with Iran strained ties with the Saudi Arabian government even more in the run-up to the collapse of the revolution in Yemen in late 2014 and early 2015.

Obama began to worry in 2013 and 2014 that he would be dragged into a conflict in Syria, which could easily escalate to a wider clash with Iran. Saudi authorities lost faith in the president when he changed tactics and worked with Iran to negotiate and execute

the JCPOA. The toppling of the Yemeni government in January 2015 shifted the focus of US-Saudi tensions away from Yemen and towards Syria. In February and March, as the Houthis tried to consolidate their power with assistance from commanders loyal to Saleh, Obama and his National Security Council were concerned that another entrapment scenario would threaten to derail the JCPOA. King Salman of Saudi Arabia chose to respond with a full-scale war. Abdullah in Lebanon, Ambassador Tueller almost certainly believed the Saudis. Even though the situation in Yemen did not mirror that in Syria, President Obama nonetheless sought to evade notice. To keep the United States out of direct conflict during Operation Decisive Storm, he put limitations on American participation.

“While Obama did enable US major generals to take part in a Saudi Arabian "joint planning cell," he also imposed "limitation rules" via the Pentagon that prevented Americans from choosing bombing targets in Yemen. The only way American commanders could aid their Arab counterparts was by delivering intelligence analysis based on US satellite data. Similarly, American pilots refueled Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) fighter planes in midair while forbidden from bombing Yemeni targets. The sale of American weaponry to Saudi Arabia was unrestricted. According to the Trump administration, it was in Saudi Arabia's best interest to continue a long-standing military commitment (Malley and Pompeo 2019). While the Saudi government saw the Houthi leaders as a threat, President Obama and his cabinet members declined to provide them with any additional aid” (Day, 2020).

“This year, The Wall Street Journal cited an anonymous senior administration official as saying the United States had no plans to employ military action against the Houthis. Focus on AQAP is essential” (Solomon et al., 2015). If Obama could convince Iran to take a more moderate posture, he reasoned, the region's tensions would subside. To improve relations with the Iranian regime, his administration prioritized completing the JCPOA nuclear accord. Washington responded to any danger to the JCPOA by trying to defuse the situation in Yemen. In the middle of May 2015, Iran said that it will deploy two naval warships to escort a cargo ship carrying supplies to the people of Yemen. John Kerry warned Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif that the GCC alliance may strike Iranian ships if they continued to supply Yemen. Kerry cautioned Zarif that an assault on

Saudi Arabia may set off an unpleasant confrontation between the United States and Iran” (Day, 2020).

“To facilitate UN inspection, a deal was reached allowing Iran to provide a naval escort to Djibouti. This is because, like the Obama administration, the leaders in Tehran gave the JCPOA their highest priority. Around the same time, the White House began expressing growing alarm over the rising toll of Yemeni civilian casualties. Sanaa-based media outlets often showed images of wrecked houses and other essential infrastructure. Reports sometimes show pictures of missile components with US manufacturer ID.

When international human rights organizations accused the coalition of committing war crimes, it deeply troubled the Obama administration. In June 2015, a State Department envoy met with Houthi officials in Oman to secure the release of an imprisoned American citizen (Shear and Schmitt 2015), marking the beginning of US efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict. In the fall of 2015, after President Obama had urged King Salman of Saudi Arabia to intervene in the humanitarian situation in Yemen, the two leaders met in person in Washington, D.C. U.S. President Barack Obama has said that he supports a political agreement between all sides, including the Houthi movement's leaders. During a short cease-fire at the beginning of peace negotiations in Kuwait the following spring, Obama removed the United States from the "joint planning cell" in Saudi Arabia, but he maintained US military training and assistance, including the refueling of coalition aircraft” (Day, 2020).

“An anonymous former senior staff member of the National Security Council gave a personal interview in June 2019; Emmons 2017) claiming that Ambassador Tueller, while stationed in Saudi Arabia during the peace talks, routinely declined or avoided opportunities to engage the Houthis. A majority of Americans swiftly turned against the war, prompting both parties in Congress to submit anti-war legislation that ultimately failed to garner enough support to become law. The legislation aimed to prohibit the delivery of air-to-ground weaponry to Saudi Arabia. Houthi-Saleh soldiers in control of the coast launched attacks on U.S. Navy vessels in the Red Sea in the summer of 2016. Two Silkworm missiles fired during the second week of October missed a second US ship, while a third, independent missile, fired from close range, killed a vessel from the United

Arab Emirates. President Obama ordered a response, and the US Navy fired ship-to-shore missiles against coastal radar installations. U.S. soldiers also helped the alliance retake the land from AQAP along the country's southern coast, so this wasn't their first or last direct engagement in the conflict” (Day, 2020).

4.2.2. 2 The Trump Administration's Yemen Policy: A Focus on Combating Iran.

Author Andrew Feinstein's 2013 essay in the publication African Security shares this view. He claims that postcolonial nations have suffered greatly because of the armaments trade, which only serves to exacerbate the impacts of colonialism (Fanon, 1963). “Three weeks after the US Navy's reply in the Red Sea, in November 2016, a candidate from the Republican Party surprisingly won the American presidential election. There was a major change in US policy in support of the alliance's military endeavor in the months after President Trump took office in January 2017. After just one week in office, Trump ordered a poorly planned nighttime attack on an AQAP suspect in the southwest Yakla al-Beida district of Yemen. The assault killed a US Navy Seal and many Yemeni civilians, including Anwar al-Awlaki's 8-year-old daughter and other youngsters. Trump has also moved up the clearance timeline for numerous weapons systems that Obama had blocked from being supplied to the GCC coalition. In 2017, when Houthi rebels acquired additional missiles with which to strike Saudi Arabia, Trump offered the Saudis an integrated missile defense system.

Before the end of the year, US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley held a press conference to display the remnants of an Iranian ballistic missile that had been fired from Yemen toward Riyadh. (The People's Voice) To counter Iran's actions in Yemen, Haley promises, "You will see us assemble a coalition to fight back." It seems that the potential of global commercial accords with Saudi Arabia was the driving motivation, notwithstanding the Trump administration's justification of US behavior in Yemen on the grounds of standing up to Iran” (Day, 2020). “Secretary of State and former Exxon-Mobil chairman and CEO Rex Tillerson has confessed that closer ties with Saudi Arabia were an early priority for the Trump administration. In May 2017, during Trump's first overseas trip as president, he met with King Salman in Saudi Arabia for the Riyadh Summit.

As the Republican Party assumed power in the White House and Congress, Democrats were more vocal in their opposition to the war. Senator Chris Murphy and Representative Ted Lieu, together with several other Democrats and a few Republicans, have introduced legislation to end US support for the fight. A vote in the Senate in March 2018 failed by a razor-thin 55-44 margin. The Republican-controlled Senate made another vote in December, months after the murder of Washington Post writer Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi embassy in Istanbul, Turkey. The Senate voted this time to end US support for the conflict in Yemen by a margin of 56 to 41. After the House passed "War Powers" legislation, the President of the United States vetoed it, marking the first time this had happened since the early 1970s, during the Vietnam War" (Day, 2020).

In its last hours in office, the Trump administration designated the Houthi rebels in Yemen as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), causing concerns that the following sanctions will exacerbate Yemen's already catastrophic humanitarian situation. Joe Biden, Trump's successor, quickly reversed the decision due to hunger concerns, although the policy change was controversial due to concerns that it would strengthen the rebel organization (Kroft, 2021). Ansarullah is a dangerous Iranian-backed militia organization operating in the Gulf area, and these designations will give the United States more leverage against their "terrorist conduct and terrorism," as Pompeo put it. The purpose of the designations is to make Ansarullah (the Houthi rebels) responsible for the terrorist activities they have committed, including cross-border assaults that endanger civilian populations, infrastructure, and commercial ships (Hansler, 2021).

4.2.2.3 Biden's Balancing Between Threats and Needs

"First visiting the State Department on February 4, 2021, Biden spoke on the topic of "America's Place in the World" for the first time. Abolishing all aid for offensive activities, including weapons sales, supporting the UN-led peace plan, and naming experienced diplomat Tim Lenderking as special envoy were the three choices he stated about his administration's attitude toward the conflict in Yemen. By making these choices, the United States has effectively switched roles, going from a supporter of one side to an intermediary to end the fighting. The policies of the two administrations that came before Biden's have not changed as a result of these judgments. Rather, Biden's current actions

in Yemen are the culmination of a gradual transformation that started in the latter months of the Obama administration and has continued into the Trump administration.” (Sheline, 2023).

“You can make it seem like the United States stopped supporting the war just before Joe Biden assumed office by tracing the pivotal moments of that support. It will also demonstrate the two key reasons why Washington is drifting away from backing the Saudi-led Arab alliance in Yemen. Humanitarian and human rights organizations have had a significant influence on US policy via advocacy campaigns and lobbying in reaction to rising civilian casualties and worsening humanitarian circumstances in Yemen. Furthermore, rising partisanship and institutional polarization in Washington have contributed to the change in the conflict in Yemen and US-Saudi Arabia, notably between Congress and the president and also between the two parties.

One of the key points of the debate centers on relationships. The Biden administration officially delisted the Houthis, a Yemeni rebel group, off the State Department's list of designated foreign terrorist organizations on February 16, 2021. Concerns that the designation would make it more difficult to provide humanitarian goods to Yemen and potentially perhaps exacerbate the current humanitarian catastrophe in the country led to this decision. Some, however, are beginning to doubt the sincerity of this decision and its possible influence on the situation in Yemen as the Houthis' military power continues to grow” (Sheline, 2023).

“Some have seen the decision to delist the Houthis as an act of diplomacy and a step toward a peaceful settlement of the crisis. The decision to delist the Houthis is a reflection of the complexity of the situation in Yemen and the challenges of balancing humanitarian concerns with security considerations, but as the Houthis' military capabilities continue to expand, there are concerns that this decision may have bad consequences. It's possible that revoking the terrorist label would backfire, making it harder for the international community to settle the fight. “Some have argued that the decision to remove the terrorist label has given the Houthis newfound confidence and legitimacy.

The Houthis, meanwhile, have used the change to their advantage, portraying themselves as legitimate actors in the conflict and gaining support from the Yemeni

population. The Houthis have used the delisting as an excuse to increase their assaults on civilians and further their military goals. Foreign Affairs released an essay by Yemeni political analyst and researcher Farea Al-Muslimi titled "Yemen: The Consequences of Delisting the Houthis."

The decision to delist the Houthis was pragmatic and intended to ease restrictions on humanitarian supplies to the people of Yemen; however, its success in this regard is as yet unknown. Research Associate at the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies Helen Lackner writes in the journal *Middle East Policy*, "The Delisting of the Houthis: Implications for Yemen and the Region." The move has also strained ties between the United States and its regional allies, notably Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-led coalition claims the Houthis have Iranian support and pose a danger to their national security. Some people think the U.S. government doesn't take the danger presented by Iran and its proxies very seriously since it decided to remove the terrorist label. "Additionally, in February of 2021, Biden named Tim Lenderking as special envoy for Yemen.

Lenderking made many trips to the area in the 14 months leading up to the current ceasefire, meeting with Houthi representatives and other players including Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. While it is encouraging that the Biden administration is emphasizing diplomatic efforts, there is no evidence to indicate that this was the deciding factor in securing a ceasefire. To get the Biden administration to stop supporting Saudi military efforts in Yemen, Senator Bernie Sanders invoked the War Powers Resolution towards the end of 2022. In response, the Biden team argued that the war powers' action is needless and might make the situation worse. The administration explained its opposition to the War Powers Resolution in a document sent to members of Congress, citing the United States' role in mediating the UN-sponsored ceasefire and warning that discontinuing US engagement may complicate negotiations. In light of the White House's public opposition, Senator Sanders decided to drop the resolution in return for a commitment from Vice President Biden to collaborate with his office. If his office and the administration can't come to terms, Sanders has promised to introduce the War Powers Resolution again" (Sheline, 2023).

“The administration's primary concern with the most recent round of legislative moves to withdraw US involvement in the war is that it would undermine US support for the talks. The withdrawal of U.S. military assistance does not signify the end of U.S. involvement in Yemen. As a result, the United States should allocate much more money toward humanitarian and development assistance to alleviate widespread human suffering and dampen anti-American sentiment. The Houthis' capacity to inflict major damage on Saudi and Emirati targets changed their calculations, and the timing of the truce's implementation reflects this.

Houthi violence rose in the United Arab Emirates an attack by a Houthi drone in Abu Dhabi in January 2022, two months before the armistice deal, resulted in the deaths of three persons. This incident has damaged the UAE's image as a peaceful oasis in the Middle East. The United Arab Emirates envoy to the United Nations General Assembly refrained from voting to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 because Emirati authorities were still so angry with the United States for not responding more forcefully. On March 25, 2022, the Houthis attacked Saudi Arabia many times, including an Aramco complex in Jeddah, as they had done often in the weeks leading up to the ceasefire. The assault came so close to canceling the Formula One event that was set to take place two days later” (Sheline, 2023).

4.3 USA Interests in Yemen

Yemen is a key player in the region due to its central location. Theodore Roosevelt, a former president of the United States, referred to Yemen as "one of the world's most important geographical locations." A significant transit point for oil exports from the Arabic Gulf to Europe and the United States, the nation sits at the southern entrance to the Red Sea and provides access to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean (Roosevelt, 1907). The United States has, therefore, long been worried about the security of Yemen's waterways. Oil from the Persian Gulf flows to the rest of the globe via the Suez Canal, which means whoever controls Yemen controls the access to the Red Sea, and hence controls the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the rest of the world (Kaplan, 2012).

4.3.1 Politically and Militarily

The United States has two main political and military goals in Yemen: countering Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and bolstering regional allies against Iranian expansion. Frantz Fanon argues in his book "The Wretched of the Earth, that" the colonial powers imposed a system of economic exploitation and political control that continues to perpetuate inequality and suffering in the former colonies (Fanon, 1963).

4.3.1.1 Fighting AQAP.

Since al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the assault on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000 and the attempted bombing of a commercial airplane destined for the United States in 2009, the United States has been fighting al-Qaeda in Yemen. The United States government has responded with several military and intelligence activities. They helped the Yemeni government financially and militarily, educated security and anti-terrorism soldiers, and supported regional counter-terrorism initiatives to combat the group's activities in the country of Yemen (Terrill W. A., 2011).

The United States conducted several operations in Yemen that had a major impact on the strength and military capability of the al-Qaeda group, including the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), also known as drones, to carry out targeted killings of suspected al-Qaeda members. The 2011 killing of American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, a key figure in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Yemeni branch of the organization, was one of the most publicized US operations against AQAP. It was a US drone that carried out the operation, and in addition to Samir Khan, another American citizen, the drone also killed an AQAP propagandist. January 2020 also saw the death of Qasim al-Rimi, the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

The US Department of Defense claims the strike, which took place in Yemen, was an attempt to cripple al-Qaeda's ability to plot and execute terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies. The death of al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen has been celebrated as a major victory in the war on terrorism since it has severely hampered the organization's ability to plan and execute attacks. But other experts say it is not enough to stop al-Qaeda from being a danger in Yemen as long as the group is still active there and able to attract new members. Analyst of Yemeni politics Michael Horton calls Al Qaeda

in the Arabian Peninsula "one of the most dangerous and active branches of the global jihad network," with operational reach well beyond the boundaries of Yemen. Therefore, although eliminating al Qaeda leaders is an important part of counterterrorism, it should be part of a larger strategy that seeks to address the root causes of extremism in Yemen. "The US has a legitimate interest in preventing Yemen from becoming a failed state and a refuge for terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS," says Peter Salisbury, a senior Yemen expert with the International Crisis Group (Salisbury, 2019).

4.3.1.2 Confronting Iranian Expansion.

Because of its proximity to Saudi Arabia, the United States' most important ally in the Middle East, Yemen is of paramount importance to American national security. The United States relies heavily on Saudi Arabia's economic and military backing in the region, and the kingdom's efforts to limit Iran's regional influence have been crucial. Due to its strategic importance, Yemen's conflict has evolved into a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. As part of its larger attempt to challenge Iran's regional aspirations, the United States has been giving substantial military aid to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, including information, logistics, and munitions.

U.S. officials see Iran's backing for the Houthi rebels in Yemen as part of a broader plan to increase Tehran's regional clout and pose a danger to American interests. To that end, the United States backs the Saudi-led coalition's fight against the Houthi rebels and for a return to peace and stability in the area. The United States "saw Iran's backing to the Houthis as part of a bigger campaign to enhance its influence in the region and harm American interests," as Schmidt (2018) writes for The New York Times. The continuing crisis in Yemen has direct ramifications for American geopolitical goals in the Middle East, especially regarding the country's competition with Iran.

4.3.2 Economically

The economic interests of the United States of America in Yemen can be summarized as follows, Due to its strategic position at the southern end of the Red Sea, which carries an estimated 4.8 million barrels of world oil per day, Yemen has commercial interests in the United States. Therefore, the United States has made protecting the Bab al-Mandab Strait a top priority. To go from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, oil tankers

and other commercial ships utilize the waterway. The United States has an interest in the oil, natural gas, minerals, and precious metals found in Yemen. These riches have been mostly unexplored, however, because of the continuous violence and instability in the nation. In addition, Yemen might be a promising market for U.S. exports. U.S. exports to Yemen in 2019 were \$350 million, demonstrating the significance of the two countries' trading relationship. U.S. exports to Yemen mostly consist of agricultural goods, cars, and medical gear and equipment.

4.4 USA-Saudi Alliances Relations in Yemen Crisis

As political scientist Vijay Prashad notes, "The colonial powers have never truly left their former colonies, but have continued to exercise power through the arms trade, military intervention, and political and economic domination" (Prashad, 2016). This domination is often achieved through the sale of arms to both former colonies and their allies, which creates a dependence on the former colonizers and perpetuates their influence in the region. For example, the United States has provided significant military aid to countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan in their fight against terrorism, with conditions attached that require the countries to align with U.S. political and economic interests (Prashad, 2016).

The relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia can be traced back to 1931 when oil production began in Saudi Arabia. However, it wasn't until the signing of a cooperation agreement in 1933 that the relationship between the two countries began to transform. Over time, this relationship evolved into a political, oil, economic, and commercial partnership, and eventually developed into a strategic alliance in the late 1950s. The United States' interest in the security of the Arabian Gulf as a key supplier of oil and source of the largest global reserves has been a major concern, and the US has sought to protect its interests in the region through the "two pillars" policy, which involved Iran and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the largest exporter of oil in the world, and Iran was a close ally of the United States under the Shah. As part of this policy, the US also tried to improve relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran by encouraging Iran to abandon its territorial claims to Bahrain.

Despite tensions between the US and Saudi Arabia due to the recognition of Israel and the oil embargo of 1973, which increased oil prices significantly, the US still desired to maintain a relationship with Saudi Arabia due to its substantial oil wealth. This resulted in Saudi Arabia purchasing a large amount of American military technology, and in 1974, an extensive agreement was signed between Washington and Riyadh to expand economic and military cooperation. In 1975, the two countries signed military agreements worth \$2 billion, which included the purchase of 60 combat aircraft for Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia insisted on keeping OPEC prices high in the mid-1970s, albeit at a lower price than Iraq and Iran, to satisfy US demands (Abdullah, 2019). After the end of the Cold War, there was a noticeable improvement in relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

American companies played an active role in the reconstruction of Saudi Arabia, and in exchange, Saudi Arabia sent \$100 billion to the United States for that. The US also helped build and train the Saudi army as a counterbalance to Shiite extremism and the revolution in Iran and recognized Saudi Arabia as the primary Islamic leader in the region. The US military established permanent bases in the region after the Second Arab Gulf War to protect its interests. However, tensions arose after the September 11 attacks, when it was discovered that 15 of the 19 attackers were Saudis. From 2003 onwards, Al-Qaeda and terrorist cells carried out a series of attacks and bombings against foreign and security targets in Saudi Arabia, leading to becoming Saudi Arabia as a key partner in the fight against Al-Qaeda.

Given that energy policy is a crucial issue that affects the interests of the United States and its global influence, the country has become increasingly vulnerable to fluctuations in energy prices, supply disruptions, and extortion attempts since the September 11th attacks. In addition, the United States is facing stiff competition from other global powers, particularly China, in the economic sphere. China is heavily reliant on oil imports from the United States, which provides over 52% of its oil needs, and the Persian Gulf region, with Saudi Arabia being a key supplier. Therefore, the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has become increasingly important, with the two countries expanding their relationship after concerted efforts to combat terrorism.

This was reflected in the visits of President George W. Bush to Saudi Arabia in 2008 and King Abdullah's visits to the United States in 2002, 2005, and 2008. The leaders of the two countries made significant decisions to enhance the security, economic, and commercial aspects of their relationship, which has made it at the highest level. "During Barack Obama's presidency in the United States, there was a major shift in US-Saudi relations, marked by tensions and tensions.

This change resulted from several reasons, including the difference in Obama's foreign policy approach towards Arab and Islamic countries, including Saudi Arabia, compared to his predecessor, George W. Bush Jr. One of the main factors that led to this change was the Arab Spring revolutions. And its influence on the Arab Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia. In addition, the US-Iranian nuclear agreement, Obama's inaction on the Syrian crisis, and the US's silence towards the events in Bahrain, in addition to the impact of energy security on US foreign policy decreased due to the lack of threats and the tendency to find domestic and foreign alternatives.

Despite the challenges, the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia remains strategic because of the Kingdom's great weight in the balancing game between the United States, China, and East Asia, which prompted the United States to sell \$110 billion in weapons to Saudi Arabia at the beginning of 2009, and the National Security Agency (NSA) began (NSA) cooperated with the Saudi Ministry of Interior in 2013 to help ensure the continuity of the system. The White House and President Obama have praised Saudi Arabia as a leader in promoting stability and security in the Middle East and beyond. The United States also provided logistical and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia during its military intervention in Yemen, but limited this support to certain areas and placed restrictions on the export of some weapons to Saudi Arabia (Abdullah, 2019).

"A new page began in the relations between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with the arrival of the new American President Donald Trump to power in the United States of America in January 2017, as this beginning culminated in the visit of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the White House in 2017. He met with President Trump, stressing two important things - the importance of

confronting all the activities carried out by Iran because it is working to destabilize the region, stressing Trump's support for the coalition efforts in the Yemeni war.

The visit and what was agreed upon between the two sides has restored the relationship between them to the right track, because of the great qualitative shift it witnessed in all fields, military, political, economic, and hopeful, thanks to Trump's understanding of the importance of that relationship. Accordingly, US President Donald Trump authorized an arms deal with Saudi Arabia worth about \$110 billion and a value of \$300 billion over ten years that was signed on May 20, 2017. This includes training and close cooperation with the Saudi army, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has signed billions of dollars in deals. The trade volume between the two countries reached about 38 billion dollars in 2016, as the United States is the first exporting country to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the second among the importing countries from Saudi Arabia. Despite some tensions that occurred a little during Trump's term, the relationship between the two countries was at its best (Abdullah, 2019).

"The Biden administration adopts a diplomatic approach to addressing conflicts and crises in the region, including limiting US participation in supporting the military operations of the Arab coalition countries in Yemen, which seem less important than other issues. The United States removed the Houthis from the list of foreign terrorist organizations, citing its efforts to advance the political process. On the other hand, the United States has frozen arms deals with Saudi Arabia, including precision missiles and maintenance contracts for F-16 and F-15 warplanes that could result in half of the powerful Saudi air force being retired. The United States stresses the need to end the war in Yemen, but there are contradictions in its approach toward Saudi Arabia. Despite its commitment to Saudi Arabia's security and sovereignty, the United States raised the "terrorist classification" of the Houthi group, followed by an escalation launched by the Houthis against the Yemeni government and Saudi territory. The United States also intends to return to the Iranian nuclear agreement, which affects the security of the region" (Abdullah, 2019).

CHAPTER FIVE

INTERVIEWS ANALYSIS

Recognizing the relevance of comprehending the United States' role in the Yemeni issue, this chapter includes a series of in-depth interviews with Yemeni authorities and Yemeni affairs experts. These interviews are an invaluable resource for understanding the complicated factors that have created and influenced the United States' role in the Yemen situation. This research intends to uncover Yemeni authorities' and experts' thoughts, experiences, and judgments of the American role, with the ultimate goal of contributing to an accurate understanding of the issue. It is important to recognize that this chapter is part of a larger research project aimed at providing a complete understanding of the Yemeni crisis and the role of external parties, particularly the US. Yemeni authorities' and experts' perspectives in this chapter will be blended with other primary and secondary sources to ensure an accurate and fair analysis.

5.1 Interviews

Q1: What are the American interests in Yemen and how do they affect its position on the Yemeni crisis?

Through our questioning of officials and experts about the nature of American interests and their impact on the Yemeni crisis, participants agreed on most points, with slight differences in their perspectives.

Mr. Yasser Al-Ra'ini, the former Minister of State for the Implementation of National Dialogue Outcomes, summarized American interests in three points, said, 'According to the commander of the US forces in the Middle East, the United States is interested in fighting terrorism and safeguarding the interests of its friends in the region, namely Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.' Al-Ra'ini added, 'The United States also cares about the stability of Yemen to secure the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait against any attacks from Iran or others that may affect global trade in this region.' The good thing about Al-Ra'ini's response is his definition of American interests from the perspective of American

officials, which focuses on their concerns about terrorism, their keenness on Gulf interests, and the importance of the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait for international trade.

As for Mr. Abdulaziz Jubari, Deputy Speaker of the Yemeni Parliament and Secretary-General of the Justice Party, who has extensive relations with Americans and is currently residing in the United States, his response was, 'America is considered the world's leading power and has a commitment to the stability of the region. Having good relations with the United States is in Yemen's interest as well as in the American interest. The United States is also concerned about safeguarding its interests in the Gulf and the Arabian Sea, and it is also concerned about the stability of Yemen since Yemen is a region close to Africa, and Africa is very important to the United States. Furthermore, add to the above the important location of the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait.' Here, we notice that Jubari focuses on American commitments to maintain global stability as the dominant global power, as well as the United States' significant interest in its relations with Gulf countries. He emphasized the importance of Yemen's stability considering its strategic location and its proximity to American interests in the Gulf and the Horn of Africa.

Let's move on to the opinion of Mr. Yasin Al-Tamimi, a Yemeni journalist and political analyst. He responded to our question as follows: 'The priorities of the United States in Yemen are focused on fighting terrorism, supporting the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the war, as well as blackmailing Saudi Arabia. It also aims to influence the regional climate in general.' Regarding the importance of the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait, he said, 'Despite the importance of the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait, it is not of significant interest to the United States, as the world today possesses sufficient power to neutralize any attacks on the strait.' He also summarized Yemen's importance by saying, 'The external parties' interest in Yemen is either related to undiscovered resources or Yemenis have not obtained accurate information about the oil wealth they possess.' In his perspective, he said, 'Yemen gains its importance from its proximity to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the south and being surrounded by wealthy countries, and thus its importance stems from the importance of these countries.' Al-Tamimi mentioned several points regarding American interests, some of which align with the previous responses. However, he added that there is an American interest in prolonging the war to blackmail Saudi Arabia, and he

downplayed the significance of the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait, given the ability of international parties to protect and neutralize it from the conflict."

Finally, let's consider the opinion of Dr. Nasser Al-Taweel, a professor of political science at Sana'a University. His response was as follows: "The American interests in Yemen are primarily a matter of security, with consider that the United States is the dominant state in the international system and bears a security responsibility for the stability of various regions worldwide. Additionally, the United States seeks to maintain stability in the Gulf region." He added, "The economic interests of the United States and others in Yemen are extremely limited. However, there are two other factors: Firstly, Yemen's proximity and its supervision over international passages, and secondly, from the perspective of American research and security institutions, Yemen is a fertile environment for extremist groups that need to be confronted." Al-Taweel believes that the security concern is the predominant interest for the United States in Yemen, whether it is the fear of the expansion of Al-Qaeda or the threat the current conflict poses to global trade passing through the Bab Al-Mandeb strait, in addition to the threat to U.S. allies in the Gulf region. He also considers the economic interests in Yemen, such as oil and minerals, as it is of no great importance for the American side.

From the participants' responses regarding the nature of American interests in Yemen and their impact on the United States' stance on the Yemeni crisis, it can be inferred that the most important interest for the United States in Yemen is the fight against Al-Qaeda. The United States considers it a strategic enemy in Yemen, and limiting the capabilities of Al-Qaeda is an American interest that outweighs other interests. Yemen also acquires significant importance due to its proximity to the wealthy Gulf countries, which have economic interests with most global powers. Al-Tamimi and Al-Taweel believe that the continuation of the war and Saudi Arabia's failure to achieve clear success represent an American interest through which the United States ensures Saudi Arabia's ongoing need for American protection. To a lesser extent, Yemen's proximity to the Horn of Africa has given it importance in the eyes of the United States. Al-Tamimi's opposing view for the rest emerges regarding the significance of securing the Bab Al-Mandeb strait. He indicated that the international parties have sufficient capability to secure the strait without the need to intervene in the Yemeni conflict. Finally, some argue that the United

States has a responsibility to impose stability in Yemen as part of its responsibility toward maintaining international peace and security.

Q2: How does the United States view the local parties involved in the Yemeni conflict?

Al-Ra'ini responds to the question by stating, "Americans deal with the Houthis as a coup outside of legitimate authority, seeks to impose their agenda by force of arms. There is an exception in the period when John Kerry was the U.S. Secretary of State, as he dealt with the Houthis as a minority. The claim that the Houthis are a minority is completely untrue." Regarding the United States' perspective on the legitimate government, he said, "The American position supports legitimacy against the Houthis, but it pressures for peace through any agreement reached by the Yemenis. You may hear about donor conferences and statements issued by the U.S. administration all of which support the legitimate government.

As for the Southern Transitional Council, Americans emphasize the importance of Yemeni unity in all their meetings with all parties." According to Al-Ra'ini's description of the U.S. perspective, the United States is concerned about Yemeni stability and views the Houthis as turned on the power, but they cooperate with them in fighting Al-Qaeda. The United States sees the Yemeni government as the legitimate party in the conflict, but it is weak and lacks unified leadership. As for the Southern Transitional Council, the United States has not taken a clear position against its actions, but it emphasizes the unity of Yemeni territories in all its stances.

Jubari's response was, "The United States deals with the Houthis based on international resolutions that classify them as coup plotters against the state, but they cooperate with them in fighting Al-Qaeda. As for the Yemeni government, the United States recognized President Hadi's legitimacy, but it was not 100% satisfied with the formation of the Presidential Council, it recognized the Presidential Council to support the Saudis. As for the Southern Transitional Council, the United States has concerns about the division of the country and the return of Al-Qaeda". Once again, we see that the U.S. fear of Al-Qaeda's expansion is behind the classification of the parties involved in the Yemeni conflict, as it collaborates with the Houthi rebels to fight Al-Qaeda and supports

unity to prevent potential conflicts in the south, which may create conditions for Al-Qaeda's resurgence.

According to Al-Tamimi's perspective, he says, "Overall, the United States considers the Houthis as partners in counterterrorism, with slight differences between the positions of different U.S. administrations. The United States also recognizes the legitimacy of the Yemeni government with a different position towards the Islah party, one of the parties in the legitimate government. Regarding separatism, despite the United States' affirmation of unity, it does not have a strong position towards the Southern Transitional Council, even though the council receives support from the United Arab Emirates an important U.S. partner." This perspective from Al-Tamimi's point of view makes the U.S. position fluctuate, as the United States seeks to balance its security concerns regarding Al-Qaeda while maintaining a good relationship with its Gulf allies.

As for Al-Taweel's response, he argues that "The United States considers the Houthis a partner in fighting Al-Qaeda, which explains the United States leniency towards the Houthi advance and their control over the capital, Sana'a. As for President Hadi, the United States was managing him from behind during the transitional period because President Hadi did not have popular support or military components to support his new regime. He relied primarily on the position of international powers, especially the American stance. Regarding the United States' stance on unity, it is an advanced position and the international community sees unity as one of the essential factors for supporting stability in southern Yemen." Al-Taweel indicates the United States deals with the Houthis as a partner and overlooks their crimes while recognizing the legitimacy of Hadi and the Presidential Council, and supporting Yemeni unity, However, it does not impose sanctions on the Transitional Council.

The participants concluded that the United States sees what the Houthis did as a coup against the legitimate authority led by President Hadi. Al-Tamimi adds that the American ambassador bears some responsibility for the Yemeni army's failure to confront the Houthis before they entered the capital, Sana'a because the American ambassador was the one managing the scene behind Hadi during that stage. The participants agree that the United States deals with the Houthis as a partner in its war against Al-Qaeda. On the other

hand, the participants see that the American position supports Yemeni legitimacy represented by Hadi and then the Presidential Council of Yemen, but Jubari disagrees with them regarding the Presidential Council, he believes that the United States was not completely satisfied with the formation way of the Presidential Council, but it recognized the Council to preserve its relationship with Saudi Arabia. As for the Southern Transitional Council and its quest for separation, the participants agree that the United States supports the unity of Yemeni territories but has not taken a firm stance against the Transitional Council.

Q3: What are the American interests in Yemen and how do they affect its position on the Yemeni crisis?

After the events of September 11, 2001, then the operations carried out by Al-Qaeda in Yemen against American interests inside and outside the United States, Al-Qaeda became a constant threat to the United States. In response to our question about the impact of fighting Al-Qaeda on American positions regarding the Yemeni crisis.

Al-Ra'ini answered, "Fighting Al-Qaeda is very important for the United States. Therefore, at the beginning of the conflict, the Houthis flirted with the Americans by claiming to fight Al-Qaeda through their movements in Al-Bayda. However, the Yemeni government informed the Americans about the details of the Al-Qaeda elements released by the Houthis from prison and how these elements attacked officers belonging to the national security forces affiliated with the government." He also said, "The legitimate authorities are very cooperative and coordinated with the international community and the United States in the fight against terrorism and Al-Qaeda." In his reply, Al- Ruaini indicates that the United States' position on the conflict parties is based on their cooperation in fighting Al-Qaeda. Therefore, the Houthis sought to portray themselves as partners in the fight against Al-Qaeda, while the government proved the Houthis' cooperation with Al-Qaeda, and the government shows cooperation with the Americans in the war against Al-Qaeda.

Jubari says, "The Americans have a partnership with the Houthis, and I have information that confirms that the Americans still receive a lot of information about Al-Qaeda from the Houthis." He adds, "The United States is sensitive to fighting Al-Qaeda

and cooperates with any party against Al-Qaeda. The Houthis presented themselves as partners for the US in the fight against terrorism, contrary to the slogans they promote to Yemenis. Americans must not deal with militias that have turned against the legitimate authority in the country. Moreover, the Americans do not exert enough pressure on the Houthis because they see the Houthis as a strategic partner in the war against Al-Qaeda." Jubari points out that the impact of concerns about fighting Al-Qaeda led to the alignment of the United States with the Houthis, despite their overthrow of a legitimate authority recognized internationally and their entry into a war with Saudi Arabia, an American strategic ally.

Tammimi confirms the relationship between fighting Al-Qaeda and strengthening the relationship between the United States and the Houthis. He says, "Of course, America adopted the idea that Yemen is the second arena for terrorist activity in the world after Afghanistan. After the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, the United States asked Ali Abdullah Saleh to make a series of changes to curtail the role of Ali Mohsen, considering that Mohsen's forces include elements with religious affiliations. The United States sees Yemen as a hub for terrorist activity, and the Houthis can be partners in fighting terrorism. Therefore, when the Houthis entered Sanaa, they immediately headed to Rada'a to fight Al-Qaeda, and the Houthis received air support from American aviation. In the end, the United States sees that the real threat in Yemen is Al-Qaeda, not the Houthi coup." Tammimi believes that the Houthis are aware of the United States' concerns about Al-Qaeda and exploit that to gain American approval. The United States overlooks the crimes of the Houthis and their coup, which is why we haven't seen a serious American stance on the Houthi coup.

Al-Taweel confirms the statements of the former participants, saying, "The American position regarding the expansion of the Houthis was based on the perspective that any development would reduce or limit the presence of Al-Qaeda, no doubt that the Americans would support it. Therefore, in the beginning, according to many sources, the entry of the Houthis into Sana'a was mainly with the approval of the Americans. The Houthis were aware of the American concerns about Al-Qaeda when they arrived in Sana'a. so the Houthis directed their focus towards Al-Udayn and, further, to Qifah Radaa, engaging in battles against Al-Qaeda, with American drones assisting the Houthis in their

expansion. The strategic enemy for the United States is Al-Qaeda, extremist groups, and also political Islamic groups, which they view as a breeding ground or support for this organization". Here, Nasser completely affirms what Al-Tamimi stated.

The participants' responses coincide in emphasizing that the main concern of the United States in Yemen is Al-Qaeda, and the United States is willing to compromise democratic and liberal principles in exchange for reducing the presence of Al-Qaeda. The American position, aligning with the Houthi coup against the legitimate authority, comes within the context of the United States considering the Houthis as their partner in the war against Al-Qaeda, although they are terrorist militias that forcefully overthrew the legitimate authority. Some believe that the United States is sensitive to certain parties within the legitimacy, such as the Islah party, which embraces a political Islamic perspective. This sensitivity has caused the United States to fear the rise of these forces to govern the country, leading them to seek ways to limit their influence. The participants also affirm that the Yemeni government is committed to cooperating with the United States in the fight against Al-Qaeda, as it has carried out numerous operations against the organization's strongholds.

Q4: How do you interpret the United States's support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, and what implications does it have on the conflict?

The Saudi-American relationship is historically significant, for almost a century, the pace of economic exchanges has increased, reaching record numbers. These relations have evolved into a strategic partnership. We asked the participants about the impact of this relationship on the United States' support in its war against the Houthis and its influence on the conflict.

Al-Ra'ini answered, saying, "The Americans have been aware of the Yemeni crisis from the beginning, and the presence of Saudi Arabia in this coalition has enhanced their role. They have provided intelligence and logistical support to the alliance." He also stated, "This support comes in the context of the Americans being friends of the Saudis and friends of Yemen, but their interests with Saudi Arabia are greater." He mentioned that "there is a change in the new American administration, which is pushing to close the Yemeni file. However, they have come to realize that the only obstinate party is the

Houthis. Thus, the international community finds itself in an embarrassing situation because the Houthis remain obstinate, and no real pressures or actions have been taken against them. The international community should exert significant pressure on the Houthis to accept these settlements." From Al-Ra'ini's statements, we understand that the support of the United States is a commitment to their traditional partnership and their interests in the Gulf countries. This role has had a significant impact in pressuring the parties to end the Yemeni war.

As for Jubari, he answered, "The problem is that the United States considers Yemen a sphere of influence for Saudi Arabia, and America deals with Yemen through the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, without direct engagement. This perspective has caused a problem for us as Yemenis." He added, "The United States establishes direct relationships with other countries worldwide, and it should have established a direct relationship with Yemen without an intermediary." Regarding the impact of the American relationship on the crisis, he said, "The American role is very important, and all the countries in the region take it into account.

Claims that they can act independently of American will are misleading." Jubari, a prominent figure in the Yemeni legitimacy camp opposing the Houthis and rejecting Saudi and Emirati manipulation of the Yemeni issue, expressed his strong displeasure with the United States' approach to Yemen through Saudi Arabia. However, we have already discovered this fact in our previous research, as the United States has been dealing with Yemen through Saudi interests since the establishment of the Yemeni Republic until now. We mentioned this in the case of arms deals in the 1980s, where the United States delivered weapons to Yemen through Saudi Arabia, which eventually led to Yemen leaning towards the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. Jubari pointed out that statements coming from some regional parties, presenting themselves as independent of American decisions, are mere deceptions. He added that the United States and other major powers generally allow their allied regimes to make such statements to promote themselves internally.

As for Al-Tamimi's response, he said, "The United States support for the coalition has had a continuous impact on the ongoing war in Yemen. This support includes

providing advanced weapons and logistical support to coalition's aircraft, whether in target selection or supplying fuel to the warplanes." He added, "The American position has changed with the changes in American administrations. The support for the coalition was strong at the beginning of Obama's administration, then it decreased towards the end of Obama's term. It then returned generously during Trump's administration, but the support declined again with Biden taking office. Currently, there is complete Saudi-American agreement regarding the war in Yemen." Al-Tamimi indicates that the fluctuation in American positions occurred as a result of the United States using arms sales as a means to pressure and influence the military stance of the Kingdom of Saudi. He pointed out that the ongoing negotiations in Yemen are based on the initiative put forward by the Obama administration, during the term of Secretary of State John Kerry in 2016, but that initiative was restored in the form that Saudi Arabia wanted, through a presidential council, but Al-Houthi is not part of it.

Dr. Al-Taweel responded to the question, saying, "The US position was not consistent in support of Saudi Arabia's war against the Houthis in Yemen, and in my estimation, there was no American desire for the war to break out in March 2015. It was purely a Saudi decision." He also said, "US-Saudi interests have experienced a state of lukewarmness and occasional clashes, but they remain within defined limits. The relationship is not subject to interruption." Regarding the nature of the support, he stated, "The Americans provided limited logistical support to Saudi Arabia only. Then the United States decided not to supply Saudi Arabia with offensive weapons, limiting the support to defensive weapons."

He also mentioned a new point, saying, "Some accuse Americans of leaking information to the Houthis, especially in the case of errant airstrikes, because they do not want Saudi Arabia to achieve significant success outside the American umbrella." Here, Al-Taweel confirms that US policies in supporting the coalition, like being influenced by security variables, are also affected by the convergence or divergence with Saudi interests. He firmly believes that the Houthis do not pose a threat to Americans but rather to Saudi security interests. Americans consider the Houthis as a contributing factor in regulating Al-Qaeda's behavior and reducing its presence. As for the relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia, he mentioned that they are not subject to interruption due to the

recognition of the weight each side carries. However, he clarified how these relations have differed from what they were in the past, stating that the divergence between them has expanded and increased, leading to America's utilization of the Yemen conflict either for positive influence, coercion, or pressuring Saudi Arabia. In his speech, Al-Taweel pointed out that US support was provided through in-flight refueling of aircraft and limited intelligence sharing. Even this aviation support later declined, and the US announced its cessation for a certain period.

It is evident from the participants' responses that US support for Saudi Arabia had a significant impact on the Yemeni conflict. Everyone acknowledges that the nature of US military support to the coalition was limited, but it provided broad political cover and protection against international criticism of the coalition's intervention and violations. US support for the coalition has experienced periods of increase and decrease with changes in US administrations. It is clear from Jubari's speech and part of the others' speeches that linking US support to Yemen with US-Saudi relations has negatively affected the Yemeni crisis. The participants also perceive that the US position initially held the coalition primarily responsible for the continuation of the war during its early stages. However, they later realized that the Houthis do not want to end the crisis, which is evident through their continuous rejection of peace initiatives. Al-Taweel mentioned that America does not want clear success for Saudi Arabia in the Yemeni war outside the American umbrella. He believes that the tension in US-Saudi relations may push the United States to keep the Yemeni war ongoing as a means to exert pressure on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Q5: What role has the United States played in resolving the Yemeni crisis, and how effective have these efforts been?

This question addresses the evaluation of participants on the American role in resolving the Yemeni crisis and its impact on the Yemeni arena. Al-Ra'eeni responds, "Regarding the role of the United States, we can say that it is a positive role, which started before the outbreak of the war. After the war, the United States declared its support for the Yemeni legitimacy and the Arab coalition. It provided logistical, intelligence, and humanitarian support." Regarding the effectiveness of the role, he said, "The American role needs further development and seriousness in exerting pressure on the Houthi militias,

both in the north and the Southern Transitional Council in the south." Thus, we see that Al-Ra'eeni considers the American role in the Yemeni crisis, whether before the war, where it pushed everyone to reach an agreement that guarantees the rights of all Yemenis or after the war, where it supported the Yemeni government. However, he believes that the American role is not at the desired level and there is a significant shortcoming in exerting sufficient pressure on the Houthi and Transitional Council militias for them to surrender to peace.

From Al-Jubari's point of view, he says, "The American role in the Yemeni crisis is better than the role of many Arab countries. For example, if we compare it to the Emirati role, there is a vast difference between the two roles." He adds, "In general, the American role is positive in the Yemeni issue and supportive of legitimacy, but it is constrained by security concerns and Gulf interests." Al-Jubari summarizes his evaluation of the role as good and better than the role of many Arab countries, as the American role seeks to solve the crisis, while some Arab countries like the UAE seek to exploit the Yemeni crisis to support the division of Yemen. He states that despite the United States support for legitimacy, it is limited by their security concerns regarding Al-Qaeda and their alignment with Saudi interests at the expense of Yemeni interests.

As for Al-Tamimi, he responds to this question by saying, "The United States, until before the Biden era, stood behind the efforts of the United Nations to resolve the Yemeni crisis. However, in Biden's era, was appointed as an envoy for the United States in Yemen, which indicates an advanced level of U.S. involvement in the Yemeni conflict. This involvement led the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to abandon the decision of war." Regarding the effectiveness of this role, he said, "The effectiveness of the role is very strong, as it practically ended the war now, imposed the option of peace. However, this option is still far away." Al-Tamimi believes that there has been a clear change in the American position before and after Biden's arrival, where the American diplomatic position before Biden's era supported international initiatives and supported UN envoys without direct involvement in the Yemeni conflict. However, after Biden's arrival, one of his first decisions was to appoint a special American envoy to Yemen, and the Biden administration exerted significant pressure on the coalition countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, to make concessions and sit at the negotiation table with the Houthis. He believes

that the current cessation of the war is a result of those efforts, but reaching a comprehensive solution to the Yemeni crisis is still far away. Regarding the effectiveness of the American role, he believes it is decisive, evidenced by its ability to bring all parties to the negotiation table and end the internal conflict throughout this period.

Al-Taweel stated, "From my perspective, the American role in the military aspect did not offer much; it only served as a logistical factor for the coalition countries. But diplomatically, it provided an important political umbrella for the coalition. However, the weakness was not in this role but rather in the military and political roles adopted by the coalition countries." Regarding the effectiveness of the role, he said, "The Americans are pushing to stop the war, but they greatly consider the political considerations of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis work within American institutions to gain American support or, at least, to not harm them at this stage." Al-Taweel believes that the current weakness in the coalition's position is not due to a decline in American support but rather due to the incorrect practices of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, especially the UAE's deviation from the alliance's goals and Saudi Arabia's failure to take a position against the UAE's deviation. They may have provided some cover and minor remedies for the UAE's deviations, which deprived Saudi Arabia of achieving clear military accomplishments.

In answering this question, there was generally a consensus on the importance of the American role, as participants viewed the overall American role as positive and supportive of the legitimate government and the coalition. However, they believed that the primary concern was the security threat and fear of Al-Qaeda, which significantly influenced the American stance on the Yemeni crisis. This security concern led the United States to refrain from taking decisive measures against the Houthi militias and their coup against the state, which resulted in violations and crimes against the Yemeni people. Secondly, the interests of the United States with the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, played a dominant role in shaping the American decisions towards the Yemeni crisis, whether negatively or positively. Participants believed that the United States' handling of Yemen from a Saudi perspective or as a Saudi sphere of influence was troublesome for Yemenis and that Saudi interests in Yemen were prioritized over Yemeni interests. In the past two years, the American role shifted towards pressuring for the closure of the Yemeni file by encouraging negotiations and exerting pressure on the

conflicting parties. This pressure was criticized by Yemeni officials who believed that the United States was pressuring the Yemeni government to make concessions while not exerting real pressure on the Houthi group. As for the Southern Transitional Council and its movements seeking to divide Yemen, the American position was largely absent. Jubari indicates that the United States has a decisive word in the region, a sentiment shared by Al-Tamimi, who said, "The American role is decisive, as evidenced by bringing all parties to the dialogue table and practically ending the war after the recent ceasefire." Finally, it can be said that there is a consensus on the existence of shortcomings in the American role regarding the Yemeni crisis and the conflicting parties, compared to what it should be as a pivotal role in supporting the Yemeni government in restoring the state, ending the coup, and fostering a comprehensive political process among all warring Yemeni parties.

Q6: In your opinion, what can the United States do to better contribute to resolving the Yemeni crisis?

Our last question to the participants was how the United States can play a greater role in the Yemeni crisis, achieving a fair resolution and stability in Yemen, from their perspective as Yemenis.

Al-Ra'ini responded, saying, "I believe there are three roles that can be pursued. Firstly, we face a problem in the unity of decision-making within the Presidential Council, as the Council has become fragmented due to the differing supporters and viewpoints within the coalition countries. The American side can pressure Saudi Arabia and the UAE to enhance the unity of the Presidential Council. Secondly, there is an attempt to hinder the roles of political parties, especially in Aden. The United States and the international community can exert pressure on both the legitimate authorities and the coalition supporting these forces to activate the political aspect and revive political life. Thirdly, the United States should exert pressure on the Houthis to move closer to the peace process by imposing new sanctions on Iran due to its arms exports to the Houthis and officially designating the Houthi group as a terrorist militia. Additionally, the international pressures on the legitimate government should be eased to prevent its submission to these militias." Al-Ra'ini summarized the desired actions for the United States as pressuring for the

unification of the Presidential Council's decisions, pushing for the return of political life, and imposing strong pressure on the Houthi militias to bring them to the negotiation table.

Jubari responded, saying, "Certainly, the United States possesses many cards to push for the peace process. It can pressure Saudi Arabia and the UAE to halt their secondary projects of dividing Yemen and threaten to suspend military protection and political cover for them. The United States can also contribute to the development of Yemeni institutions, including the leadership of legitimate authority and security and service institutions. It can impose a strong blockade and severe sanctions on the Houthis, suspending coordination with them until they comply with international decisions." Jubari believes that the Biden administration has taken the right steps to end the conflict, but there are other roles the United States can play, such as rehabilitating state institutions in general, opposing the division project that contradicts American interests, pressuring to end the Houthi coup, and involving the Houthis as a political party in the political competition for governing Yemen.

As for Al-Tamimi, he responded, saying, "I believe that the United States can do what no other international party can. It is the largest country in the world and can achieve peace in Yemen on fairgrounds, not based solely on its security priorities and not by rewarding the coup perpetrators. It can also force Saudi Arabia and the UAE to respect the sovereignty and unity of the Yemeni state. It can bring all parties back to the basic reference of the Yemeni crisis and exert greater pressure on the Houthi group by preventing Iranian weapons from reaching the region. It can also threaten to add the Houthis to the terrorism list if they do not pursue genuine peace." Al-Tamimi states that there is no objection to the United States focusing on its interests, but these interests can also align with the potential Yemeni interest and resolve the Yemeni crisis, as the United States has sufficient leverage to achieve that.

Al-Taweel answered "According to some sources I have encountered, Yemeni officials feel that the Americans will intervene militarily if the coalition and the legitimate government engage in serious dialogue and the Houthis refuse to comply." He stated, "If the United States deals with the Houthis seriously as it deals with Al-Qaeda, I believe the crisis will be resolved more quickly." He concluded that "the United States can exert

pressure to rectify the deviation caused by the United Arab Emirates and some of the Saudi actions." From the participant's perspective, the problem lies in the seriousness of the United States in ending the crisis because the United States is capable of playing a bigger role in pressuring the Houthis, possibly intervening to limit their capabilities, as well as modifying the coalition's deviations and preventing side projects that threaten Yemen's unity and sovereignty.

Therefore, it can be said that the U.S. role in the Yemeni crisis can be more significant by implementing a set of measures and practices, including reclassifying the Houthis as a terrorist group and preventing the flow of Iranian weapons to them, supporting the legitimate government and the Presidential Council politically, militarily, and economically, and working with international partners to address the humanitarian repercussions of the war by increasing humanitarian and developmental support in various fields. The United States should also directly engage with Yemen, separate from dealing through regional partners such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in a way that ensures Yemeni political decision-making remains in the hands of the Yemeni government, free from regional interventions that threaten Yemen's unity and sovereignty. Additionally, according to the participants, the United States should adhere to international resolutions related to Yemen and work towards their implementation, prevent movements by certain international powers to modify UN Security Council Resolution 2216 and respect the peace references among Yemenis.

5.2 Summary

American interests in Yemen are diverse, but combating Al-Qaeda in Yemen ranks at the top of those interests. The United States considers Al-Qaeda in Yemen as a strategic enemy and shows flexibility in cooperating with any party to reduce the organization's capabilities or eliminate it. Yemen's proximity to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states ranks second in American interests, as the United States has strategic partnerships and massive economic interests with these countries. The United States is concerned with the stability of these states and their defense against any threat. Yemen's proximity to the Horn of Africa and its control over the Bab-Al-Mandeb Strait ranks third in American interests.

Some view a new American interest in the failure of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to decisively win the military battle, thus ensuring the continuation of the war to maintain the Saudi need for American protection.

The United States perceives the Houthi rebels' actions in 2014 as a coup against the legitimate authority led by President Hadi. However, the United States treats the Houthis as partners in its war against Al-Qaeda. On the other hand, the United States considers Al-Qaeda as a strategic enemy. The internationally recognized Yemeni government represents the legitimate party, and the United States declares its ongoing support for the Yemeni government. However, this support is conditional on its alignment with Saudi-American interests in Yemen. The United States provides logistical support to the Arab coalition in Yemen and offers political protection under the international community's umbrella. While the United States does not hide its discomfort with the coalition's wrongful practices in Yemen, shared American-Saudi interests prevent a firm stance against those practices. Despite the United States' consistent position on Yemen's territorial integrity, it has not taken a clear stance on the movements of the Transitional Council advocating for the secession of southern Yemen.

Combating Al-Qaeda is the most important American interest in Yemen, and the American approach toward other Yemeni factions is built upon it. The United States aligned itself with the Houthi coup against the legitimate authority and turned a blind eye to their crimes against the Yemeni people within the context of its partnership with the Houthis in fighting Al-Qaeda. Similarly, overlooking the crimes of the United Arab Emirates and the Transitional Council in the south, and remaining silent on their actions that threaten Yemen's territorial integrity, is part of the same context.

The US support for the Saudi-led coalition has had a significant impact on the conflict in Yemen. Although the US military support to the coalition is limited, it provides extensive political cover and protection against international criticism of the coalition's intervention in Yemen and its violations. Linking US support for Yemen to the Saudi-US relationship has negatively affected their position on the Yemeni crisis, as American interests prioritize Saudi interests over Yemeni interests. Additionally, the Saudi failure

to achieve military success in the Yemeni war aligns with the US desire to maintain Saudi Arabia's reliance on American protection.

The US role in the Yemeni crisis has varied over time depending on changes in US administrations. However, overall, it has remained positive and supportive of the legitimate government and the Saudi-led Arab coalition. The primary concern shaping the US role has been the security threat posed by Al-Qaeda, making it a key factor influencing the US position on the Yemeni crisis and leading the United States to refrain from taking decisive action against the Houthi militias and their coup against the state, as the United States considers the Houthis as partners in the fight against Al-Qaeda. Furthermore, American-Saudi interests have caused the United States to view Yemen through a Saudi perspective, prioritizing Saudi interests in Yemen over Yemeni interests. In the past two years, the US role has shifted towards efforts to resolve the Yemeni file by pressuring the conflicting parties to engage in negotiations. These pressures have been criticized for being exerted against the government without genuinely addressing the Houthi intransigence. The US position has also been largely absent concerning the Southern Transitional Council and its movements seeking to partition Yemen.

The United States can play a more significant role by taking a series of measures aimed at resolving the Yemeni crisis. These measures include pressuring the Houthis and reclassifying them as a terrorist group, as well as preventing the flow of Iranian weapons to them. The United States can also provide political, military, and economic support to the Yemeni government and work with international partners to address the humanitarian consequences of the war by increasing humanitarian and developmental assistance in various fields. Furthermore, the United States should directly engage with Yemen to ensure that Yemeni political decisions remain in the hands of the Yemeni government, free from regional interventions that threaten Yemen's unity and sovereignty, and uphold the three references related to Yemen as the basis for resolving the Yemeni crisis.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSION

The first chapter of the study provided an introduction that highlighted the importance of the American role in the Middle East in general, and in Yemen specifically. It also emphasized the significance of the United States as a global power with an interest in the stability of the region. The problem of the research lies in the lack of previous literature that accurately assesses the American role in the Yemeni crisis, but rather the American role is dealt with as a small part within the regional and international actors in Yemeni affairs. The importance of this study lies in evaluating the role of the most influential state in the world and the region, its relationships with the parties involved in the Yemeni conflict, and defining the American interests in Yemen. A comprehensive approach was adopted in collecting data, based on previous studies, official data, and interviews with officials and experts in Yemeni affairs. The post-colonial theory was used as a theoretical framework for the research to uncover the lingering impact of colonial legacies in colonized countries.

The second chapter of the study focuses on understanding the crisis theoretically and finding ways to resolve it, then delving into the historical background of the Yemeni crisis. It explores the political hegemony of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Yemen, the power dynamics between the two countries, and how the interventions of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have affected the Yemeni political scene in the past. It also sheds light on Yemen as a battleground for foreign ambitions. It explores how tribal affiliations and rivalries played a role in fueling the conflict and perpetuating instability. Understanding tribal dynamics is crucial to understanding the Yemeni crisis. It also deals with the tragic transformation of the Yemeni crisis from primarily a political conflict to a sectarian war that deepened divisions and hindered potential solutions. Finally, the chapter explores the two parts of Yemen before reunification and analyzes the historical context of Yemen's reunification in 1990 and the subsequent secessionist war in 1994.

The third chapter began by exploring the nature of the current crisis and discussing the major turning points that shaped the course of the conflict, starting from the February

11 revolution, which was considered a pivotal event in the country, leading to increased polarization between political forces. This was followed by the National Dialogue consultations to address the grievances of all segments of the population, then the Houthi coup that escalated the crisis into an armed conflict and led to the formation of an Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia to confront the coup. This was followed by numerous stages of conflict and negotiations to resolve the crisis. The chapter also examined the local, regional, and international actors involved in the conflict and the projects associated with each party. It then highlighted the various aspects of the Yemeni crisis, analyzing the military aspect and the proliferation of militias on the ground, and discussing the political aspect and the accompanying difficulties in achieving a political settlement. It also examined the collapse of the country's economic system and the ensuing humanitarian crisis, described as the worst humanitarian crisis in history.

Chapter Four examines the historical relations between the United States and Yemen before unification. It discusses American relations with the Yemen Arab Republic in the north and its support in countering communist expansion. It also discusses the often strained and fluctuating relations between the United States and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south, which was close to the socialist regime at the time. The chapter studies the process of unification in two stages, separated by the 1994 civil war, and the role of the United States in supporting Yemen's unity and stability. It divides the U.S. stance on the Yemeni conflict into two stages: the peace stage from 2011 to 2015, which included the February 11th revolution, where the U.S. administration initially hesitated to support it but later encouraged the revolutionary forces to sign the Gulf Initiative. The U.S. ambassador played a prominent role in engineering the transitional period of power and the Yemeni National Dialogue. The second stage is the armed conflict stage from 2015 to 2022, which began with the Houthi coup and received cautious American alignment. The United States supported the legitimate government and the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The chapter also examines the U.S. stance on the crisis during different American administrations, starting from the Obama administration's support for the coalition, then a decrease in support at the end of his term, followed by significant support during the Trump administration, and with Biden coming to power, the stance shifted to a pressure stance to end the Yemeni crisis. It also explores the interests

driving U.S. intervention in Yemen, such as combating Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and countering Iranian expansion in the region, in addition to economic interests with Gulf countries and regional stability. The chapter discusses the relationship between the United States and its main ally in the region, represented by Saudi Arabia, and the cooperation between the two countries and its impact on the Yemeni crisis.

Chapter Five of the thesis focuses on the interviews conducted with four officials and experts in Yemeni affairs, which provided valuable insights into the American role in the Yemeni crisis. The results of the interviews were analyzed and interpreted within the research objectives to understand the American interests in Yemen, the nature of American relations with different Yemeni parties in the conflict, and to evaluate the American role in the Yemeni crisis. The interviews helped uncover the dynamics of power, influences, and consequences of U.S. intervention in Yemen from a post-colonial perspective. The insights gained from the interviews contributed to a comprehensive and accurate analysis of the research topic.

The results of this research provide evidence to support the four formulated hypotheses.

(H1): The United States gives priority in Yemen to fighting al-Qaeda and is looking for a local partner to collaborate with.

Analysis of US interests in Yemen and its efforts in counterterrorism reveals a consistent focus on combating Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in the region. The United States has already prioritized fighting AQAP and has sought cooperation with local actors in Yemen, including the Houthi militias. The hypothesis is supported by evidence of military operations and intelligence sharing to confront the AQAP.

(H2): The involvement of the United States in the Yemeni crisis is influenced by its interests in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

Examination of the US-Saudi alliances and the broader geopolitical landscape in the region demonstrates that the United States has maintained strong relationships with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states due to shared strategic interests, including

regional stability, energy security, and countering Iranian influence. The research reveals that US involvement in the Yemeni crisis is partly driven by its desire to protect its interests in Saudi Arabia and maintain its influence in the Gulf region.

(H3): The US keeps the Houthis alive as leverage for Saudi Arabia's reliance on American protection.

Analysis supporting the role of the United States in the conflict and its impact on regional power dynamics indicates that the United States has been wobbling in its approach towards the Houthi rebels, exerting pressure at times and providing limited support at others. This approach acts as a lever, ensuring the continued reliance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on American military support and protection. By maintaining a delicate balance, the United States can exert its influence over both the Houthis and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, enhancing its interests in the region.

(H4): The US's role in Yemen aims to secure global navigation and trade safety.

The research confirms the strategic concerns of the United States regarding the safety of international shipping lanes and trade routes. Yemen occupies an important geostrategic location, particularly in the Bab-Al-Mandeb Strait, a vital waterway for global trade. The United States has an interest in ensuring the free flow of goods through this area, protecting navigation, and preventing any disruptions that could negatively impact international trade.

In conclusion, the research successfully validated all the hypotheses and provided valuable insights into the motives and actions of the United States in the Yemeni crisis. These findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics of the conflict and the role of key actors, emphasizing the importance of American interests, alliances, and geopolitical considerations in shaping its involvement in Yemen.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For The American Side:

- 1- Rehabilitation and Support for Yemeni Forces: The United States should prioritize the rehabilitation and support of Yemeni forces in the fight against terrorism. This includes providing the necessary capabilities, training, and resources to strengthen their capacity to combat extremist groups effectively.
- 2- Reevaluate Partnership with al-Houthi: The United States should reassess its approach towards al-Houthi, recognizing the concerns of Yemeni authorities who view them as an armed militia. It is crucial to respect Yemeni decisions and focus on collaborating with legitimate Yemeni actors in the fight against al-Qaeda.
- 3- Prevent Arms Smuggling to the Houthis: The United States should exercise strict control to prevent the smuggling of weapons to the Houthis. This involves strengthening border security measures and cooperating with international partners to disrupt illicit arms networks supplying the Houthis.
- 4- Intelligence Sharing: The United States should actively share intelligence information with Yemeni governments to support military operations aimed at limiting the military capabilities of the Houthis. This collaboration can enhance the effectiveness of counterinsurgency efforts.
- 5- Aid Delivery: The United States should ensure that its organizations working through the legitimate Yemeni government focus on delivering aid to areas controlled by the Houthis. This will help address the humanitarian crisis and alleviate the suffering of affected populations.
- 6- Pressure on Coalition Countries: The United States should exert pressure on coalition countries involved in the Yemeni crisis to support Yemeni sovereignty and promote stability in liberated areas. This includes monitoring their actions and advocating for adherence to international humanitarian law and human rights standards.
- 7- Unification of Opposing Parties: The United States should actively contribute to the unification of the Presidency Council and opposition parties opposed to al-Houthi. Facilitating dialogue and cooperation among these parties can strengthen efforts to defeat al-Houthi and restore stability in Yemen.

- 8- Promote Negotiations: The United States should use its influence to encourage all parties involved in the Yemeni crisis to engage in negotiations based on the agreed-upon three terms of reference. This includes supporting peace initiatives and pushing for a comprehensive political settlement to the conflict.
- 9- Economic Support: The United States should provide economic packages to support the Yemeni economy and prevent further deterioration of the Yemeni currency. This can be achieved through investment, job creation, and initiatives aimed at revitalizing key sectors of the Yemeni economy.
- 10- Sustainable Humanitarian Assistance: The United States should focus on providing sustainable humanitarian assistance, such as small-scale projects, to support the classes most affected by the conflict. This includes initiatives that promote long-term resilience and address the underlying causes of the humanitarian crisis.
- 11- Sanctions on Weapons Smuggling: The United States should impose harsh sanctions on Tehran to prevent it from smuggling weapons to the Houthis. This can serve as a deterrent and disrupt the flow of arms that fuel the conflict.
- 12- Upholding Yemen's Unity and Territorial Integrity: The United States should take strong positions against threats targeting Yemen's unity and territorial integrity. This includes diplomatic efforts to support Yemen's sovereignty and counter any actions that undermine the country's unity and stability.
- 13- Prioritize Yemeni Interests: The United States should prioritize Yemeni interests and ensure that they are not overshadowed by American and Saudi interests. This requires a balanced approach that takes into account the needs and aspirations of the Yemeni people.

For The Yemeni Government:

- 1- Lobbying in Congress: Engage with experienced lobbyists who have a strong understanding of the U.S. legislative process and relationships with key members of Congress. Work together to draft compelling policy proposals, organize meetings, and present evidence highlighting the importance of supporting Yemen's

legitimate government. Emphasize shared values, regional stability, and the fight against terrorism as key talking points.

- 2- Hire Marketing Firms to Champion Yemen's Cause in the U.S: Collaborate with reputable marketing and public relations companies to create a targeted advocacy campaign. Develop emotionally resonant messaging that humanizes the Yemeni people and showcases the potential benefits of supporting the legitimate government's vision. Utilize social media, traditional media outlets, and public events to raise awareness and garner public support.
- 3- Reassurance File on Security and Development: Compile a comprehensive reassurance file that outlines the legitimate government's plans for security and development in Yemen. Highlight successful initiatives, partnerships, and measurable progress. Address concerns related to terrorism by detailing the government's commitment to fighting groups like Al Qaeda and providing evidence of their efforts.
- 4- Special Units to Counter Al Qaeda: Collaborate with U.S. security and intelligence agencies to establish joint task forces or units focused on countering Al Qaeda and other extremist threats. Demonstrate the Yemeni government's willingness to take proactive measures to maintain regional and global security.
- 5- Combat Corruption and Enhance Transparency: Implement anti-corruption measures within the Yemeni government, and provide regular updates on progress made. Transparency initiatives such as publishing financial records, conducting audits, and involving independent oversight bodies can help build trust and credibility.
- 6- Human Rights Promotion: Work with international human rights organizations to showcase Yemen's commitment to enhancing human rights and addressing past abuses. Share stories of progress and collaboration with these organizations to illustrate a genuine dedication to improving the lives of Yemeni citizens.
- 7- Direct Collaboration with the U.S.: Highlight the mutual benefits of direct cooperation between the U.S. and Yemeni governments. Emphasize shared goals, such as stability, counterterrorism, and regional development. Provide concrete examples of how cooperation can lead to positive outcomes for both nations.

8- Engage Yemeni Diaspora and Allies: Mobilize the Yemeni diaspora and supportive allies within the U.S. to amplify government message. Leverage their personal stories, connections, and networks to garner broader support for the legitimate government's vision.



Limitations And Biases

While the research on the role of the United States in the Yemeni Crisis aimed to provide valuable insights into the subject matter, it is important to acknowledge certain limitations and potential biases inherent in the study. These limitations arise from factors such as the small sample size, language constraints, and the mixed modes of conducting interviews.

Small Sample Size: One significant limitation of this research is the relatively small sample size of four participants, consisting of two Yemeni government officials and two experts in Yemeni affairs. The small sample size may not fully represent the diverse range of perspectives and experiences within Yemeni society. The findings should be interpreted with caution, considering that the views expressed by the participants may not be reflective of the entire Yemeni population or even the broader range of stakeholders involved in the crisis.

Language Constraints: Another limitation arises from the language barrier encountered during the interviews. Since the participants do not know English, the interviews were conducted in Arabic. While efforts were made to ensure accurate translation and interpretation, nuances and subtleties of participants' responses may have been lost in the translation process. This language constraint could introduce potential biases or misunderstandings in the interpretation of the participants' perspectives.

Mixed Modes of Interviews: Some interviews were conducted face-to-face and others using Zoom platforms. While face-to-face interviews allow for a more comprehensive understanding of participants' perspectives, it was not possible to meet directly with all participants due to geographical constraints. Conducting interviews via Zoom introduces potential limitations, such as the absence of non-verbal cues or limitations in establishing rapport. These factors may influence the depth and quality of the data collected, as well as the participants' comfort level in expressing their views.

Participant Selection Bias: The selection of participants in this research focused on Yemeni government officials and experts in Yemeni affairs. While these individuals possess valuable insights and expertise, their views may not capture the perspectives of

other relevant stakeholders, such as non-governmental organizations, and civil society actors. The selection bias in the participant pool may limit the comprehensiveness and diversity of perspectives represented in the research.

Researcher Bias: Despite efforts to maintain objectivity, the researchers conducting the interviews may have personal biases or preconceived notions that could influence the interpretation and analysis of the data. To mitigate this bias, steps were taken to remain impartial, document any potential biases, and incorporate multiple data sources and perspectives.

It is important to recognize and acknowledge these limitations and biases to ensure transparency and integrity in the research process. Despite these limitations, the insights gathered through the interviews provide valuable qualitative data that can contribute to a nuanced understanding of the role of the United States in the Yemeni Crisis. The findings should be considered as a starting point for further research and as a supplement to other qualitative studies conducted on the topic.

Addressing Limitations and Biases

To ensure the integrity and reliability of this research on the role of the United States in the Yemeni Crisis, several measures were taken to address the limitations and biases discussed earlier. This section outlines the steps undertaken to mitigate these concerns and enhance the validity of the findings.

Small Sample Size: While the sample size of four participants is relatively small, efforts were made to select individuals who hold key positions and possess expertise in Yemeni affairs. To compensate for the limited sample, a rigorous approach was adopted to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the participants' perspectives. Triangulation of data from multiple sources, such as official documents, reports, and scholarly articles, was employed to corroborate and validate the insights shared by the participants. Before these procedures, we contacted a larger number of Yemeni officials, but the development of recent events during the interview period prevented us from sitting with them. We also contacted the relevant US authorities such as current and former US ambassadors and the US State Department, but we did not get any response.

Language Constraints: Recognizing the language barrier faced during the interviews, Audio recordings of the interviews were transcribed, allowing for a thorough analysis and cross-referencing of the data to ensure consistency in the translations. In addition, the researcher is fluent in Arabic and English.

Mixed Modes of Interviews: To accommodate geographical constraints and ensure participation from a diverse set of perspectives, a combination of face-to-face and Zoom interviews were conducted. While face-to-face interviews offer richer insights due to non-verbal cues and personal interactions, zoom interviews provided an alternative means to engage with participants who were unable to meet in person. Care was taken to create a comfortable and open environment during both types of interviews, allowing participants to express their perspectives freely.

Participant Selection Bias: While the selection of participants focused on Yemeni government officials and experts in Yemeni affairs, steps were taken to minimize bias and ensure a broader representation of perspectives. The selection process involved conducting a comprehensive review of relevant literature, consulting with subject matter experts, and considering recommendations from local contacts in Yemen. This approach aimed to include participants with diverse backgrounds, experiences, and viewpoints to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the subject matter.

Researcher Bias: Conscious efforts were made to remain impartial throughout the research process. The researcher involved in data collection and analysis was careful to recognize and minimize his own biases. Reflexivity was encouraged, with regular discussions to reflect on personal biases and potential influences on the interpretation of the data. Detailed documentation of the research process, including the decisions made at each stage, was maintained to enhance transparency and allow for external scrutiny.

By implementing these strategies, this research sought to address the limitations and biases inherent in the study, while maximizing the validity and reliability of the findings. While no research is without its limitations, the steps taken aimed to ensure rigor, transparency, and the inclusion of multiple perspectives, thus contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of the role of the United States in the Yemeni Crisis.

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APPENDIXES

Appendix-1.

The Role of The USA In the Yemeni Crisis (2011-2022).

Interview Questions:

- 1- What are the American interests in Yemen and how do they affect its position on the Yemeni crisis?
- 2- How does the United States view the local parties involved in the Yemeni conflict?
- 3- How has the United States of America's interest in battling al-Qaeda affected its position in the Yemeni crisis?
- 4- How do you interpret the United States's support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, and what implications does it have on the conflict?
- 5- What role has the United States played in resolving the Yemeni crisis, and how effective have these efforts been?
- 6- In your opinion, what can the United States do to better contribute to resolving the Yemeni crisis?

Appendix-2.

The Role of The USA In the Yemeni Crisis (2011-2022).

Mr. Yasser Al-Ra'ini

Former Minister of State for the Implementation of the Outcomes of the Yemeni National Dialogue - Deputy Secretary-General of the National Dialogue.

P1Q1: ما هي المصالح الأمريكية في اليمن وكيف تؤثر على مواقفها من الأزمة اليمنية؟

P1A1: اولاً: اريد ان أستشهد بكلام قائد القوات الامريكيه في الشرق الاوسط على قناة الجزيرة، حيث قال "ما يهمنى في اليمن هما شيئين: اولاً محاربه الارهاب، حيث أن هناك عناصر مطلوبه للجانب الامريكى في اليمن. والنقطه الثانيه تتمثل في مصالح اصدقائنا في المنطقه - يقصد بذلك السعوديه ودول الخليج -". وهناك نقطه ثالثه مشتركة بين الاتحاد الاوروبي والولايات المتحده تقول بأن اليمن تمثل بوابه الاتحاد الافريقي. فيما يتعلق بمسالة المياه الدوليه، نحن نتكلم بان 29% من التجاره العالميه تمر من باب المندب، بالاضافه الى أن ربع النفط العالمى تقريباً يمر عبر هذه المنطقه، ولذا هي منطقه حيويه. ولا يخفى عليكم بان القوات الامريكيه المتواجده في البحر الاحمر وخليج عدن، والمكونه من 153 جندي تقريباً، تتواجد لتأمين الممر وفي اطار محاربه الارهاب والقرصنه والاعتداءات من ايران وغيرها على السفن التي تمر من ذلك المكان. هذه ابرز المصالح. ايضا امريكا لها حضور وتأثير، فأمريكا تتعامل على انها قائده العالم، ولذلك لديها حضور كبير في اي مشكله تحصل في المنطقه. الموقف الامريكى ايجابى، وكذلك موقفهم من الحوثى موقف متقدم عن الموقف الاوروبى، وهو داعم للسلطه الشرعيه. لكن مؤخراً كان هناك ضغط دولي كبير لايقاف الحرب والتوصل الى عمليه سلام، الحكومه الشرعيه استجابت، والتحالف استجاب، لكن المشكله الكبيره تكمن في تعنت الحوثيين. الجانب الامريكى يقول: انتم من تملكون الشرعيه ولم تفعلوا شيء يُبنى عليه. ومسار الحرب غير معروف الى أين يتجه. نحن كيميبيين نقول للجميع بأن الحوثى جزء من المجتمع اليمنى، والمطلوب هو أن يتحول الى حزب سياسى يمارس حقوقه السياسيه، وينافس بطريقه ديمقراطيه، لكن ان يفرض نفسه بقوة السلاح، هذا لن يرضى به أحد.

P1Q2: كيف تنظر الولايات المتحده إلى الأطراف المحليه المتورطه في الصراع اليمنى؟

P1A2: بحسب حديثنا مع الامريكان، فهم يتعاملون مع الحوثى كاتقلابى خارج على السلطه الشرعيه، يريد فرض اجندته بقوة السلاح، كان البعض - لكن اعتقد لم يعد توجهها - كانت الاداره الامريكيه في مرحله اوباما، عندما كان كيرى وزير الخارجيه يتعامل مع الحوثيين كأقليه، وهذا الكلام غير صحيح تماماً، عندنا في اليمن لا توجد اقلية بهذا المعنى - الاقليه التي يجب الحفاظ عليها من الاضطهاد - والامريكان بالاضافه الاوروبيين يدركون كل يوم حقيقه الحوثى اكثر، عندما تتحدث مع شخص ويقول لك انا ابن الله فالمشكله هنا كيف تصل انت وهو الى اتفاق، وربما ادارته ترامب،

كان موقفها اكثر شجاعة وصنفت الحوثي كجماعة ارهابيه، لكن ادارة بايدن الغت هذا التصنيف حتى نصل الى اتفاق سلام حسب مبرراتها، تلاها ضغط من اداره بايدن على الاطراف للتوصل الى سلام، استجابت الشرعيه ولكن الحوثي لم يستجب. الشاهد بان الموقف الامريكي داعم للشرعيه ضد الحوثي، لكنه يضغط لفرص السلام باي اتفاق يصل اليه اليمنيون، بالنسبه للحكومته الشرعيه فالامريكان داعمين للحكومته الشرعيه، وربما تسمعون بمؤتمرات المانحين البيانات والمواقف الصادره من الاداره الامريكيه كلها داعمه للحكومته الشرعيه، اما بالنسبه لموقفهم من المجلس الانتقالي فهم مؤكدين خلال لقاءاتهم مع جميع الاطراف بأهميه الوحده اليمنييه، لكن نحن نطالب بالمزيد من الضغط على الحوثي و المجلس الانتقالي لتمكين مؤسسات الدوله.

P1Q3: كيف أثر اهتمام الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بمحاربة القاعدة على موقفها من الأزمة اليمنية؟

P1A3: في بداية الامر، غازل الحوثي الامريكان بادعاء محاربة القاعده من خلال تحركاته في البيضاء، لكن عمليا الحوثي علاقته قويه بالقاعده، نحن لم نجد ولم نسمع الى الان اي عمليات تقوم بها القاعده ضد الحوثي، العمليات التي تقوم بها القاعده بين الحين والآخر هي تستهدف القوات الشرعيه، لقد قامت الحكومه اليمنييه بابلاغ الاوروبيين والامريكان بتفاصيل حول عناصر القاعده الذين اطلقهم الحوثيين، وكيف هاجمت عناصر القاعده ضباط تابعين للامن القومي التابع للحكومته، وقتلت مجموعه من الضباط وايضا قُتلت هذه العناصر. ايضا السلطات الشرعيه متعاونه جدا ومنسقه مع المجتمع الدولي والولايات المتحده في محاربه الارهاب والقاعده، ولمعلوماتكم هناك قوات أمريكية في حضرموت والمهره لمحاربه القاعده، والعمليات تجري بتنسيق بين الولايات المتحدة والحكومة الشرعية.

P1Q4: كيف تفسر دعم الولايات المتحدة للتحالف الذي تقوده السعودية في اليمن وما أثاره على الصراع؟

P1A4: بالنسبه للامريكان فهم مطلعين بشكل كبير على الازمه اليمنييه من بدايتها، ووجود السعوديه في هذا التحالف عزز من تواجدهم ودورهم، وقدموا دعماً استخباراتياً ولوجستياً للتحالف، خاصه فيما له علاقه بالضربات الجوية، وهذا الدعم ياتي في نفس سياق ان الامريكان اصداقاً للسعوديين، وهم اصداقاً لليمن، لكن مصالحهم مع السعوديه اكبر. فالموقف الامريكي عموماً كان داعم للتحالف في اليمن، صحيح ان هنالك تغير في الاداره الجديده، وهي تضغط لإغلاق الملف اليمني، وتذكرون المبادره السعوديه التي اطلقت في عام 2019، المكونه من اربعة بنود، أنت تحت ضغط امريكي وأممي لإغلاق الملف اليمني، لكن الحوثي تعنت ولم يقبل، فوقعنا الاداره الامريكيه في موقف محرج، لانهم كانوا يقولوا ان الاشكاليه في ان التحالف والشرعيه لا يريدون انهاء الازمه، لكن اتضح ان المعرقل الرئيسي هم الحوثيين، وانتم تشاهدون الان بان المحادثات الاخيره التي اطلقت بين السعوديه والحوثيين، ظهر بأن المتعنت الوحيد في تطبيقها هم الحوثيين، ولا يريدون الوصول الى حل شامل، التحالف مع السلام والشرعيه مع السلام لكن الحوثي يرفض، الحوثي يريد ان يطبق ولايه الفقيه في اليمن، ولذلك لا نستطيع الوصول معه الى صيغه للسلام، لذلك المجتمع الدولي يعيش وضع محرج، لان الحوثي يتعنت ولم يمارسوا ضده ضغوطات واجراءات حقيقيه، المفترض ان المجتمع

الدولي يضغط بشكل كبير على الحوثيين حتى يقبل بهذه التسويات، ومؤخراً بدأ الاتحاد الأوروبي وأمريكا بالقبض على كثير من شحنات الأسلحة المهربة باتجاه الحوثيين.

PIQ5: ما هو الدور الذي لعبته الولايات المتحدة في حل الأزمة اليمنية؟ وما مدى فاعلية هذه الجهود؟

PIA5: بالنسبة لدور الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية نستطيع القول بأنه دور ايجابي، وبدأ قبل اندلاع الحرب، وكانت تدفع بشكل أو باخر الى الوصول الى اتفاق يضمن لجميع اليمنيين حقوقهم، وبعد الحرب ايضا اعلنت وقوفها الى جانب الشرعيه اليمنيه والتحالف العربي، وقدمت دعماً لوجستياً واستخباراتياً بالاضافه الى جهود انسانية، ويحتاج الدور الامريكي الى مزيد من التطوير والجديه في ممارسه الضغوط على الميليشيات، سواء الحوثيين في الشمال او الانتقالي في الجنوب، لانه يوجد قصور في دورهم من هذا الجانب.

PIQ6: برأيك، ما الذي يمكن أن تفعله الولايات المتحدة لتساهم بشكل أفضل في حل الأزمة اليمنية؟

PIA6: انا اعتقد ان هنالك ثلاثه ادوار يمكن العمل من خلالها، الدور الاول: هنالك قيادات في السلطة الشرعية، الذين دخلوا مؤخراً لا يعرفوا ابجديات العمل السياسي، ولذلك نحن نواجه مشكله في واحديه القرار في المجلس الرئاسي، حيث اصبح مجلس القيادة الرئاسي متفرق، بسبب اختلاف وجهات النظر داخل دول التحالف، فيمكن للجانب الامريكي الضغط على السعوديه والامارات لتعزيز واحديه المجلس الرئاسي، بالاضافه الى تعزيز سلطات مؤسسات الدولة، ومن ضمنها المؤسسات الامنيه والعسكريه وتاهيلها بالشكل المطلوب للقيام بواجباتها. النقطه الثانيه: ان هنالك محاوله لاجهاض ادوار الاحزاب السياسي، وخاصة في عدن، ويمكن ذلك من خلال ضغط الولايات المتحدة والمجتمع الدولي سواء على السلطات الشرعية، او على التحالف الذي يقف خلف هذه القوى لتفعيل الجانب السياسي، وعودة الحياه السياسيه. النقطه الاخير: وهي الضغوط التي يجب ان تمارسها الولايات المتحدة على الحوثيين، حتى يقترب لعملة السلام، ويمكن ذلك من خلال الضغط وفرض عقوبات جديده على ايران، بسبب تصديرها الاسلحه للحوثيين، وتصنيف حقيقي لجماعة الحوثيين كمليشيات اراهابيه، وتخفيف الضغوط الدولية التي تمارس على الشرعية، للرضوخ لهذه الميليشيات.

Appendix-3.

The Role of The USA In the Yemeni Crisis (2011-2022).

Mr. Abdul Aziz Jubari

Vice President of the Yemeni House of Representatives - Secretary-General of the Justice and Construction Party.

P2Q1: ما هي المصالح الأمريكية في اليمن وكيف تؤثر على مواقفها من الأزمة اليمنية؟

P2A1: أمريكا تعتبر الدولة الأولى في العالم، ولها التأثير الأوسع، ولديها التزام تجاه استقرار المنطقة، وتعتبر العلاقات الأمريكية اليمنية علاقات جيدة، واقامه علاقات جيدة مع الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية هي مصلحة يمنية، ومصلحة للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية أيضاً، وللعلم فالولايات المتحدة هي من اكتشفت النفط في اليمن، ويهمها الا تتضرر مصالحها في الخليج وفي البحر العربي، ويهمها استقرار اليمن، فاليمن منطقة قريبة من افريقيا وهي منطقه مهمه جدا للولايات المتحدة، بالاضافه الى الموقع المهم لمضيق باب المندب.

P2Q2: كيف تنظر الولايات المتحدة إلى الأطراف المحلية المتورطة في الصراع اليمني؟

P2A2: على حد علمي، ما جرى في الرياض من مشاورات، وتشكيل المجلس الرئاسي، لم تكون راضية عليه أمريكا 100%، فأمرىكا وجميع العالم الحر يؤمن بحق الشعوب في اختيار من يحكمها، لكن الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بحكم علاقتها الكبيرة ومصالحها مع المملكة العربية السعودية سوقت للمجلس الرئاسي، ولو لم تعترف الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بهذا المجلس، لما اعترفت به كثير من الدول، واعتقد ان المملكة العربية السعودية لم تقدم على هذا الموقف، الا بعد استئذان وخط اخضر من الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية. بالاضافة الى ان مجلس القيادة الرئاسي معين من المملكة العربية السعودية والامارات، الا ان المشكله الاكبر، هي ان الاشخاص الذين تعينهم على راس السلطة، لديهم مشاريع لتقسيم البلاد، وهذا اول مره يحدث تاريخيا، فالرئيس ساكت حول التحركات الملموسة لتقسيم البلاد، ونائب الرئيس يترأس مليشيات تسعى لتقسيم البلاد وتمويل الدولة نفسها.

P2Q3: كيف أثر اهتمام الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بمحاربة القاعدة على موقفها من الأزمة اليمنية؟

P2A3: الأمريكان لديهم شراكة مع الحوثيين، وهناك معلومات تفيد بان الأمريكان مازالوا يعملوا مع ضباط الامن القومي في صنعاء، سواء بشكل مباشر او غير مباشر، والحوثيين قدموا انفسهم كشركاء في محاربة الارهاب، على غير الشعارات التي يسوقونها لليمنيين، ولدي معلومات تؤكد ان الأمريكان مازالوا يتلقوا كثير من المعلومات حول

القاعدة من الحوثيين، والمفترض أنهم لا يتعاملوا مع مليشيات انقلبت على السلطة الشرعية في البلاد، بل أن الامريكان لا يمارسون ضغط كافي ضد الحوثيين، ولا يعتبرونهم تهديدا على الرغم من الشعارات الحوثية المعادية للأمريكان، لأن الامريكان يرون الحوثي شريك استراتيجي في الحرب ضد القاعدة " .

P2Q4: كيف تفسر دعم الولايات المتحدة للتحالف الذي تقوده السعودية في اليمن وما آثاره على الصراع؟

P2A4: أمريكا تتعامل مع اليمن من خلال المملكة العربية السعودية، ولا تتعامل بشكل مباشر، وانما تعتبر اليمن منطقته نفوذ للسعودية، هذا المنظور سبب مشكله لنا كيمنيين، ومع الاسف السعودية لم تستطع الحفاظ على يمن قوي، بحيث تمنع تصدير التهديدات لها، وايضا لكي ينعم اليمنيين بالاستقرار، وهذا التعامل غير صحيح، وكان يجب على الولايات المتحدة، كما انها تقيم علاقة مباشرة مع باقي الدول العالم، ان تقيم علاقة مباشرة مع اليمن بدون وسيط. طبعا الموقف الامريكي لا يستطيع القول بانه موقف غير متعاون ومتحيز، فقد كان للسفير الامريكي دور داعم للحلول، لكن لم نصل الى حل بسبب التعنت الحوثي. وبالنسبة للدور الامريكي هو دور مهم جدا، وكل الدول في المنطقه تعمل له الف حساب، وربما الاصوات التي تخرج من حين الى اخر بانها تستطيع التصرف خارج رضى الارادة الامريكية فهي خاطئة، فقط الدول الكبرى تعطي بعض الهامش للدول الصغيرة للتحرك فيه وتسويق نفسها داخليا.

P2Q5: ما هو الدور الذي لعبته الولايات المتحدة في حل الأزمة اليمنية؟ وما مدى فاعلية هذه الجهود؟

P2A5: الدور الامريكي في الازمه اليمنيه أفضل من دور كثير من الدول العربية، مثلا لو نقارنه بالدور الإماراتي هناك فرق شاسع بين الدورين، فالدور الامريكي تعامل مع اليمن والمسؤولين اليمنيين بشكل محترم ولائق، بينما الدور الاماراتي يسعى الى تقسيم اليمن، ويتعامل بتحقير مع اليمنيين، فالحوثيين رغم انهم يعلنون الصرخه واللعنة على الامريكان وما الى ذلك، لكن الامريكان يعتبرون ذلك في اطار المزايدة السياسية كما يقولون. وعموما فالدور الامريكي ايجابي من القضية اليمنية، وداعم للشرعية، لكنه مقيد بالهواجس الامنية والمصالح الخليجية.

P2Q6: برأيك، ما الذي يمكن أن تفعله الولايات المتحدة لتساهم بشكل أفضل في حل الأزمة اليمنية؟

P2A6: بالتأكيد تملك الولايات المتحدة الامريكية اوراق كثيره للدفع بعملية السلام، للإنصاف كانت ادارة بايدن تعتقد بانها من خلال بعض الاجراءات التي تجريها ستصل الى عملية سلام شاملة، ومن ضمن هذه الاجراءات اخراج الحوثيين من قائمه الارهاب، بالاضافه الى تعيين مبعوث امريكي في اليمن، كانوا يعتقدون ان هذه الاجراءات ستقرب الحوثيين نحو عملية السلام، لكن الحوثيين لم يوافقوا، ويبدو انهم غير مستعدين، وايران ما زالت تريد ان تحتفظ بهذا الملف كورقة سياسية، والسعودية من خلال اتفاقها الاخير مع ايران، ترى انه يمكن ان تحقق شيء بهذا الشأن، رغم انها كانت قادرة على فعل ما هو اكثر، اذا اتفقت مع القوى اليمنية الفاعلة. طبعا اؤكد بان الولايات المتحدة تملك الكثير من الاوراق على الفاعلين، او من يقف ورائهم للوصول الى حل شامل للازمه اليمنيه، لكن ما اخشاه ان الوساطة الصينيه بين السعوديه وايران الحالية، تُغيب الدور الامريكي في حل الازمة.

Appendix-4.

The Role of The USA In the Yemeni Crisis (2011-2022).

Yaseen Al-Tamimi

Yemeni journalist and political researcher.

P3Q1: ما هي المصالح الأمريكية في اليمن وكيف تؤثر على مواقفها من الأزمة اليمنية؟

P3A1: الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية انخرطت بشكل كبير في الأزمة اليمنية، انطلاقاً من أولوياتها في مكافحة الإرهاب، ومن أجل دعم المملكة العربية السعودية، ولابتزاز المملكة العربية السعودية أيضاً، وفي التأثير على المناخ الإقليمي بشكل عام. وبالرغم من أهمية باب المندب فأعتقد أن العالم اليوم يمتلك القوة الكافية في تحييد باب المندب من أي اعتداءات، واليوم هناك قوات دولية مشتركة في خليج عدن و في جنوب البحر الأحمر، لمكافحة نشاط القرصنة والتهريب إلى آخره، فإذا هناك من أهمية استراتيجية لليمن، فالمسألة إما لها علاقة بموارد لم تكتشف حتى الآن، أو أن اليمنيين لم يحصلوا على معلومات حقيقية، فيما يتعلق بحقيقة الثروة النفطية التي لديهم، وغيرها من الثروات المعدنية، أما أهميتها حسب فهمي، وجودها في جنوب الجزيرة العربية، وفي جنوب المملكة العربية السعودية، وتبسطها دول غنية، وبالتالي أهميتها من أهمية هذه الدول.

P3Q2: كيف تنظر الولايات المتحدة إلى الأطراف المحلية المتورطة في الصراع اليمني؟

P3A2: الحوثيين شركاء بالنسبة للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، وكما قلت هناك تغيير في الموقف الأمريكي نفسه، العقيدة السياسية الأمريكية تأثرت بمواقف الحزبين، مثلاً ترامب لم يكثرث للنصائح التي وجهت له، حول أهمية الحوثيين في مكافحة الإرهاب، ومضى في دعم المملكة العربية السعودية، واختتم عهده بتصنيف الحوثيين في قائمة الارهاب نكاية بالديمقراطيين. ولهذا عندما جاء الديمقراطيون للحكم، كان أول قرار اتخذه، هو إزالة الحوثيين من قائمة الارهاب، وتعيين مبعوث أمريكي، وذلك اثناء خطاب بايدن في مقر الخارجية الامريكية، كتوجه لدعم الحل الدبلوماسي للصراع في اليمن، وكأن الأمر يشير إلى أن جزء من دوافع الانقسام الأمريكي نفسه بين الحزبين الجمهوريين والديمقراطيين، هو الموقف من السعودية وحربها في اليمن، وكان هناك مزايده من جانب بايدن، الذي كان قد وعد بعزل السعودية على المستوى الدولي، بعد ذلك سئرى أن الموقف في عهد بايدن بدأ يتغير إلى حد كبير، فمثلاً الشركات الامريكية أعادة تصدير الأسلحة والقنابل الذكية للمملكة العربية السعودية، لكن في المجمل العام الولايات المتحدة الامريكية ليس لديها حساسية تجاه الحوثيين، لكن ليس لها موقف ودي من الاصلاح، الذي يعتبر طرف رئيسي في الشرعية، هذه مسألة محسومة وتفسر بعض التصرفات الامريكية تجاه الشرعية. وترى الولايات المتحدة أن السلطة الشرعية مستتلبة وضعيفة، ولهذا تتعامل مع السعودية بشكل مباشر، لإدراكها أن تأثير السعودية بات مؤثراً وطاغياً.

بالنسبة للانفصال ليس للولايات المتحدة موقف قوي تجاه المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي، على الرغم من ان المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي يتلقى دعم من شريك امريكي استراتيجي هو دولة الإمارات، فهناك شراكة ذات قيمة بين الولايات المتحدة والإمارات، لكن إلى الآن ليس هناك تأثير لهذه الشراكة على موقف إيجابي للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بالضغط على المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي.

P3Q3: كيف أثر اهتمام الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بمحاربة القاعدة على موقفها من الأزمة اليمنية؟

P3A3: طبعاً أمريكا هي من تبنت فكرة ان اليمن ساحة للإرهاب، أو الساحة الثانية للنشاط الإرهابي في العالم بعد أفغانستان، وكما تعلم منذ عهد علي عبدالله صالح، تورطت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في عدة عمليات اغتيالات، عبر طائرات الدونز، وهذه العمليات خلفت مآسي كبيرة بالنسبة لليمنيين، وسببت مقتل الأطفال والنساء إلى آخره، وهذه العمليات استمرت حتى الان، ففي عهد ترامب كان هناك عملية جوية على قرية المعجلة، وإنزال جوي في البيضاء، والجميع يعرف هذه القصة، الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية تحمست في التعامل مع الحوثيين، وتشجيع الفكرة الشيعية منذ نهاية تسعينيات القرن الماضي، وتعززت هذه الفكرة بعد الهجوم على المدمرة كول في 2000، حينها طلبت الولايات المتحدة من علي عبدالله صالح إجراء سلسلة من التغييرات، لتحجيم دور علي محسن، عبر إنشاء وحدة عسكرية خارج الوحدات العسكرية التي يسيطر عليها علي محسن، باعتبار قوات محسن تضم عناصر لديها انتماءات دينية، فبدأ علي الفور علي عبدالله صالح بطور من الحرس الجمهوري، لأن هذا توافق مع رغبته أيضاً في التخلص من نفوذ عساكر وضباط سنحان، وتسليم السلطة إلى الجيل الثاني من ابنائه وابناء أخيه، فقوات الحرس الجمهوري والقوات الخاصة وقوات مكافحة الإرهاب في الأمن المركزي كلها حُصيت بتمويل أمريكي كامل، لمواجهة الإرهاب وكانت عقيدتها هي مواجهة الإرهاب، ولهذا كان هاجس الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بالنسبة لليمن، هي أن اليمن ساحة للنشاط الارهابي، وأن الحوثيين يمكن أن يكونوا شركاء في مكافحة الارهاب، و لهذا عندما دخل الحوثيين صنعاء اتجهوا مباشرة إلى رداع لمحاربة القاعدة، وربما كان ذلك لتحقيق أهداف إيرانية حوثية، بإعطاء إنطباع بأنهم شركاء جيدين للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في مكافحة الإرهاب، ففي تلك الفترة حصل الحوثيين على اسناد جوي من الطيران الأمريكي، في النهاية الولايات المتحدة ترى أن الخطر الحقيقي في اليمن هي القاعدة وليس الانقلاب الحوثي.

P3Q4: كيف تفسر دعم الولايات المتحدة للتحالف الذي تقوده السعودية في اليمن وما أثاره على الصراع؟

P3A4: طبعاً، دعم الولايات المتحدة للتحالف في عهد كل الإدارات، من اوباما إلى اليوم، كان له أثر باستمرار الحرب على الساحة اليمنية، وهذا الدعم كان يتعلق بأسلحة نوعية، والدعم اللوجستي المقدم لطيران التحالف، سواء على مستوى تحديد الأهداف أو تزويد الطائرات الحربية بالوقود إلى آخره، إذن دعم أساسي ومهم جداً، واستخدمت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وسيلة منع بيع أسلحة كأحد وسائل الضغط للتأثير، على الموقف العسكري للمملكة العربية السعودية في اليمن. موقف الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، شهد نوع من التغيير، مع تغير الإدارات الأمريكية، كان هناك دعم

للتدخل العسكري السعودي في عهد أوباما، ثم تقلص هذا الدعم في نهاية عهد أوباما، ثم عاد هذا الدعم بسخاء كبير في عهد ترامب، ثم تبنت الإدارة الجديدة في بداية عهد بايدن موقف عدائي ضد المملكة العربية السعودية، ثم التوافق التام السعودي الأمريكي حالياً تجاه الحرب في اليمن، يعني الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية كان لها تأثير في صياغة وهندسة العملية الانتقالية، عن طريق مبعوث الامم المتحدة المتحدة، ايضاً ولايات المتحدة الأمريكية ألفت بثقلها وثقل المجتمع الدولي ومجلس الأمن الدولي خلف الأزمة اليمنية، وادى ذلك لعقد جلسته تاريخية لمجلس الأمن خارج مبنى الأمم المتحدة، حيث عُقدت في صنعاء، في عهد الرئيس هادي، ودل ذلك على حجم التدخل الأمريكي في الأزمة اليمنية، فالسفير الأمريكي ببيراد بريستين، الذي كان موجوداً في صنعاء عند اندلاع ثورة التغيير، ورث دوراً مؤثراً لسفراء سابقين كانت مهامهم مواجهة الإرهاب، لكنه انخرط في عملية سياسية، لها علاقة بانتقال السلطة من علي عبدالله صالح إلى هادي، والتعامل مع استحقاقات التغيير إلى آخره. فالولايات المتحدة منخرطه بشكل قوي جداً في الأزمة اليمنية، فقد رأينا الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية - خصوصاً الإدارة الديمقراطية ليس لديهم مشكلة من الحوثيين - تقدمت إدارة أوباما، في عهد وزير الخارجية أنداك جون كيري، بمقترح لقيادة مشتركة يكون الحوثيين جزء منها، وهي المبادرة التي رفضتها السلطة الشرعية آنذاك، في نوفمبر 2016 بإيعاز من المملكة العربية السعودية، واليوم تقريباً اعيدت تلك المبادرة، ولكن بالصيغة التي تريدها السعودية، من خلال مجلس رئاسي لكن الحوثي ليس جزءاً منه.

P3Q5: ما هو الدور الذي لعبته الولايات المتحدة في حل الأزمة اليمنية؟ وما مدى فاعلية هذه الجهود؟

P3A5: الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية إلى ما قبل بايدن، كانت تقف خلف جهود الأمم المتحدة، وكانت تدعم جهد المبعوثيين الدوليين، وابتقت على موقفها الداعم للسلطة الشرعية، وقدمت دعماً مهماً للعملية الإنسانية، ودعمت حرب التحالف في اليمن، والذي خضع كما قلت لك لحالة من التذبذب، أما في عهد بايدن فقد عُين مبعوث للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، وهذا أشر إلى مستوى انخراط الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، ودفع هذا الانخراط المملكة العربية السعودية إلى التخلي عن قرار الحرب، حيث شعرت السعودية بالخطر إذا استمرت في حالة عناد مع الإدارة الأمريكية، التي توعدت بنبذها، ونبذ ولي العهد الذي يرغب في الوصول إلى الحكم، فإضطرت إلى اتخاذ إجراءات عملية، مثل تبني العقيدة البيئية للإدارة الجديدة والشرق الأوسط الأخضر، واتخذت خطوات متقدمة لوقف شامل لإطلاق النار، ثم ذهبت في خطوات متقدمة أخرى، وأرسلت سفيرها إلى صنعاء، ايضاً تسارعت خطوات المحادثات الثنائية بين الحوثيين المملكة العربية السعودية عبر مسقط، وعبر الوساطات الاممية، وكل هذا بضغط من الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وتحقق أول هدنة حقيقية على الساحة اليمنية، وما كان للأطرف لتصل إلى هذه الهدنة، بدون الضغوط التي مارسها بايدن، وايضاً المكافئة التي منحها بايدن للحوثيين، بإزالتهم من قائمة الارهاب، مما دفعهم إلى أن يقبلوا بالهدنة، ثم عززت هذه الهدنة بحزمة من المحفزات التي حصل عليها الحوثيون، ثم نرى أن هذه الهدنة تحولت إلى سلسلة من إجراءات بناء الثقة، ونرى ان هذه الاجراءات اليوم تكاد تقود إلى عملية سياسية أشمل، لكن في نهاية المطاف لم تعد هناك حرب عابره على الحدود السعودية، ولا يوجد تدخل عسكرياً عبر الطيران، خيار الحرب يكاد يكون توقف، كل

هذا بتأثير من الموقف الأمريكي، وفاعلية الدور دور قوي جداً، بدليل أنه أنهى الحرب عملياً، وفرض خيار السلام، وإن كان بطبيعة الحال هذا الخيار لا يزال بعيداً.

P3Q6: برأيك، ما الذي يمكن أن تفعله الولايات المتحدة لتساهم بشكل أفضل في حل الأزمة اليمنية؟

P3A6: أنا اعتقد ان الولايات المتحدة الامريكية تستطيع ان تعمل ما لا يعمله اي طرف دولي آخر، فهي الدولة الاكبر في العالم، وتستطيع ان تحقق السلام في اليمن، على الأسس العادلة وليس وفق أولويتها الأمنية، وليس من خلال مكافأة الانقلابيين، كما تستطيع ان تجبر السعودية والامارات على احترام سيادة الدولة اليمنية، واحترام الوحدة اليمنية، تستطيع أن تعيد كافة الأطراف إلى المرجعية الأساسية للأزمة في اليمن، وتستطيع أن تفرض ضغطاً أكبر على جماعة الحوثي، من خلال منع وصول الأسلحة الإيرانية للمنطقة، وتستطيع أن تهدد الحوثيين بإضافتهم لقائمة الإرهاب، إذا لم يذهبوا إلى سلم حقيقي، ويتخلوا عن خيار الحرب، كما يجب على الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية أن تتجاوز عقدة المصالح، لأنها في نهاية المطاف هي من تتحكم بهذه المصالح، وهي من تستطيع أن تؤثر على مواقف سياسة الدول الإقليمية، وبالتالي السعودية والإمارات وإيران.

Appendix-5.

The Role of The USA In the Yemeni Crisis (2011-2022).

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P4Q1: ما هي المصالح الأمريكية في اليمن وكيف تؤثر على مواقفها من الأزمة اليمنية؟

P4A1: المصالح الأمريكية تتمثل باعتبارها الدولة التي تترتب على النظام الدولي، وبالتالي تكون مسؤوليتها الأمنية عن مختلف مناطق العالم أعلى، المصالح الأمريكية في اليمن هي مسألة أمنية بدرجة أساسية، حزام النفوذ الأمريكي يمتد من أفغانستان وباكستان الى اليمن، فهذه منطقة نفوذ أمريكية خالصة، ولذلك القوى الكبرى لا تنافس أمريكا في اليمن لأعتبارات أمنية، فالروسيين لا يحاولون الدخول في الملف اليمني، كما أن التدخل الصيني محدودة للغاية، أيضاً العالم ينظر إلى اليمن كممنطقة نفوذ سعودي، أيضاً القوى العظمى تنظر إلى الخط الممتد من أفغانستان وباكستان وحتى اليمن منطقة نفوذ أمريكي خالص، لأنه يرتبط بالمصالحة الأمنية الحيوية مباشرة، خاصة بعد أحداث 2001، وصعود تنظيم القاعدة، واصطدامه مع الأمريكيين، مثل ما ماقلنا المصالح الاقتصادية لأمريكا، ولغيرها في اليمن مصالح محدودة للغاية، لا تكاد تذكر، لكن هناك عاملين آخرين، الاول قرب اليمن وشرافه على الممرات الدولية، الثاني أن اليمن من منظور المؤسسات البحثية الأمريكية والأمنية، بيئة خصبة للجماعات المتطرفة، يعني شعب عالي التدين، وأممية عالية، مع مستويات عالية من الفقر، وحالة تعبئة ضد الغرب متواجدة في هذا المجتمع، كلها عوامل تؤدي لظهور تنظيمات متشددة .

P4Q2: كيف تنظر الولايات المتحدة إلى الأطراف المحلية المتورطة في الصراع اليمني؟

P4A2: بعد المبادرة الخليجية ووصول الرئيس هادي للسلطة، تراجعت السعودية ودول الخليج، كأن الدور الخليجي كان لوقف التوتر ودعم عملية التغيير فقط، لذلك كان السفير الأمريكي من 2012 وحتى 2015 الأكثر نشاطا داخل اليمن، كان حاضر بقوة، وأدى هذا لميول الرئيس هادي نحو السفير الامريكي، لان هادي لم يكن يمتلك قاعدة شعبية، ولا مكونات عسكرية مساعدة لنظام حكمه الجديد، وكان يعول بدرجة أساسية على موقف القوى الدولية، خاصة الموقف الأمريكي، ولذلك كان الموقف الأمريكي يدير المشهد من خلف، من خلال تأثيره على الرئيس هادي، ولذلك البعض يحمل السفير الأمريكي، مسؤولية عدم تدخل الجيش أثناء تمدد الحوثيين في عمران وماقبلها، لأن الرئيس هادي كان يصغي بشكل كبير للسفير الأمريكي، ويضع اعتبارات كثيرة للنصائح الامريكية. ايضا الامريكان عندما يتبنون أي سياسة تجاه اليمن، فالاعتبار الأمني، وخاصة اعتبار التطورات الداخلية اليمنية، غالباً تكون الأكثر تأثيراً، فتراخيهم تجاه الحوثيين، هو نتج عن هذا الظرف، وتفكيرهم بتقليص حجم القاعدة لأن الحوثي يعتبر لدى الامريكان

شريك في محاربة القاعدة. أما بالنسبة للوحدة فالولايات المتحدة الأمريكية لديها موقف متقدم، والمجتمع الدولي ينظر إلى الوحدة، واحد من أهم العوامل الأساسية لدعم الاستقرار في جنوب اليمن، وبالتالي الاستقرار في المنطقة والعالم، لأن هناك احتمالية سيطرة القاعدة، على اجزاء كبيرة في الجنوب، فالأطراف الدولية الأمريكية والأوروبية، لديهم تقديرات اذا حصل الانفصال، سيُنتج حالة من التشطي والتمزق بين النخب الجنوبية، لاعتبارات تاريخية واعتبارات مناطقية وإلى آخره، اذا لم تتمكن قوة سياسية من السيطرة على الجنوب، فحالة الصراع بينهم ستهيئ الظروف، لخروج القاعدة من جبال أبين وشبوه وربما حضرموت، وهذا يمثل تحدي كبير بالنسبة للمصالح الأمريكية والعالمية، ولذلك عندهم موقف متقدم تجاه الوحدة، مع مراعاتهم لمظلومية الجنوب، والإحتياجات الاقتصادية والإنسانية لبعض المحافظات الجنوبية، لكن الامريكان لن يدفعوا ولن يقبلوا بأن يمضي خيار الانفصال منتهاه.

P4Q3: كيف أثر اهتمام الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بمحاربة القاعدة على موقفها من الأزمة اليمنية؟

P4A3: الموقف الأمريكي من تمدد الحوثيين، كان من منظور أن اي تطور سيقلص أو يُحجم من وجود القاعدة، لا شك أن الأمريكيين سيدعمونه وتبنونه، ولذلك في البداية كان دخول الحوثيين الى صنعاء بضوء أخضر أمريكي بدرجة اساسية، حسب كثير من المصادر. الأمريكيين حاولوا أن ينقلوا التجربة التي كانت موجودة في سوريا والعراق، وهي ضرب المكونات المحلية ببعض، فداعش تضرب بالمكونات الشيعية، والمكونات الشيعية تضرب بداعش، ولذلك الحوثيين كانوا مدركين لهذا عندما وصلوا الى صنعاء، فاتجهوا الى العدين، وبشكل أكبر إلى قيفه رداغ، وخاضوا معارك مع القاعدة، وكان الدرونز الأمريكي يساعد الحوثيين في تمددهم، لوجود التقاء في لاهداف الأمريكيين والحوثيين، وما زال هذا الموضوع إلى الآن، فالأمريكيين ينظرون إلى الحوثيين، بانها جماعة محلية سياسية، لها أطماع في الوصول إلى السلطة، والاستمرار فيها، ولا ينظرون إليها كعدو استراتيجي، فعندما يكون هناك شخص او شخصين في شرق اليمن، تابعين لتنظيم القاعدة، يتم ايقاظ الرئيس الأمريكي من النوم، ويؤخذ منه أمر، لإطلاق الطائرات من جيبوتي، وتقص هذه الشخصيات، يعني العدو الاستراتيجي بالنسبة لأمريكا هو تنظيم القاعدة، والجماعات المتشددة، و ايضا الجماعات الإسلامية السياسية، التي تمثل من وجهة نظرهم حاضنة لهذا التنظيم أو داعمة أو مساندة له.

P4Q4: كيف تفسر دعم الولايات المتحدة للتحالف الذي تقوده السعودية في اليمن وما آثاره على الصراع؟

P4A4: الموقف الأمريكي لم يكن ثابتاً في حرب السعودية ضد الحوثيين في اليمن، وفي تقديري، لم يكن هناك رغبة أمريكية في اندلاع الحرب في مارس 2015، كان قرار سعودي محض، لأن الحوثيين لا يمثلون خطر للامريكان، الحوثيين يمثلون خطر على المصالح الأمنية السعودية، وليس على المصالح الامريكية، بالعكس مثل ما قلنا بالنسبة للامريكان فالحوثيين يعتبرون عامل من عوامل ضبط سلوك القاعدة وتقليص وجودها. والمصالح الأمريكية السعودية شهدت حالة من الفتور، وربما الصدام في بعض الاحيان، لكنها تبقى في هامش محدد ، فالعلاقة غير قابلة للانقطاع، لأن ثقل السعودية الاقتصادي والتجاري، وإيضا ثقلها في المنطقة، يجعل من الادارة الأمريكية لا تتبنى القطيعة الكاملة،

ونفس الأمر بالنسبة للسعوديين، حيث ان الثقل الدولي لأمريكا، ومصالحها في العالم، وقدراتها الأمنية والعسكرية، يجعلهم يبقون على هذه العلاقة، أما إعلان السفير السعودي في أمريكا لعاصفة الحزم، فلا يعني أنه الأمر تم بدعم أمريكي، الأمريكيين تقدموا فقط بدعم لوجستي محدود للسعودية، من خلال تزويد الطائرات بالوقود في الجو، وتقديم معلومات استخباراتية محدودة، حتى هذا الدعم للطيران تراجع لاحقاً، وأمريكا أعلنت توقفه في فترة معينة، كما اتخذت قرار بعدم تزويد السعودية بسلاح هجومي، وإنما يقتصر الدعم على السلاح الدفاعي، بمعنى أن السعودية نهضت بأعباء هذه الحرب منفردة في تقديري، وبعيدة عن الأمريكيين، لو كان الدعم الأمريكي كبير، لكان هناك تغير كبير في مسار الحرب. يتهم البعض الأمريكيين بتسريب معلومات للحوثيين، خاصة في ضربات الطيران، لأنهم لا يريدون ان تحقق السعودية نجاح كبير بعيد عن المظلة الأمريكية، فهذا سيؤثر على مصالحهم الأمنية في المنطقة، أيضا أمريكا لديها موقف من الجيش الوطني، لانه ضم أطرف تراهم أمريكا قريبين من الاسلام السياسي أو تنظيم القاعدة. بالمختصر الموقف الأمريكي يتأثر بعلاقتهم مع السعودية، فمنذ إدارة أوباما وبقية الإدارات الأمريكية، الأمريكيين لم يعودوا يهتمون بالمنطقة بشكل كبير، وإنسحابهم من المنطقة، وتركهم دول الخليج مكشوفة، وترتت علاقاتهم مع السعودية، وأصبحت المصالح الأمنية السعودية، تختلف عن المصالح الأمنية الأمريكية، رغم ان في السابق، كان هناك تطابق إلى حد ما بين المصالح الأمنية للطرفين، لكن تقريبا منذ العقد الأخير، أصبح هناك تباين وهذا التباين في حالة اتساع، وكلما توترت العلاقات السعودية الأمريكية، كلما أدى الى توظيف أمريكا للصراع في اليمن، إما للتأثير الإيجابي وإما لإبتزاز أو الضغط على السعودية، أو للتجاوب معها في بعض هذه المطالب، يعني أن السياسات الأمريكية تجاه الصراع في اليمن، مثلما تتأثر بالمتغيرات الأمنية، أيضا تتأثر بالالتقاء مع المصالح السعودية من عدمه.

P4Q5: ما هو الدور الذي لعبته الولايات المتحدة في حل الأزمة اليمنية؟ وما مدى فاعلية هذه الجهود؟

P4A5: في الجانب العسكري، لم يقدم الأمريكيين الكثير كما قلنا، لكنهم قدموا مظلة سياسية، كموافقة أمريكا على القرار 2216، ووقوفهم إلى جانب السعودية في معظم القرارات التي كانت ترفع، بمعنى أن الأمريكيين منحوا السعودية مساحة ووقت واسع لحسم الأمور عسكريا، لكن الحسم لم يحدث. أيضا قدم الأمريكيين للسعودية دعم غير مباشر في حربها ضد الحوثيين في اليمن، من خلال الموقف المتقدم الذي اتخذته إدارة ترامب من إيران، فقد كان أوباما غير المشهد من خلال الاتفاق النووي مع إيران، لكن وصول ترامب غير الموقف الأمريكي من خلال الأموال الخليجية والسعودية والإماراتية تحديدا، فخدم هاتين الدولتين من خلال الغاء الاتفاق النووي، وفرض حصار موجه ومؤلم بالنسبة لإيران، جعل الإيرانيين في حالة دفاع بدل الهجوم في المنطقة، هذا الأمر أوجد مساحة أوسع لتحركات دولتي التحالف في اليمن، وخفف عليها الضغوط، وجعل إيران منشغلا بمواجهة الإدارة الأمريكية، وإيضا بمحاولة التأثير على الاتحاد الأوروبي والأمريكي للعودة إلى الإتفاق النووي. لكن هذا الموقف الأمريكي لم يظل ثابت مع وصول إدارة بايدين، وهي إدارة تحمل العداء بالنسبة للسعودية في تقديري، وكانت هذه الإدارة موجهة نحو السعوديين، لكن السعوديين استبقوها بمجموعة من السياسات التي تمثلت في مبادرة نهاية 2021، وخففت الضربات الجوية التي ينتج عنها أثار إنسانية كبيرة، والحوثيين أيضا بدورهم ساعدوا السعوديين من خلال تعنتهم، وأخرجوا الإدارة الأمريكية،

ورفعوا الحرج عن السعودية في أنها الطرف المتعنت، وتم تقديم الأمر على أن الحوثيين هم الطرف المعيق للسلام بالنسبة للأمريكيين والفاعلين الدوليين. الأمريكيين يضغطون في هذا الجانب، لكنهم يراعوا الاعتبارات السياسية للسعودية بشكل كبير، والسعوديين يشتغلون داخل المؤسسات الأمريكية لكسب موقف أمريكي مساند لهم، أو على الأقل لا يضرهم في هذه المرحلة.

الدور الأمريكي من وجهة نظري مثل عاملاً لجوئياً مهماً بالنسبة لدولتي التحالف، لكن نقطة الضعف لم تكن من هذا الدور وإنما من الدور العسكري والدور السياسي التي انتهجته دولتي التحالف، وتحديداً السعودية والإمارات، حيث حدث انحراف في مسار العمل العسكري، خاصة من قبل الإمارات بخروجها عن أهداف التدخل المعلن. السعوديون لم يتخذوا موقف تجاه انحراف الدور الإماراتي، وفي بعض الأحيان كانوا يقدمون تغطية ومظله ومعالجات طفيفة للانحرافات الإماراتية، هذا الأمر حرم السعودية من تحقيق إنجازات عسكرية واضحة، كما شنت معسكر الشرعية وأضعفه، وأثار الانقسامات داخل الشرعية، وبالتالي في تقديري أن هذا لم يكن نتيجة الدور الأمريكي، ولا حتى الدور الأوروبي، وإنما نتيجة السياسات الغير حاسمة بالنسبة لدولتي التحالف للأسف الشديد.

P4Q6: برأيك، ما الذي يمكن أن تفعله الولايات المتحدة لتساهم بشكل أفضل في حل الأزمة اليمنية؟

P4A6: الأمريكيون بحسب بعض المصادر التي قابلتها، ولدي دراسة قريبة من هذا الأمر، الامريكيون يطلبون من السلطة الشرعية ومن السعودية أن يدخلوا في حوار سياسي جاد مع الحوثيين، وعندما يطرح السعوديين بأن الحوثيين لا يوفون بالتزاماتهم، ويستخدمون التكتيك والمناورة في هذا الجانب، فإن الأمريكيين يُشعرون بعض المسؤولين اليمنيين بأن الأمريكان سيتدخلون عسكرياً. أيضاً الأمريكيين مثل الأوروبيين انشغلوا بالصراع الكثيف في أوكرانيا، هذه الحرب أثرت على نحو كبير بالنسبة للموقف الأمريكي. الى الآن الموقف الأمريكي ما زال يعطي فسحة للسعودية لتنفيذ أجندتها، لكن دون جدوى. ولم يتخذ الأمريكيون الى الآن مواقف مضررة بالنسبة للسياسة السعودية، لكن دون استثمار واضح من قبل السعودية ودول التحالف لهذا الأمر. ولا أظن أن الأمر سيمتد إلى ما لا نهاية، في الاخير المجتمع الدولي سيراعي الاعتبارات الانسانية في اليمن، وموازن القوى على الواقع. بقدر ما كان الامريكيين يرفضون في السابق ان يعترفوا او يتعاملوا مع الحوثيين كقوة رسمية، ربما بدأوا الان التعامل معهم، وإذا ما استمر الوضع على ما هو عليه، يمكن ان ينتزع الحوثيون الاعتراف بهم كسلطة امر واقع في المناطق التي يسيطرون عليها.