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Department of Political Science and Public Administration

**ETHNIC -BASED FEDERALISM IN ETHIOPIA:
THE SOMALI REGION CASE**

Master Thesis

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Supervisor

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Turkish Abstract : Alandaki bu boşluğu dolduracak bir katkı yapmak adına bu araştırmada Etiyopya etnik federalizminin Somali bölgesinin yerel ve özerk yönetim ihtiyaçlarını ne kadar başarılı bir şekilde karşıladığı ve aynı zamanda kendi kendini yönetme, ortak yönetim, adil temsil ve kapsayıcılığı teşvik edip etmediği konusu araştırılmıştır.

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that in the preparation of this thesis, scientific ethical rules have been followed, the works of other persons have been referenced under the scientific norms if used, there is no falsification in the used data, any part of the thesis has not been submitted to this university or any other university as another thesis.

Haji Dahir ABDULAH

.../.../2022



Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my father and mother, a strong man and smart woman whom I cherish every day and every time for the wonderful effort that they paid to witness the position that I am in today.



ISTANBUL GELISIM UNIVERSITY
THE DIRECTORATE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES INSTITUTE

The thesis study of Haji Dahir ABDULAH I titled as Ethnic Based Federalism in Ethiopia: The Somali Region Case has been accepted as MASTER THESIS in the department of Political Science and Public Administration by out jury.

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ABSTRACT

Ethiopia is a sub-Saharan African country struggling with many problems such as unemployment, poverty, malnutrition, hunger, child mortality, agriculture-based economy, inadequate health, and inadequate education. In addition to these economic and social problems of the country, there are also political problems that must be overcome and that have seriously damaged the country for years. Although the country has a turbulent political past as it hosts many ethnic structures and cultures, the federal constitution that came into force in 1995 gave the ethnic groups living in the country their rights and gave them equal representation within the federation, and allowed residing in the country with their language, religion, and cultural values. However, it is unclear how well the ethnic federal model has been transformed into a functioning ethnic federal model. Although the Nation's Constitution guarantees decentralized and autonomous regional governments, political practices can largely ignore these principles. For this reason, in terms of Ethiopia's federalism, whether self-rule and shared rule are practiced in Somali and similar ethnic regions, or is the self-government and representation of ethnic structures only a constitutional expression.

There were not enough research studies to provide a comprehensive and objective answer to this matter. Therefore, to contribute to these gaps, this study investigated how well Ethiopian ethnic federalism was implemented in the self-rule and shared rule of the Somali region.

In this study, in which a qualitative research design was used, the data were collected by using semi-structured online interview questions from 6 people from different professions who have knowledge and experience about the Somali region.

The research findings are presented under the titles of political participation, ethnic rights, resource allocation, representation, and expectations. The findings showed that there are problems with the political involvement in the Somali region and that the lack of political participation is seen at all levels, from the local level to the federal level. Regarding ethnic rights and ethnic relations, the research findings showed that the people of the Somali Region, like most of the country, are satisfied and hopeful about the ethnic rights offered by the Ethiopian constitution and the benefits of their implementation in the country.

The region's people accept federalism as a solution for the real and radical implementation of these rights. Regarding resource allocation, it has been found that while it is stated in the country's constitution that resources should be allocated to the regions proportionally and fairly and that this allocation should be supervised, in practice, the resources are not distributed proportionally and fairly. They are not audited objectively and transparently.

Regarding representation, it has been found that although people of Somali are satisfied with the rights such as self-government, recognition of ethnic identities, and living by protecting religious and cultural values, which are stipulated by the federal constitution, the promises of real ethnic self-government at the local level and egalitarian representation at the federal level have not yet been fully fulfilled.

Regarding the anticipation, it has been found that people of the Somali region have expectations in the fields such as the operation of the current constitution, the strengthening of the federal structure, the guarantee of autonomy, the fundamental respect for ethnic identity, and the implementation of this respect in practice, as well as the elimination of the problems experienced in terms of basic needs such as water, electricity, health, education, and making adequate investments in these areas.

Key Words: Federalism, Somali Region Case, Ethnic

ÖZET

Etiyopya işsizlik, yoksulluk, yetersiz beslenme, açlık, çocuk ölümleri, tarıma dayalı ekonomi, yetersiz sağlık ve yetersiz eğitim gibi pek çok sorunla mücadele eden bir Sahraaltı Afrika ülkesidir. Ülkenin bu ekonomik ve sosyal sorunlarının yanında üstesinden gelmesi gereken ve yıllardır çok ciddi bir şekilde ülkeye zarar veren siyasi sorunları da bulunmaktadır. Ülke pek çok etnik yapıyı ve kültürü barındırdığından çalkantılı bir siyasi geçmişe sahip olsa da 1995 yılında yürürlüğe giren federal anayasa ülkede yaşayan etnik gruplara haklarını teslim ederek federasyon içerisinde eşit temsil hakkı vermiş ve ülkede kendi dil, din ve kültürel değerleriyle yaşamak imkânı tanımıştır. Ancak etnik federal modelinin ne kadar işleyen bir etnik federal modele dönüştürüldüğü belirsizdir. Ülke anayasası âdemi merkeziyetçi ve özerk bölgesel yönetimleri garanti etse de siyasi uygulamalar bu ilkeleri büyük ölçüde göz ardı edebilmektedir. Bu nedenle Etiyopya'nın federalizmi açısından “Somali ve benzeri etnik bölgelerde öz yönetim ve ortak yönetim gerçekten uygulanmakta mıdır?” yoksa “etnik yapılarının özerk yönetimi ve temsili sadece anayasal bir ifade midir?” soruları ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu soruları objektif ve kapsamlı bir şekilde yanıtlayacak alanda yapılmış yeterli bilimsel araştırma bulunmamaktadır. Alandaki bu boşluğu dolduracak bir katkı yapmak adına bu çalışmada Etiyopya etnik federalizminin Somali bölgesinin yerel ve özerk yönetim ihtiyaçlarını ne kadar başarılı bir şekilde karşıladığı ve aynı zamanda kendi kendini yönetme, ortak yönetim, adil temsil ve kapsayıcılığı teşvik edip etmediği konusu araştırılmıştır. Nitel bir araştırma dizaynının kullanıldığı bu çalışmada araştırmanın verileri Somali bölgesi hakkında bilgi ve tecrübesi bulunan farklı mesleklerdeki 6 kişi ile yarı yapılandırılmış mülakatlar yapılmıştır. Araştırma bulguları Somali bölgesindeki halkın siyasi katılımı, etnik haklar, kaynak tahsisi, temsil ve beklentiler başlıkları altında sunulmuştur. Araştırma sonuçları, Somali bölgesinde siyasi katılımı ilgilendiren sorunlar olduğunu ve siyasi katılım eksikliğinin yerel düzeyden federal düzeye kadar her düzeyde görüldüğünü göstermiştir. Ayrıca, Etiyopya anayasasının sunduğu etnik haklar ve bunların ülkedeki uygulamalarının sağladığı kazanımlardan ülkenin çoğu yerindekiler gibi Somali bölgesindeki halkların da memnun ve umutlu olduğu ve bu hakların gerçek anlamda ve köklü olarak uygulanabilmesi için bölge insanının federalizmi çözüm olarak kabul ettiği

anlaşılmaktadır. Ülke anayasasında bölgelere orantılı ve adil bir şekilde kaynakların tahsis edilmesi gerektiği ve bu tahsisin denetlenmesi gerektiği belirtilirken uygulamada kaynakların orantılı ve adil bir şekilde dağılmadığının ve bunların objektif ve şeffaf şekilde düzenlenmediğinin düşünüldüğü görülmektedir. Federal anayasanın öngördüğü kendi kendini yönetme, etnik kimliklerin tanınması, dini ve kültürel değerlere sahip çıkarak yaşama gibi haklardan memnun olunsa da yerel düzeyde gerçek etnik öz yönetim ve federal düzeyde eşitlikçi temsil vaatlerinin henüz tam olarak yerine getirmediği düşünülmektedir. Keza araştırma sonuçları, Somali bölgesi halkının mevcut anayasanın işletilmesi, federal yapının güçlendirilmesi, özerkliğin garanti edilmesi, etnik kimliğe gerçek anlamda saygı duyulması ve bu saygının uygulamada da görülmesi gibi başlıkların yanında su, elektrik, sağlık ve eğitim gibi temel ihtiyaçlar açısından yaşanan sorunların giderilmesi ve bu alanlarda yeterli yatırımların yapılması alanlarında beklentilerini işaret etmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Federalizm, Somali Bölge Örneği, Etnik

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ABBREVIATIONS

EPRDF	: Ethiopia	People Democratic Front
ONLF	: Ogaden National Liberation Front	
ONLF	: Oromia National Liberation Front	
TPLF	: Tigray People Liberation Front	
WSLF	: Western Somali Liberation Front	
ESDL	:Ethiopian Somali Democratic League	
OPDO	: Oromia People’s Democratic Organization	

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PREFACE

First and foremost, I want to thank Allah, the Almighty, the Most Gracious, and the Most Merciful, for the blessings He has bestowed upon me throughout my studies and in the completion of this thesis.

Many people have been supportive and encouraging throughout the thesis process. My first heartfelt gratitude goes to my dear supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa ULUCAKAR, for his moral, kindness, and academic advice, and for continuing to supervise despite his hectic schedule. I am grateful to all the research participants for allowing me to conduct interviews with them to complete this study.

I would like to thank all the research participants for agreeing to be interviewed for this study. During the online interview I had with them, I benefited from the support and involvement of many ordinary people and officials at the federal, regional, and local levels, and I want to thank them for their excellent contribution.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my family, without whom I could not have completed my thesis due to their love and emotional support.

INTRODUCTION

Ethiopia remains the most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa. With more than 112 million people and nearly 90 ethnic and linguistic groups (World Bank, 2019). Peasant agriculture, which accounts for 42.8 percent of GDP, is the mainstay of the economy. Agriculture employs more than 85% of the population and generates most foreign exchange earnings. The country faces a mysterious, vast, deep, and structural poverty. Ethiopia has one of the most profound incomes per capita - around the US \$ 850 and lists one of the world's poorest countries Ethiopia is striving to reach lower-middle-income status by 2025 (World Bank,2019). Every country's federal structure is the result of its own set of political and historical events. Ethiopia's federal structure addresses the issue of a failed nation-building project through assimilation and centralization. As a result, the ethnocultural system, which decentralizes state power to ethnic communities, contradicts the former regime's totalitarian nation-building policy. Former governments promoted "Ethiopian nationalism" as a unifying ideology, preferring centralization over provincial or ethnic autonomy (Asnake, 2006).

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Background

under the rule of King Haile Selassie (1931-1974), this was centered on authoritarianism and the centralization of power on the emperor himself across a feudal system of control, property, and prestige aggregation and dissemination that benefited the kings and their few betrayers at local, regional, and central levels with small ethnic references, a monarchy system of control, asset, and wealth acquisition and distribution at the local, state, and state levels benefited the rulers and their few traitors with small concern for ethnicity. The state's main goal was to extort farmers' resources to accommodate the various ruling nobility and their supporters, who helped the deeply centralized state survive (Messay, 1995).

This project, however, was met with opposition from across the region, including increasingly radicalized students who rallied around the slogans "land to the tiller," "ethnicities concern," and an armed insurrection in Eritrea. As a result, the Ethio-Eritrea federation was disbanded in 1962, sparking a bloody war. In 1974, the country was shaken by revolutionary upheavals. After its formations refused to deal with the growing demands for change from all corners of the region, the colonial dictatorship was finally overthrown by a triumphant revolt in September 1974 (Clapham, 1988:32). Following 1974, the military dictatorship claimed to support a "socialist" solution to the nationality issue but instead implemented militaristic nationalism through an oppressive and centralized political structure. It did, however, appear to take a few steps, including airing radio broadcasts in Afar, Af-Somali, Oromiffa, and Tigrigna, as well as sketching a new internal border based on ethnic regional lines.

Nonetheless, it made no effort to tie ethnic rights to political or governance concerns. Instead, it established the most centralized and brutal government structure possible, with junior military officers in charge, irrespective of ethnicity or orientation.

Excessive centralization fueled by brutal repression failed to eradicate regional and ethnic uprisings, despite the encouragement of militaristic state nationalism combined with socialism. Instead, it exacerbated domestic unrest and widespread discontent in society, providing more fertile ground for ethno-nationalist movements to flourish.

Following the 1974 revolution, ethnic-nationalist groups claimed an unrestricted right to self-government up to secession. For example, in its early years, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) declared fighting for self-rule, which could mean anything from autonomy to the federation to independence (Markakis, 1987:254).

Eritrean separatist movements saw Eritrea as an Ethiopian colony and advocated for its independence. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was founded in 1974 to create an independent state for the Oromo. The Ogaden Liberation Front (ONLF) was founded in 1984 to form an independent Somali state in Ethiopia. As a result of the situation, decades of civil wars emerged. The military regime attempted to reorganize the country's internal administration after establishing the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) in 1987. However, it was unsuccessful in stabilizing a new social or political foundation (Clapham, 1994:34).

The long-term lived party and government, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), arose from the expulsion of the military regime in May 1991.

The new ruling party, which began its operations to free their ethnic region Tigray people's liberation front (TPLF) from Ethiopia's central government, has advocated for ethnic federalism, stating that it will stimulate and equalize Ethiopia's varied ethnic civilizations while also reducing disputes. Therefore, a federal-state system has replaced the former administration's overall centralized framework. In July 1991, the Ethiopian Transitional Government (TGE) passed a Transitional Charter acknowledging Eritrea's separation due to the Peace and Democracy Conference. "According to the Transitional Charter's preface, "all peoples' self-determination shall be the governing principles of political, economic, and social life." It also recognized ethnic groups' right to self-determination, including secession. Following the charter, the country's internal administration was divided into 14 ethnolinguistic regions in 1992 (TGE, Article 2 1992). The transitional government appointed a constitutional commission to draft a constitution. The commission adopted the federal constitution, which was ratified by the constituent Assembly in December 1994 and went into effect in August 1995. As a result, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) created a federal government with nine ethnically defined regional states and two federally governed city-states in Article 49 of its 1995 constitution (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa). The regional states were also classified based on language, settlement

patterns, and nationality. As a result, Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somalia, Benishangul-Gumuz, Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (SNNPR), Gambella, and Harari are among them.

Following the 1991 charter, the constitution guaranteed unrestricted corporate rights to entire ethnic groups: "Every nation, nationality, and people shall have the unrestricted right to self-determination up to secession" (Article 39). Secession requires a two-thirds vote in the legislature of the seceding ethnic group, followed three years later by a referendum in the seceding state. Several changes to ethnicity and governance occurred because of the country's federal restructuring.

According to the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), ethnic federalism will be the foundation for a reformed Ethiopian state structure and a solution to the ethnic-nationalist conflict. Therefore, ethnicity and federalism become critical elements in the geopolitical space of the region. However, it is unclear how far Ethiopia's state has been turned into a functioning ethnic federal model due to these civil, geographical, and political structures. Hence, the Ethiopian ethnic federal model will be investigated and evaluated to see if it is suitable for empowering and balancing Ethiopia's varied and different ethnic groups.

1.2 Problem Statement

The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic (hereafter EPRDF) founded ethnic federalism in Ethiopia following the collapse of the authoritarian Derg regime in 1991, which had several implications. First, the arrangement promoted cultural diversity and multiethnic political engagement by delegating political power to local communities, and the paradigm grounds citizenship in ethnic identity. Second, supporters of the system argued that dividing the country into ethnic regions would recognize the country's primordial reality and past injustices. Ethiopia's solution aimed to allow ethnic groups more equal autonomy in managing their affairs (Keller, E. J. 1995). Even though the nation's constitution permits decentralized and autonomous regional governments, the political course has mostly disregarded these ideas. As a result, the long-term repercussions of Ethiopia's ethnic regions on the country's integrity remain a matter of debate. Due to the new constitution's promise of self-determination up to secession, some predict Ethiopia's exclusive sub national identities would lead to the country's dissolution. According to proponents of this theory, the former Soviet Union

is an example of this phenomenon when a previously authoritarian and ethnically divided society's central government is weakened (Ottaway, M. 1994). Second, advocates of the ethnically based regime argue that the new federalism is a giant stride forward for Ethiopia, which, despite initial difficulties, cannot be overturned (Henze, P. B. 1998). Third, critics claimed that the TPLF/EPRDF had violated its democratic guarantee by illegally stifling free ethnic political mobilization. (Lata, L.1999).

Each of the three claims has some merits. On the other hand, if political leaders and regional governments cannot create a genuine political and economic policy that meets the aspirations of various societies. The federal system may implode. Finally, there is evidence that those in power in Addis Ababa target ethnic organizations in the region with centrist, nationalist, or independent agendas (Pausewang, Tronvoll, and Aalen, 2002).

The ethnic federal system has existed for more than two decades, despite these arguments. However, unfortunately, this brief survival time might not be sufficient to guarantee the system's long-term viability. Therefore, the only way out of Ethiopia's current situation is to implement the constitution and abolish the EPRDF's unequal and undemocratic structures and practices built over two decades. Therefore, this research will explore whether ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia has allowed the Somali region's self-rule and shared rule or merely been enforced theoretically.

1.3. General Objectives

The general objective of the study is to explore Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, mainly in the Somali region.

1. Specific objectives

1. The first specific goal of the study is to explore Ethiopia's ethnic-based federalism and whether the Somali regional's self-rule and shared-rule were implemented or not.
2. The second specific purpose of the study is to determine how effectively Ethiopian ethnic-federalism promotes self-rule and shared rule in the Somali region simultaneously.

1.4 Research Questions

As a result, the thesis aims to answer the research's significant questions by analyzing those mentioned above and other related concerns.

1. How successfully does Ethiopian ethnic federalism address the needs of the Somali region for local self-government while also promoting fair representation and inclusion at the national level?

2. How effectively did Ethiopian ethnic federalism promote self-rule and shared rule in the Somali region simultaneously?

1.5 Importance

The importance of this research stems from the need to explore the current ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia, particularly in the Somali region. According to Ethiopia's ethnic-based federalism, three main intellectual perspectives exist in Ethiopia's political discussion on federalism and ethnicity, according to the first perspective, the Ethiopian community developed a shared identity through the cultivation of Ethiopian citizenship and the dismantling of fundamental ties and allegiances (Daniel 1992; Alem 1993).

On the other hand, the second opinion claims that Ethiopia has a diversified ethnic population that requires representation in government and self-government (Merera 2003, Fasil 1997).

Finally, the Ethiopian state was established through invasions and colonization of nations and civilizations outside its control, such as the Oromo and Somali peoples (Hassen 1999; Assefa 1993; Dolal 1992). Thus, while all these studies explored ethnic federalism in Ethiopia's various regions, they did not disclose whether the self-rule and shared rule in the Somali region were implemented or merely theoretical. However, the findings of this study will have the following contributions.

1. The study will seek to contribute to the scientific debates on this topic and investigate how the current ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia was implemented in the Somali region.
2. Academics will benefit from this research and add value to the body of knowledge on ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, specifically in the Somali region.

3. The study will propose recommendations for new areas of research that will be investigated. In addition, it will assist in comprehending the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, particularly in the Somali region.



CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Theoretical framework: Federalism, Ethnicity, Ethnic federalism

Ethnicity and federalism have increasingly shaped Ethiopia's political and territorial space. As a result, the purpose of this chapter is to explain ethnicity and federalism theories to provide a foundation for observing and evaluating how Ethiopian ethnic federalism operates. Furthermore, at least on a theoretical level, it could help pave the way for the study by highlighting conflicts in synchronizing ethnicity and federalism.

2.2 Federalism

As defined by Daniel Elazar, a leading expert in Federalism, 'Federalism is concerned with the demand for people and polities to meet for shared goals while remaining separate to maintain their dignity. Furthermore, Federalism is involved in distributing political authority under liberty and the consolidation of governmental authority in unity (Elazar, 1987).

"Self-government" and "shared rule" are the primary federal ideals here. This notion encompasses the permanent but bound union of persons, groups, and polities to pursue common goals while preserving each party's integrity. Federalism is thus described as a collection of political institutions centered on integrating self-determination and shared rule within a legally divided power model (Elazar, 1987:33).

According to Burgess, Federalism is ideological. However, this can take the form of an implicitly philosophical and action-oriented guide. It is also a normative assessment of the suitable structure of human relationships and behavior. However, he gives Federalism a practical dimension by suggesting that its appreciation of diversity—as a live reality distinct from ideological and philosophical perceptions—can be empirically proved as a fact in its societal, financial, cultural, and political contexts. This implies that power and authority in society should be shared among and between groups (Burgess, 2000).

Nonetheless, Graham Smith questions whether Federalism should be considered a philosophy. "Rather than seeing it as a philosophy that originated and existed

separately from the core belief in political thought," (Smith, 1995:4). He notes, "Federalism is better viewed as crossing a wide spectrum of what we might more usefully call programmatic orientations.

According to him, the term "federalism" has given various purposes and used in various ways federalism", as a doctrine, is best thought of as a fusion of concepts, beliefs, and generative aspects that represent the ambiguities and pressures essential in thinking about the politics of modernity (Smith, 1995:4).

On the other hand, Riker sees "federalism as a series of events rather than a singular constitutional concept". The existence of a federal system does not imply that power lines are permanently drawn, but rather that political bargaining and process are ongoing. Thus, it is not a static event. Federalism according to Riker exists on a continuum of centralization and decentralization. Federalism is a political structure in which government activity is shared among regional governments and a central government so that each form of government has some activity on which it makes final decisions,' according to him (Rikker, 1975:103).

"Since the balance of power among federal and local states will change over time," John Agnew said, "federalism is a developmental political system rather than a rigid method for the geographical division of government authorities" (Agnew, 1995: 294).

In his study on Nigerian Federalism, Sam Egite Oyovbaire, like Riker and Agnew, states that Federalism is a social process that should be discussed regardless of ideological premises (Oyovbaire, 1985: 19). He believes that the prevailing intellectual opinion conflates Federalism with an end by supporting Riker's stance. He argues that this approach requires a normative assessment of federal governments before removing all reasons for various types of Federalism.

Consequently, according to Oyovbaire, opposing Federalism as a target in and of itself would cause Federalism to be regarded as a historical phenomenon.' Moreover, 'he states, 'one should not determine the merits of Federalism by analyzing Federalism in general, but rather by observing Federalism's real significance for specific communities (Oyovbaire, 1985:37).

Seeing federalism as a traditional phenomenon has two advantages in this scenario. First, it allows one to study Federalism without being constrained by the accepted model of Federalism; second, it allows one to examine genuine power-sharing without

constraining the regime in power's formal (or alleged) constraints (Oyovbaire, 1985:21). However, the flaw in this historical method is that it endangers confusion by extending the idea too far, making it vague and meaningless, or for other 'fake federalism' purposes. However, separating federalism from doctrine is sensible because it could otherwise become a goal rather than a means of reorganizing society-state relations. As a result, analyzing federalism without attaching ideological concerns or values to the regime's nature, such as democracy or other related concepts may be possible. As a result, there's a risk of misinterpreting the federal system as a process focused on cooperation among organizations and elites without taking citizens' interests into account.

If we equate features with this form of federal structure which may be characterized as an "elites 'Federal system" or consociation process (Lijphart, 1977: 2002) under which the people's needs are to some degree, the same as the elites', the debate becomes complicated. On the other hand, a federal system that lacks integrity and misrepresents public interest will quickly devolve into autocratic control or regional (local) dictatorship. The definition could become too fluid if there is no basic agreement on federal principles and processes. Any regime could call its arrangement "federal" simply because the systems exist. As King says, 'It must be granted some accurate and equally fixed context if it is to be used effectively' (King 1982: 90).

Otherwise, the many different meanings connected with federation provide a solid foundation for confusion'. As a result, the existence of arrangements and the reflection of the mechanism and functions of relationships among and within the federal and state institutions and between communities and states determine the nature of the matter. The process could signify the degree to which the systems adequately represent the people's interests. Individuals with equal voting rights, as well as geographies, states, and regions with unique central authority, are all included' (King 1982:71). In the absence of such a process, the federal system could be used for power concentration or internal government tyranny in the form of a federal system or regional government.

As it can be understood from the explanations above, it is very difficult to make a consistent and classical definition of federations because federations can differ within themselves. However, two basic features can be mentioned for federations. While the federated states are represented equally in the federal legislature, at the same time there is another assembly that will represent the populations of the federated states (Suksi,

2012: 63- 64). Classically, there is a bicameral structure that represents the people in proportion to the population of the federated states and the federated states with the principle of equality. The federated states take roles in the election of the head of state directly or indirectly (Teziç, 2020: 155).

Federal states are formed through integration or separation. The federations formed through integration consist of independent states that previously had sovereignty both internally and externally. This type of federation emerges with the motives such as security threat, economy, creating a new order, or sometimes when one state imposes it on the others. The previously fully independent and sovereign states have transferred their powers to the federal state in international relations corresponding to the external dimension of their sovereignty; on the other hand, they have largely preserved the internal dimension of their sovereignty (Teziç, 2020: 149). The most classic example of federations formed through integration is the USA (Odyakmaz v, 2011: 186).

As it is told, federalism is formed because of either integration or separation. Some federal states, such as the USA and Switzerland, have emerged from the convergence and unification of previously independent and separately sovereign states. States that were able to use their powers freely in the international arena as well as in the country, find it appropriate to leave the exercise of certain powers to a higher-level institution, a federal organization, due to the compulsions of the period they are in and for some other certain reasons.

These reasons are usually the presence of a military threat, the creation of a wider economic market, the elimination of civil unrest, or the desire of states to jointly achieve social order (Gözler, 2011:71).

The second type of federal state is formed through separation. This type of federal state was formed by the separation of some regions or states from the state structure they were in before. The reasons behind the separation emerge with the pressure of ethnic, cultural, and religious factors. Regions or states desire to have certain autonomy without becoming independent states because the policies implemented in the monolithic state suppress ethnic, cultural, and religious differences. Thus, the collapse of the central single-structured state is restrained by the federal structure, which is the new organizational form, and disintegration is prevented. The USSR can be shown as an example of federalism formed in this way (Çağdaş, 2019: 165-166).

The most basic feature that distinguishes federations from unitary states is that federations are not monocentric. Both the federal and the federated states are central organs. The territory of the federation and all citizens of the federation constitute the non-limiting place and personal dimension of the powers of the federal state body. On the other hand, the territory and citizens of the federated state constitute the place and personal dimension of the non-limited powers of the federated state. In this sense, it cannot be said that there is no center in federations; however, it can be said that there is a polycentric structure in which political powers are shared (Nalbant, 1997: 32).

The principles of federalism can be grouped under three main headings. These are the principle of superposition, the principle of autonomy, and the principles of participation. The principle of superposition refers to the existence of two separate legal orders placed on top of each other. The first is the legal order of the federal state, and the second is the legal order of the federated states.

As a result of this structure, as the federal state has its own legislative, executive, and judicial organs, federated states also have their own legislative, executive, and judicial organs that are separate from those of the federal state (Odyakmaz vd., 2011: 187). In federalism, autonomy means that each federated state forming a federation has the power to organize itself with its state identity, and at the same time, the powers are divided between the federal state and the federated states. For this reason, autonomy requires first the organizational power of the federated states themselves, and then the sharing of authority between the federal state and the federated states. In terms of the organizational power of the federated states themselves, each federated state has its constitution, legislative, executive, and judicial organs. While using this power, federated states must not ignore certain principles accepted by the federal constitution to which they pledge allegiance (Roskin, 2014: 266-268).

In general, the federal system is based on the sharing of powers between the federal state and the federated states, and the power-sharing must be guaranteed. The federal state should not be able to withdraw the powers of the federated states or impose its will on matters within the jurisdiction of the federated states. A written and strict constitution is necessary to ensure this sharing of powers. In federalism, power-sharing takes its power and validity from the constitution of the federal state (Çağdaş, 2019: 165-166).

When it comes to the third principle of federalism, the principles of participation, to talk about the federal state, first; the federated states that make up the federation must participate both in the organs of the federal state and in the decisions to be taken there. This feature is one of the most important principles of federalism. We see the participation of the federated states primarily in the preparation and amendment of the federal constitution.

Participation of the federated states can be seen primarily in the preparation and amendment of the federal constitution. Since the federated states have a say in the making of the federal constitution, this constitutes a memorandum of understanding.

Therefore, no change can be made in the amendment of the constitution without their consent. Because they can oppose a change that will take place against them through this participation, this situation constitutes a guarantee for the federated states (Çağdaş, 2019: 165-166).

2.3 Federalism as a lasting political compromise

According to the previous debate, federalism relates to a constitutionalized or lawfully mandated separation of governmental powers and duties on a regional basis within a single country. It can be conceived of as a country structure built on "self-rule" and "shared rule" methods to build a union of units while protecting their honor.

One of the key priorities of a federal system that seeks to foster harmony and plurality is doing this. It involves mechanisms and procedures that establish the balance of authority and duties among the center and the provinces and an acceptable agreement and the nature of both self-administration and shared control at the same time. It is a procedure in which each part of the decision-making and implementation process has an "equal" or "reasonable" share of authority.

Any federal Arrangement faces the difficult challenge of maintaining self-government and shared rule. The federal arrangement's proper operation depends on maintaining harmony between what seem to be intrinsically contradictory interests. A federal system depends on continuing political bargaining to preserve the equilibrium. As Elazar put it, any contract implies permitting, pledging, and accepting (Elazar, 1987: 06).

Thus, contractual relations, which should be based on discussion and agreements, are implied by covenantal methods. As a result, the covenantal involvement in a federal system is characterized by continuous negotiation and bargaining rather than operating on the principle of "the victor takes all." To achieve self-rule is like a "give-and-take" arrangement. Participation in a shared-rule structure is a requirement. It is not a case of one or the other; both must work on federal forms properly, which is not to say that government agencies should not make independent decisions in their jurisdiction; instead, this power should be exercised according to the shared rule concept. The federal regulations prohibit arbitrary judgments or activities that contradict the shared law framework. It is not always easy to balance federalism's competing values of self-government and shared rule. It could be challenging to maintain constitutional arrangements indefinitely, especially where ethnic groups have fundamentally conflicting and irreconcilable interests. Considering federalism as a long-term political bargain, on the other hand, may help to alleviate the tension. After all, federalism is not a one-time event.

The Federalist principle does not require the imposition of a plurality vote by them in theory or practice; otherwise, it would be analogous to "majority despotism." There are no lower or higher power units in the federal concept, just smaller or larger units unless the authority has chosen to act in a matrix or non-hierarchical fashion. The sum of the components is not greater than the sum of the parts. However, pursuing a non-hierarchical function of power is not always easy, particularly when observing or investigating various federal structures in the real world with examples of majority structures. There are disparities in the allocation of authority between federal units in some asymmetric federal states. Relationships between the federation and its constituent bodies, the level of similarity or inconsistency among the respective authorities, or the amount and scale of the constituent units are all factors to consider. "They are a plurality in existence and activity in Canada, or mainly in Switzerland and Belgium," says Ronald Watts.

As in the United States and Switzerland, national and state authorities exist within the constitution and affirm the separation of authorities (Watts 2000a: 7). India is shown as a federation with a tumultuous core. The Nigerian federation is characterized by regional polarization. On the other hand, each model of federalism relies on a variety of historical and geographical experiences in the respective societies. Consequently,

applying any of the models of federalism outside of the boardroom to a variety of other contexts might be meaningless (Agnew 1985).

According to Agnew, the four "classic" examples (the United States, Switzerland, Canada, and Australia) have all struggled to introduce "forms" of the federal organization (Agnew 1995: 295). However, the challenges of federalism in the United States are primarily concerned with the country's incapacity to ensure that underrepresented minority groups, such as African Americans, are represented in state legislatures and the United States Congress. In general, there are two styles of federations. Federalism is fundamentally used in multilingual and multi-ethnic societies like Switzerland, India, Malaysia, Belgium, Spain, and Nigeria to accommodate and integrate territorial diversity.

The United States, Australia, Austria, and Germany, for example, use the second form of federalism in cultures that are homogeneous and do not recognize multilingual or multi-ethnic characteristics (Watts 1999: 117).

Following the above discussions, federalism is not a done deal. However, the most critical responsibility for the victorious system is to build a federal working arrangement in a provided setting that allows diverse groups to express themselves. Forming a coherent and robust power center in ethnically fractured communities is often regarded as harsh and contested on the inside as a 'hegemonic' power; consequently, brutality and destructive wars may strengthen policies to grab the center. Controlling the center, as a result, can be utilized to fight 'others' rule and a proclivity 'hegemonic' regulation. Furthermore, establishing a stable state system in multi-ethnic communities necessitates reaching an agreement that can foster trust among various groups by allowing sufficient space for self-expression and representation. As a long-term political agreement, the federal government can be one of the easiest, if not the best, solutions to handle representation and self-administration issues in ethnically segregated communities. Conversely, in ethnically divided countries, the federal system can be one of the most powerful, if not the most effective, means of resolving concerns of representation and self-government. As a result, the federal government should be thought of as a cooperative system. Therefore, the federal system should be viewed as a dynamic and complicated legal structure.

2.4 Ethnicity

2.4.1 Defining Ethnicity.

According to researchers, ethnicity is a modern cultural construct, a global social environment, a self-identity, a unique unofficial governmental organization, or a vibrant culture. Nonetheless, individuals such as Smith and Hutchinson, who acknowledge ethnicity's symbolic and subjective components, should be applauded (1996). Second, define ethnic as "a labeled human society with a shared origin story, owned memories, one or more components of shared heritage, a link to an ancestral home, and a sense of patriotism among at least most of its members." "Ethnic is a word that needs to be defined. Third, in terms of 'the community's destiny,' subjective as "the community's destiny is tied up to ethnographic history, with its awareness of a distinctive, shared history," as "ethno-symbolic meaning and historical adjustment play a crucial part in this notion. According to Fukui and Markakis, defining ethnic identities based on genealogical or cultural grounds necessitates a complex fusion pattern and fission within the group. They demonstrate that ethnic identities are primarily political outcomes of a socially and historically defined situation (Fukui and Markakis, 1994:6). In the same way, ethnicity, according to Thomas Eriksen (1993), involves a relationship among societies whose individuals see themselves as significant and can be viewed hierarchically within a community. As a result, he defines ethnicity as "the classification of people and group relationships" with political, organizational, and symbolic implications (Eriksen, 1993:13).

According to Nabudere, there are two dimensions of ethnicity in an African context: positive and negative. The positive side of ethnicity, which he refers to as 'post-traditionalism,' is a forward-thinking ethnic identity firm that attempts to cope with modernity while also explaining an individual's identity for the sake of cohesion and self-definition.

He describes the negative side of ethnicity as "Class distortions and mobilization of ethnic emotions for solely narrow and self-serving preferences of a small minority of elites who are struggling for leadership roles in the state"(Nabudere, 1999:90). The Previous Ethiopian regimes associated ethnicity with narrow nationalism, tribalism, or the agenda of conspirators. On the other hand, the new ruling elites are seen as liberators and valuable assets that must be protected and promoted.

Ethnicity displayed a genuine and adopted policy of political system overnight, according to Markakis, and gave the grounds for a rebuilding Ethiopian state (Markakis, 1994).

The idea that it is an ideology of mobilized collectivizes that may be utilized as a weapon of resistance by marginalized ethnic groups and a political tool by elites is one of the many relevant situations in Ethiopia (Merera, 2003:26). This thesis will examine the political changes in Ethiopia since 1991 as part of the study's primary focus in subsequent chapters.

2.5 Ethnic Federalism

Ethnic heterogeneity in a country means that there are at least two different ethnic or linguistic groups in the country. Heterogeneity, not homogeneity, characterizes the population of many countries in the world in terms of ethnicity. Ethnicity is plural in more than 90 percent of the 180 or more states in the world (Gurr 1993). On the other hand, most of the time, the constitutional approach and political practice adopted by most of these multi-ethnic states do not adapt to their ethnic diversity. The institutional principles adopted by these states seem to ignore or suppress the social realities and cultural differences of the countries. The pursuit of political unity and territorial integrity was at the top of the constitutional and political agenda of most of these countries. Similarly, the most important aim of these countries has often been to create and maintain national unity at the expense of ethnic diversity. Moreover, the assertion of ethnic identity and political rights was considered an attempt to compromise political unity and regional integration (Majeed 2005: 181).

It is evident that a multi-ethnic state faces the complex problem of managing ethnic diversity. As the above discussion shows, a multi-ethnic state cannot overcome this challenge by suppressing ethnic groups. Suppressing ethnic groups could only lead to more ethnic conflict. The solution is neither to try to establish an ethnically neutral state nor to separate the state from ethnicity. Instead, a multi-ethnic state should focus on other ways in which it can respond to the challenges of ethnic diversity without trying to transform itself into a nation-state (Fessha, 2010:2-4).

As described earlier in this chapter, the recognition principle allows for this. Therefore, according to this notion, the protection of universal individual rights alone is insufficient. Similarly, common citizenship rights are not sufficient to protect ethnic

claims, as well. If it is aimed to meet the needs and demands of ethnic groups in a country, the state must recognize its multi-ethnic character.

Furthermore, the government should supplement universal individual rights with institutional measures that reflect ethnic diversity—accepting the recognition principle results in institutional designs that indicate a commitment to ethnic diversity.

Finally, the government should create institutional frameworks to aid in transforming ethnic diversity recognition into concrete institutional reality and establishing an all-inclusive state (Dent, 1995).

If these are not accomplished, conflicts will likely arise in states with heterogeneous structures. The political conflicts experienced by many countries in the world are often explained by the failure of states to manage ethnic politics. These are just a few of the costs that states bear while maintaining their political union practices. The genocide in Rwanda, which claimed the lives of one million people, and the more than 30-year-long civil war in South Sudan are two clear examples of ethnic-based conflicts in Africa (Fessha, 2010:2-4). Ethnic conflicts in the Balkans (Gurr 1993) and Sri Lanka, in which many lost their lives, can be given as examples. On the other hand, there is an emerging trend to accept the principle that the ethnic diversity of a society should be recognized, and practical expressions should be provided through some form of institutional principles.

This transition to the recognition and practical expression of ethnic diversity has in some cases been achieved by adopting a federal system. Nigeria, a country of more than 250 ethnic groups on the African continent, for example, has adopted a federal form of government (Fessha, 2010:2-4). In Asia, the federal regulation of India, which is an ethnically diverse country comprising 18 national languages, nearly 2,000 dialects, many ethnic communities, and seven religious' groups, is a relatively successful example of addressing the problems posed by ethnic diversity.

It could be argued that for most ethnic groups and territorially structured communities, federalism offers the most realistic way to preserve state unity against major power centers and ethnic divisions.

It could also be argued that federalism serves as a tool to reconcile the interests of two or more different ethnic communities locked within the borders of a single state, and

thereby federalism provides "a sound strategy for promoting national unity and political legitimacy" (Alemante 2003: 83).

Since ethnic federalism, or a federal system centered on ethnolinguistic lines, is the main subject of this study, it is followed by a theoretical discussion of federalism's application in multi-ethnic societies. It is debatable whether ethnic federalism is viable or tractable. The discredited ethno-federal regimes of the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, On the other hand, raised concerns regarding the sustainability of ethnolinguistic federalism. However, some ethnolinguistic federal structures, such as those in India and Switzerland, have already demonstrated that ethnic federalism can function in fractured communities. Therefore, both opponents and proponents of ethnic federalism can make compelling arguments.

Ethnic federalism, according to proponents, can eliminate class inequities, increase harmony and self-rule, promote ethnic collaboration through coexistence, and lessen tendencies of secession and dissolution (Lijphart 1977 and 2002, Gurr 1993; Kymlicka 2006).

Examiners of ethnic federalism claim that it can institutionalize ethnic segregation, stifle individual human rights, enhance divergent forces, impose zero-sum ethnic struggle, and lead to dangerous ethnic purification, removal, and decomposition (Nordlinger 1972; Lipset 1983; Fleiner 2000).

Because this research focuses on Ethiopia's ethnic federalism implementation, understanding the theoretical underpinnings and important competing viewpoints is critical. The theoretical studies of ethnic federalism in this chapter focus on the relationship between ethnicity and federalism.

It examines the relationship between federalism and ethnicity to determine whether they are compatible. As a result, this theoretical research aims to comprehend better the real or imagined uncertainties, disputes, or convergences between ethnicity and federalism.

The purpose of this concept was to oblige the researcher in constructing an objective framework or inquiry instrument for correctly understanding Ethiopia's ethnic federal system. In addition, the theoretical argument helps organize Ethiopian ethnic federalism findings. As a result, before digging more into the relationship between ethnicity and federalism, we will take a theoretical look at ethnicity.

While defining a federal system based on ethnicity is difficult and complicated, numerous experts believe that one of federalism's attributes is its desire and intention to produce as well as preserve both harmony and plurality at the same time (Watts, 1999:6).

Elazar claims that federal systems perform effectively in communities where fundamental interests are sufficiently homogeneous. He stated that Switzerland was the first contemporary federation worth tolerating because of enduring ethnic and linguistic differences. In locations where firmly entrenched primal classes entirely rule politics and society, political integration, whether federal or not, will most likely be more difficult. Nonetheless, he feels that federalism is the best political structure for a political career in the presence of roughly perpetual religious, ethnic, cultural, or social classes. Moreover, he continued, Minorities and marginalized groups will also be protected by territorial power divisions, which will provide them more autonomy within their political rights'(Elazar, 1987:191). As a result, Elazar specified two types of federal frameworks to accommodate ethnic diversity (1987:236). The first is a policy that cuts across ethnic cleavages, thereby diluting them by forming a civic community that cuts across them. The second method is to structure a comprehensive polity so that each of its constituent polities provides a primary means of expression for each of its citizens. On the other hand, Elazar believed that federalism should eventually go beyond acknowledging differences by structuring relationships that recognize groups with that diversity to work mutually within a similar political arrangement.

Therefore, Elazar believes that federalism allows for the development of a democratic culture that transcends ethnic divisions and the formation of civilized society and a functional governmental system in certain situations (Elazar, 1987:232). Of course, federal structures can be built through ethnic, linguistic, or religious communities that are territorially structured, but the issue legitimizes primordial identities in political structures.

As a result, 'ethnic nationalism' is likely the most dominant force in federalism since ethnic identity can disrupt power-sharing structures, leading to ethnic federalism devolving into civil war. Consequently, rather than ethnolinguistic federal arrangements, it is preferable to encourage a power structure characterized by non-primordial or civic ties (Elazar, 1987:232). On the other hand, federalism may be an

excellent way to grant ethnic groups more autonomy if they are geographically clustered. By Admitting the necessity of creating federal arrangements based on ethnic boundaries in the case of regionally concentrated ethnic groups,' the federal framework should make national splitting lines correspond as closely as practicable with ethnic peripheries in the context of relatively little or few constituent members (Lijphart, 2002:51). However, if ethnicities are regionally separated and aligned Lijphart (1997) advocates "convocational democracy," which includes four primary features: grand coalition, segmented autonomy, proportionality, and minority veto.

In a base coalition, all key factions in political authority, notably executive power, must share power. Each significant community is given decision-making authority under segmented autonomy.

Each key group's share should be considered. Political clout, public service recruitment, and the distribution of public funds are just a few of the issues that need to be addressed. Finally, minority veto refers to the capacity of minority parties to veto any decision that would damage their critical interests due to a lack of majority votes.

In highly fragmented communities, Lijphart empirically identifies a variety of effective power-sharing mechanisms.

For example, executive power-sharing, such as in Malaysia and South Africa, through a grand coalition minister of ethnical organizations; fair inclusion of ethnolinguistic or several other parties in administration, such as in Belgian ministries; and balance of ministerial positions among various linguistic communities, counties, and provinces, such as in India (Lijphart, 2002:46). On the other side, Donald Horowitz argues that ethnic homogeneity in federal administration is harmful to inter-ethnic collaboration. Horowitz recognizes the value of delegation of authority and power-sharing. However, he argues that regional compartmentalization combined with excellent power decentralization can have transformative consequences. Geographical formation with decentralization of significant authority can have calming effects in countries with territorially different communities, significant sub-ethnic differences, and significant tension in the middle (Horowitz, 1985:164). Horowitz further claims that a political system that hardens and legitimizes racial distinctions will be ineffective in reaching a power-sharing agreement in ethnically diverse countries because majority-group officials will be unwilling to give minority classes any political power or rights. He

contends that ethnic majority and ethnic minority rule are ineffectual and harmful in ethnically separated communities. Majority rule, often known as "majority ethnic dictatorship," ensures that the majority has total power over the minority (Horowitz, 1994:46). In a zero-sum struggle, problems like equal governmental control, official language recognition, and educational issues like languages of instruction and curricula content are complex issues; individuals are more concerned with "who gets whatever." As a result, methods or measures that solidify or promote ethnic equality may not be a viable option for achieving inter-ethnic center and harmony because "divisive problems are difficult to negotiate," and metaphorical needs such as language are more difficult to reconcile than quantifiable assertions (Horowitz, 1985:566). According to Horowitz, federalism has tended to mitigate central tensions in severely fragmented communities such as Nigeria, India, and Malaysia because many disputed problems become federal issues among ethnicities; this holds distributed the stream of tension in language culturally homogeneous counties into sub-ethnic networks, and it creates job opportunities for non-state communities. He also stated that ethnic federalism has either reduced or increased marginalized groups' isolation: "A community that is a minority at the center could be a plurality for one or more regions, and likely in a place to govern such states," he explained. Thus, allowing "ethnic or some other groups claiming a strong identity to practice full control over the activities that special importance to them while allowing the larger groups to exercise those functions which address shared interests" might help sustain unity while yielding self-government demands. The traditional conflicts of federalism, such as resource distribution and regional power, are likely to be exacerbated by ethnic federalism. 'Inter-regional movement is likely to be problematic, and the line between both the private and public realms will be less distinct than other forms of federalism. Furthermore, because the federal system needs solid managerial skills, political abilities, and vast support, limited team, or ethnic preferences by itself themselves will not be sufficient to construct a suitable arrangement. It could lead to "under-equipped provinces unable to carry out additional obligations they do not understand or enjoy," "inefficient bureaucracies," or "politicians unwilling to negotiate" (Horowitz, 1994, 613).

2.6 Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, ethnic consciousness and mobilization might emerge due to social, political, and economic factors rather than inherent or primordial impulses. Primitive variables such as supposed universal descent, genetic lineage, language, and the like have formed the foundation for promoting unity and identity politics. That is not to suggest that ethnic categorization and unity are standardized in the publicity are, on the contrary, more prevalent among the upper crust than among the general population (Messay 2002). There are three major intellectual points of view in Ethiopia's political debate over ethnicity. According to the first point of view, Ethiopians have attained a single identity through developing Ethiopian citizenship and eradicating primordial ties and loyalties (Daniel 1992; Alem 1993). According to the second point of view, Ethiopia is home to a diverse ethnic population that requires political representation and self-government (Merera 2003; Fasil 1997).

Finally, the Ethiopian state was established through a series of invasions and colonization of nations and civilizations outside its control, such as the Oromo and Somali peoples (Hassen 1999; Assefa 1993; Dolal 1992). Since the 1970s, ethnic organizations have operated at the political level under the names of many nationalities, including Oromo, Somali, Afar, Sidama, and Tigrayan. Due to ethnic redistribution and ethnic entitlement rules, Ethiopia has legalized over a hundred ethnic organizations since 1991 (National Election Board of Ethiopia, [NEBE] 2005). While no systematic research of such ethnicities' presence and values has been done, it is plausible to infer that social, political, and economic interests, rather than primitive or archaic impulses, are the fundamental driving forces in such ethnicities. Thus, ethnic mobilizing and unity statements have virtually always been expressed in the context of "historical injustices," "respectful life and self-administration," changing culture, and the use of traditionally disregarded or banned languages. These rights are primarily motivated by the need to hold a social position, political influence, and financial gain (instrumental) instead of maintaining or cultivating generational bonds or appreciating the overwhelming and compelling congruities of blood, language, and culture (primordial). However, this seeming generational relationship or primitive connection has facilitated all these sociological, economic, and political Goals. This has tended to establish a "continuous division" that could deepen, as well as a road for any further marginalization, prejudice, and other heinous deeds.

According to Markakis (1994), In the Horn of Africa (particularly Ethiopia), the growth of ethnic mobilization and activity has attempted to impose control over or weaken the state, which controls resource allocation, political power, and social status. As a result, ethnic mobilization is joint when the central authority is accused of ethnic division or partiality. Ethiopia's central government has long been chastised for favoring ethnic groupings in this regard. Several ethnic and regional independence organizations, including Eritrea, Tigray, Oromo, and Somali, referred to the main rule as "Amhara rule" before 1991." Therefore, the movements were able to attract of many sympathizers and fighters from many ethnic groups. As a result, several ethnic movements have risen to challenge the Tigrayan group's perceived ethnic solidarity-based supremacy. Thus, Ethiopia's federal government has been described as Tigrayan-dominated since 1991. As a result, rather than primordial impulses, it is reasonable to argue that Ethiopia's emergence of ethnic unity is due to social and historical influences such as suppression, isolation, differentiation, and exclusion. Therefore, using the term "primordials" for explaining the growth of ethnic frustrations and aspirations in Ethiopia is misleading because it ignores the underlying nature of the situation. Rather than protecting or glorifying their 'primordial' identity, people acted in this fashion to preserve their economic, political, and fundamental fairness in the face of exclusion, subjugation, and dominance brought about by the central government's southerly expansion. 'Exportable products like coffee and jewelry were already being produced [in the south],' Messay stated emphatically. Moreover, the area was rich and fertile, perfect for any cash crop. As a result, an ethnic attitude based on supremacy evolved. The goal of this ideological shift was to establish private property rights and rationalize land acquisition" Ethnic distinctions made land manipulation easier both rationally and politically," according to the report (Messay 1999: 53).

Thus, Ethiopian ethnic categorization and classification are social-historical constructs that evolved in response to oppression by a central government that designated itself (and others) as Shewan tribalism. By emphasizing statements and uniqueness, the force of blood, on the other hand, has introduced irrationality and hardness to ethnic insurgents, as well as consolidated primordial feelings to construct a politically significant social movement.

When faced with the plight of Tsarist Russia's subordinate ethnic classes and minorities, Russian revolutionaries established what became known as the Stalinist

theory on nationalities. Initially, Russian nationalist figures such as Lenin dismissed nationalism within the Russian Empire. Also, in a post-Tsarist Russia, Lenin opposed the social democrats' plan to grant nationalities territorial and extraterritorial sovereignty in 1905 (Hirsch; 2005:23). He altered his thought and began to consider national self-determination as the movement gained momentum. The need to obtain support from non-Russian ethnic groups in the fight against the Tsarist regime and the civil war that followed the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 necessitated this shift in approach. Therefore, the Soviet state was built on self-determination and federalism principles the Soviet Nationalities Strategy, which Joseph Stalin primarily formulated, introduced Marxist-Leninist ideas, and attempted to legitimize the communist party's vanguard position. As a result, the Soviet Union was established as a multitier ethnic federation with the unitary communist party holding a monopoly on power. In addition, the constitution protects the right to self-determination, which includes secession (Duchacek, 1970:137). Following the 1974 revolution; all those leftist political movements in Ethiopia adopted the ML ideology and Stalin's nationality theory. After seizing power in 1991, the EPRDF began reorganizing the country into an ethnic union. This process, which resulted in secession, heavily influenced Stalin's concept of ethnic self-determination (Young, 1997:154). Ethnic federalists, on the other hand, are concerned that it would lead to ethnic tensions and state disintegration (Ottaway, 1995). They believe Ethiopia will follow in the Soviet Union's and Yugoslavia's footsteps. Others, particularly ethnic nationalists, are skeptical of the administration's emphasis on self-determination, claiming that the ethnic federal constitution has not been implemented in exercise (Solomon, 1993). On the other hand, advocates of ethnic federalism argue that it has preserved Ethiopian peoples' integration and territorial integrity while fully acknowledging the principle of ethnic equality. Ethiopia's federal arrangement had two levels of government, according to the 1995 FDRE constitution: The central government of oversaw international affairs, federal defense, political economy, fiscal and monetary policies, as well as the construction and administration of major development facilities and foundations.

However, it was given the power to budget allocations to regional governments. Likewise, except for matters assigned to the federal government, regional governments were given extensive sovereignty over full affairs within their territorial control. Some of the significant duties delegated to regional governments included:

1. Complete control over policies relating to culture, language, and education.
2. Establishing a state government that encourages self-government to the greatest extent possible.
3. Developing and implementing policies and initiatives in the areas of economics, and social development.
4. Enacting and enforcing laws governing the state civil service (Article, 52:2.7).

2.7 The Politics of Self-Determination

Ethnic-based federalism is the EPRDF's most contentious strategy. Some hail them as the miracle cure for bringing Ethiopia's multi-ethnic people together. Others see it as a potentially risky idea that would eventually break the nation apart. According to nationalists, the policy is a deliberate effort to undermine national identity. Moreover, they see the constitution's grant of ethnic groups' self-determination as a calculated step backward in the nation-building process. Many people even suspect that ethnic federalism is a TPLF plot to establish ethnic differences for the Tigrayan minority to govern. The majority accuses the TPLF of opposition supporters of exploiting ethnic identities and tensions to remain in power. Racial relations have deteriorated because of ethnic rivalry, according to critics. They argue that the political structure divides rather than unites citizens by instilling mutual distrust and animosity and tribal dynamics that can quickly escalate out of control. A constitutional provision that requires nationalities to secede is blamed for the EPRDF's anti-Ethiopian stance. The liberation of Eritrea, which left Ethiopia landlocked, is evidence of a plan to partition Ethiopia. The EPRDF's claim that it enjoys an unfair advantage is familiar. Eritrea's independence, which made Ethiopia a landlocked country, is evidence of a goal to partition Ethiopia. The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has been accused of prioritizing its Tigray base and regional state over its administration (Paulos, 2007:378-380). Ethnic federalists, on the other hand, applaud the recognition of community rights, arguing that the best way to reduce ethnic tensions is to establish ethnic-based administrative bodies. According to this government-promoted perspective, Ethiopian ethnic and minority groups have been marginalized for centuries by a central state that forced the Amharic language and culture on them. Allowing 'nationalities' to pursue their cultural, ethnic, and political

ambitions is essential for redressing historical injustice. As a result, many cultural and linguistic groups have gained considerable attention.



CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF THE SOMALI REGION

3.1 Historical Background

The present-day Somali Territory in Ethiopia was the territory of former Western Somali, also called the Ogaden & Hawd area. This region was traditionally located in the southeastern Ethiopian region bordered by British Somaliland to the North and Italian Somaliland to the east. This region gained its current shape and geopolitics with the occupations it experienced during the colonial period. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the historical developments that affect the geopolitics of this region today. Colonialism is defined as the "control of a single power over a dependent territory or people." Colonialism occurs when one nation subjugates another, exploits its population, and often imposes its language and cultural values upon the people of the occupied country. Colonialism is strongly linked to imperialism, defined as the policy or morality of operating force and influence to control another nation or people. (John, 2014:20-22). Since it is so closely related to imperialism, it becomes difficult to define Colonialism clearly. However, often these two concepts are considered synonymous. Like Colonialism, imperialism includes political and economic control over a dependent territory (Sander, 2000:2001).

During the colonial period, one of the regions Western states wanted to control was the Somali region in the African continent. In the Horn of Africa, Somalia, the easternmost country in Africa, stretches from just south of the Equator to the North of the Gulf of Aden. Due to its location, Somali territories have an important geopolitical position between Sub-Saharan Africa and Arabian countries, and southwest Asia (John, 2014:20-22).

The people's character in a country is often shaped by their natural habitats, historical events, and cultural experiences over the past few centuries. Most of the Somali population is Sunni Muslim. Despite the religious homogeneity, the clan structure of the Somali society has led to a clan-based power struggle in the region from ancient times to the present. There are four main tribes, Dir, Isaaq, Darood, and Hawiye, in Somalia, and about 80 percent of its population is nomadic. These four tribes are

divided into sub-tribes, extended families, and clans that compete. The most substantial basis of loyalty rests on the family or extended family, while solidarity and loyalty at the tribal and national scales are weaker (Shay, 2008:1-2).

For much of the pre-colonial and colonial period, Somalia was known as the Land around the coastal areas in the North, "Guban." Guban is roughly translated as "Burnt Land." Before the colonial invasion, Somalia, or more precisely the countries in that region, was divided into clan-based regions whose existence was traditionally accepted (Fellin, 2013: 44-48).

Although Somali pastoralists have traditionally had a strong sense of cultural and linguistic unity, they have not been able to form a single political unit due to clan structuring (Lewis 2008: 29). During the colonial race in Africa, the European powers agreed in 1884 to share the African lands. As a result, the vast Somali lands came under three central colonial administrations: British, French, and Italian. British Somaliland colonial administration was established in 1884 by a series of Anglo-Somali Protection Treaties (Abdirahman and Siraj, 2000: 63-64). Likewise, the Italians made direct claims over Italian Somalia and its coasts in 1889. In 1891, the Italian and British colonial powers reached an agreement on the colonial influence areas in East Africa, including Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritria.

In the late 19th century, when the lands of Somalia were shared, another state that claimed rights over the region was Ethiopia (Abyssinia). Ethiopia is a country in northeastern Africa with over 80 ethnic and religious groups, each with its own culture, language, and religion. Ethiopia is one of the oldest civilizations globally, and its origins date back to the Aksum civilization. The Aksum Empire was founded in Ethiopia in the 1st century BC and maintained its political life for about a thousand years. From the Aksum Empire until the middle of the 19th century, decentralization was the dominant feature of the country's political structure. As a result, more vital religious and ethnically based authorities emerged in the surrounding regions than Ethiopia (Fenta, 2014: 71). In the 19th and 20th centuries, many Ethiopian leaders tried to establish a centralized system of government dominated by a single culture, religion, and language. For example, Emperor Menelik (1889-1913) and Emperor Haile Selassie (1930-36, 1941-74) tried to unite Ethiopians around the Amharic language and the Christian Orthodox religion.

Ethiopia, which was one of the rare states with a political organization in the continent during this period when the Western states colonized the Horn of Africa, entered into a power struggle in the region with the colonial states because it wanted to control the Western Somali lands, which had a fragmented appearance due to the scattered clan structure in the region.

In this context, the Wuchle agreement was signed in 1889 on the division of the region between Italy and Ethiopia. Italy, which launched itself as the protector of Ethiopia according to the Wuchle treaty, determined the border between Ethiopia and British Somaliland (Abdirahman and Siraj, 2000: 63-64).

Despite the treaty, the Ethiopian king II Menelik attempted to enter Somali territory in 1896 by building some grass huts at Alola, a water source southeast of Bio Kabob. Also, Menelik hoisted his flag in Alola and claimed that the lands of the Gadabursi and Issa tribes belonged to Abyssinia. Following, when the Italians were defeated in the Battle of Adwa in 1896, the Addis Ababa peace treaty was signed between Ethiopia and Italy. In this treaty, Italy was no longer the protector of Ethiopia, and Ethiopia began to control the vast western Somali lands as much as Ogaden. In 1897, Ethiopia continued its expansion into the South and Southeast region, where the Somali people were settled. Ethiopia has reached an agreement with the British colonial administration to draw the border between British Somaliland and Ethiopia.

In this Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, the British ceded the Somali lands to the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik for his aid in the fight against the Somali tribes (Laitin and Samatar, 1987). In addition, with this treaty, the Ogaden region of approximately 25 thousand miles was left to Ethiopia's sovereignty. This circumstance was met with a great reaction by the Somalis because Ogaden was a vital area for grazing for nomads. Upon this unrest, Ethiopia and Britain came to the following decision with an additional provision to the London Agreement: "Somali nomads and herders will freely enjoy pasturelands essential to their survival in areas under both British and Ethiopian control" (Coşar, 2011: 31). Although the 1897 treaty legitimized Ethiopia's territorial claims over the whole of this region, which includes Ogaden, Ogaden nationalists claimed that the region was never historically part of Ethiopia and that the 1897 treaty was invalid. Different types of treaties made in the past have been the most crucial reason for the border conflicts to be experienced between Ethiopia-Somalia and Kenya-Somalia. It is possible to group these treaties under three headings: (1) treaties

with Somali tribes that were more of a commercial nature and resulted in the settlement of European powers in the Horn of Africa; (2) treaties between Western powers to determine their spheres of influence in the region; and (3) treaties between Ethiopia and other colonial powers that determine the dominance of the disputed regions today, especially Ogaden, located on the Ethiopian-Somali border (Coşar, 2011: 32).

Emperor Menelik II incorporated the western Somali region into Ethiopia at the end of the 19th century. The region did not have a well-organized or unified management system before this. Instead, a traditional administrative system among the Somali tribes was ruled by Grads, Sultans, or Uses. According to many studies, three reasons prompted Emperor Menelik's forces to incorporate the Somali lands into Ethiopia. First, the Emperor wanted to control and gain access to the Somali coast, especially the ports of Berbera and Zeila.

This access was vital for Ethiopia as port cities on the Red Sea coast gained importance after opening the Suez Canal. Second, the Emperor believed that the occupation of the Somali region would facilitate an agreement with the western colonial administrations in neighboring countries. Third, the Emperor wanted to seize Somalia's rich animal resources (Eshete, 1994: 71). In this period, resistance movements emerged among the Somali people against both the colonial powers and the Ethiopian occupation. The division of Somali territory and the encroachment of Christian colonialists provoked a fierce reaction. The resistance in Ogaden, which is under Ethiopian control, was launched by the religious leader Sayyid Mohammed and Abdille Hassan Dervish's forces to drive the 'infidel' usurpers out of Somali lands and regain Somalia's independence. The first major significant conflict against the Ethiopians took place in Jigjiga. Although the resistance movement was inconclusive after the death of Sayyid Mohammed in 1920, this struggle raised hopes for the establishment of a united Somali state (Abdullahi, 2017: 23-27).

On the other hand, the Somali Dervish movement led by Abdille Hasan turned into a popular-supported movement that tried to liberate all Somali regions in the Horn of Africa from the colonialists. Hasan directed the movement by establishing a governing council called Khususi, composed of Islamic clan leaders and wing leaders (Mamdani, 1996: 17-18).

In 1906, Italy, France, and Britain legally recognized Ethiopia's occupation of Somali lands and attempted to resolve border disputes. However, after the fascist regime came to power, Italy attempted to expand its colonies in Africa. As a result, the Second Ethiopian-Italian war started in Walwaal in December 1934. This war marked the beginning of the Italian occupation, and after the occupation of Walwaal in the Dollo Region, a Somali settlement in Ethiopia, all of Ethiopia was occupied.

After the war, Italy declared an Italian colonial empire in the Horn of Africa, including Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, in 1936. As a result, Italy took control of Ethiopia, including the Somali territory of the South and British Somaliland up to Hawd and Ogaden (Abdirahman and Siraj, 2000: 63-64). With Italy's dominance in the region, for the first time since the beginning of the colonial period, all of Somalia's territory came under a unified administration (Lewis, 1988:33-38). Similarly, the second opportunity for a united Somalia was seized after the defeat of Fascist Italy, with the unification of all regions except French Somaliland under British colonial rule. These opportunities for reunification, however temporary, have further fueled the desire of Somali nationalists to reunite the divided lands (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: 63).

The colonial powers decided to leave Africa at the end of World War II, realizing that they could not maintain their colonial policies on the continent. For instance, the British took measures to pave the way for democratic development in Somalia by gradually loosening the military control of Somalia. They also supported non-governmental organizations for the same purpose (Abdullahi, 2017: 23-27). In the meantime, countries such as England, France, the USA, and the USSR began to negotiate Italy's former colonies. Finally, Britain proposed the establishment of a unified Somali state under the UN Board of Trustees and British rule under the name of the Bevin plan. This proposal was rejected, Somalia was repartitioned, and the British Somaliland protectorate was reinstated. Finally, in 1950, it was decided that Italy, under the control of the UN Board of Trustees, would maintain a nominal tutelage in Somalia for ten years (Lewis 2008: 32).

Italian tutelage in Somalia officially started on April 1, 1950. The London Agreement was signed between Britain and Ethiopia in 1948, shortly before the tutelage began. Following this agreement, the British withdrew their soldiers from the Ogaden region, but their military units in the Haud region remained. After this decision of the British, nationalist movements began to emerge in Somalia. One of these is the Somali Youth

League, which acts with the slogan of the unity of the Somali people and will play an active role in regional politics in the future. This movement followed active politics in Somalia and started to gain superiority in the parliament in the elections. After the Somali Youth League followed politics in the region within the framework of the Pan-Somali ideal, Ethiopia and Britain agreed on November 29, 1954, and the British left the region, leaving the dominance of the Haud region to the Ethiopians together with Ogaden. On the other hand, this agreement made in 1954 caused disappointment in Somalis.

The people of Somalia understood that the Pan-Somali ideal could not be left to the decision of the Western powers, and they began to make statements about the need to establish a Greater Somalia at every opportunity (Coşar, 2011:41).

The activities of the nationalist organizations, which increased their effectiveness in Somalia, especially after the Second World War, to unite the British and Italian colonies of Somalia gave positive results. During the decolonization period, both colonial states thought they could no longer control these lands, so they immediately started making unification plans. In April 1960, the leaders of the two regions met in Mogadishu under the auspices of the UN and agreed to establish a unitary state. As a result, British Somaliland gained its independence from Britain on June 26, 1960, as the Province of Somaliland.

The State of Somaliland merged with the Trust Territory of Somaliland on July 1, 1960, forming the Republic of Somalia. The Assembly appointed Hagi Bashir Ismail Yusuf, President of the Somali Unity Movement, as the First President of the Somali National Assembly. On the same day, Aden Abdullah Osman Daar was proclaimed President of the Republic of Somalia. On July 22, 1960, Daar appointed Abd al-Rashid Ali Shermarke as the first Prime Minister (Abdullahi, 2015, 103-115). Despite all these developments, the people's right to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity was not respected in Somalia. Although the lands under the British, French, and Italian colonies were united, Western Somalia, which remained within the borders of Ethiopia, was still under the occupation of its neighbor. For Somalis, the conflict was not just about Land, but societies separated by arbitrary and artificial borders (Ratner, 1996:590-592). For this reason, it was not acceptable for Somali society to have people who stay within the borders of neighboring countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya from the same ethnic group themselves. It was complicated for the Somalis to

respect the haphazard borders drawn by the colonial powers. In this framework, the reunification of Somali lands and people under a single flag formed the main foreign policy principle of the newly independent Somali republic (Samatar, 2016: 35-37).

The leading cause of the war between the military regimes of Siad Barre in Somalia and Mengistu in Ethiopia, popularized as the 'Battle of Ogaden' in the international media, was the issue of control of Western Somalia Ogaden, which Somalis heavily populated. The Battle of Ogaden was a continuation of the historical struggle between the two countries to dominate the region. Previously, successive Somali governments have attempted to seize the Ogaden region under Ethiopian control but are densely populated by ethnic Somalis by military means. Religious reasons were also at the root of the Ethiopian-Somali historical conflict (Ingiriis, 2016: 138).

A border dispute came to the fore between the Somali State, which declared its independence after the unification of the colonial lands, and Ethiopia quickly. Indeed, there was no internationally recognized border between the two countries. The Ogaden Somalis shared a strong sense of Somali identity on the Ethiopian side of the border and had deep ties to their relatives on the Somali side. In this context, after gaining independence, successive governments of Somalia conducted a campaign focused mainly on diplomatic means and restoring what they called the "lost lands" of Western Somalia. They brought the issue to the agenda on international platforms such as the Organization of Islamic Countries and the United Nations. Freeing the remaining Somali lands from both white and black colonial powers has been highlighted as one of Somalia's principal tasks to be accomplished. Successive Somali governments have sought to incorporate the remaining Somali lands into the "Republic of Somalia" and realize the dream of Greater Somalia represented by the pentacle on the flag (Mukhtar, 2003:176).

Some developments in the region have worried Ethiopia. The rejection of the border between Ethiopia and Somalia by the newly established Republic of Somalia, the increasing diplomatic and military relations of the Republic of Somalia with the world, and the demands of the region's people to unite with Somalia can be given as examples to these developments. In the following years, hostilities between the two states increased steadily, and some clashes began to occur between Ethiopian-occupied Somali pastoralists and Ethiopian police forces (Ingiriis, 2016: 138).

Furthermore, due to the military coup in Somalia in 1969, Siad Barre's seizure of power in the country notably increased tension between the two countries. Because Siad Barre, who took power by ending a democratic administration, hardened his rhetoric towards the Western Somali lands under Ethiopian occupation to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people in Somalia. Barre wanted to gain the support of all Somalis by gaining the lands of Western Somalia and building the Greater Somali State (Ingiriis, 2016: 138).

Similarly, Ethiopian leader Mengistu thought he would strengthen his legitimacy by fighting his neighbor. However, with the revolution in Ethiopia in 1974 and the establishment of the military regime, a significant change was observed in foreign policy approaches. During and after the Cold War, the enmity between the east and the west deteriorated Ethiopia's relations with the USA, and the Soviet Union replaced the US. Due to many different factors, the military regime deposed the throne in 1974. Water cuts, insufficient food, tax problems, unemployment, postponement of salaries, and social services problems also overwhelmed the new administration. Therefore, Ethiopia's foreign policy during the military regime focused mainly on the territorial integrity and security of the Ethiopian State. Western Somali has had its share of these policies. Successive Ethiopian governments have shown paranoid attitudes in the face of rising nationalism in the Western Somali region under their rule (Broich, 2017: 12).

Therefore, Ethiopia has carefully determined its foreign policy and target to avoid the threat posed by the freedom fighters supported by Somalia and secure its national interest in the region and world politics. Under this policy and target, Ethiopia has emphasized the issue of political independence and the protection of its territorial integrity. Accordingly, it has determined these two issues as its primary targets in foreign policy (Mesfin, 2004: 1). In such a period when relations between the two countries became tense with high-pitched security rhetoric, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), consisting of Somalis living in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, called for the annexation of the region they control to Somalia. These developments have been an opportunity for the Somali leader, Siad Barre. The instability in Ethiopia has paved the way for Somalia to realize the dream of a "Greater Somalia" that includes the Somalis living in Ethiopia.

The Barre regime initially sought to achieve this goal through irregular warfare. In early 1975, the Somali State helped restructure the Ogaden rebellion as the Western

Somali Liberation Front to maintain greater political and military control. By May 1977, these rebels controlled most of the flatlands of the Ogaden area (Baadiyow, 2017: 76-80). Ethiopia and Somalia had a brief territorial battle in 1977 over the Ogaden area, which lies between the two countries and is claimed by both. However, this conflict was of greater importance than most territorial disputes, as the Soviet Union backed Ethiopia and Somalia was backed by the United States. This conflictual process caused the strong winds of the Cold War to blow in East Africa (Baadiyow, 2017: 76-80). The Somali government, which had previously received substantial Soviet aid, began supplying the WSLF with weapons and supplies. As a result, in July 1977, the thirty-five thousand-strong Somali National Army led by Siad Barre, supported by fifteen thousand WSLF militias, occupied the Ethiopian region of Ogaden (Ingiriis, 2016: 139).

Despite the successes of the Somali Ogaden rebels against the military rule in Ethiopia, Barre wanted to turn the struggle into a conventional war in which the Somali army would participate due to the slow pace and indecisive nature of the irregular guerrilla warfare. After the attacks by guerrillas in the spring of 1977 failed to control any significant city, Siad Barre began preparations for the deployment of conventional forces to achieve his political goal of uniting all Ogaden Somalis under the Somali State (Issa-Salwe, 1994, 23-27).

The Somali army, which officially entered the war on June 15, 1977, started its full attack a month later. Troops also supported the Somali army from the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which wanted to secede from Ethiopia. When the dispute began in July 1977, Ethiopia controlled about 10 percent of the Ogaden area. Despite Moscow's warnings, the Soviet-equipped and Soviet-trained Somali National Army occupied Ogaden in July 1977.

The Somali advance's pace and unified armed character initially put the poorly equipped Ethiopian troops stationed in the country's barren plains in a difficult position. However, after a further 700km advance, Somali troops were stopped by Ethiopian military forces in the more mountainous and multi-ethnic region at the western edge of Ogaden (Lewis, 1989: 575).

While this war was going on, the Soviet Union intervened and pressured both countries to sign a peace contract that would permit it to maintain relations with Ethiopia and

Somalia. However, Siad Barre continued the military movement to achieve his goals. As a result, the Ethiopian army, with more significant and more consistent Soviet assistance, drove back the Somali Army and its WSLF allies (Ingiriis, 2016: 140).

In October, the Somali army carried out its most significant offensive to seize the Ethiopian city of Harar. Somali forces faced forty thousand Ethiopian and eleven thousand Cuban troops supported by Soviet artillery and air power. The Ethiopian army won the struggle and forced the Somali army to retreat. Finally, in March 1978, the Ethiopian army captured almost all of Ogaden. Defeated in the war, Somalia had to give up its claims in the region (Tareke, 2000: 66).

There have been endeavors by countries such as Italy, Uganda, and Madagascar to resolve the problem between Ethiopia and Somalia. However, these mediation efforts did not yield the desired results, as Ethiopia was reluctant to negotiate peace following the victory of the Ogaden war and stipulated that the Western Somali lands belonged to it by the Somali government. In addition, Ethiopia's demand for compensation for the damage that occurred during the Ogaden war created a severe obstacle to the problem's solution. As a result, the unilateral efforts of the countries mentioned above to solve the problem have been in vain (Yihun, 2012:17-172). Later, the Barre government preferred to launch a comprehensive diplomatic campaign to isolate and exclude Ethiopia from the international community rather than accept Ethiopia's terms. To achieve this goal, Somalia continued its diplomatic initiatives in different parts of the world. In this diplomatic campaign on the Western front, the Somali government tried to approach the pro-Western countries and explain the human rights violations and unlawful practices of the Mengistu government in Ethiopia. Furthermore, the Somali government argued that Soviet Russia and Cuba also supported the unconstitutional actions of the Mengistu government. In the front of the Arab State, Barre tried to use Somalia's membership in the Arab League as a trump card to get Arab countries to be included in the Somali issue. Furthermore, as part of his diplomatic campaign against Ethiopia after the Ogaden war, President Barre strengthened his relationship with the United States. In line with this policy, after Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden War, in March 1978, US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Richard Moose was invited to Mogadishu to discuss bilateral relations between the two countries (Yimer, 2021:120). Following paragraphs cover

3.2 The Region Liberation Movement's History and Evolution

After the occupation of Emperor Menelik's forces, Somali pastoralists resisted the occupation and fought against the invaders. The predecessors of these resistance movements first made them feel the religious character at the end of the 19th century. For example, when Ethiopia occupied the Ogaden region, the Dervish movement of religious leader Sayyid Mohammed Abdille Hassan in Ogaden attracted 5,000 to 6,000 youths from different clans between 1899 and 1900, and these groups attacked the Ethiopian army in the Jigjiga region with firearms (Muhumed and Siraj, 2000: 67-69).

The division of Somali inhabited territories by the European colonial powers and Ethiopia had profound social and economic effects on the people of Somali. With the external administration established by the European colonial powers in the region, the traditional livestock-based livelihoods of the Somali society were disrupted. In addition to these economic difficulties, all foreign powers were Christians created suspicions among the Somali religious elite. Beneath the impact of all these factors, the first religious-based resistance movement against foreign powers began in Somalia. The target of this movement was invading neighboring Ethiopia and colonial states such as Italy and England (Mukhtar, 2003:192).

After the independence of the Somali State in 1960, the most crucial goal of the governments that came to power in Somalia was to unite the Somali lands, which were under the sovereignty of the neighboring countries, with the lands of the Somali State. Steps have been taken to realize the dream of rescuing the Somali lands outside the territory of the Somali State, which means Greater Somalia, represented by the pentacle. However, the refusal of the border between Ethiopia and Somalia by the nascent Republic of Somalia emboldened the Ethiopian-controlled Somalis, leading to the emergence of separatist organizations that sought to separate from Ethiopia and integrate with the State of Somalia (Samatar, 2008).

After establishing the military regime in Somalia under Siad Barre in 1968, the new regime's more robust expression of the ideal of great Somalia further encouraged the separatist organizations in Western Somalia, and thus some clashes began to occur between these organizations and Ethiopian police forces. In the 1970s, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was established and managed to unite its people with its propaganda activities on the Somalis living in the region.

The liberation movement against Ethiopia in the Western Somali State of 1977-78 reached its peak. The conflict in the region has turned into a hot war called the Ogaden war between Somalia and Ethiopia. Although the Somali army had some success in this war with the support of the WSLF, Ethiopia, at the end of the war, defeated the Somali army and took the whole of Western Somali territory under its control (Muhumed and Siraj, 2000: 67-69).

In 1984, the youth and intellectuals of the Somali region established the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) to continue the resistance. The ONLF was established after the WSLF, which lost Somali support after the 1977-1978 Ogaden war when Ethiopia crushed Somali government forces. The organization, founded by members of various ethnic groups advocating for the liberation of Somalia, could also be referred to as a separatist rebel group fighting for the independence of Ogaden. The ONLF opposed the Greater Somalia initiative and declared that its main aim was to establish an administrative system independent of Ethiopia and the Somali republic (Hagmann, 2008). Having strengthened militarily after the battle of Ogaden, Ethiopia tried to suppress the rebellion. However, Ethiopia also had to deal with its internal problems. In 1991, after seventeen years of military rule, the complete defeat, and the dissolution of its armed forces, the Marxist-Leninist government of Ethiopia came to an end. With the end of the Derg regime in Ethiopia, the ONLF became more assertive and strengthened its presence in the Somali regional government. As a result, the ONLF formed the first regional government, winning more than 70% of the parliamentary seats in June 1992. After the Revolutionary Democratic Front of the Ethiopian Peoples (EPRDF) took over the administration in Ethiopia, ONLF's founding partner, Abdillahi Mohamed Saadi, was elected the first President of the Somali Regional Government. Thus, ONLF gained a dominant position in regional politics (Hagmann and Khalif, 2008:28-29).

However, this regional administration has not been successful in terms of governance. Mismanagement of public resources, the pursuit of sectarian interests, and a general lack of response to influence have characteristic features of the Somali region's governance. These problems marked the end of the regional government, and the elected regional government lasted only two years. However, the main reason for the collapse of the regional government was the desire to secede from Ethiopia by a

popular vote. In early 1994, federal security forces were forced to dismiss it as the ONLF demanded a referendum on self-determination (Hagmann, 2014: 12-15).

In response to ONLF's calls for a secession referendum, 11 parties, primarily representing Issa, Gurgura, Issaq, Gadabursi, Gaboye, and Rer Barre, formed the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (ESDL) in February 1994. By keeping their distance from the ONLF, which they stated to represent only one clan, this union expressed their support for the forces that support democracy and a legal, and political process throughout the country. Although they would like to see the right to self-determination, including secession, preserved in the new Constitution, they expressed that regionalization has potentially changed the political scene in Ethiopia. In any case, the present is not a suitable time for secession. ESDL stated that their priority is investments in the development of the Somali Regional Government. For Ethiopia, the EPRDF's alliance with the ESDL has paved the way for the emergence of several moderate and secular Ethiopian-Somali politicians on the region's political scene (Gudina, 2003: 524-525). As political commissioners loyal to the EPRDF, the ESDL represented national interests at the regional level and regional demands at the federal level. With this stance, they created a vital political link between the federal and regional capitals of Addis Ababa and Jigjiga. As a result, they have received federal support in the region's internal power struggles by supporting the EPRDF's political agenda. Since the ESDL came to power in 1994, top politicians of the Somali Region have often been perceived as "a proxy of the Addis Ababa federal government" (Samatar, 2004: 1144). The move by advocates of a quick referendum on secession was to establish the Western Somali Democratic Party (WSDP) in March 1994, of which the then regional President was elected chairman. The concept of "Greater Somalia" was deliberately brought up at the founding meeting of the party. ONLF, on the other hand, with its direct support within the Ogadeni clan, was able to mobilize the smaller Darood clans such as the "Jidwaq " alliance of Bartirre, Yeberre, and Abasqul. Thus, two blocs were formed, ostensibly differing over political programs and priorities. Moreover, "tribalism" has entered the politics of the Somali Region in Ethiopia, which led to the destruction of Southern Somalia, conflicts, and the collapse of the first government in Somaliland (Markakis, 1994).

After the Ethiopian central government overthrew the ONLF, the ONLF declared a guerrilla war against Ethiopian forces. Meanwhile, in 1995 the Ethiopian Somali

Democratic League (ESDL), affiliated with the EPRDF, dominated the regional parliamentary seats in controversial elections and formed a regional government. Despite the existence of a government in the region, the wars between Ethiopian forces and the opposition group of ONLF have plunged the region into poverty compared to other states of Ethiopia. The second primary trend of the conflict between the Ethiopian government and the ONLF is its increasing internationalization. While the conflict has centered in the heart of the Somali Regional Government, where the Ogaaden communities live, it has drawn in more and more countries where Ogaadeeni communities that support the ONLF live, including Eritrea and Kenya (Hagmann and Khalif, 2008:24-26).

Many of the ONLF leaders have operated in the Diaspora, primarily in the Arabian Gulf States and later elsewhere in the world. Although they are rarely found in Ethiopia, many of these central committee members have some form of personality cult among their followers. ONLF's military commanders play an essential role because they are responsible for tactical decisions and represent a link between political leaders abroad and fighters on the ground. In the Ethiopian Ogaden context, the relationship between Islamic radicals and Ogaadeeni nationalists is striking, as both fought against the Ethiopian government. Although the ONLF temporarily allied with al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, it generally opposed and fought radical Islamist groups. However, ONLF has tried to gain momentum in the struggle by using the Islamic narrative in its propaganda activities from time to time (Hagmann, 2014: 12-15).

Although the ONLF claimed to fight for and represent all Somalis in eastern Ethiopia, it was mainly supported by the Ogaadeeni clan. Although Ogaadeeni communities make up 40 to 50 percent of the region's population, ONLF claims Ogaadeeni communities are the demographic majority in the Somali Regional Government. The vast majority of non-Ogaden clans in the region reject ONLF, which they associate with a political project of regional Ogaden domination. Aware of this rivalry and wanting to take advantage of it, the Ethiopian government is arming the minority Somali militias to fight the majority ONLF. On the other hand, some Ogaden members continue to press for other Somali clans to be represented in the regional government (Abdullahi, 2007).

Fully engaged in the conflict, the Ogaden Diaspora has become the target of a rival public relations campaign by the ONLF and the Somali Regional government. ONLF

supporters have participated in global advocacy campaigns to raise awareness of "genocide" in Ogaden. On the other hand, Abdi Mohamed's administration successfully recruited Diaspora members (Hagmann, 2014: 12-15). The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) operations against ONLF forces and Al-Shabaab militia continued throughout the 2000s. These operations continued in the Fiq, Korahey, Degehabur, Warder, and Gode regions inhabited by the northern Ogaden clans of Rer Abdulle, Makahil, and Rer Ishaq. In addition, government forces cordoned off the borders of Somaliland and Puntland, which the ONLF allegedly used to obtain supplies, and the ONLF's new Eritrean-trained fighters in the region.

In early August 2007, the Ethiopian government claimed to have taken control of ONLF activities and had killed more than 500 ONLF fighters and taken nearly 200 prisoners since May. The ONLF immediately denied this allegation, arguing that most ONLF fighters alleged to have been killed were civilians. He also reported that the Ethiopian military action resulted in the death or injury of many civilians, accompanied by severe human rights violations. Human rights groups, international aid organizations, and UN organizations have also claimed that both ONLF and Ethiopian forces threaten the lives and livelihoods of the civilian population in the conflict zone. At the same time, the trade blockade also lowers the purchasing power of the poor, limits the availability of foodstuffs, and reduces access to food (reliefweb.int).

On October 13, 2010, the Ethiopian government signed a peace agreement with a faction of the Ogaden National Liberation Front. This ethnic Somali rebel movement has waged a separatist war against Addis Ababa since the 1980s. At the signing of the agreement, the main faction of ONLF condemned the agreement and announced that it would continue to fight the Ethiopian government (Opalao, 2010). Despite ONLF's determination to fight, the Ethiopian government wanted to reduce the number of armed groups in the Ogaden region, signing a peace agreement with the United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF) in July 2010 in exchange for amnesty for senior leaders. These agreements have been crucial steps to bring peace to the Ethiopian Regional Province, a region that has suffered from conflict and crippling underdevelopment for decades (Shinn, 2006).

The Ethiopian government's effort and haste for peace in Ogaden stemmed from the region's oil and gas production potential. Foreign companies, including PETRONAS

from Malaysia, Canada-based Africa Oil Corporation, and a subsidiary of Sinopec from China, have participated in oil exploration. However, insurgent groups have threatened to sabotage attempts to explore natural resources if their demands for self-determination are not met.

These attacks took place because the demands were not met. For example, in April 2007, ONLF attacked an exploration field operated by Sinopec's subsidiary, China Petroleum, and Chemical Corporation, killing sixty-five Ethiopians and nine Chinese workers (Opalao, 2010). Upon these developments, the Ethiopian government accelerated the counter-insurgency operations in the region. In the following years, political issues in Ethiopia's Somali Regional State continued to be sensitive and controversial. Peace talks started again in 2012 between the Ethiopian government and the ONLF. After the first and second peace talks in Nairobi in September and October 2012, Abdi Mohamed's administration launched a public relations campaign that made him the leader of all Ethiopian Somalis (Hagmann, 2020). Abdi Mohamed Omer (iley) built his career by fighting the ONLF. Therefore, he opposed ONLF's re-emergence as a political actor in peace talks. For this basis, he put pressure on the intellectuals who support the peace talks in the region (BCR, 2020).

Abdi Mohamed is a character closely associated with the formation of the special police force. The Liyu police (special police) was established in 2009 when Abdi Mohamed was head of regional security. Daud Mohamed Ali oversaw the presidency, Police force, which has 10,000 to 15,000 personnel, is mostly made up of members of the Ogaadeeni clan. He made forces leaders his Ali Yusuf lineage (Rer Abdille), to which Abdi Mohamed belongs. The Liyu police stood out for their record of treating civilians even worse than the ENDFs.

In October 2012, at the start of the second round of peace talks, two key points emerged: the negotiation status of the Ethiopian Constitution and the composition of the Ethiopian government delegation. These issues stood in the way of progress in the peace talks, impacting the ONLF's core claim to self-determination. However, despite these obstacles, the Kenyan facilitation team was instrumental in eventually overcoming these obstacles and advancing the process, thanks to their powers of persuasion.

The Kenyan team sought to reform Addis Ababa's request and divert discussions to other, less controversial issues. However, ONLF was concerned that any compromise would be seen as surrender. Likewise, the Ethiopian government feared that this issue would be seen as a second attempt to divide the country after Eritrea's secession and acted timidly, fearing that recognizing the right to self-determination could set an example for other ethnic armed groups. After lengthy discussions, the parties could not find a solution for these reasons, and the negotiations ended without an agreement (Hagmann, 2020).

3.3 The Birth of a New Shift for the Somali Region in 2018

A window of opportunity suddenly opened in April 2018 after an unexpected and radical leadership change in Addis Ababa. A series of rapid reforms were introduced, including the delisting of ONLF as a terrorist organization in June, and ONLF was removed from the list of terrorist organizations by the Ethiopian Government in July 2018. Three months later, in October 2018, the government and the ONLF signed a peace agreement in Asmara, ending the 34-year-old rebellion in the Somali Regional State. In August 2018, the head of the Somali Regional State Abdi Mohammed Omar, also known as Abdi Iley, was arrested, and replaced by Mustafa Omer, an exiled activist, and former UN employee. The ONLF leadership later supported Mustafa Omar. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed invited the opposition leaders to return to the country and continue their political activities. The main opposition parties, including the ONLF, welcomed this call. In November 2018, Ethiopian Airlines brought many uniformed ONLF members from Eritrea to Jigjig, the capital of the Somali Regional State. In December 2018, ONLF leadership returned to Ethiopia. In April 2019, the regional government and the ONLF signed an agreement to disarm and reintegrate members into the State's security forces and civil service (Hagmann, 2020). The Somali region leaders joined Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's unified Prosperity Party (PP), which took over from the ruling EPRDF coalition in December 2019. While joining the "national" party was not an easy decision for senior members of the erstwhile Somali Democratic Party (SDP) leadership, they claimed one significant reason for doing so: to have a place at the table. Having a seat at the table when Somalis had been structurally excluded under the EPRDF appealed to some Somalis, but it also prompted criticism from others. Moreover, the mechanics of this "table" was never adequately clarified, raising the question: if the table will compromise the fate of Somalis in

Ethiopia, what benefit does having a place at the table bring? However, PP (prosperity party) branch leaders are only answerable to the national PP central committee, not to any specific group. Moreover, PP adopts an individual-based membership strategy that avoids ethnic or group affinity; what good is this representation? This renders the "place at the table" argument, which has been used to appeal to historically marginalized peoples like Somalis, obsolete. Indeed, the Somali people's collective bargaining power has not increased due to sitting at the table. The struggle for democratization and a more just system in Ethiopia resulted in a political transformation over time. Instead, a rebranding of the old authoritarian system of control took place. The federal government intervened at will in the internal affairs of regional states under the EPRDF regime, undermining the critical principles of the self-rule system – an unlawful and unofficial intrusion (Juweria, 2020). Despite the turmoil in Ethiopia, the Somali region looks to be the one bright point in this otherwise bleak situation. After the major opposition party, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), laid down its arms and ended a 24-year insurgency, the region has experienced relative peace for the previous three years. The current administration has taken commendable steps as well. For example, President Mustafa Omer has significantly enhanced freedom of expression, reduced but not eliminated arbitrary arrests, and significantly improved infrastructures such as roads, water wells, and the agriculture industry. However, despite the relative calm and a constructive growth goal, much is still to be desired (Warfa, 2021).

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

4.1 Methodology

This study aims to investigate Ethiopia's ethnic federalism, especially in the Somali region. As a result, this chapter focuses on the research technique, data collection processes, sample method, and data processing methods.

In cases where prior information is insufficient, an empirical study may be the most effective option (Armstrong 1970: 27). Qualitative research methods will be used in this investigation to answer the research questions and achieve the study's goals. However, as Moody points out, while empirical research is usually utilized in academic research, it might also address the practical question.

A qualitative interview will provide a more remarkable chance to examine, locate, and analyze data because of the close engagement and exchanges with the respondents. Respondents may express themselves more freely in open-ended interviews, which enable them to speak openly about their experiences, thoughts, and incidents. The researcher also needs to know the interviewee's subjective interpretations and meanings of beliefs, actions, acts, and events (Moody 2005). The method is generally preferred and used while joining entirely new areas, and it may become less empirical as the field's mastery grows. A higher level of perceptive ability may be required to use this method effectively.

4.2 Research Data Collection methods

The study's primary approach for collecting empirical data on how ethnic federalism works in Ethiopia is divided into two parts: document investigation and analysis and online qualitative interviews with participants to increase the study's validity and reliability. First, academic and research studies, governmental and regional administration documents, local adapted news items, evaluative assessments of local governance, and numerous data sources will be examined at different levels. Second, online qualitative interviews will be used synchronously to converse in real-time and zoom as a research medium.

Zoom interviews allow participants and researchers to speak in real-time. Video chat is the closest a researcher will get to resemble a face-to-face interview.

This is because it allows for facial expressions and other visual cues absent in textually based forms such as chat rooms.

The goal of the online interviews, also known as E-interviews, is to conduct in-depth interviews with CMCs. While any ICT may be used for online interviews, the emphasis here is on communication tools that allow researchers and participants to converse in real-time. Online interviews are employed for primary Internet-mediated Research (IMR). They gather original data via the Internet to subject them to analysis to provide new evidence concerning a specific research question (Hewson, 2010).

Scholarly online interviews are conducted by following ethical research guidelines; verifiable research participants provide informed consent before participating in an interview.

4.3 Sampling techniques

In terms of sampling, the researcher will employ a purposive sample technique to gather data for this research. According to Kothari, purposive sampling entails the purposeful choosing of certain parts of the universe to form a sample that represents the universe (Kothari, 2004). Furthermore, according to Oliver (2012), purposive sampling is a type of non-probability sampling. The researcher makes selections about who should be included in the sample based on many characteristics, such as the knowledge about the research subject or capacity and willingness to engage in the study (Oliver, 2012).

Furthermore, the online interviewees will be chosen purposefully for their responsibilities, status, and knowledge concerning Ethiopia's ethnic federalism process, notably in the Somali region. As a result, the interviews will be of good enough quality to provide crucial information. A total of six qualitative online interviews will be chosen. Even though the number of respondents appears to be lower, an online qualitative interview, which predominantly employs semi-structural methods, offers a significant amount of helpful information through visual elicitation discussion. An interview with a single person took longer in certain circumstances.

The names of all the interviewees are not given in the thesis, as guaranteed to the interviewees, to safeguard their privacy and eliminate the danger of retaliation because of the interview.

4.3.1 Data collecting instrument

4.3.2 In-depth Interviews

Robinson and Tolley (2005), In-depth interviews involve one interviewer and one responder. This type of comprehensive, one-on-one interviewing has been termed a "conversational partnership" by many academics.

Furthermore, among the three types and styles of interviews (completely structured interview, semi-structured interview, and unstructured interview), the fully structured interview, semi-structured interview, and unstructured interview are the most common, therefore, this research will use semi-structured interview guidelines to gather data for its plan's consumption. In addition, semi-structured and unstructured interviews are commonly employed inflexible, qualitative designs where respondents are allowed free reign to say anything they want on the broad subject of the discussion with relatively minimum support from the interviewer. Interviews are often performed one-on-one and face-to-face.

However, they can also happen in a group context (Robson, 2002). Thus, the researcher will carry out an in-depth individual interview or an online qualitative research interview as a data collection method to support these approaches.

4.4. Data Analysis

The qualitative analysis focuses on integrating data rubrics, bringing context, and meaning together (Ulin et al., 2005). According to Creswell (2002), it entails making sense of the text and visual data. Preparing the data for analysis, delving deeper into the data, representing the data, and interpreting the data's greater significance are all part of the process. There are several interrelated steps to consider in qualitative data analysis: reading, coding, displaying, reducing, and interpreting (Ulin, Robinson, and Tolley, 2005). As reported by Creswell (2002:191) tries to put it, blending generic and specific research design steps is an ideal situation in qualitative data analysis. According to Ulin, Robinson, and Tolley (2005:145), Qualitative analysis starts with data immersion, which entails the researcher reading and rereading the organized notes and records until he or she is thoroughly familiar with the contents.

In terms of epistemology, this research adheres to the interpretive theory, which views humans as social actors continually constructing their social reality. As a result, both

the researcher and the respondents are acknowledged as personal actors with their thoughts, ideas, and convictions. These subjective variables may have an impact on the findings of the study. As a result, integrating interpretative theory with several sources (or triangulation) could help reduce subjectivity. Rather than comparing the values of techniques, the methodological path was chosen in this study based on an appraisal of their deeper relationship to the research issue

This study does not believe in exaggerating the benefits of one strategy while downplaying the benefits of others. Instead, it is thought that, in many cases, the study findings are perhaps the most relevant indicator of not whether the strategy used is beneficial. In this sense, qualitative interviews as a research method combined with an interpretive framework have proven highly beneficial in reaching closer to public views and convictions in addressing and understanding Ethiopia's state reconstruction. In addition, the empirical analytic technique has also helped the study in unearthing critical material that can reflect on the real function of Ethiopian ethnic federalism.

CHAPTER FIVE

FINDINGS

5.1 Introduction

In this section, findings from the collected interviewee's data are presented. As it was promised to the interviewees to protect their privacy and avoid risks, they may face possible retribution because of the interview, the names of all interviewees are not revealed in the study. Instead, the interviewees are identified in their roles and status not to compromise their safety. Thus, to protect the anonymity of the interviewees and yet to satisfy the requirement of documentation of the research, the interviewees or informants are identified by common names and numbers. All interviews were conducted in 2021, and a piece of brief information was given to each interviewee.

Here is the brief information for each interviewee:

(Interviewee 1 a former opposition party executive member from the Somali region, 2021)

(Interviewee 2 former Somali region executive member, 2021)

(Interviewee 3 a regional executive member from the Somali region)

(Interviewee 4 a former regional advisor to the president.2021)

(Interviewee 5 law expert, 2021)

(Interviewee6 civil servant, 2021)

5.2 Political Participation of the People

When the interviewees were questioned about the people's political participation, they all mentioned problems regarding political participation. Depending on the interviewees' statements, the lack of political participation can be seen at all levels, from the local to the federal level. Although not all interviewees talked about the same problems, the problems were generally about the political culture of Ethiopia, the history of the region, the reluctance of the state regimes to share their authority, and unfair elections.

The interviewees stated a reason behind the problems related to political participation in the political culture of Ethiopia. According to Interviewee 2, the Ethiopian community has been numb regarding political involvement. The culture of politics in

Ethiopia has viewed the public as the puppets of the state. Therefore, it has been imbued with a sense of control, subjugation, and obedience.

Regarding this, Interviewee 2 stated that: In the imperial and Derg regime reign, political participation was taboo to discuss in public confabulations. However, the political involvement inquiry gained prominence after TPLF came to power in 1991 with their vision of a multi-ethnic federal-state Ethiopia. Despite the question of public participation coming to life after the downfall of Derg, EPDRF saw 30 years of general repression, torture, and extrajudicial killings. In the same way, Interviewee 5 stated that:

The opposition parties regard the local leaders as corrupted and undemocratic who care less about their people. There are also many critics from the community regarding the weakness of public service institutions. Still, in general, there is both a positive and negative relationship between the local community and their local leaders.

Interviewee1, a former opposition party executive member from the Somali region, drew attention to the history of the acquisition of democratic rights and how the region was shaped during this history. Although Ethiopia's Transitional Government was established in 1992, the Somali regional state was founded in January 1993. However, the provincial government's top administrative role began in 1994. As a result, the region gained 93 woreda, zonal, kebele, and city administrations in years. On the other hand, Interviewee3, a member of the regional executive from the Somali region, emphasized the role of the ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) to gain political participation. According to him, the ONLF has been fighting for ethnic Somali self-determination in the SRS (Somali Regional State), the region's official name now, for more than two decades.

Following the collapse of Ethiopia's military regime in 1991, which evolved into an ethnically oriented federal structure, the ONLF won elections for the first SRS regional parliament in 1992. Similarly, Interviewee6 mentioned that Since Ethiopia became a federal state after overthrowing the Haile Salase regime, the country was restructured under ethnic region lines when the Tigray-led party EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) came to power in 1991. As a result, the Somali region was recognized as autonomous after a long battle against the Abyssinians.

Concerning political participation, it is also stated that the successive state regimes have not been willing to share their authority. Interviewee 2 said that these administrations in Ethiopia demonstrated an insatiable desire to control the public and implanted the crowd with a myopic vision of the political reality in Ethiopia. Interviewee 1 emphasized that all political and administrative spaces in the Somali regional state were controlled by the ruling Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party (ESPDP)/EPRDF. Therefore, opponent parties like the ONLF (Ogaden national liberation front) have been forbidden from engaging in multi-party politics during elections and from taking part in the state's governing, legislative, and judicial functions at all levels.

Major political decisions in the Somali Region, like with the rest of the country, are created, and enforced through the ruling party structure rather than through representative institutions like parliament or local government councils, according to interviewee 3.

A top-down procedure appointed the region's zonal and district administrators and village chairpersons from its inception until its first-ever district elections in 1992. After that, senior regional politicians selected their clients as local government officials, usually loyal to the ruling party and representing the dominant clan lineage within a particular jurisdiction.

Similarly, Interviewee 5 stated that: The local people demand good governance and good service from all public institutions. In contrast, the opposition parties only request one thing from all government levels to be given political space to compete freely. Although the current administration has a particular type of power, the local admin takes orders from Addis Ababa. Regarding problems related to political participation, Interviewee 1 particularly emphasized the role of the State Council. According to him, the State Council was almost non functioning, assembling only occasionally (at least twice a year, as required by the state constitution). This circumstance could have facilitated the creation of an ineffective and corrupt bureaucracy, resulting in government mismanagement. Moreover, even though elected legislators are constitutionally accountable to the State Council, there is no administrative framework to perform the State Council's constitutional duties.

Interviewee 1 described the State Council as the supreme regional political authority because it represents its people. However, he stated that its operations do not allow it to play a substantial role following its jurisdiction. He counted various factors that contribute to this:

First, members of the state council do not get adequate payment for their service. Moreover, most of them work for regional, zonal, and Woreda Government institutions, making them exposed to executive branch manipulation, bribes, rewards, and coercion. Second, the legislative body meets just twice a year, which leaves little time to oversee and control the executive branch's operations. Furthermore, the state legal system has been unable to monitor and manage the executive branch's enormous power. First, despite the Constitution's provisions protecting judges from interference and removal, it has been easy for the executive body to change judges from their positions because it is effortless to get the approval of the State Council, which has been rendered ineffective in challenging executive power and has evolved into a rubber stamp for the executive and the dominant ruling party. Even if the constitutional procedures are followed, removing judges is still relatively easy. Judges have been ousted from their positions on several occasions. Second, the state judicial structure may fail to adequately assist local people because they must travel to zone towns to obtain higher court decisions. Because the woreda court is constitutionally powerless and frequently staffed by non-qualified judges, this adds a high cost to the local (mostly poor) people's access to justice.

Another topic related to political participation was the elections. In general, elections are considered an indicator and grant of political participation. However, interviewees stated that it had not been the same in Ethiopia. According to Interviewee 2, Ethiopia's lack of political participation is confined to the federal level and is evident in regional and zonal level elections. He added that all the elections held in Ethiopia between 1991 to 2018 had been considered sham elections and, to some extent, annulled by international observers like the EU.

Moreover, it is argued that there were no elections before 2021 in Ethiopia. According to Interviewee 5, by keeping in the political nature of the country, there are no fair and accessible election exercises at all levels. The region is governed by the ruling party, which selects its own handpicked membership, picking up undemocratic and ill-processed votes.

There are several political parties registered at the regional level; these parties have, in theory, been given the approval to compete in elections but never have been given the space to compete. Regarding the problems in elections, Interviewee 2 stated that despite establishing representative institutions at the district and regional levels, elections and appointments in the Somali Region were based on rigorous candidate pre-selection by the ruling party's leaders.

Similarly, Interviewee 4 emphasized that the election board of the region allows to elect and be elected all citizens whose age is not less than 18 years. Therefore, every citizen and organization has the right to participate in the election process. On the other hand, the ruling party has much facilitation since the ruling party mainly nominates the election board. Interviewee 4, a former regional advisor to the president, added that "for the last ten years I have been looking at the real situation in people of the region with respected local relationships and I did come across local leaders having zero influence in the election process with almost little influence on the individual."

According to Interviewee 2 listed the problems related to elections as follows: First, people's participation in the selection process is non-existent. Let alone participating in the election, the people of the Somali region had even no clue about who was running. This depicts the reality of the political culture in the Somali region as gloomy. The only way that the people participate in elections in the Somali region is to not know about the candidate they are required to vote for. Second, not asking questions about the election results since that risks them getting incarcerated without trials, the regional and zonal level people had to verify the supposed candidate because either way if they turned out to vote or not, the ruling party dominated the election. Third, the candidates are pre-selected, making the election an already decided one. The most important thing about becoming a candidate is only about the views and upholding the ruling class's values. This characteristic applies to all candidates. Fourth, the top-down political approach that Ethiopia's inept ruling party (TPLF) left no room for political participation. In the case of the Somali region, there are four political parties (S-PP, ONLF, EZEMA, FEP) , the ruling party and the opposition groups, respectively. In the 2021 Somali region's election, some argue that the government refused to register minority political parties despite claims of the flourishing democracy made by the region's president Mustafa Omar.

In the same way the opposition parties at the federal level declined to participate in the election, the opposition parties in the Somali region did the same, citing government misconduct in handling election affairs. Fifth, one of these misconducts cited by the opposition groups leading their election withdrawal is voter registration cards. They argued that most of the cards, 70%, are at the hands of the ruling party. They made calls to change the cards and argued that the government did not distribute voter registration cards to the public. The ruling party envisaged that if they distributed the voter's cards fairly, winning the election was in jeopardy. Sixth, there is no apparent relationship between the newly elected candidates and the public. The newly elected members, either from regional or zonal levels, pursue their vested interest and the broader affairs of the state, which is politically glorifying everything. In the same way, Interviewee 6 mentioned that:

The post-1991 era offered new chances at first. However, the ruling party's manipulation of internal regional politics ruined the promise of a self-governing and legitimate local government that could address historical problems. In general, starting from 1995 to 2021, the political participation and both federal and regional elections were dominated by the dominant party who was in force, and the political space of opposition groups was delimited. There was no political polarization at both the federal and regional levels. However, in the last election held in 2021, three opposition parties withdrew from the postponed poll.

The biggest opposition group, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), announced its withdrawal from the election when its concerns were not addressed, its followers were not registered to vote, and the ruling party members pocketed the bulk of voting cards. This indicates that the political participation of the people and opposition parties was not fulfilled since the Constitution allowed them to have their political right to participate.

5.3 Ethnic Rights and Ethnic Relations

According to the interviewees, ethnic rights and ethnic relations are the major concerns in the region. According to Interviewee 1, since the early nineteenth century, the former centralized Ethiopian governmental structure has imposed its authority on Ethiopia's numerous ethnic communities. The centralized state-imposed power was not tolerant of recognized and promoted local identities. As a result, these ethnic communities' cultures, including their languages, were neglected at the national level. Though the 1975 land reform was critical in ending the central ruling elites' and their local agents' economic abuse of the "southern" people, it did not allow for local self-governance or recognition of ethnic rights to self-administration.

Some interviewees mentioned some advantages and disadvantages of ethnic entitlement. Interviewee 3 Stated: that ethnic rights have some benefits in Ethiopia based on socio-cultural and religious issues. Also, it has drawbacks like conflicts on those rights,

For example, land ownership, religion, political representation, Etc. Though it has great benefits for most marginalized ethnic groups, including the Somali community, by recognizing their ethnic rights and use of their local language and promoting their culture and religious beliefs it has some disadvantages to many other minority groups. Similarly, Interviewee 5 stated that benefits regarding ethnic rights ensure citizens' rights are equally addressed; another benefit is the idea of self-rule. Shortcomings are ethnic conflicts, lack of national unity, and identity politics. The benefits that the ethnic entitlement has come across are allowing all ethnic groups to have their ethnic line region and develop their culture, religion, and language for local administration and primary education.

On the topic, Interviewee 4 emphasized that the Somali region got a self-administered region through their ethnic entitlement. In contrast, the Somali community had a lot of obstacles and federal interference at the federal level. However, Somali society feels their respective ethnic groups were recognized since they get their autonomy and the self-administered region at least in theory and hopes the constitution burden will be implemented and improved for the future. Also, he added that:

So far, there is a good relationship among the region's community. Interviewee 4 stated he did not experience challenges while living with the other ethnic groups living in the region. The positivity of redrawing the internal boundary provided peaceful conflict resolution. At the same time, the negative aspect creates more internally displaced people due to their language or ethnic background, and the highest rate of causes of the problem is ownership of the land.

Regarding the importance of ethnic rights and ethnic relations, Interviewee 1 emphasized that: Since the beginning of ethnic restructuring in 1991, ethnic identities have become a focal point for political mobilization and local administrations, and newly restructured ethnic administrative constituencies have become a venue for official expressions of ethnic identity and ethnic self-administration by providing at least symbolic importance for recognition and dignity of ethnic elites and communities. Interviewee 6 described the process of gaining ethnic rights in that region as follows:

Ethiopia's new multinational federal structure, which went into effect in 1995, was the first time Somalis were recognized as constituent members of the Ethiopian state. Moreover, the promise of redressing historically oppressed peoples' subservient status in Ethiopia manifested itself in the form of an auspicious new constitution. This Constitution established nations', nationalities', and peoples' ethnocultural rights, signaling a shift away from earlier hierarchical government systems that bolstered dominant groups' hegemony at the expense of marginalized ones. Some of the country's regions profited from the established ethnic federalism, including the Somali region. The region was granted autonomy for the first time and administered itself in its mother tongue (Somali). The Somali language forged forward, portraying an environment of togetherness and individuality, owing to a receptive community.

The Somali people in the region sighed a sigh of relief and saw a new dawn when members of their own became schoolteachers, nurses, administrators, and other professionals.

It is understood from the interviewees' statement that federalism be the solution to the problems related to ethnic rights and ethnic relations. According to Interviewee2, the Somali community saw ethnic federalism as one to retain their identity and culture, and ethnicity itself as an opportunity to compete with other cultures in a multicultural

environment. Those who espouse this belief presume that competing ethnicities can develop the country. This could be a good idea if people discard the negative aspect of ethnicity and compete with other ethnicities in a healthy style, promoting Ethiopia's overall economy. Similarly, Interviewee stated that ethnic federalism benefits indigenous communities by allowing them to exercise self-government and the right to self-determination in the future. According to Interviewee 6, ethnic federalism would be highly beneficial to the region if adequately implemented.

Some interviewees stated that the attitudes of political leaders made it difficult to solve ethnic problems and even exacerbated the problems.

For instance, Interviewee 2 mentioned that ethnic leaders politicized ethnicity in Ethiopia to an unprecedented level in recent history, proving cosmopolitanism's seemingly dead idea. He added that: Hence one of the apparent shortcomings of being entitled to ethnicity in Ethiopia is paying for the transgression of others who claim to be from your ethnicity. The most notable example happened right before Abiy came to power, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of innocent civilians who had no idea why they died. Before Abiy came to power, ethnic leaders used young people (mob) to achieve political ends. There have been waves of protests in 20 with 18, hundreds of murders perpetrated by groups like Qeero and Heego. It was one of the worst periods to be entitled to ethnicity. Ethnicity in Ethiopia has commanded many innocent individuals to lose their jobs and wealth, particularly those living in an area dominated by ethnicity to which they do not belong to. Corrupt ethnic leaders employed ethnicity as an opportunity to divide and escape from their responsibility.

It is understood from the interviewees' statements that language is considered an ethnic right. For instance, Interviewee 4 asserted that the benefit of ethnic rights is self-administration and learning primary school with their mother tongue. At the same time, the shortcoming is less integration among other ethnic groups since what each ethnicity gives primary core is their mother tongue. In addition to that, minority groups living in a region may suffer due to the dominance of the primary ethnic language of the region. Similarly, Interviewee1 stated that:

Today in Ethiopia, people living in different parts of the country can speak and study in their language. The different ethnicities residing in the country feel attached to their culture and communities geographically and culturally. However, there are also challenges posed by ethnic federalism in Ethiopia: its less patriotic aspect. Ethiopia's totality of the nation is in question; language and geographic segregation are reasons why the sense of patriotism is absent in the average lay ordinary people. Furthermore, the promotion of local language in local administrations has become a venue for official expressions of ethnic identity and ethnic self-administration by providing at least symbolic importance for recognition and dignity of ethnic elites.

Regarding the language as an ethnic right, Interviewee 2 stated that:

It is pretty evident in Ethiopia today. The number of people who aspire to learn English is more than those who aspire to learn the national language, i.e., Amharic. This is due to ethnic leaders and the people belonging to the ethnicities opposing the idea of one ethnic group dominating others. That is why many people see Amharic as a language specific to one ethnic group and hence cannot opt as the national language. People believe that adopting the language of other ethnic groups is a hegemonizing factor. The issue of ethnic hegemony is one of many reasons why most of the Ethiopian public refrains from speaking Amhara. This conundrum over the language has roots in the country's history, which many believe is full of dehumanization and subjugation of ethnicities. Ethiopia was one of the few nations in the world that aspired to reach cosmopolitanism, i.e., the peaceful coexistence of the different ethnicities, by seeing difference as an opportunity to see the other as a brother.

Interviewee 2 In addition to language, education was another ethnic right. Only Interviewee 1 mentioned education. According to him, the concept of self-government has sparked indigenous societies' desire to seek better education to meet the challenges of modern administration. However, many indigenous ethnic groups have historically found education insufficiently appealing to send their children to school. There was no incentive or rational reason for most of these ethnic groups to send their children to modern educational facilities. Also, he added that:

Modern education, they believed, was an alien phenomenon that may harm their children's behavior and incite them to rebel against their traditions and customs. More crucially, it is a well-known truth that the public education system, along with the

oppressive administrative institutions of the central state, was forced on indigenous communities by ejecting local and traditional chiefs. Such a design would likely fail to entice indigenous populations to embrace the modern school system that has alienated traditional administrative and legal institutions. However, in the face of the promise and difficulty of self-government, indigenous people increasingly recognize the importance of modern education.

5.4 Resource Allocation

Regarding resource allocation, the interviewees stated that from 1992, the Constitution and laws ensured equal and fair distribution of resources. However, there are problems with the applications. According to Interviewee 1, the Constitution imposes that 'the Federal Government may grant to states emergency, rehabilitation, and development assistance and loans, with due care taken that such assistance and loans do not hamper the proportionate growth of states.' The federal government will audit and inspect how states are developing proportionately. The Constitution also gives the HF authority to establish the federal government's subsidies to the states. Interviewee 3 emphasized that the federal government allocates unearmarked general purpose grants to sub-national regional governments based on a formula developed by the House of Federation. The grant allocation formula that was in effect for the period 2017/18 to 2019/20 was extended by the House of Federation in October 2019 to be used for two years.

Despite the provisions of the Constitution and laws, resource allocation is not done as it should be in the region. According to Interviewee 5, the Constitution spells out the question of resource sharing, but this is never fully implemented, and people do not feel transparent because there are no institutions to oversee this. Interviewee 2 summarized the problem as follows:

We know Ethiopia is a federal state, and each fiscal year, the federal government grants budgets to the regional governments. Out of these grants, the Somali region receives at least 10% of the federal budget, placing the region in the fourth position in the number of regions that receive the highest grants from the federal government. Hence the regional government allocates the budget to zonal/district administrations based on the grants from the federal government and the income generated from the region.

Regional government areas usually emphasize the rubrics of health, education, infrastructure (roads), water, and energy.

However, where considerable work is to be done in these thematic areas of emphasis, the government allocates a budget each year. However, improvements in people's lives in terms of water, health, and electricity have been stagnant over the years. Most all the rural population in the region has no running water or electricity. However, the hypocrisy in the growing number of contractors and people asking the governments at regional, zonal, and district levels to invest in water and electricity, but the problem is more profound and perpetuated. So, the query of who is to condemn, people can be confident in government promises to improve their lives. The answer is simply no; He believes the investments in water and electricity are not a direct investment that touches the people's lives but an investment between the contractor and responsible official. In this process of the contractor and the politician relationship, the pressing issue of quenching the people's thirst is lost and forgotten.

The problems related to resource allocation were tied to different reasons by the interviewees. One of these reasons is the attitude of Ethiopia's federal and regional structures. According to interviewees, the federal budget subsidy to regional governments is distributed in a block grant, with regional authorities' free' to decide on distribution and expenditure depending on their development goals and priorities. However, because the EPRDF's centralized party command structure monopolized political power in Ethiopia's federal and regional structures, regional states' policy orientations and decisions are in most cases like the federal government's policy directions and objectives, and thus no major divergence or contradictions have emerged between the federal and regional preferences.

According to Interviewee 5, the federal government, which controls the formula of resource sharing quota, did not transfer the budget to the regions by following the resource sharing. However, they transferred the budget by giving some regions more and others less without constitutional basis. Similarly, Interviewee stated that the regimes at the federal level played a crucial role in blocking the Somali region from taking part in economic activities. In the same way, Interviewee 6 stated that the budgetary relationship in Ethiopia's federal system was marked by a high level of imbalance in favor of the federal government. Almost all substantial internal revenue

sources were allocated to the federal government, making regional states utterly reliant on federal transfers (or a budget subsidy) to fulfill their responsibilities and tasks.

On the other hand, Interviewee 1 stated that: After the federal projected expenditure, the budget subsidy to the regions is calculated. The total of regional states' budget subsidies is equal to total countrywide fiscal sources minus federal government expenditure demands, or: Budget Subsidy to the Regional States = Total Fiscal Resource – Federal Spending Needs This means that the budget subsidy for regional states is computed based on the federal government's priority, not the regional states. Instead of considering both levels of government on an equal footing, this demonstrates the federal government's dominance.

Similarly, Interviewee 4 drew attention to Ethiopia's federal and regional structures in terms of resource allocation and said that:

Resource allocation of the country is based on a federal structure whereby internal revenue is covered by the regional state while federal institutions transfer allocated money to each region. Regarding the other local resources in the country still, it does not have a fixed labeling strategy on how to share local resource income. That is why still Somali region, which has the highest petroleum reserve, lacks a clear policy on resource sharing in the country. The fact is that as government rule and regulation process looks quite transparent when it comes to the budget announcing to the public, tax regulation in custom authority and other related business sectors but still sharing resource of each region in terms of their rate does not reflect clearly in government proclamations. Finance distribution of the country and how it was handled at the federal level is still under a question mark. However, at least there is some sharing quota for each region, though, in principle, many financial problems exist in the region allocation budget. Another problem related to resource allocation is ethnicity. Interviewee 3, claimed that the federal government provides a subsidy to the regional government, distributed to ethnically delimited administrative entities to allow the numerous ethnic groups that make up the regional state to have some degree of self-administration. As a result, budget allocation to each zone or wereda administration is evaluated through the lens of resource distribution across the regional state's ethnic populations. As a result, a subsidy distribution formula is developed to create recognizable and fair budget allocations, reducing tensions and destructive rivalry for financial resources. He also added that the total amount of the federal general-purpose

grant is divided and transferred proportionally to the regions such as Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Benishangul Gumuz, Gambella, Harari, and Dire Dawa.

Similarly, Interviewee 4 stated: "The way designed ethnic-based federalism creates more decentralized power whereby each zone, woreda, and kebeles get their sharing and quota properly, so I believe that ethnic-based federalism has a positive approach in regional economic development as well as country development." On the other hand, Interviewee 2 stated that the economic relation between different ethnicities in Ethiopia is influenced by how ethnic leaders politicize ethnicity.

The more ethnic leaders politicize ethnicity, the less economic relation between ethnicities. One recent example is the economic embargo Somalis and Oromos imposed on each other in 2018 after ethnicity led to a violent confrontation. On this matter, Interviewee 2 emphasized that:

If regions had been given control over most of the tax and other revenue sources within their regional state, a few regions with higher levels of economic activity, such as the Somali region, could have self-financed their expenditures and could have been in a better position to do so. However, due to the region's reliance on federal budget allocation, the Somali community did not feel transparent about how the resource allocation was divided at both the federal and regional levels.

Another problem related to resource allocation mentioned by interviewees is the public's attitude in Ethiopia. According to Interviewee 6, the relationship between ethnic federalism and economic relations is almost obscure to the public in Ethiopia since people do not ask the critical question that they should have asked. He added that: People should ask where and how the revenues generated by the region are spent. Nevertheless, instead of asking these questions, people jump to the question of the nature of the federal budget distribution. They ask questions like, is the federal government granting our fair share of the budget? It is an excellent question; the interviewee emphasized that the question should come after ensuring that the citizens' tax is misused, i.e., regionally generated budget.

5.5 Representation

Regarding representation, interviewees stated that representation in Ethiopia had been a long-standing question. Interviewee 6 exemplified some representation problems as follows: the TPLF/EPRDF has failed to deliver on its pledges of true ethnic self-administration at the local level and equitable representation at the federal level. Many ethnic communities are pleased with the ideological commitment behind the promise to recognize their identity, language, and political rights; yet, they are frequently disappointed with the implementation, which lacks genuine self-administration. However, they are dissatisfied with the actual execution, which lacks genuine self-government. Furthermore, the federal government has not been established at the national level as a coalition government of Ethiopia's many ethnic groups. The TPLF generally dominates the federal government by imposing its predominance at the federal and regional levels by using the EPRDF as a cover to mask its hegemonic position in the Ethiopian state, which is disproportionate to its share and contribution.

Concerning representation, interviewees explained their thoughts that apparently, the FDRE constitution states that the HoPR shall be representatives of the Ethiopian people, and a similar expression is found in the sub-national constitutions. In addition, the FDRE constitution clearly states that "all sovereign power resides in the nations, nationalities, and people of Ethiopia." However, the political representation of the Somali region in the federal arrangement did not follow the guidelines set by the Constitution. The federal parliament currently has 547 seats, most of them occupied by the ruling prosperity party, the ruling and dominant party.

All the interviewees agreed that there are problems related to the representation of the Somali region.

For example, according to Interviewee 4 each region's legislatures at the federal and regional levels, however, the level of capability in their responsibility is weak since most of them are from the ruling party. They follow their political party's direction and do not consider representing their respective ethnic group on behalf. They always please their picked-up party rather than their respective community. He added that "for the last two elections, candidates are nominated for the ruling party is always the one selected as a member of parliament both regional and federal level, so representing

people is always in debate since the approach they come to power is selection rather than an election."

Similarly, Interviewee 5 emphasized that there are always issues of underrepresentation in the house of people's representatives, which was supposed to be a place where people could elect their representatives. However, instead, the dominant party chooses a candidate they believe will follow their political agenda. No other candidate can compete with him because the election process indirectly controls who is in charge. In addition, Interviewee 3 stated that:

It should also be remembered that the ethnic-federal arrangement has formed nine regions heavily carved along ethnic criteria. The Somali region population has been suffering from political injustice for a long time. An estimated population of more than 10 million makes Somalis the third most populous in Ethiopia society and second in land area.

However, the Somali community did not receive fair parliamentary representation from the Haile Selassie reign up to this day. The regional state recommended that adequate steps be taken to ensure that the Somali people have their "constitutionally guaranteed equitable representation" in the national parliament during the 2021 election. Unfortunately, these initiatives were also overlooked by the national electoral board and other concerned institutions. Moreover, the Somali community feels oppressed and underrepresented until all their injustice is raised to the federal level. On the topic, Interviewee 1 emphasized that the Somali regional state's request for a new arrangement was constitutional. He added that:

This is purely an independent effort done by the Somali Regional Administration by our constitutional obligation to fight for and protect the Somali people's interests. However, regardless of whether our current efforts influenced them, we should not be shocked if other regions and groups raise comparable constitutional demands that are always unavoidable.

Interviewee 2 expressed his views on this matter as follows: Suppose asking this question to everyone in Ethiopia. In that case, you will encounter dissatisfaction towards how they are under-represented or misrepresented at the federal level. Those who feel under-represented in the regions at the periphery, in this case, the Somalis, and those who feel misrepresented are Oromos, but this is not exhaustive; almost every

ethnic group feels the same, but the Somalis and Oromos can be a typical examples of underrepresented and misrepresented groups respectively. Somalis feel underrepresented because both the current regime and the past regimes of Ethiopia considered them second-class citizens and questioned their allegiance to Ethiopianism. This prompted their under-representation at the federal level. Some people relate the 1977 war between Ethiopia and Somalia as why Somalis are sequestered to participate in federal politics. However, he opposes this view and espouses that Somalis have been under-represented in Ethiopia since time immemorial. In addition to that, some espouse the idea that the underrepresented nature of Somalis in Ethiopia is coupled with misrepresentation. Those few individuals representing Somalis at federal misrepresent them and become the puppet of the federal government and their vested interest. In the case of Oromos, most of the public are secessionist oriented, and some Oromos believe that those who represent them at the federal level deviate from the interest of the people of Oromia. The interest of the Oromo people is adopting Afaan Oromo as the national language, hiring more Oromos in federal institutions to show their dominance in numbers, and subjugating others to heal from their suffering under Tigray and Amhara regimes. However, the politicians who represent Oromos at the federal level do not ponder to ask this question out loud, although they ask themselves each day internally.

5.6 Anticipation

All interviewees expressed their expectations. The expectations of the interviewees can be listed as the operation of the current Constitution, the strengthening of the federal structure, the guarantee of autonomy, the recognition and respect of ethnic identity in practice, the provision of security, language, education, accountability, and improvement of living conditions. However, the expectations that all the interviewees emphasized are related to the operation of the current Constitution, the strengthening of the federal structure, the guarantee of autonomy, and the recognition and respect of ethnic identity in practice. According to Interviewee3, the current ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia and the Constitution does not need any amendment but fully abide and a genuine implementation. He emphasized that

The current Constitution is the finest ever in Ethiopia's history, which allows all ethnic groups to administer their local affairs but was misused by the fallen Tigray liberation

front (TPLF) and its regional puppets. It separates power, guarantees the rights of nations and nationalities and people of Ethiopia, and gives ultimate right to federal member states up to the right of self-determination.

Interviewees described their expectations concerning a fully functioning federalism. They stated that even though the promises of true federalism were not fulfilled, a federal framework that guarantees genuine autonomy and self-rule is still in the best interests of Somalis and other Ethiopian oppressed communities. According to Interviewee4, the positive anticipation of ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia, the federal government should develop new improving mechanisms and reforms to promote the current ethnic-based federalism. As a result, each region will get more involved without affecting the rights of minority people living in the region. He explained his expectations as follows:

The federal government should establish approaches to promote the existing ethnic federal system and give autonomy to the regional administrations in their affairs while federal cooperation prevails. The federal Government should also streamline the distribution of resources to each ethnic group by avoiding one ethnic group to get the most significant share. In contrast, others have a small number of resources. This will make the country develop, and all ethnic groups will thrive together instead of as one ethnic dominant ethnic group.

Similarly, Interviewee 5 also wished for a fully federated order and said that "the anticipation of the current ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia is for the local regions to manage their local affairs and use their language and culture within their regions. Moreover, what needs to be changed and improved is fully federated order, ethnicity without identity politics, self-rule, security, and adequate power and resource sharing."

According to Interviewee5, people's anticipation of ethnic federalism differs according to their ethnic group. Somalis insist on ethnic federalism as the only system for their excellence, i.e., safety and security. Other Ethiopians are different from Somalis in this sense, although some of them feel the same. Interviewee2 explained that Somalis have always been a peripheral group and second-class citizens. The safety of Somalis was in jeopardy under imperial and Marxist socialist regimes.

The Somali people remember the remnants of the Derg military in the Somali region hitherto harassing the local people; this explains how Somalis felt under fluid identity regimes. Ethnic federalism at least empowered Somalis in the sense of safety and security. They now feel they belong to the region and are entitled to that region. This entitlement to the region was completely absent in other past regimes. Some Somalis feel that they can lead a path to self-determination because of ethnic federalism. In ethnic federalism, the police are from the same ethnicity; some local paramilitary units can defend the region from external threats, which was not the case under imperial and Derg regimes. Therefore, the Somalis believe that the essential thing Somalis expected from ethnic federalism is its relative safety, which improved compared to the past. Ethiopians anticipate its relative autonomy from ethnic federalism, which has not improved the way safety did. The federal government dictates how the regional governments should run its affair through political ideology. Another area that people in Ethiopia anticipate from ethnic federalism is life improvement, but this seemingly is not happening soon. Basic facilities like water, electricity, health and education have not yet been achieved. It is fair to say people's regional, local, and federal level administration expectations are almost slim or non-existent. This is due to two factors: the correlation between systems and ideologies from the federal to the district level, and the other is inept, corrupt politicians who, in the case of Somali, do not even represent the constituencies that they are elected from and the public.

Another anticipation of the interviewees is about ethnic identities. According to Interviewee1, Ethnic identities have become a focal point for political mobilization and local administrations since the beginning of ethnic restructuring in 1991, and newly restructured ethnic administrative constituencies have become a venue for official expressions of ethnic identity and ethnic self-administration by providing at least symbolic importance for recognition and dignity of ethnic elites and communities. He also added that:

By giving at least symbolic relevance to recognition and dignity of ethnic elites, the promotion of indigenous language in local administrations has become a venue for official manifestations of ethnic identity and ethnic self-administration. Indigenous societies' quest for improved education to address the problems of modern administration has been motivated by the concept of self-government.

CHAPTER SIX

ANALYSIS

This empirical analysis chapter examines how Ethiopia's Somali regional State implemented ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia. It is primarily an empirical investigation based on online qualitative work as well as the literature review to discover new knowledge about the power and function of state structures, federal-state relations, resource control and allocation, political representation, and trends in state-people interactions. Additionally, the chapter seeks to ascertain how ordinary citizens residing in these regional states perceive the federal arrangement, what they discovered to be positive or negative about it, what they would like to see changed, and their general anticipation of the federal process and structures.

6.1 The Somali Region

The Somali region is in eastern and southeast Ethiopia, between latitudes of 4 and 11 degrees north and 40- and 48-degrees east longitude. The Somali region of Ethiopia's Federal Democratic Republic (FDRE) is the country's second-largest regional State, with an area of roughly 376,000 km². Oromia Regional State borders its west and southwest, while Afar Regional State borders its northwest. On the international level, it shares borders with Kenya in the south, Somalia in the east, and Djibouti in the northwest. The temperature is sunny for most of the year. Temperatures range from 18 to 45 degrees Celsius. The annual rainfall ranges from 386 to 660 mm. Pastoral, Agro-pastoral, and Reverie livelihood zones are the three major livelihood zones in the region.

6.1.1 Demographic Profile

With a total land area of roughly 376,000 square kilometers, Somali Regional State is the second largest among Ethiopia's nine Regional States. There are 11 administrative zones, 93 Woredas, six administrative cities, and 1,415 Kebeles. According to the Central Statistical Authority's (CSA) population projections based on the 2007 Population and Housing Census, the total population of the Somali region was estimated to be 4.4 million (CSA 2007), with a projected population of 6.2 million in 2020, making it the country's most populous region. Men make up 55.61 percent of

the overall population, while women make up 44.4 percent. A pastoralist lifestyle is practiced by 86 percent of the people.

The average household size is 6.6. Children under age 15 accounted for 44.14% of the population, and individuals aged 65 and older accounted for 4%. The population pyramid shows that demand pyramid shape which means the population growth decreased in the last 10 years may be due to a change in fertility rate, socio-economy, education, increased mortality rate etc..... This needs further investigation on the cause or maybe the census itself.




Figure 1 Somali Region population by age and sex (percent)

The population is characterized by rapid growth, a young age structure, and a high dependency ratio with a high rural-urban differential. It has the highest total fertility rate of 7.2 births per woman. The average population density is calculated at 13 persons per square km, with great variation among Woreda of the region.

6.1.2 Socio-economic situation

The Somali region is engaged in rapid and comprehensive development activities to transition from poverty to sustainable and reliable growth and prosperity. Ethiopia has increased, and progress has been made towards attaining the MDGs, particularly in hunger, gender parity in primary education, child mortality, HIV/AIDS, and malaria. Between 2000 and 2017, Ethiopia's HDI (Human Development Index) value increased from 0.283 to 0.463, an increase of 63.5% still it shows below the average of 0.504.

6.2 The Constitution of the Somali Regional State

The first Constitution of the Somali Regional State was adopted in August 1995, and it was amended in 2002. Most of its terms are related to the federal Constitution, especially provisions on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, and fundamental principles of the Constitution are entirely alike to the federal Constitution.

The Somali region Constitution defines "the Somali people" in the same way that the Federal Constitution defines "nations, nationalities, and peoples" as "a group of people who have or share a large measure of common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identity, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, primarily contiguous territory." Even though the Somali Region Constitution states that the State Constitution is the supreme law of the regional State, Article 9 accepts the primacy of the federal Constitution. Some crucial matters need an investigation in connection with the Somali Region's Constitution.

First, concerning the official regional language, The Somali region Constitution in article 6 declares that the official language of the regional State is Somali (the name of the official language of the Somali people) and uses the Latin alphabet.

This follows the federal Constitution Article 5, which states "that members of the federation may determine their respective working languages by law."

Second, concerning the rights of citizenship, the Somali Constitution states that "every Ethiopian national who resides in the State and can speak the working/official language of the State has the right to be elected and employed in any public or government office (The Constitution of Somali region 2002, Article 33)."

This article implies that discrimination based on ethnic category is unconstitutional; therefore, a non-Somali resident who speaks the Somali language can have equal rights as a Somali resident. However, putting aside constitutional pledges practice is very far from such constitutional pledges due to many factors.

In politics and other necessary bureaucratic appointments, ethnic affiliation is the only criterion. Ethnic linkage and language proficiency are the significant criteria. However, without ethnic linkage, language proficiency alone does not meet the requirements for political and bureaucratic appointments.

1) Many non-Somali individuals who cannot speak Somali work in various regional government offices as technical experts and others.

2) Prejudice based on political loyalty is also quite prevailing. Significant Somali individuals suspected of harboring opposition opinions are mistreated and abused. There was a widespread practice by the ruling EPRDF/TPLF party in labeling dissenting Somali intellectuals as a member or sympathizers of the ONLF.

Moreover, many qualified Somali professionals have been mistreated and their constitutional rights curtailed because of their alleged link with the 'illegalized' Ogaden national liberation front. Since 1991 thousands of Somali individuals and Somali civil society groups have been constantly harassed and imprisoned by the ruling EPRDF/ESDP party by alleging them for connection with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) (Amnesty International, 2005).

It is reported that: thousands of members of the Somali ethnic group (or 'nationality') were arrested without any charge or prosecution on suspicion of supporting the Ogaden Liberation Front (ONLF) (Amnesty International 2001).

Third, in connection with the right to secession, the Somali Constitution in article 39, like the federal Constitution, affirms the unconditional right of the Somali people to self-administration, including the right to secession by stating similar preconditions as was stated in the federal Constitution for realizing the right to secession. It is just a copy of the federal Constitution in many aspects (The Somali Constitution 2002, Article 39, no. 5).

In the current context, it is complicated to satisfy the conditions for secession. It is observed that the ruling EPRDF party controls both the federal and regional government exclusively and heavy-handedly. However, the future repercussions could be very harmful, especially when the status of the regional states is subordinate to the federal government and when the federal government is accused of serving or favoring the interests of a particular region.

Furthermore, it looks unrealistic for the State to secede in such a smooth amicable process. There are many complex issues like agreement on the boundary, resource division, the rights of non-Oromo people within Somali, the status of many urban centers, which non-Oromo people predominantly inhabit, and other relevant critical issues. Hence, it could be better to stress bargaining and compromise mechanisms to

address grievances and resentments rather than making a pretense provision that claims secession can be made amicably and efficiently.

It could be better to leave for the State or ethnic group what action they want to take if their rights would be abrogated or abridged, rather than to give a promise of secession that would be very difficult to fulfill but has a terrible implication and undertone in prescribing incentive to demand secession. Fourth, concerning the right to property, land ownership, and non-eviction, in the same manner as the federal Constitution, the Somali Constitution declares that: "Land is a common property of the people of the State and shall not be subject to sale or other means of exchange (The Constitution of Somali region 2001, Article 40)."

The Somali Constitution states that when it comes to fixed property in the Land, "Any Person has full ownership of the immovable property he constructs and the permanent improvements he makes to the Land through his labor or investment. This right includes the ability to sell, bequest, and if the right of use expires, the ability to remove, transfer, or claim compensation for his property (The Somali Region Constitution, Article 40, No. 7) ".

Nevertheless, there may be some controversies between the State and the federal Constitution. For example, in the federal Constitution, Land is the property of the peoples of Ethiopia. In contrast, in the State constitution, it is the property of 'the people of the State.' However, it does not necessarily mean that it belongs to the Somali people because the state constitution gave the right to ownership to Somali people and the 'people of the State,' which includes all who reside in the State. Moreover, the Somali Constitution in article 40 Says that" the peasants of the State have the right to acquire land without payment and the protection against eviction from their possession. "However, regardless of the constitutional guarantee of prohibiting eviction from Land, in some cases, either there have been misconceptions and errors by some regional or local officials and resident groups, or there may be a deliberate violation of constitutional rights of non-Oromo peasants who have faced eviction from their farmland. For instance, in the Balballeti Oromia region, many Somali peasants were evicted or expelled from the settlement area by disallowing them the right to have Land in Oromia or 'Oromo land.'

Many factors such as ethnic aversion, ill-will, and divide and rule tactics of the Politicians have also involved the issue. Furthermore, there is a widespread delusion regarding the Constitutional rights of the non-Somali people in the Somali Regional State. Since the Somali Constitution has included the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it has accepted that any discrimination based on race, ethnicity, language, or other factors is unconstitutional. Moreover, there is a discrepancy between the federal Constitution and the Somali Constitution concerning the right of the peasants to obtain Land.

'The peasants of the State' have the right to get Land without charge, as well as protection from eviction from their possession, according to the Somali region's Constitution (The Somali Constitution 2002, Article 40, No. 4), 'The Ethiopian peasants have the right to purchase land without payment and protection against eviction from their possession,' according to the federal Constitution (The FDRE Constitution 1994, Article 40 No. 4). According to the Constitution of the Somali region, it is "peasants of the State," not peasants from other states that have a right to get Land Without payment. In contrast, the federal Constitution guarantees this right anywhere as far as Ethiopians. Therefore, without any preference for state residents, it is constitutionally possible to freely resettle peasants of one State based on the federal Constitution. However, the Somali Constitution has not recognized such resettlement in Somali from other states.

To make a comparison from a parallel case, one can examine article 41, no. 1 of the Somali Constitution which states: "Every resident of the State or other Ethiopians who want to reside in the State has the right to engage freely in economic activity and to pursue a livelihood of his choice." Therefore, Article 40, no. 4 has not extended free Land to the other Ethiopian peasants who may want to resettle in Somali.

Nonetheless, the Constitution of the Somali region in article 9 accepts the primacy of the federal Constitution. Therefore, constitutionally, inter-state resettlement is allowed, and the Somali regional government is also answerable to the federal Constitution. Therefore, there could be resettlement of peasants in Somali from other states in the future. However, it could be contentious and conflictual currently; intra-state resettlement is undertaken in Somali, Oromia, Afar, and other regional states.

6.3 The Somali Regional State Structure

Somali regional State was established in January 1993, following the proclamation of Ethiopia's Transitional Government in 1992, but the regional government's proper administrative function began in 1994. The region was initially divided into nine zones and 52 woredas. However, in 2012, the region gained an additional 42 woredas' administrations, two zonal administrations, and six city administrations, giving the region a current structure of 93 districts, 11 zonal administrations, six-city administrations, and 1224 kebele administrations.

At the level of the regional level, the highest and most potent political and administrative authority is centered on the regional government, which is led by a chief executive or regional state president elected by the regional legislative body known as a regional council. The regional council serves as the regional State's supreme legislative body. With the approval of the regional council, the regional President establishes the executive body of the regional government. Regional legislative authority appears to be concentrated in the hands of the directly elected regional council. However, current operations contradict constitutional decrees and intentions. The regional executive branch, particularly the regional President, possesses supreme administrative authority in the regional State.

The regional State's supreme judicial authority is vested in the regional State's Supreme Court. There are 24 courts in the region, including a Supreme Court, three zonal courts, and twenty woreda courts. There are also two Sharia courts and 424 social courts?

However, judicial authority is entirely limited to non-political cases, except when politicians and government officials use it for political ends such as imprisoning opponents. It infrequently occurred during the judiciary's activities in Ethiopia to safeguard citizens' rights against state encroachment. It is not easy to find a single instance in which the judiciary in Ethiopia interfered to protect a citizen's rights against state officials. On the other hand, government officials frequently use the judiciary to legitimize their actions against citizens.

However, regional governments did not delegate sufficient authority and resources to these local governments. Government services such as health, education, water,

sanitation, and roads were restricted to urban areas. In contrast, pastoralists in rural areas relied on humanitarian assistance from local organizations, international humanitarian organizations, and United Nations agencies. The first local government elections in the Somali Regional State occurred in 2004.

Observers have cast doubt on the election's fairness and accused the ruling Somali People Democratic Party (SPDP) of vote manipulation and mismanagement; the ruling SPDP party won most local council seats in the region's various districts during 2004 local elections. The party won 3182 (96.2 percent) local councilors out of 3309 councilors elected across the Somali region. The Western Somali Democratic Party (WSDP) won 21 (0.6 percent) seats, while independent candidates won 106 (3.2 percent) seats (Hagmann, 2005). To ensure proper implementation of the DLDP program, the Somali regional state parliament passed Proclamation No. 76/2007, which established woreda and kebele local authorities. This proclamation established 52 woreda administrations and authorized the regional government and zonal administrations to transfer financial, administrative, and political authority to the woreda administrations. According to this proclamation, woreda/districts will have a council elected directly by the people, a chief district administrator chosen from among the council's members, and heads of district sectoral offices appointed by the head administrator and approved by the council.

The following figure identified the 52 districts created by Proclamation No. 76/2007.

No	Local Administration	No	Local Administration
1	Adadle woreda	27	Garbo woreda
2	Addam woreda	28	Gashamo woreda
3	Aware woreda	29	Gode woreda
4	Awbare woreda	30	Gorbakaksa woreda
5	Aysha woreda	31	Guradamole woreda
6	Babile woreda	32	Gursum woreda
7	Bare woreda	33	Hamaro woreda
8	Bokh woreda	34	Hargalle woreda
9	Jarati woreda	35	Harshin woreda
10	Dambal woreda	36	Jijiga woreda
11	Danod woreda	37	K/bayah woreda
12	D/buur woreda	38	K/dahar woreda
13	d/madaw woreda	39	Kalafa woreda
14	Dannan woreda	40	Lagahida woreda
15	d/weyn woreda	41	M/muluko woreda
16	Duhun woreda	42	Maeso woreda
17	Dolo-ado woreda	43	Mayale woreda
18	Dolo-bay woreda	44	Mustahil woreda
19	Eme bare woreda	45	Sagaga woreda
20	Elkare woreda	46	Salahad woreda
21	Eme galbed	47	Shegosh woreda
22	Erer woreda	48	Shilabo woreda
23	Fer-fer woreda	49	Shinile woreda
24	Fik woreda	50	Warder woreda
25	Piltu woreda	51	Gunagada woreda
26	Galadi woreda	52	Hudet woreda

Figure 2. District Administrations in Somali Region (Proclamation No. 72/2007)

However, the number of woreda administrations in the Somali region has gradually increased to 93 districts. According to Shiferaw, the primary functions of district councils are to ensure the implementation of federal and regional government rules, regulations, and directives and authorize, evaluate, and control district administration functions.

Additionally, the executive organ of district administrations is responsible for arranging, organizing, and preparing district budgets and implementing them once approved by the district council, and managing block grants received from the higher government (Shiferaw, 2007: 13). To further decentralize lower administrative levels, the Somali Regional State established four city administrations in the region's four most significant and most populous towns in 2011. Later, the city established two additional administrations.

The primary goals of establishing these city administrations were to accelerate the delivery of public services to residents of large urban centers and increase local citizen participation in planning and executing urban development programs. According to article 11 of Proclamation No. 198/2020, city administrations in the Somali region are responsible for planning and implementing social and developmental activities; developing action plans to support urban development; preparing and approving city budgets; levying and collecting taxes and duties; constructing roads, drainage systems, and sewerages; and expanding, developing, and administering primary and secondary education (Dhool Gazeta, 2020: 7).

However, the regional government, 11 zonal administrations, 93 woreda administrations, six-city administrations, and 1224 kebele administrations comprise the current structure of local administrations in the Somali region.

6.4 Administration structure of the Somali Regional State

6.4.1 Zonal, Woreda/district, and Kebele structures

In the Somali Regional State, zonal administrations are structured as executive subdivisions or branch offices of the regional government, devoid of legislative authority or function. The Somali Regional State is divided into eleven zonal and six city administrations. The zonal administration was uniformly composed of a team of line department heads and a chief vice administrator appointed by the State Council on the recommendation of the State President. The zonal administration's powers and functions include the following:

- a. Coordination of woreda administrations
- b. Support, supervision, and collaboration of all departments and institutions in zone
- c. Responsibility for law, order, peace, and security in the zone
- d. reporting to the State President on overall zonal working activities

The zonal administration is headed by a chief administrator whom the State Council appoints on the State President's recommendation. The Chief Administrator, who reports directly to the State President, wields considerable authority at the zonal level, commanding the activities of various regional government departments and institutions and leading and controlling zonal security and police forces.

Nonetheless, there is overlap between legislative and executive organs in all zones, as several members of the zonal administration also serve on the regional legislative council. Additionally, the chief administrator is frequently a chief of the zonal party structure.

As a result, political, legislative, and executive functions are concentrated on an executive body and in the hands of a single individual. The woreda structure comprises three components: the woreda council, the woreda administrative council, and the woreda judiciary. The Somali region has approximately 93 Woreda structures. Woreda Council is the legislative body of the woreda structure.

The Woreda people elect it in a direct popular vote for a five-year term. Members of the Woreda Council are constitutionally accountable to the people. Among its constitutional powers and functions are the following: approval of the Woredas draft

plans and programs for economic development, social services, and administrative activities; appointment of the Woreda administrator from among members of the majority party in the council; approval of vice Woreda Administrator and other appointments upon submission by the Woreda Administrator; and ensuring the (The Somali region constitution, 1994, Article 82).

However, most of these functions are, to a large extent, delegated by top officials at the zonal and regional levels to be carried out in the woreda area, rather than having the actual authority to make decisions on its behalf to protect the interests and benefit of its electorate. Additionally, it is expected to have only four secessions per year, which means that its speaker performs most of its duties daily in collaboration with the Woreda administrative council and woreda chief administrator. The woreda administrative council is responsible for executive functions at the woreda level. The council comprises the Woreda Administrator, vice Administrator, and heads of sector offices organized in the Woreda. It is accountable to the Administrator of Woreda and the Woreda Council (Somali regional state, 1994, Article 84). Among its constitutional powers and functions are the following: implementing policies, laws, rules, plans, and programs in the Woreda; preparing the Woreda budget, submitting it to the Woreda Council for approval and implementing it; leading and coordinating the woreda security and police force, and preparing the woreda budget.

They develop social, economic, and administrative plans and submit them to the Woreda Council (Somali Region Constitution, 1994, Article 85). The Woreda council appoints the Chief Woreda administrator, who serves as the head of the Woreda Administrative council and is also responsible for the regional state president. This direct accountability of the chief woreda administrator to the regional President undoubtedly fosters a tendency toward power concentration at the regional executive, particularly at the regional President, who possesses enormous authority over and influences overall key power centers at all levels of the regional state structure. The regional State's lowest and smallest administrative structure is the Kebele administration, which maintains relatively close ties with the local populace. Kebele administrations consist of a kebele council, a kebele administrative council, and a kebele social court. According to the Constitution, the kebele council is the highest political authority in the kebele and is chosen for a five-year term by the kebele people. It has the authority to organize the kebele administration council and appoint the

kebele administrator, but only on the recommendation of the majority party, which in the Somali region is the ESPDP/EPRDF (The Somali region Constitution, 1994, Article 97). It is anticipated that they will meet once a month. The kebele council's primary functions are limited to implementing the woreda council's and woreda administrative council's plans and regulations, ensuring law and order in the kebele, and organizing the kebele administration. The Speaker and vice-speaker of the council are appointed by the ruling majority party in the Kebele council, which is the ESDPD/EPRDF. The executive function of the kebele is carried out by the kebele administrative council, which is elected for a five-year tenure by and from the kebele council. The critical functions are ensuring peace and security in the kebele, protecting, and developing natural resources, and motivating the public to participate in development activities (The Somali region Constitution 1994, Article 96). The Kebele administrative council is led by a kebele administrator appointed by and from the Kebele council on the recommendation of the Kebele Council's majority party. The Kebele administrator is accountable to the Kebele Council and the administrator of the wereda. The kebele administrator's primary responsibilities and powers include leading the Kebele Administrative Council, ensuring proper implementation of kebele policies, laws, rules, and regulations, recommending judges of the kebele social court to the kebele council, and performing other duties as directed by the kebele administrative council, the kebele council, and the woreda administrative council.

Additionally, the kebele administration has a vice kebele administrator elected and appointed by the kebele council and reports to the kebele administrator. Each kebele administration also has a social court that adjudicates minor social and private matters in the neighborhood. While the kebele administration is in close contact with the local populace, the ruling party's overwhelming influence and maneuverability in its overall operation have prevented the local populace from owning and controlling their grassroots kebele structure. As a result, the kebele administration has devolved into a heinous tool for imposing higher command and control over the indigenous people.

6.4.2 A level of power at regional executive or regional President

The Constitution's various and expansive powers and functions have elevated the State's President to a position of monopoly power at the expense of the state legislative branch. Nonetheless, it is exceedingly difficult for the President to carry out these functions effectively due to the vast and intricate nature of these four tiers' activities. Second, the vast intensities of power in his hands undoubtedly make him too powerful by undermining local governments and popular participation and depriving the local populace of the ability to control their local leaders. Thirdly, attempting to dictate the nomination of regional bureau officials and other influential regional officials such as presidents of the regional Supreme Court and Auditor General bolsters the President's power in the face of a state legislative branch that is extremely weak and undifferentiated. It would be comparatively mild for him to build his own 'oligarchy' and clique within the executive. While massive power may allow a president to form an extremely efficient executive organ in a responsible and efficient governance system, the enormous concentration of power on an executive organ may form an oligarchy in a patron-client governance model. The check and balance systems are weakened because the institutions created to perform these functions, such as the Supreme Court, the Judicial Administration Council, and the Auditor General, are directly influenced by the regional President. Their actual operation reflects this subordinate role to the executive branch. This type of administrative body power structure may result in elitism and self-serving bureaucracies. The major disadvantage of the ethnic federal structure is that it fosters despotism among ethnic elites. According to the constitutional arrangement, the legislative branch's authority, specifically the State Council, directly elected by the people, appears to be relatively insignificant.

CONCLUSION

Ethiopia is a sub-Saharan African country struggling with many problems such as unemployment, poverty, malnutrition, hunger, child mortality, agriculture-based economy, inadequate health, and inadequate education (UNICEF, 2018; World Bank, 2019). In addition to these economic and social problems of the country, there are also political problems that exacerbate these problems, which must be overcome and that have seriously damaged the country for years. The country has a turbulent political past as it is home to many ethnicities and cultures. The past regimes in the country have established a central authority by using "Ethiopian nationalism" as a unifying ideology through oppression and coercion (Asnake, 2006). The unrest caused by this oppression caused different ethnic groups in the country to establish different organizations to demand rights and freedoms and to fight for these rights and freedoms. Finally, after the deportation of the Derg military regime with the advent of the EPRDF in 1991, the hope of a federal state in which all the people of the country could have a voice arose.

The federal constitution that came into force in 1995 gave the ethnic groups living in the country the right to equal representation within the federation by giving them their rights and the opportunity to live in the country with their language, religion, and cultural values. Numerous changes in administration have occurred due to the federal restructuring of the country. The regional states within the Federation are divided into regions such as Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's region (SNNPR), Gambella, and Harari, classified according to language, settlement, and nationality.

With the establishment of the ethnic federal state of Ethiopia, ethnic structures in the country were recognized to put an end to past injustices, and the country was divided into ethnic regions to allow ethnic groups to enjoy equality and autonomy in managing their affairs (Keller, 1995). Cultural diversity and multi-racial political participation were encouraged by transferring political power to local communities. The Ethiopian ethnic federal model aims to strengthen and balance diverse and diverse ethnic groups. However, it is unclear how well the ethnic federal model has been transformed into a functioning ethnic federal model. Although the country's constitution guarantees

decentralized and autonomous regional governments, political practices can largely ignore these principles.

There are signs that those in power are targeting ethnic organizations in the region with centrist, nationalist, or independent agendas (Pausewangvd, 2002). There are people who support Ethiopia's federalism in terms of cultivating Ethiopian citizenship and developing a shared identity through the elimination of basic ties and affiliations (Daniel 1992; Alem 1993) and hosting a diverse ethnic population in need of political representation and self-government (Merera 2003; Fasil 1997). On the other hand, some claim that the Ethiopian state was founded on the invasion and colonization of nations and civilizations outside its jurisdiction, such as Oromo and Somali (Hassen 1999; Assefa 1993; Dolal 1992). Therefore, from the point of view of Ethiopia's federalism, the following question arises: Are self-rule and shared-rule practiced in Somali and similar ethnic regions or is the self-government and representation of ethnic structures only a constitutional expression? There is not enough scientific research in the field to answer this question in an objective and comprehensive way.

To contribute and fill this gap in the field, in this research, the Somali region in Ethiopia was examined. In this research, it was investigated how well Ethiopian ethnic federalism met the self-rule needs of the Somali region and whether it promoted self-government, shared, fair representation, and inclusiveness. In this study, in which a qualitative research design was used, the data of the research were collected through interviews made over Zoom. The data were collected using semi-structured interview questions from 6 people from different professions who have knowledge and experience of the Somali region. The data of the research were analyzed by in-depth content analysis.

The findings of the research are presented under the titles of people's political participation, ethnic rights, resource allocation, representation, and anticipations in the Somali region. Findings regarding the political participation of the people in the Somali region have shown that there are problems with political participation in the Somali region and the lack of political participation is seen at all levels, from the local level to the federal level. Political events in the past in the region and throughout the country have been cited as the reasons for the problems experienced in the Somali region regarding political participation, and it has been stated that the region is not yet ready for political participation due to these events. Similarly, it has been stated that

political participation is problematic due to the glorification of the state in Ethiopian political culture and the fact that the people are seen as the servants of the state, as well as instilling a sense of obedience and obedience to the people for many years.

Another reason why political participation was problematic was found to be the unwillingness of successive state regimes to share their powers. It has been stated that while the decisions should be taken by local governments, as foreseen by a federal structure, the decisions are either taken by the center or by the local administrators under the control of the center. It has been found that there are problems with the functioning of the State Council regarding political participation. It has been found that there are some problems related to elections, which is an important element of political participation. It has been found that the elections are anti-democratic and dubious due to reasons such as nomination, voter registration, democratic consciousness level of the voters, and domination of the ruling parties. In previous studies, it is emphasized that the importance of power-sharing and the federal system is based on the principle of power-sharing between the federal state and the federated states (Çağdaş, 2019). In addition, it has been stated that the principle of participation is as important as sharing of authority, and ,to be able to talk about a federal state, first, the federated states that make up the federation must participate both in the organs of the federal state and in the decisions to be taken there (Çağdaş, 2019). Consistent with the findings of this research, Juweria (2020) claimed that the struggle for democratization and a fairer system in Ethiopia changed over time and turned into the old authoritarian control system, and that the Federal government under the EPRDF regime, by intervening in the internal affairs of the regional states as it wishes, undermines the critical principles of the self-government system. According to Taşkın (2017), the federation in Ethiopia has created ways to accommodate ethnic, religious, and historical differences and protect the fundamental right to participation, and the federation has guaranteed the right to equal treatment with other groups, cultural autonomy, and relative political autonomy. According to him, on the other hand, there are still great difficulties in practice. Berhane and Tefera (2018) also pointed out that ethnic federalism was adopted in Ethiopia to reduce ethnic tension and conflict and to build a democracy formed by multi-ethnic structures. However, it is claimed that this federal structure does not reduce ethnic tension and conflict, but rather fuels it, as it causes ethnic mobility, gives importance to ethnic identities, encourages differences,

and causes competition for power and resources. It is recommended to abandon the use of ethnic identities as a stand-alone criterion for federal structuring in Ethiopia and to consider geographical and economic factors. Thus, it was envisaged that a more civilized understanding of nationalism would be adopted, and trust could be established among people.

Fiseha (2018) stated that Ethiopia has taken important steps towards democratization and development in recent years and has made efforts in this regard but emphasized that the centralist and authoritarian attitude of the monopolized power has eliminated the political opposition and encouraged the hardliners.

Regarding ethnic rights and ethnic relations, which is the second title of the findings of the research, it has been found that the people of the Somali region are also satisfied and hopeful with their ethnic rights, such as self-government, land ownership, the political representation of religion, using their local language and experiencing their own culture, provided by the Ethiopian constitution and the gains provided by their implementation in the country. It has been found that the people of the region accept federalism as a solution for the real and fundamental implementation of these rights. It is believed that the freedom of each ethnic group to live on its land and in accordance with its values will provide economic benefits as well as serving the peace of the country. However, it is also among the findings that the attitudes of political leaders make it difficult to solve ethnic problems and even exacerbate the problems. To guarantee ethnic rights, there are demands to protect each ethnic language, to encourage its use, to ensure that it is used comfortably, and to teach it, especially in primary schools. In addition, it has been found that providing equal opportunities for ethnic groups to access modern education is among the demands. It has also been stated in previous studies that federalism serves as a tool to reconcile the interests of two or more different ethnic communities locked within the borders of a single state, thereby creating a robust strategy for promoting national unity and political legitimacy (Alemante 2003). Consistent with the findings of this research, Fessha (2010) emphasized that a multi-ethnic state faces a complex problem of managing ethnic diversity, and this difficulty cannot be overcome by suppressing ethnic groups. Doğan (2021) pointed out that despite many obstacles and difficulties, democracy is being institutionalized in Ethiopia and drew attention to the difficulty of the ethnic structure in the country. According to the federal constitution, although Ethiopia is

divided into states according to their ethnic origins, no state has a completely homogeneous structure in terms of ethnicity. In some states, people of very different ethnic origins live together, making it difficult to guarantee ethnic rights in the country. According to Özyurt and Gün (2022), after the realization of federalism in Ethiopia, ethnic identity became essential in the structuring of the country, and language was prioritized in the determination of ethnic identities. Ethiopianism has now become a secondary identity in the country. However, governments have sometimes moved away from the constitutional line. Identity policies are shaped by governments. Governments have tried to suppress ethnic groups by applying repressive policies from time to time. The current administration's increasing authoritarianism, unlawful appointments, dismissals, and postponing the elections due to the Covid 19 epidemic are shown as examples of shifting out of the constitution and democracy. It has been stated that such attitudes cause unrest among the ethnic structures in the country and pose a risk to peace. In his research on Ethiopian federalism, Gebremichael (2011) found that like the findings of this research, there is a constitutional focus on the rights of ethnic groups, but in practice, not enough attention is paid to the protection of citizenship and minority rights in regional states. Moreover, the centralist policy of the ruling party has been found to restrict the genuine democratic participation of citizens and the right to self-determination of ethnic groups. It is also among the findings that the federal structure allows ethnic groups to use regional resources and the power of the regional government, and this encourages competition. According to Fiseha (2019), Ethiopia has shown significant economic development in recent years, but while doing this, self-management has been compromised because it perceives poverty as an existential threat that all resources should be mobilized and considers development as paramount. Since the compromise on self-management paved the way for unrest and conflicts, development was damaged and poverty continued, paradoxically. According to Bassi (2014), despite the constitutional reform in Ethiopia and many national and international efforts, ethnic minorities still face great difficulties. Especially nomadic communities called pastoralists. The two main causes of problems faced by ethnic minorities are ethnic conflicts and the unbalanced policies of governments. Ostensibly, the constitution stipulates that those decisions will be made locally and jointly, but in practice, there is a very strict central administration.

Regarding the allocation of resources, the findings of the study showed that there are problems with the allocation of resources in the Ethiopian Federal state. While it is stated in the country's constitution that resources should be allocated proportionally and fairly to the regions and that this allocation should be supervised, it has been found that in practice it is thought that the resources are not distributed in a proportional and fair manner and that they are not audited in an objective and transparent manner. Due to the resource allocation problem, it has been found that there are deficiencies and problems in the region even in terms of very basic needs such as water and electricity. It was also found that there is concern about corruption related to investments made in the region. It is thought that the disproportionate and insufficient allocation of resources to the Somali region is due to the attitude of the federal authorities. For this reason, it was stated that while federal development was provided, regional development could not be achieved. Politicization of ethnic origins by political leaders and destructive competition between ethnic regions has also been found to be a problem in terms of resource allocation. It has been found that the fact that the people have not yet reached the democratic consciousness regarding resource allocation and that they do not question where and how the revenues collected from their regions are spent are also thought to play a role. Other studies in the field also emphasized the inequality in resource allocation and access to public resources and services, in line with the findings of this research (Hagmann, 2014). Absino (2019) emphasized that common natural resources should be shared for common interests along with an integrative structure including common ethnicity, religion, and language in the country. Gebremichael, (2011) and Berhane and Tefera (2018) drew attention to the potential for competition and conflict between ethnic groups, as the federal structure allows ethnic groups to use regional resources regarding resource sharing. Bassi (2014) emphasized that governments' rural development plans and land legislation contain some cultural prejudices and related inequalities. According to Güneyli (2020), there are serious problems with education in Ethiopia and education opportunities cannot be provided equally in every region. Although the literacy rate in the country has increased, in general, about half of the country's population is illiterate. In the country, which had a very low schooling rate in the past, the rate of students going to school increased to 90% with the breakthroughs made after 1994. Although the primary school enrollment rate is medium, problems continue in secondary education. Students either do not complete primary school or do not continue

secondary education. The reasons for this are the inadequacy of schooling in secondary education, the lack of equality of opportunity between regions and the use of children in the workforce. FDRE (2017) states that the Somali region lags other regions in terms of accessing resources due to its unique social and geographical features, but some applications have been recently developed to close this gap, and mobile health teams developed to provide health services to rural people are an example of these practices. In addition, it should not be forgotten that the economic situation of the country is very bad.

According to the findings of the research on representation, although the rights such as self-government, recognition of ethnic identities, and living by protecting religious and cultural values are satisfied by the federal constitution, it has been found that the promises of real ethnic self-government at the local level and egalitarian representation at the federal level have not yet been fully fulfilled. It is thought that the federal government in Ethiopia is not established at the national level as a multi-ethnic coalition government. It is also among the perceptions that the political representation of the Somali region in the federal arrangement does not comply with the rules set by the constitution. It is even among the perceptions that the representation of the Somali region is at the lowest level, and this is due to the Ethiopian administrators' seeing the Somalis as second-class citizens. Another problem that has been raised regarding political representation is related to politicians. It has been found that politicians are perceived to think of their political parties instead of the people they represent, and to work for the benefit of political parties rather than the interests of the people. In some studies, in the field, it is reported that the Ethiopian federal state behaves differently towards the Somali region. Jimale (2019) states that having a prejudice from past Ethiopia always looks at the Somali region with suspicion and acts with distrust. According to him, Ethiopia has certain security concerns, and these concerns require it to take some steps and develop a certain attitude towards Somali, which poses a threat to national security. Ethiopia's main concern is the possibility of a resurgence of the expansionist politics of Somali. Samatar (2004), on the other hand, stated that since the ESDL came to power in 1994, top politicians of the Somali Region are mostly perceived as “a proxy of the Addis Ababa federal government”. Consistent with the findings of this study, Akyol and Mohammed (2016) stated regarding the electoral system in Ethiopia as a winner-take-all majority system. According to them, this

electoral system does not allow for a proportional and fair representation of minorities. There are no homogeneous ethnic groups in every region in Ethiopia. The system is not suitable for small groups dispersed in Ethiopia to represent them. This system also seems to contradict the power sharing principle. Since the simple majority system has an understanding that excludes voters, participation in the elections decreases. In addition, this system also reduces participation in the elections when it becomes difficult for a party to win the election. With all these features, the electoral system applied in Ethiopia seems to be unsuccessful and a single transferable vote system is proposed instead of this existing system. In addition, Akyol and Mohammed (2016) emphasized that representation should be provided in public services such as military police and judiciary as well as in elections.

The last title of the research's findings is related to the anticipations of the people of the Somali region. According to the findings, the Somali people have expectations in different areas, and if these expectations are met properly, the second-class citizen perception of the Somali people may change. The findings showed that the people of the Somali region have expectations on topics such as the operation of the current constitution, the strengthening of the federal structure, the guarantee of autonomy, the real respect for ethnic identity and the implementation of this respect. Although the promises of federalism in the country have not yet been fully fulfilled, it has been found that a federal framework that guarantees true autonomy and self-government is still considered to be in the interest of Somalis and other oppressed Ethiopian communities. As a contribution to this, it is also expected that the Ethiopian federal government should come up with new improvement mechanisms and reform that will encourage the existing multinational federalism without affecting the rights of the minority people living in the region. Within this developed and strengthened federated administration, full self-government, full security, fair resource sharing, and free use of language, free living of religion and cultural values are among the expectations. In addition to these expectations regarding the federal structure, it is also among the expectations to eliminate the problems experienced in terms of basic needs such as water, electricity, health, and education, which are still a problem in the Somali region, and to make adequate investments in these areas. It was also expected that political figures would truly serve their region by protecting their people and explain them to their people in an objective way.

Previous research in the field has reported problems in Ethiopia related to areas, such as federal structure in, the rights of ethnic minorities, representation, resource sharing, education, etc. (Gebremichael, 2011; Bassi, 2014; Akyol and Mohammed, 2016; Berhane and Tefera, 2018; Fiseha, 2018; ; Güneyli, 2020; Doğan, 2021; Özyurt and Gün, 2022). According to the information presented in these studies, the expectations of the people of the region are understandable.

Temesgen (2015) also summarized the situation in Ethiopia and made some suggestions. He stated that ethnic federalism has been exploited by governments to establish division among ethnic groups to institutionalize and facilitate the rule of other politically linked groups. It has been stated that the administration is only structurally federal, and in practice, there is a structure that controls all political decisions from top to bottom and challenges regional autonomy. The power of regional states to make contextual local decisions is minimal. It has been stated that in some regions of Ethiopia, minority rights are not protected, languages cannot be used freely, and there are problems in the use of political representation and self-government. It was stated that the federal structure could not create a harmony between individual rights and citizenship rights and that ethnic tensions and conflicts were manipulated. It has been suggested to stay away from such actions, as government actions damage integrating factors such as religion, shared historical experiences and feelings of national unity, increasing the vulnerability and risk of inter-ethnic conflict and national fragmentation. In addition, the principle of common power sharing, like mutual veto, should be used proportionately against centralist and monopolistic government approaches. Common historical experiences, religion and other cross-cutting values should be embraced and promoted to develop common values, cooperation, and the will to live together. However, there are also positive developments, which should be supported and encouraged, in meeting expectations in the country. For example, many developments have been accomplished economically and educationally (Fiseha, 2018). President Mustafa Omer has significantly enhanced freedom of expression, reduced but not eliminated arbitrary arrests, and significantly improved infrastructures such as roads, water wells, and the agriculture industry (Warfa, 2021).

Based on the findings of this study summarized above, some suggestions can be made for practitioners and researchers.

First, it should not be forgotten that Ethiopia has taken important steps in terms of democratization and economic development in recent years and has been making efforts in this regard. The constitution and federal state structure enacted to guarantee the human and democratic rights of ethnic minorities is a very important step. In addition, there have been developments in the fields of economic development, education, and health. These achievements should be embraced and supported.

Considering the multi-ethnic structure of the country, sensitivity should be paid to protect the federal structure, which the people believe, and the achievements in this regard. It should not be forgotten that the federal structure is new, open to development and change, and everyone should do their part for the federal structure to evolve for the better. While all this is being done, lessons should be learned from the experiences of the past and efforts should be made to increase and improve the gains of the federal structure with patience and self-sacrifice. While improving the federal structure, attention should be paid to the delivery of the rights of ethnic groups and regions guaranteed by the constitution and the full implementation of the rights specified in the constitution in practice. To maintain the positive atmosphere in the country in recent years, all segments must be careful and sensitive, and care must be taken to make the developments even more positive. The positive contributions of politicians such as President Mustafa Omer should be supported and their number should be increased (Warfa, 2021).

To contribute to the development of democracy, it is necessary to improve the capacities of regional states, ensure the participation of citizens and eliminate the organizational weaknesses of political parties.

The rich potential of the country should be used well, and this potential should be used in a way to ensure the economic development of the country. Every action should be planned and supervised to ensure that rich natural resources are used for the benefit of the country. Plans should be audited to prevent corruption as well as to be rational and profitable.

While allocating the country's resources, it should be ensured that it is distributed proportionally and equitably to all regions. The resources distributed to the regions should be spent considering the priority and vital needs of the regions. In addition to vital needs such as water, food, health and energy, the development of education

should be considered as a priority. The country should continue its breakthroughs in the field of education and the inequality of opportunity in education should be removed.

For researchers, it may be recommended to conduct more frequent and comprehensive research on Somali. Scientific studies examining the federal structure in the country and the results of this structure are limited. Much more scientific research, both quantitative and qualitative, should be conducted in this area.



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RESUME

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Education

Degree	Education Unit	Graduation Date
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Work Experience

Year	Place	Title
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2018-2019	Kebridehar University	Lecturer

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English

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Publications

Hobbies

Reading books, sports, and watching movies.