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Political Science and Public Administration

**POLITICAL ISLAM IN IRAQ AND ITS IMPACT ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS FROM 2005 TO 2020**



Master Thesis

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Supervisor

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that in the preparation of this thesis, scientific ethical rules have been followed, the works of other persons have been referenced in accordance with the scientific norms if used, there is no falsification in the used data, any part of the thesis has not been submitted to this university or any other university as another thesis.

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ABSTRACT

The study tries to find a clear methodology for Iraqi foreign policy under the rule of political Islam parties that did not present an advanced version of Islamic thought in the administration of the state. Instead, it suffered from its stagnation and despite the existence of a crisis of renewal of thought, there are no propositions that can present any model for governance contrary to what it was in the period during which there were opposition parties. The study also tries to research the reasons for the fluctuation of Iraqi relations with its Arab surroundings and the extent of the impact of the historical and sectarian dimensions of that fluctuation. The reason for this is the reliance of political Islam parties on developing sectarian identity to gain the sympathy of the masses and allies in order to gain power and manage their relations instead of relying on strengthening the national identity. Therefore, we are looking in this study for solutions that enable political Islam parties to manage their foreign relations in an open and balanced manner in a way that serves the general national interest of Iraq in the region.

One of the most important reasons for choosing the research is the urgent need to establish equal basic rules for the Iraqi foreign policy stemming from a national feeling through which it seeks to bring political and international gains so that it can have an important role in the international community in the future. Likewise, the study provides benefit to the decision maker and political analyst in the region. The practical results of the study could be said to lie in investigating the link and the nature of the relationship between political Islam and international relations.

The importance of this study is through its presentation of the role of religious political parties that hold power only, and for this reason I will not address in this study any unofficial armed jihadist groups, as they do not have any legal capacity through which they can influence the drawing of the foreign policy of Iraq.

Key Words: Political Islam, Iraq, Foreign Relations

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı, devlet yönetiminde İslami düşüncenin gelişmiş bir versiyonunu sunmayan siyasi İslam partilerinin yönetimi altındaki Irak dış politikası için net bir metodoloji bulmaya çalışmaktır. Bunun yerine durgunluğunu yaşadığı ve bir düşünce yenilenmesi krizinin varlığına rağmen, muhalefet partilerinin olduğu dönemin aksine herhangi bir yönetim modeli sunabilecek önermeler bulunmamaktadır. Çalışma ayrıca Irak'ın Arap çevresiyle olan ilişkilerinin dalgalanmasının nedenlerini ve bu dalgalanmanın tarihsel ve mezhepsel boyutlarının etkisinin boyutunu araştırmaya çalışmaktadır. Bunun nedeni, siyasi İslam partilerinin ulusal kimliği güçlendirmeye bel bağlamak yerine, güç kazanmak ve ilişkilerini yönetmek için kitlelerin ve müttefiklerin sempatisini kazanmak için mezhep kimliği geliştirmeye bel bağlamalarıdır. Bu nedenle bu çalışmada siyasi İslam partilerinin dış ilişkilerini Irak'ın bölgedeki genel ulusal çıkarlarına hizmet edecek şekilde açık ve dengeli bir şekilde yönetmelerini sağlayacak çözümler aranmaktadır.

Araştırmanın seçilmesinin en önemli nedenlerinden biri, Irak dış politikasının, uluslararası arenada önemli bir rol oynayabilmesi için siyasi ve uluslararası kazanımlar sağlamaya çalıştığı ulusal bir duygudan kaynaklanan eşit temel kuralların acilen oluşturulması ihtiyacıdır. Gelecekte topluma, aynı şekilde çalışma bölgesindeki karar verici ve siyasi analistlere de fayda sağlamaktadır. Çalışmanın pratik sonuçlarının, siyasi İslam ile uluslararası ilişkiler arasındaki ilişkinin ve doğasının araştırılmasında yattığı söylenebilir.

Bu çalışmanın önemi, sadece iktidarı elinde bulunduran dini siyasi partilerin rolünün sunumundan kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmada herhangi resmi olmayan bir silahlı cihatçı grup ele alınmayacaktır. Çünkü Irak'ın dış politikasının çizimini etkilemede onların herhangi bir yasal kapasiteleri bulunmamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasal İslam, Irak, Dış ilişkiler

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RECOGNITION

To my dear country.

For the soul of my beloved father

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To my dear brothers and sisters.

For my small family (wife and children).

For those who supported me financially and morally from friends and loved ones.

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INTRODUCTION

In looking into Political Islam in Iraq and its Impact on Foreign Relations from 2005 to 2020, we're venturing into new directions of politics. The Baath Party ruthlessness controlled Iraqi politics for decades, obliterating the "natural" workings of Iraqi politics, particularly among Islamist organizations, and pushing their operations, if any, underground. Movements such as communists, liberals, and Islamists, which are still active in other Arab nations, were scarcely seen in Iraq. However, most of these hidden forces are now resurfacing in the open. Even though Iraq is governed by a US-led occupation administration, this study concentrates on Islamic politics as they are anticipated to arise and grow in the new post-Hussein age of openness.

After the end of the rule of the Baath Party and new political prospects, this research makes one crucial assumption: there is little reason to assume that newly emerging Iraqi politics would considerably depart from the numerous established patterns of Arab politics. Sure, every country is different, and Iraq has had its own specific experience over the previous five decades. Any country's history, geography, and geopolitics all leave an everlasting impact. Nonetheless, a freer Iraq will definitely be familiar with some shared political and aspirational impulses in the Arab continent. One of these distinguishing features is that in most Arab countries, Islamist groups are the most prominent, if not the only, source of resistance to current administrations. Political Islam will thus develop powerfully in post-Hussein Iraq—indeed, there are already obvious signs that it has. However, there is one crucial caveat: Islamist parties profit greatly from the absence of alternative opponents, as authoritarian regimes shut down all opposition organizations.

In today's Iraq, there will be some political rivalry, which will put a stop to any Islamist monopoly on power. But how will these inclinations express themselves in the country, and how will they interact with other factors? The three largest sectarian/ethnic groupings in Iraq are Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds, and this study examines their three main Islamist inclinations. Rather than theological disagreements, social and communal issues are to blame for this split. For over 1400 years, the two Arab communities have been separated in numerous ways. Indeed, as Yitzhak Nakash (2003) points out in his article "The Shiites and the Future of Iraq,"

Sunni and Shia Arabs originate from similar tribal backgrounds and share a similar worldview. Nonetheless, for Shia across the world, Sunni and Shia is not only a theological vision, but also a psychology and a cultural way of life. Even though preserving significant Arab awareness and features, most of Iraqi Sunni and Shia culture has grown urbanized and somewhat influenced by Iranian and Turk cultural legacy.

As a result, Iraq's Shia and Sunni populations have grown increasingly distinct in many ways throughout time, and these distinctions have progressively been ingrained in the political and social order. Of course, on a personal, political, and social level, the borders between the two groups are frequently breached, especially in less difficult times. However, years of terrible sectarianism and political bloodshed in Iraq, the country is now divided.

Both communities' Islamist groups function as distinct and separate vehicles for their respective communities' interests, to some extent, political adversaries. This does not have to be a permanent state, but it will require a lengthy time of upheaval and normality in Iraqi political and social life before these divisions can be bridged. The same is true of racial divisions.

CHAPTER ONE

POLITICAL ISLAM AND FOREIGN POLICY

1.1. The Concept and Definition of Political Islam

The problem in understanding "political" Islam begins with a definition: what is political Islam, and how can it be "defined" effectively? This is mirrored in the frequent practice of "prefixing" Islam in order to generate a befuddling conceptual diversity, which includes radical Islam, militant Islam, extremist Islam, revolutionary Islam, and fundamentalist Islam, to mention a few. This diversity reflects both the numerous characteristics that are considered to define political Islam, as well as the difficulties in defining it. "Islam used for political purposes" is the simplest (and most comprehensive) definition of political Islam. However, the term "political Islam" has the unintended consequence of implying "an unlawful expansion of the Islamic tradition outside of the legitimately religious sphere it has historically occupied" (Hirschkind 1997, 12).

Another problem with the term "political Islam" is that Islam is a religion and a political system (*din wadawla*), which the term "political Islam" does not reflect. here is a tendency to label all forms of social protest as illegal, associating genuine dissent with militancy and violence (*ibid.*). As Kari Karamé (1996) points out, there is a growing use of the term "Islamism" (and Islamists) to refer to the Islamic movement (*al-harak al-Islamiyya*) and its supporters, which also conforms to the widespread Arabic reference to the Islamic movement (*al-harak al-Islamiyya*) and its supporters as Islamists (*Islamiyyun*). There is a shift from a more abstract perspective to one that focuses on the wider goals of the Islamist movement and the Islamist awakening (*al-sahwa al-Islamiyya*).

This broad category covers a wide range of organisations, but three features, according to Utvik (1993, 223), define the Islamist movement. They first declare themselves to be members of the Islamic movement, then seek an Islamic state controlled by Sharia, and then organise themselves to achieve these objectives. *Ijtihad*, or independent thought and reinterpretation of the Quran and Islamic traditions, is a

distinguishing characteristic of Islamists, as is the necessity to reinterpret and adapt the Holy Scriptures to modern realities. In this way, Islamism is a modernist aim; nevertheless, Islamists embrace modernity (technical developments, industrialisation, etc.) but reject modernism and its associated strong trust in science and reason, as Utvik (1993) points out.

As Khan (2001) illustrates, the Islamist "project" is built on three intertwined critiques: modernity, the West, and the State. More importantly, while Islam is a "complete system," it does not give a ready-made blueprint for a modern Islamic society, as the current Islamist movement has learned. So they've adopted a reconstructive nature centred on reinterpreting sacred texts (ijtehad), as well as a programmatic dimension aiming at putting key Islamic ideas into legislation. Khan argues that there is a significant trend toward more democratic techniques among individuals he refers to as "second-generation Islamists." This democratic shift may be seen in the rise of Islamist groups and political-religious leaders (such as Iran's President Khatemi). The democratic transformation of political Islam, called "New Islamism" by some (Langohr 2001), is still poorly understood and researched in general.

Opinions are divided as to whether this is due to an ideological shift or because the experiences of the preceding decade shown that removing secular regimes is impossible, and that this approach has weakened movements and robbed them of their leaders. This is also relevant to the fundamental question of whether political Islam is now a dormant force or one that might expand in the future.

One important phase of political Islam, which this thesis is interested in, is that which lasted from 1970 to 1982, with the revolution in Iran (1977–78) serving as the high point, with Ayatollah Khomeini as the charismatic and messianic leader. Islamic groups have become routinized and incorporated into normal politics, as Sami Zubaida has observed, since their heyday in the 1970s (Zubaida 2000). When this period ended, political Islam was gradually shorn of its political identity, and conservative moralism took its place. Olivier Roy's claim to *The Failure of Political Islam* was inspired by this change.

Gilles Kepel (2002) claims that the Islamist movement experienced a period of expansion (about 1966–89) followed by a decade of decline (around 1990–present). It

may be claimed that Kepel's thesis is faulty because he employs a very narrow definition of what constitutes proof of Islamism's success, namely that the Islamists have gained power by popular vote or force. This criterion appears to be hindering us from comprehending the many manifestations of political Islam in today's globe. Sami Zubaida (2000) suggested a three-part typology of Islam to better comprehend the conceptual basis of Islamic movements: conservative, radical, and political. Conservative Islam, according to Zubaida, is primarily concerned with moral and social supervision of its adherents. The Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, are the most prominent example of this kind (Gilles ,2002).

The second kind is best illustrated by Egyptian Islamic groups that want to remove unjust regimes using Sayyid Qutb's philosophy. Political Islam, the third kind, differs from the other two in that it seeks to transform society and politics while maintaining ties to nationalist and socialist objectives. Much of the scholarly work on political Islam, according to Sabet (2000, 856), is produced within the limits of Western social theory and must adhere to its "discursive boundaries." Sabet cites the inclination to attach the epithet "fundamentalist" to any administration that attempts to follow Sharia in line with Islam as an example of this dilemma (Sabet ,2000).

The implication is that religion and politics should be kept apart, as in Western participatory democracy. The inference is that fundamentalism's (or political Islam's) unification of religion and state is questionable, and that Islam as a moral system separate from the state is opposed to Islam (din wadunya). This logic frequently leads to the biased conclusion that there are "good Muslims" and "bad Muslims" (Mamdani, 2002), which might explain the current increase in "anti-Muslimism" in the West, (Halliday ,1999).

1.2. The Modern View of Political Islam

In modern term, there are many preeminent scholars who have framed the development of political Islam. This section will deal with the three most influential scholars within the history of the development of political Islamic thought. These include Sayyid Jamal Al-Din Al- Afghani, Hassan Al-Banna and Seyyid Qutb. The first is Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897). Al-Afghani was most likely born in Persia, and he spent the most of his life looking for a ruler who would carry out his reform programme across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The ulema had "closed

the door of *ijtihad* (personal interpretation)" of Islam's sacred texts, the Koran and the Sunna (compilations of the prophet's actions and sayings) in the third century, following the Hegira. Since then, they've been restricted to preserving and commenting on the views of previous generations of religious scholars (Sigwart, and Hans-Jörg ,2013).

The ulema's objective had been to prevent textual distortion, but their glosses of mediaeval writers' writings grew more worthless. In the way of the salaf, Al-Afghani advised Muslims to disregard canonical mediaeval literature and return to Islam's core sources, the Koran and the Sunna, the holy forefathers of Islam who were never hesitant to apply reason to interpret Islam as the circumstances dictated. However, his motivations were entirely political. His speech, on the other hand, was frequently revolutionary: the Muslim community must choose a monarch based on his trustworthiness and adherence to Islamic law (Lake, and David ,2011).

Hasan Al-Banna (1906–1949), our second reformer, was a schoolteacher rather than a religious person. Nonetheless, he provided a radical and distinctive interpretation of Islam, which he attempted to relate to the Muslim tradition at all times, and he categorically denounced anyone who disagreed with his understanding as "enemies of religion" and "henchmen of the colonial powers." Born in a tiny Egyptian town, Al-Banna later came to Cairo as a youngster to complete his education. In the capital, he was astounded by Egypt's fast Westernization and the resulting loss of ancient values (Henne, and Peter ,2012) .

He bemoaned these developments in his memoirs: "After the previous war, while in Cairo, under the guise of intellectual freedom, the flood of dissipation of souls and minds, morals and traditions reached unprecedented heights." (Fox, Jonathan. 2019) The atheism and licentiousness tsunami was huge, overpowering, and unstoppable. He characterized Islam as a way of "glory and fortitude, truth and strength, blessedness and righteousness, firmness, virtue, and grandeur". (Fox, Jonathan. 2019) Whereas earlier Islamic reformers, like al-Afghani and 'Abdu, attempted to modernize Islam, the next generation of Islamists, like Al-Banna and the Muslim Brothers, wanted to Islamize modernity. In the late 1920s, Al-Banna created the Muslim Brothers' Society, for which he is most known. Like his forebears, he was deeply influenced by the prevalent ideas of his day. The fascist ideology that was

gaining popularity in Europe seemed to give an enticing alternative in an Egypt still occupied by the British and whose parliamentary system had been completely discredited owing to royal involvement, party corruption, and political violence (Fox, Jonathan. 2019)

The third reformer of political Islam was Seyyid Qutb. Qutb chastised individuals he referred to as "descendants of the Muslims," who, in his opinion, had lost all ties to Islam except the name. He claimed that jihad just meant defensive combat, along with "defeatists in the face of the current situation and the Orientalists' clever onslaught". (Reference) For Qutb, the phrase had to be interpreted widely, to cover men's defense against anything that stood in the way of spiritual liberation. To him, religion is not a coercive force. However, impediments must be removed that obstruct the transfer of that benefit to all people, as it was given by God to all people. Among these impediments are oppressive governments that hinder people from listening to Islam's message or seduce those who have followed it correctly. That goal is the same, and jihad remains a [religious] obligation for Muslims if they truly are Muslims. Qutb emphasized that while Islam desires peace, it is not the "cheap" tranquility of being confined to a narrow area. Rather, it is concerned with the whole human race. Qutb, like his forefathers, claimed to be a supporter of true Islam. Despite this, he was strongly impacted by the so-called "jahiliyya." For example, writers such as French eugenicist and Nazi sympathiser Alexis Carrel, British scientist and novelist Julian Huxley, and British philosopher and renowned atheist Bertrand Russell, whom he referenced extensively, influenced his critique of capitalism. Marxism was also a strong influence, as evidenced by his interpretation of the Muslim obligation of almsgiving (zakat), his belief in the inevitability of Islam's triumph (hatmiyya), and his vision of a devoted vanguard (tali'a) fighting for radical change (Giddens, and Anthony, 1990).

1.3. Political Islam and the Rejection of Politics

One of the fundamental issues with political Islam when it was created in Egypt in 1928 was that it was obliged to make inflated claims in response to Western democratic, financial, and cultural colonial dominance. Simultaneously, it had to contend with the Wafd Party's secular nationalist vision of religion, which limited religion to the private realm in an attempt to mobilize Copts, as represented in the

slogan "everyone his faith, the country for everyone." The Muslim Brotherhood pledged to offer a comprehensive all-inclusive religious "system." (nizam), in the phrase of its leader Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), as part of the process of converting Islam into an ideology (Milton ,1996).

It enshrined political ambiguity by proclaiming the Koran, with its limited political directions, to be the constitution, while violence was sanctified. Hasan al-Banna despised politics (hizbiyya) since it included being engaged with "notables and names," as well as "parties and societies," in his words. Despite the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood originated as an organisation committed to da'wa and the spreading of the right call, believing that the Muslim world's problems arose from its deviation from the straight path, it became embroiled in the monarchy's political maneuverings quickly. The monarchy recognised the Muslim Brotherhood's potential as a counterweight to its nationalist opponents when it gained national appeal in 1936 as a consequence to its efforts to assist the Palestinian rebellion. The alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the monarchy, as well as conservative minority parties, did not work out in the end (Jaitely,and Anam. 1986).

The monarchy saw the Brotherhood as a hazardous ally after authorities discovered the Brotherhood's paramilitary "battalions" recruited during the Arab–Israeli war in 1948. The Brotherhood was then dissolved in 1948. The assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqrashi by the Secret Apparatus, followed by the assassination of Hassan al-Banna by Egypt's secret police, signaled the end of the Brotherhood's political experiment's first phase. Following the failed assassination attempt on Egypt's President Nasser in 1954, the group's second reappearance in 1951 ended much worse. The military suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood, assassinating some of its leaders and imprisoning its members until the 1970s. The new military administration could readily legitimize the Brotherhood's persecution by labeling it a terrorist group because of its armed branch, the Secret Apparatus (al-jihaz al-sirri). This path was neither predetermined nor universal, and it was linked to the movement's Egyptian mother organization. The development of other branches was influenced by local conditions (Milton ,1996).

Among the local branches of the Egyptian mother organization is the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Between 1945 and 1963, in Syria, where a branch

of the Brotherhood was formed in the 1940s, the Brotherhood actively participated in politics and campaigned in elections, even proposing ministerial positions in numerous governments. However, despite the Syrian Brotherhood's engagement in legislative politics, it did not result in a theoretical foundation of democracy, which was already fragile and was interrupted by military operations, as it was in Egypt. When the Muslim Brotherhood backed King Hussein against the pan-Arab movement in Jordan in the 1950s, it solidified its image as an ambiguous force. It reaped significant benefits from the arrangement, and until 1989, the Brotherhood was able to acquire access to key areas of society, including education and welfare, thanks to its partnership with King Hussein. Despite the fact that it was registered as a non-governmental organization, it was never allowed to operate as a political force or to express its political ideas. The Muslim Brotherhood had a similarly ambiguous role in Palestine, and was even sponsored by Israelis in their struggle against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on the grounds that it was non-political and focused on personal salvation. Internal reasons, as well as the tough conditions in which many of these countries find themselves, have hampered the development of a political ideology and agenda (Meijer, Roel, and Salafism ,2009).

The potential of internal struggle (fitna) which might undermine leaders' authority and jeopardize unity, was always present while discussing political methods and ideologies. To circumvent this, appointments to organisations like the Maktab al-Irshad, the Brotherhood's politburo, were made by the leader himself or by co-optation. The political culture of the Muslim Brotherhood was founded on the concepts of "obedience" (ta'a) and "listening" (sam), which were not questioned until the 1980s, reflecting the authoritarian nature of politics at the period. Obedience and listening are authoritarian principles present throughout the Koran, as well as in Salafism, where they are used to explain total loyalty to the 'ulama's position.

In this brief outline of the Brotherhood's main principles, an important question could be raised about its relevance to current events in Muslim-majority countries. For starters, individual religion is a poor predictor of voting behaviour and policy opinions. Second, in Arab countries, electorally successful parties are more likely to provide effective social services (Maktabat ,1996). In Muslim-majority countries, individual religion does not reliably influence voting behaviour. Religious affiliation has minimal effect on who one would vote for in a presidential election or

how one thinks about particular policy issues. This calls into question Islam's role as a purveyor of a certain ideological agenda. To be sure, political Islamists may hold differing views on what Islam means in terms of public policy and administration, but these ideas do not appear to be driving Islamic political parties' electoral success. Individual-level data from the Palestinian territories, Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt show that Islam has a modest impact on political views, particularly democratic attitudes, and has little explanatory power when it comes to explaining democratic support in Arab countries. In Lebanon, religiosity does not appear to be a strong predictor of political participation. Indonesia is a Southeast Asian country. For example, since the 1999 Indonesian elections, Islamic parties' vote share has been dropping, falling from 38.9% in 1999 to 37.6% in 2004, and subsequently to 27.4% in 2009. Religion was not a significant role in explaining voting behaviour in the 1999 and 2004 elections in Indonesia's most populous Muslim-majority country, nor was support for Indonesia's religious parties explained by "Islamic worldview". So, religious affiliation has minimal impact on democratic and political Islam tendencies in Central Asia (Lake, and David ,2011).

HAMAS (The Islamic Resistance Movement) was created as a Muslim group in Palestine in 1987 by Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi, Salah Sheadeh, Muhammad Shamah, Isa al-Nashar, Abdul Fattah Dukhan, and Ibrahim al-Yazuri, all leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. The most important thing that shaped HAMAS group after its founding was the peace chance that appeared with the Madrid summit in 1991 and the Oslo procedure that followed. It was founded as the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood's branch. Since the 1940s, ideological, political, and sociological events in Palestine have played a significant influence in the formation and development of HAMAS. The Muslim Brotherhood's worldview lies at the heart of HAMAS's philosophy (Saffet, ,2017).

HAMAS gained 74 of the 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2006, breaking Fatah's, the opposing group's, hegemony. Even though many consider HAMAS as a barrier to long-term peace in the Middle East, others argue that there will never be peace in the area unless HAMAS is acknowledged as a genuine political force. One widely held belief in scholarly and political circles in the West is that since its inception, HAMAS has relied only on violence and armed conflict to achieve its political goals, especially against innocent civilian targets in Israel. In 1997, the United

States of America recognized HAMAS as a terrorist group. HAMAS is defined on this list as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood's Palestinian branch, which has carried out anti-Israeli activities, including suicide bombs against civilian areas in Israel, ever since founding in 1987. (Jensen, 2009).

The Koran texts, Hadith sources, and historical conflicts and confrontations between Jews, Christians, and Muslims have all been referenced 35 times in the HAMAS charter to bolster its position. The Charter's language and doctrine are based on Islam and its relationship with Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. The charter is divided into various sections, including the description of the HAMAS movement, its aims, tactics and techniques, and its attitude to internal and external role players. The fundamental aspects of the HAMAS Charter may be summed up in a few clear concepts, leaving little opportunity for future discussions with Israel to be optimistic. To begin with, the Palestinian issue is viewed as a religious and political confrontation between Muslims and "infidel" Jews. Second, Palestine is a Muslim holy place that cannot be split with any other country. Third, the major asset that will lead Muslims to triumph is holy war jihad. Fourth, under the Muslim Brotherhood's doctrine, Islamic consciousness must be propagated via education, Muslim unity must be fueled by charitable acts, and poor people must be helped in a seamless manner. The specific strategic goal of HAMAS is stated in two headlines: the first is the establishment of an Islamic State in the Gaza Strip and West Bank in place of Israel, and the second is the destruction of Israel by jihad under all circumstances. HAMAS links itself to the unity and joint action of worldwide Muslim societies in order to achieve these goals. The Charter specifies three pillars that interact for this holy battle against Israel and Zionism: the Palestinian pillar, the Arab pillar, and the global Islamic pillar (SAFFET, 2017).

1.4. The Credibility of Political Islam

The success of Islamists appears to be connected to the provision of social services and local public goods. If the common view is true, and people in Arab nations only want Islamist policy platforms in politics, there is no reason to expect Islamists to be any more active than other political organizations in delivering social services, local public goods, and so on. Islamists have, however, played a key role in the delivery of such services across the MENA (Middle East North Africa) area, including

healthcare, education, social aid, and humanitarian relief. Algerian Islamic organizations were among the earliest and most efficient in aiding earthquake victims in Algiers in 1989. The Moroccan Justice and Development Party does not actively offer social services, but its umbrella organisation, the Unity and Reform Movement, is quite active at the local and municipal levels. Ennahda—the Movement of the Islamic Tendency has built a network of social service providers and a presence at the local government level, and is the predecessor of Tunisia's main Islamic party (Lake, and David ,2011). It also manages a number of civic organisations, such as sports clubs, and organises free group weddings.

Similarly, “The Muslim Brotherhood controls hospitals and schools in every governorate in Egypt,” according to the report. The charity also offers a number of shelters and job training programmes for impoverished widows and orphans. According to estimates, the Muslim Brotherhood controls 20% of Egypt's 5,000 officially recognized NGOs and organizations.” (Price, 2006).The Muslim Brotherhood runs the Islamic Hospital in Amman and the al-Afaf Charitable Society in Jordan, which encourages group weddings and matching. (Lake, and David ,2011)To provide social services in Yemen, the Islah party has established humanitarian, religious, and educational groups. The Islah Social Welfare Society, for example, advocates for health awareness, religious education, illiteracy eradication, and disaster assistance. Finally, one of Hezbollah's eight institutional components in Lebanon is the "Social Unit." (Lake, and David ,2011)It has created a variety of organizations, from agricultural cooperatives to cultural institutions, and it offers both social and technical assistance. In the Palestinian territories, Hamas funds humanitarian projects such as schools, orphanages, mosques, healthcare facilities, soup kitchens, and sports leagues, among other things (Price, 2006).

Studies show that religion's substantive substance isn't the sole factor influencing voting behavior in Arab nations. Religion functions as a social node in addition to its theological substance(Mitchell, and Richard, 1993)..Religion's organizational features have the potential to help in the settlement of some of the region's most pressing political issues. Religious politics, in particular, might be regarded as a possible solution to the problem of electoral commitment in new and emerging democracies. Voters elect political parties that can deliver on their pledges to offer public goods following elections. In the aftermath of government transitions,

however, such political parties are uncommon. Politicians are rarely viewed as capable of making true promises in new and emerging democracies, necessitating the development of trustworthy means of communication with voters as well as systems for tracking pledges and fulfillment. Politicians make redistribution promises to a small group of political cronies who can give their consumers credible guarantees while pocketing some of the money (Mitchell, and Richard, 1993).

Patronage, however, will affect young and developing democracies, resulting in excessively large and inefficient redistribution programs as well as a shortage of government public goods. Patronage-based politics may fade away over time if politicians establish a reputation that allows them to make genuine public-goods pledges. Patronage, on the other hand, may discourage politicians from investing in their capacity to keep their promises to the public, leading to extended periods of bad governance and redistributive politics. Religious groups in MENA countries, unlike their adversaries, have the ability to make genuine claims about policy platforms and the provision of public goods. For a long time, they've been active in providing local public goods and social services to their members and larger communities (Mitchell, and Richard, 1993).

This boosts their credibility when it comes to making promises about public goods in the future. For decades, the Muslim Brotherhood has worked in Arab nations, frequently in the face of government harassment. Furthermore, because of their theological underpinning, they are able to cope with problems of collective action in ways that secular groups cannot. Sacrifice and shame are two examples of such systems. Religious organizations require members to dedicate time to religious activities as well as the cooperative creation of goods for the group's profit. They impose fees on its members, such as clothing or food requirements, to prevent prospective free-riders. These assist members to show their devotion to the group and act as a deterrent to potential lukewarm members who might take advantage of the religious organization's goods (Milton,1996).

1.5. The Concept of Foreign policy

Every country has always been reliant on others in the international arena. Even when a country reaches its pinnacle of development, it must rely on other countries to satisfy its own requirements. There is no such thing as a country that can survive

without being connected to the rest of the globe. The development of a modern state's foreign policy is a critical duty. Each government establishes diplomatic, economic, commercial, educational, and other organisations. In today's world, multinational organisations and non-governmental actors play an important role in international relations. In this regard, the discipline of International Relations," according to Hoffmann, "is concerned with the conditions and acts that have an impact on the foreign policies and power of the essential components into which the globe is divided." It describes the ideas that the government would use to gain a substantial amount of power. A country's foreign policy is intended to protect and advance its national interests through bilateral and multilateral interactions with other countries (Sigwart, and Hans-Jörg ,2013).

While International Relations embodies a country's historical values, general national goals, aspirations, and sense of self, its foreign policy consists of both choices and acts or policies. These decisions and actions have a significant influence on inter-state relations. The foreign policy of a country is essentially a statement of its objectives. Within the confines of its authority and the reality of the outside world, every state chooses its route in international relations via it. Foreign policy provides a sense of direction to a country. It provides adequate equipment for this type of journey to be pleasant. It instils a sense of purpose and self-assurance in one's capacity to achieve one's objectives. Each country develops a foreign policy to guide it and give it a sense of direction in the international arena. "Foreign Policy is the content of a country's attempts to advance its interests in respect to other countries," Normal Hill concluded (Mitchell, and Richard, 1993). The fundamental goal of foreign policy is to advance one's own interests while retaining national ideology.

All nations are impacted by the activities of other nations (positively or adversely), and they attempt to adapt to their own requirements. Every nation must consider not just its own goals, aspirations, and challenges, but also those of other countries. The creation and execution of a set of rules that regulate a state's behaviour pattern when negotiating with (contacting) other nations in order to safeguard or promote its fundamental interests is referred to as foreign policy. National interests are also the goals that sovereign states seek via the use of force and other foreign policy instruments. "International relations as a field of study is at the heart of the processes by which nations adjust their national interests to those of other states," Hartmann

stated. George Modelski defined "foreign policy goal" as "state operations modification in favour of one's own state." According to George Modelski (2004 ,145) it is the system of actions created by communities for influencing the behaviour of other nations and adjusting their own operations to the international environment. Modelski claims that the end of foreign policy is just a desirable shift in the behaviour of other nations, which foreign policy analysis must cope with (Mitchell, and Richard, 1993).

On the other hand, some international relations specialists believe that foreign policy's goal should be not only to alter, but also to govern the behaviour of other nations in a desirable manner. For example the basics of India's foreign policy include resistance to all forms of imperialism, support for the United Nations, among other principles. India's foreign policy is thus guided by these concepts as it attempts to achieve its objectives in international affairs. Foreign policy is the result of a conversation between a country's decision-makers and the environment in which they work. Foreign policy in that region is a reflection of domestic policy, therefore domestic politics and foreign policy are inextricably linked (Halliday ,1999).

Foreign policy consistency is no longer an option, but a necessity. All foreign policies, according to Hans J. Morgenthau (2012), tend to perpetuate and reflect the following patterns of behaviour: power balance, imperialism, and prestige politics. Padelford and Lincoln stated, "Foreign Policy is the fundamental component in the process by which a state converts its generally declared aims and interests into practical course of action to attain these goals and sustain interests." Foreign policy, in this perspective, acknowledges national interests and seeks to accomplish them through the use of national power. Foreign policy determines how a country pursues its national interests in the international arena. Foreign policy, according to Dr. Mohinder Kumar, is a well-thought-out plan for attaining foreign-policy goals guided by the notion of national interest. Furthermore, a country's foreign policy must take into account international law and moral principles. "Foreign policy is the use of political power to persuade other countries to exercise their legislative authority in the way that the states involved prefer: it is a dynamic interplay between forces acting both outside and inside the country's borders (Mitchell, and Richard, 1993).

In addition to economic success, making foreign policy creates an attitude that is not only suitable for a certain circumstance, but also acts as an all-purpose attitude that can be utilised in a number of scenarios throughout time. It is defined as a mix of objectives and techniques. The objective is the national interest of a country, and the means are the country's power and skills. Short-term aims, mid-term goals (trade, foreign aid, and so on), and long-term goals are the three types of foreign policy objectives (plans, visions concerning ultimate political or ideological organisation of the international system). Short-term goals, often known as core goals, include fundamental values and interests, territorial integrity, and political independence. All concerns that jeopardize the geographic integrity of a country must be addressed. On the other hand, political independence refers to a country's power to decide whether or not to engage in international affair (Mitchell, and Richard, 1993).

These are vital subjects for a country's survival, and every state strives to protect them without compromise. Trade, foreign aid, and people's economic growth and living standards are all examples of middle-range aims. The goal of foreign policy is to encourage economic development so that the country can assert itself more assertively in international affairs. The status and respect of a country can only be preserved if its economy is steady. The transfer of ideas, philosophies, systems, civilizations, and values is also a medium-range aim. Long-term objectives are visions or plans for the international system's future political or ideological structure. These goals are vague and unpredictable since the outcome of the pursuit cannot be predicted.

Furthermore, foreign policy objectives can be divided into numerous groups. The distinction between possession goals and milieu goals was made by Arnold Wolfers (Mitchell, and Richard, 1993).. Possession goals are those sought by a country's foreign policy in order to maintain its possessions, such as territorial expansion or participation in an international organisation, whereas milieu goals are those pursued by a country in order to create favourable conditions outside of its borders. One example of such an aim is peace. Ambient objectives, on the other hand, might just be a means to an end in the pursuit of possession goals. Apart from that, there are Direct and Indirect National Goals, such as environmental protection that is linked to the primary benefit to people or groups of citizens (Mitchell, and Richard, 1993).

1.6. Foreign Policy Principles

Every country has some foreign policy goals and principles to achieve those goals, such as maintaining territorial integrity and political independence, as well as accelerating social and economic progress and improving its global position. In order to achieve its foreign policy goals, a nation state's individual authority must be strengthened. A state's foreign policy objectives must take into consideration the international arena's conditions to avoid being harmed by the disruptive effects of other nations' strength. Non-alignment, Panchsheel, disarmament, and colonisation resistance are just a few of the phrases used to characterise the pursuit of global peace and stability (Marr, 2007).

International policy, according to Prussian politician Prince Otto Von Bismark, is the extension of domestic politics (Spencer,2013). The relationship between internal and foreign policy, on the other hand, aids in assessing the relevance of a sovereign state within the international system. As a country's foreign policy evolves, so do its domestic policies. So, foreign policy can be examined through studying a “state's operations toward the external environment and the conditions, usually domestic, under which such actions are created abroad,” according to Holstein. The primary internal obstacles that governments have in developing foreign policy, on the other hand, stem from two sources: different opinions on a number of communal issues between officials on the one hand and preachers, on the other. To choose the best policy options, every state must understand the international and domestic political context in which foreign policy is formed and implemented. Setting goals is an important part of the process of developing foreign policy. Because a state has a range of objectives, it's critical to determine which are influenced by the international and local political environments. Another component of foreign policy decision-making is selecting policy choices (Spencer,2013).

A state must evaluate the policy alternatives available to attain the objective or goals in a political environment. Another alternative is to make a formal decision. The executive branch of government, which comprises the head of state, the head of government, the cabinet, and the ministers, is typically in charge of foreign policy. Following the selection of the best policy option, a formal decision must be made, and the policy must then be implemented. Foreign policy is usually overseen by the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs or State Department, as well as the ministries of trade, military, and aid.

The factors affecting foreign policy decisions consists of International or external factors and domestic or internal determinants are the primary drivers of every state's foreign policy. These are typically portrayed as elements that aid in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

On the other hand, the relationship between external (like geographical Factor) and internal factors, leadership has long been a source of debate in international relations, particularly in the discipline of Foreign Policy analysis. While some argue that domestic and international policy are "separate" matters, others argue that they are "interdependent" and may clash. While the extent to which these foreign policies have an influence varies from state to state depending on the political climate in which they are situated, there are certain parallels between them. External influences have a greater impact in certain instances, while internal forces have a greater impact in others.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND POLITICAL ISLAM

2.1 The Cold War Years and the Era of Realism in the Middle East

From the conclusion of second world war through the fall of the Soviet Union, the Cold War dominated international politics. The Cold War had already begun on March 5, 1946, when Winston Churchill delivered his famous speech at Westminster University in Fulton, Missouri, depicting Europe as split by an iron wall, with eastern Europe subjugated to the "Soviet domain" and the West under American dominance (Milton ,1996).. Superpowers have competed ideologically, militarily, technologically, and diplomatically for more than four decades. The rivalry's repercussions were felt all across the world, causing significant division and intensifying pre-existing problems. Although the two superpowers never fought a direct war, proxy conflicts erupted in Southeast Asia, Central America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East countries like Iraq .

The Middle East was a major source of conflict. Superpowers have been aware of its significance since Second World War, owing to its strategic geographical area and massive oilfields and gas resources. In reality, the territory is geopolitically located at the crossroads of three continents, just south of Russia's border with the Caucasus, and is bordered by four major seas: the Mediterranean, the Black and Caspian Seas, and the Indian Ocean. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were vitally engaged in the Middle East's oil reserves before the war ended. In reality, the major powers were not just the world's major oil manufacturers at the time, the war also managed to make them more aware of the pivotal approach oil had procured in warfare. Their motor - driven forces, as well as their navies and air forces, were completely reliant on oil for propulsion. As a result, they become extremely anxious about the possibility of their supplies being withheld by their opponents, as well as the preservation of those supplies (Milton ,1996).

When analyzing this historical period, we find that it ushered in what could be called, an era of realism, which took on several forms. sny stateswoman or statesman can pretend to be a realist when it comes to policy, but few, if any, can tell the

difference between the several sub-traditions which make up the system of thought to which they profess to adhere. The befuddlement with which these disparate groups talk has been reflected by the befuddlement with which contemporary realists convey their (always true) observations from the breach among them. To recapture reality, today's realists, just as those of the Cold War period, would have to decide wherein they stand on key issues that will drive future security issues, just as they did with the security breaches that America is already paying for. Security activities reveal the intricate relationship among ethics and safety, from renditions and torturing to missile assaults and country to drones and killings. Each of these damaging behaviors was predicated on rash decisions based on utilitarian reasoning, with little concern for the long-term ramifications of such quick fixes. In the long run, each of them had the seeds of developing dysfunction. If security is simply about short-term effectiveness, ethical calculations are pointless (Spencer,2013).

Because realism is built on the foundation of stability, an ethical commitment to security is both appropriate and necessary. Neglect to address these ethical dimensions of security would merely repeat yesterday's mistakes, specifically, the process of generating insecurity via the use of hasty security precautions in times of crisis. There is a normative component to each security action in which someone, some group, or some state pays the price in the end for America's transitory security.

The Cold War socially defined this paradigm before 9/11 through the case of the Gulf War. As the Gulf War proved, U.S. foreign policy was dominated by a dominant Cold War strategic cultural mindset prior to 9/11. This type of conservative normative paradigm prioritized geopolitical peace and sought global acceptance for American interests. This system of strategic social attitudes featured a focus on deterrent and confinement when the use of force became necessary. Saddam Hussein's seizure of Kuwait forced America to abandon its policy of cultivating him as an ally, resulting in the Gulf War. As per the realism position of the first Bush administration, allowing a radical actor with nuclear weapons like Saddam to get off with invading Kuwait would foment instability and increasing aggressiveness in the post-Cold War period. That is, Iraq would employ force to direct the supply of Middle Eastern oil reserves, allowing Saddam Hussein to threaten the financial stability of the West. In such a scenario, the US, its allies, and the global economy may be blackmailed by an unscrupulous and cruel despot who has demonstrated his antagonism. As a result, the

US entered the conflict. Likewise, during the Gulf War, the Cold War paradigm that dictated the first Bush president's thinking severely constrained its alternatives. The United States of America would declare war only after collecting a massive worldwide coalition of support, including garnering approval for its operations from autocratic Middle Eastern countries like Syria and Egypt. The alliance also helped the US win support in the Arab world by sharing the costs of engagement with European and Japanese allies (Baylis, 2005).

By acknowledging Arab nations' objectives, the US avoided accusations of operating as a neocolonial force. In this conflict, it also had specific goals, including as ousting Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and bolstering the strategic posture of oil-rich but vulnerable Gulf governments. This move illustrated how conventional Middle East policy prioritized regional peace and stability in order to ensure a steady supply of oil to fuel the global economy. Furthermore, during the Iran-Iraq War, when the US saw Saddam's powerful Iraq as a stabilizing shield, Rumsfeld played a significant role as the diplomatic envoy who actually opened interconnection between Iraq and the US, including agricultural and technical support, to counter Iran's impact while jockeying for favor with Saddam against with the Soviets. The administration of the military conflict phase of the Gulf War exemplified this careful framework for strategic culture. Former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, a personal friend of the older Bush and a mentor to Condoleezza Rice, utilized realism logic to persuade policymakers to see Iraq as a viable instrument for combating Iranian supremacy during the Cold War (Onuf, 2013). When the Kurds and Shiites revolted after the Gulf War, the United States of America's objective was to retain Iraqi unity and the multinational alliance, which meant abandoning the Kurds and Shiites. Furthermore, according to Bush and Scowcroft, "Turkey—and Iran—opposed the notion of an independent Kurdish state," while Secretary of defense, Cheney, asserted that both Syria and Iran desired Iraqi land. The administration also intended to save costs and preserve lives, as Cheney put it bluntly: "Just how many dead Americans is Hussein worth?" We didn't think there were many, and I guess we were right." Even Paul Wolfowitz did not want Saddam to be deposed at the time, mostly because he was concerned that the conflict would conclude too soon, reducing Saddam's armed capabilities (Onuf, 2013).

Policymaking was constrained by the Cold War paradigm of measured restraint. The harsh caution of the Cold War paradigm produced a reality that neoconservatives' idealistic outlook found intolerable. Following the revolts, Saddam implemented a policy of limiting his authority by legitimizing international institutions like as the UN, no-fly zones, and firearms regimes, all of which have been backed up by the fear of punishing force. The following underlying forces dictated conflicts, alliances, nuclear threats, and the complicated events that happened in the Middle East during the Cold War: The superpowers' fear of losing control of the area; their ambition to supplant Britain's supremacy in the Middle East: The growth of Arab nationalism and the spread of communist ideals; anti-colonialism and the battle for freedom of Middle Eastern governments, which culminated to their affiliations with superpowers. Ideology did, in fact, have a significant impact. It was used in both the appeals to possible allies and the economic and social models that were provided to them (Towns, 2012).

The Israeli-Palestinian dispute is another example of superpower influence on regional affairs in the Middle East. Despite the fact that the problem has nothing to do with superpower rivalry, the Cold War struggle created division over the subject, fueling an arms race and putting the world on the verge of nuclear war on multiple occasions. Superpowers sought for Israel's support throughout the initial period of its existence, from its founding in 1948 to the Suez Crisis of 1956. After 1956, polarization emerged, with the United States of America backing Israel and the Soviet Union backing Arab countries. The struggle was fought over arms and economic aid, with the stakes rising and peaking during the 1968-1970 and 1973 battles, when Washington issued nuclear alert for the final time in Cold War history.

Inside, cold war rivalry skewered economic choices, domestic policies, social, military, and governmental balances, with heavyweights orchestrating – or backing – coups and domestic revolts. Religion and philosophy have been used to further the Cold War rationale of power balance, with certain consequences for democratic development. Indeed, the US placed no emphasis on promoting democracy or civil rights in the region. The United States covered or backed activities to destabilize Middle Eastern democracy, such as the 1953 American-British coup in Iran, which deposed the democratic Mossadeq government and replaced it with the dictatorial Mohammad Reza Shah. This behavior was consistent with American security goals of

preserving the Middle East from Communism and exporting the free market capitalist logic; goals that could be accomplished more effectively by partnering with rich and conservative local leaders (Jahn, 2009).

2.2 Political Islam in The Research of Building New Foreign Relations

Iraq's first democratic elections were held in 2005, when the nation was still under US occupation and suffering from a severe economic and humanitarian crisis. The new administration implemented an unusual identity-based governance model, with ethnic and religious groups sharing power equally. Rising demonstrations and the disintegration of ethno-sectarian blocs have cast doubt on Iraq's government since then. In a situation of growing abstention, the lack of substantial additional divisions beyond the sectarian one has held indications to a governance crisis that appeared to transcend both social and ethno-religious cleavages (Spencer, 2013).

In 1958, a coup led by Egyptian Nasser, under the influence of Pan-Arabism, toppled the monarchy and created a nationalist republic under military rule. Social and agrarian reforms were conducted with the support of one of the Middle East's most significant communist parties. The Ba'ath Party seized power in 1968 and established a secular. And soon the Ba'athist administration fell on the political hegemony of Iraq and embodied Arab nationalism, as embodied by its leader Saddam Hussein. (Dawisha, 2009). While the country's human development results improved significantly in the first two decades, the country was ravaged by two Gulf Wars (with Iran from 1980 to 1988 and an attempted annexation of Kuwait in 1991), followed by crippling international economic sanctions. The invasion led by the United States in 2003, ostensibly to prevent nuclear weapons, ended up toppling the previous regime (Mansour, 2017).

The post-2003 period saw a significant institutional reorganization and the beginning of an age of severe violence. More than half a million Iraqis lost their jobs as a result of the disbanding of the Iraqi army and the methodical Baath fiction (this fiction was to dethrone Egypt as Arab world leader and establish dominion over the The Arabian Gulf) of the institutions, which sparked an insurgency in Sunni regions. The dispute rapidly devolved into a full-fledged civil war between armed militias, many of whom were connected with ethnic and religious interests. Political violence and instability has remained a constant feature of Iraqi life till now. Under the auspices

of the United States of America, a sectarian style of administration evolved, distributing power fairly among the country's different ethnic and religious groups - principally Sunni, Shia, and Kurd, but also Turkmen and Christians. The muhasassa system a system in which the authority and resources of the country are divided among groups especially religious group looked to be the favored method of preventing a politico-military minority from gaining control. Only a few secular parties have carved themselves a place in the political scene, despite the fact that all communities appear to be unified in monolithic blocks. All of the key participants were former opponents of Saddam's government, either organized in exile or clandestinely, because the Baath party was banned and its former members were barred from running for office (Kristina, 2012).

Despite tensions and a new conflict in 2014 as a result of ISIS's advance throughout the northwestern part of the country, the Islamic-dominated regime has been surprisingly peaceful since 2005, with elections held on a regular basis. Over time, this normalization allowed for more intra-group competition. Shia Arab coalitions won the most votes due to their larger demographic weight, whereas Sunni Arabs originally boycotted the election. The quota-sharing system, on the other hand, assured that the government would be formed up of coalitions, with a rotating distribution of posts among the three factions. Alliances between secular and anti-sectarian organizations have also gained traction. The secular list Al-Iraqiya, united against Shia Prime Minister Maliki's slide, came in first in the 2010 elections, but received primarily Sunni votes (Spencer,2013).

While political elites progressed from fractionalization to cooperation around power-sharing, popular Iraqi Security Forces action grew to transcend identification lines. Since 2015, growing public protests have erupted across the nation, particularly in Shia areas (Costantini, 2020). Moving beyond from demands for basic services, the social movement rapidly denounced the state's failings as a whole, calling into question the legitimacy of the state's identity style of governance. With the 2018 elections, for the first time, the anti-sectarian position resonated well in the Shia political group, and a new coalition was able to rearrange the deck, reflecting this desire for out-of-the-system partnerships. Nonetheless, both unprecedented abstention and continuous demonstrations since October 2019 have cast doubt on the 2003 regime's ability to rebuild itself (Dodge 2020). Inequalities in space and sectarianism in voting Iraqis'

socioeconomic conditions have worsened significantly as a result of more than three decades of fighting. Poverty has been expanding in an economy driven by the resource curse, with infrastructure and institutions in shambles (OPHDI, 2017).

The post-2003 era's major security concern, as well as inadequate administration, has slowed any progress in the situation for a populace that still lacks basic amenities (World Bank, 2014). During this time, no substantial reductions in poverty or economic disparity have been recorded. The twin crises of 2014, the deterioration of economic conditions owing to the fall of oil prices and the revival of violence with the formation of ISIS, wiped out any progress achieved in reducing poverty since the civil war began (Krishnan and Olivieri, 2016). As a result of the worldwide pandemic, the proportion of the population living in poverty has remained stable at approximately 20% and it is expected to rise by at least 10% by 2020 (UNDP, 2020). However, acute poverty is unevenly spread across the country, resulting in ethnic disparity. Despite the lack of an ethnic census, government figures from 2010 suggest that about 65 percent of Iraq's population is Shia and 35 percent is Sunni, with Kurds accounting for 15 to 20% of the population, mostly Sunni. The three main ethno-religious communities are generally concentrated in defined areas: Kurdish in the north, Sunni in the center, and Shia in the south (Spencer , 2013).

Regional disparities, on the other hand, have corrected over time. While Shia and Kurdish areas have historically been the poorest, the latter has had a change of fortune. After 12 years of governmental persecution and ethnic cleansing efforts, the Kurdistan region has enjoyed a period of relative peace and prosperity, thanks to a de facto autonomy system in place since 1991, which was formalized with the 2005 semi-federal constitution (Natali, 2010). The series of battles, on the other hand, had a more obvious geographical divergence impact, favoring the Sunni North-West. Increasing geographical disparities exacerbated ethnic divisions, culminating in a referendum on independence for the Kurdistan Region in 2017, whose legitimacy was challenged by the federal government. With the battle against ISIS, the Kurdish-Shia alliance has been called into doubt as a united front against Saddam Hussein's (McEvoy and Aboultaif, 2020).

The Iraqi system's sectarian nature leads to significant regional cleavages as a result of its creation. The ethno-religious split is virtually fully captured by the

geographical variable. Decomposing Iraq into three major factions occupying separate regions, on the other hand, is a simplistic misrepresentation. Mixed provinces remain significant, such as the capital Baghdad or the disputed province of Kirkuk, and only one-third to one-half of Iraq's governorates are controlled by a single ethnic group. Beyond support for secular and anti-sectarian alliances, the geographical fragmentation of political outcomes supports the existence of inter-sectarian votes. Kurdish votes, on the other hand, follow a different pattern, with virtually no national party participating in Kurdish politics (Mansour, 2017).

2.3. Principles of Social Constructivism

To better analyze the Iraqi scene and the influence of political Islam on the country's foreign policy, this thesis will adopt the principles of social constructivism. Constructivism is an ontology, or collection of assumptions about the universe and human motivation and activity, rather than a theory. Rationalism, not Realism, Institutionalism, or Liberalism, is its antithesis. Constructivists propose constructivist alternatives in each of these groups of ideas by questioning the rationalist paradigm that underpins many views of international relations. The factors that researchers are interested in—military power, commercial ties, international institutions, or home preferences—are significant in the Constructivist explanation not because they are objective truths about the world, but because they have specific social meanings (Weber, 2014). This meaning is generated from a complex and unique blend of history, ideas, customs, and beliefs, all of which academics must grasp in order to understand state behaviour.

An example of constructivist thought would be how to deal with the nuclear arsenals of the UK and China. While the nuclear arsenals of the United Kingdom and China are both destructive, constructivists argue that they have quite different meanings for the United States, resulting in very different patterns of interaction. Iain Johnston, for example, believes that China has traditionally conducted international relations in line with Realist principles, but based on a particular historical strategic culture rather than the objective structure of the international system. Because constructivists focus on the social environment in which international relations take place, they emphasise problems of identity and belief. Friendships and enemies, in-groups and out-groups, fairness and justice all have a role in how a state operates.

While some constructivists think that states are rational, self-interested actors, they emphasise that states' varied identities and beliefs defy simplistic notions of rationality in which governments want just survival, power, or money. Constructivism also takes into account the significance of social norms in international politics (Price, 2006).

Constructivists distinguish between a 'logic of consequences,' where acts are rationally selected to promote a State's interests, and a 'logic of appropriateness,' where rationality is substantially mediated by social norms, as March and Olsen did (Price, 2006). Constructivists, for example, would claim that the principle of state sovereignty has had a significant impact on international relations, establishing a bias against nonintervention that predates any cost-benefit analysis that states may do. These arguments are consistent with the Institutionalism framework for understanding international cooperation, although they are founded on manufactured attitudes rather than the rational pursuit of objective interests (Price, 2006).

Moreover, constructivism has highlighted the importance of non-State actors more than other methods, maybe because of their concern in ideas and ideology. Scholars have emphasised the importance of transnational entities such as NGOs and transnational businesses in changing state attitudes on topics such as the use of land mines in war and international commerce, for example. Through rhetoric or other types of lobbying, persuasion, and shaming, such norm entrepreneurs are able to affect State behaviour. International institutions are equally important as autonomous actors, according to constructivists. Constructivism recognises that international bureaucracies may work to further their own goals (e.g., free trade or human rights protection) notwithstanding the objectives of the countries that created them (Finnemore ,1998).

2.4 Social Constructivism and Political Islam

The study of the origins and consequences of norm dissemination in international society has developed into a robust foreign relations research area in recent years. The rise of constructivism in general, and agent-oriented thin/modernist forms of social constructivism in particular, has been a driving force in development. Despite this rapid expansion, researchers have focused on a certain form of normative framework and specific categories of players. In particular, research has accounting for the largest on processes of 'good' liberal norms such as civil rights, women's equality, humanitarian treaties, good governance, and so on being distributed worldwide and internationally in actually non contexts by 'principled' norm entrepreneurs such as international non-governmental institutions or international bodies often of Western origin or tightly linked to the liberal world order's structures.

These flaws aren't going to go unnoticed. Several academics have criticized the present mainstream research on norm spread for having 'liberal,' 'cosmopolitan,' or 'secular' biases. For a variety of reasons, such biases are harmful. Most notably, they uphold a research program that overlooks the fact that the global sphere is rife with prescriptive controversy for example, between metropolitan and collectivist, liberal and non-liberal, gradual and right wing, secular and spiritual values and ideals and populated by a diverse range of non-Western norm business owners, whether claims, socially conservative or spiritual civil society organizations, or regional bodies (Weber, 2014). We propose that the 'return' or 'resurgence' of faith in both the social environment and academic thought provides understudied empirical facts and innovative conceptual tools for widening IR research on international norm evolution and change. As experts from a variety of fields have pointed out, modernity did not bring in total secularization of the globe and the implacable annihilation of faiths, as was commonly supposed in previous centuries. Religions appear to have persisted in most regions of the world, and their political importance and visibility in the public discourse has expanded in recent decades. Since the 1990s, social theorists have largely discussed the 'privatization' of religion, the 'secularization' of the globe or the shift to 'post-secular' cultures . Parallel to this, a burgeoning discourse on faith in foreign relations has evolved. This has posed a serious challenge to the secular assumptions that underpin foreign relations as a profession and a corpus of scholarly work. The level to which foreign relations concept may be fitted to analyze religion

has been a major point of contention in this literature. Constructivism has been widely accepted as one of the best frameworks for reflecting the movements and effect of religious actors and elements in international society, both implicitly and explicitly (Walling, 2013). One of the most extensive attempts to combine religious actors, norms, ethics, and identity within a (thick) constructivist framework is Vendulka Kubálková's (2000) articulation of an 'international political religion.' Others have investigated religion's role in international politics using an explicit thin/modernist constructivist form of thinking. In line with this, during the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, Daniel Philpott (2001) demonstrated the importance of ideas, particularly those from the Reformation, in establishing a system of independent nations.

Furthermore, Nukhet Sandal (2011) has extended the epistemic community (which mean a network of knowledge-based specialists who help decision-makers to determine the problems they face) concept beyond highly secularized scientific communities to include religious actors and their agency in peaceful conflict transitions in South Africa and Northern Ireland. Fiona Adamson (2005) investigated how various norm entrepreneurs operating within two ideological systems, one of 'global liberalism' and another of 'political Islam,' fight for post-Soviet Central Asians' hearts and minds. The role of belief institutions in implementing international accounting rules and integrating them in local practices was investigated by Aaron Boesenecker and Leslie Vinjamuri (2011). While this literature represents new study directions, it generally borrows and adapts constructivist concepts to the unique characteristics of religious actors and ideational processes (Walling, 2013).

However, it is less overtly oriented on incorporating political and social ideas from religious scholarly disputes into constructivist norm diffusion research. Instead, we suggest that a more self-aware approach, one that incorporates the current sciences and ethical research of religions into constructivism rather than solely constructivism, offers significant empirical and conceptual benefits. In terms of empirical study, it extends the constructivist literature to incorporate dynamics that have received less attention, such as processes of religious-based norm spread in liberal global contexts by non-Western normative entrepreneurs. Supposedly, such an adaptation strategies our understanding of the mechanisms by which norms spread. The inclusion of religion in constructivist study forces researchers to consider the cultural/normative contexts of both the norm spreader and the norm recipient. We argue that focusing on the

kinetics of religious brings to light various methods other than persuasive communication – which is core in both older and newer mainline constructivist literature – that help clarify the life/death-cycle of norms as they are encouraged, disputed, s new, and re-interpreted across various international cultural/normative social contexts.

We find echoes of this shift in Jürgen Habermas’s work in which he has gradually changed his assumptions regarding the position of religion in the home political square of constitutional democratic societies in reaction to religion's rebirth. He's been thinking about the 'aggressive secularist' premises that underpin much current liberal political theory, which frequently seem to relegate religion to the private realm. In this framework, Habermas has developed a normative ideal based on the potential of a 'post-secular society,' one that is diverse and welcoming of faiths in the public sphere and allows religious and secular individuals to engage in meaningful dialogue. Similarly, Onuf (2013) believes that contemporary liberal philosophy frequently asks too much of religious individuals, who are required to furnish secular justifications for their religiously motivated political activism in order to be lawfully allowed to the modern public sphere. Such a situation, imposed on religious citizens' civic engagement, deprives current debate of the critical voices as well as moral gut feelings that religious practices can bring to the table, even while excluding persons who may not be willing or able to divide their moral beliefs and vocab into profane and spiritual strands from public debate. Much current liberal philosophy distributes cognitive responsibilities unequally across secular and religious persons (Onuf, 2013).

Although, it appears to go counter to liberalism's core principle of ensuring equality in pluralistic society, Habermas' goal is to establish an updated liberal regulatory regime. Within this regime, religious arguments and viewpoints might legitimately reenter the public arena, while still attempting to rescue the liberal state's rigorous impartiality and its consequent rule of separation between church and state (Kim,2014).

2.5 Social Constructivism and Foreign Policy

To better understand the role social constructivism plays in foreign policy, I will take the American position on the Iraq war as my focus. The prevailing strategic cultural norm of achieving global stability through international deterrence looked bankrupt to the Bush admin following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). As a result, administration elites saw democratic political change in Iraq as an opportunity to impose an international convention of hegemony global policing by unilateral preventative war. In this section, I provide the constructivist argument for understanding the Iraq War, based on gaps in the current literature. According to constructivists, the US invasion of Iraq was caused by a suggested normative change in American strategic cultural beliefs. The endeavor to modify the norms of America's strategic culture and hence its defense policy that invasion, according to those constructivists who adopt an optimistic stance. A more cautious observer would argue that the Bush administration's normative change worked in combination with interest-based calculations, such as geopolitical reasoning, to lead to the military response. The Iraq War was designed to demonstrate the feasibility of a new norm championed by neoconservative norm builders, conventional conservative converts, and Bush administration sympathizers: unilateral preventative war. This was part of a bigger strategic cultural vision that advocated for the hegemonic spread of democracy by force (Towns, 2012).

Advocates hoped that the hegemonic paradigm, which included international containment and maintaining the geopolitical status quo throughout the Cold War, would replace the Cold War–era paradigm. They proposed a revolutionary strategy that emphasized preventative war as part of a bigger strategic cultural vision supporting the hegemonic propagation of democracy by force in its stead. Thus, by replacing the prevailing Cold War normative paradigm with the newly suggested norm of preventative hegemonic war and coercive democratization, the recently proposed norm attempted to influence American national security policymaking. This venture looks to have been a failure.

As a result of the tragedy of 9/11, this strategy allowed America to show that it could serve as the world's police force and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. America would be enforcing a massive social engineering challenge

in the Middle East by assisting in the overthrow of autocratic regimes and placing the people directly in control. Major factors were access to oil, guarantee of control in a geopolitically crucial region, the deterrent potential of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of renegade countries, and Israeli security. The Bush administration's new paradigm, on the other hand, was guided by an attempt to redefine America's identity and relationship with the rest of the world, and therefore the problem of how the United States of America should strive to attain material goals. This new preventive war approach meant forsaking the pursuit of geopolitical peace as the ultimate aim, which had at least included the possibility of dealing with antagonistic rogue regimes in the Middle East (Kim,2014).

By forcing its will on the region and remaking it in its own image, the United States of America would fulfill its political, military, and financial interests. This strategy would begin with regime change in certain governments seeking weapons of mass destruction, assuring that other opposing actors would be intimidated. Because the United States of America could not afford to wait to be attacked, it would strike first and change the international order, despite the possibly terrible consequences. It would also enjoy the advantages and perceived low costs of quickly removing opponents with its stronger military might. By adopting the moral rationale of preemptive war as the world's policeman, America would fulfill its global and regional security objectives. Conservative constructivists, on the other hand, believe that the US went to war in Iraq to achieve both strategic and normative goals, most notably by imposing authority over a geopolitically significant region and forging a new vision for America's role in the world (Towns, 2012).

By encouraging the propagation of universal democratic principles through the fact utility of a hypothetical rule of preventative war, this cautious vision appeals to its utopian Wilsonian impulses. This norm would then become part of a wider projected social framework of benign hegemonic global governance once the Iraq War had fulfilled one of its aims as a successful test case. Access to oil, the assurance of control in a geopolitically essential area, the check of weapons of mass destruction on American influence and physical security, and Israeli security concerns were all seen as causes of the war by cautious constructivists, who saw a need to reframe what actually constitutes appropriate behavior for how to achieve its goals (Checkel, 1998).

In conclusion, conservative constructivists proposed that objectives intersected with how the United States of America identified itself, what to stand for in line with strategic culture, and how this definition influenced national security policy results. America would no longer pursue geopolitical stability in the area through unsatisfactory compromises, such as balancing Israel's backing with acquiring oil from hostile regimes. According to constructivists, the Bush administration would achieve its security and economic goals by forcing its will on the area and reconstructing it, starting with the destruction of governments pursuing weapons of mass destruction, exposing the futility of opposing America. In short, a successful war and democratic rebuilding of Iraq would de facto legitimize overt American hegemony. The Bush administration's endeavor to establish the suggested hegemonic paradigm tried to fulfill both Wilsonian idealism and pragmatic objectives in the results of national security policy, according to cautious constructivists. This would be a significant break from the prior Cold War normative paradigm in the United States of America's strategic culture, which was frequently chastised for appearing to compromise values for practical gain (Kim,2014).

CHAPTER THREE

THE FOREIGN POLICY AND RELATIONS OF IRAQ

3.1. Political Islam In Iraq Before and After 2005

Iraq's first democratic elections were held in 2005, when the nation was still under US occupation and suffering from a severe economic and humanitarian crisis. The new administration implemented an unusual identity-based governance model, with ethnic and religious groups sharing power equally. Rising demonstrations and the disintegration of ethno-sectarian blocs have cast doubt on Iraq's government since then. In a situation of growing abstention, the lack of substantial additional divisions beyond the sectarian one has led us to a governance crisis that appears to transcend both social and ethno-religious cleavages (Spencer,2013).

In 1958, a coup led by Egyptian Nasser, under the influence of Pan-Arabism, toppled the monarchy and created a nationalist republic under military rule. Social and agrarian reforms were conducted with the support of one of the Middle East's most significant communist parties. The Ba'ath Party seized power in 1968 and established a secular. And soon the Ba'athist administration fell on the political hegemony of Iraq and embodied Arab nationalism, as embodied by its leader Saddam Hussein. (Dawisha, 2009). While the country's human development results improved significantly in the first two decades, the country was ravaged by two Gulf Wars (with Iran from 1980 to 1988 and an attempted annexation of Kuwait in 1991), followed by crippling international economic sanctions. The invasion led by the United States in 2003, ostensibly to prevent nuclear weapons, ended up toppling the previous regime (Mansour, 2017).

The post-2003 period saw a significant institutional reorganization and the beginning of an age of severe violence. More than half a million Iraqis lost their jobs as a result of the disbanding of the Iraqi army and the methodical Baath fiction (this fiction was to dethrone Egypt as Arab world leader and establish dominion over the Persian Gulf) of the institutions, which sparked an insurgency in Sunni regions. The dispute rapidly devolved into a full-fledged civil war between armed militias, many of whom were connected with ethnic and religious interests. Political violence and instability has remained a constant feature of Iraqi life till now. Under the auspices of

the United States of America, a sectarian style of administration evolved, distributing power fairly among the country's different ethnic and religious groups - principally Sunni, Shia, and Kurd, but also Turkmen and Christians. The muhasassa (sharing the power between groups) system, a system in which the authority and resources of the country are divided among groups especially religious group, looked to be the favored method of preventing a politico-military minority from gaining control. Only a few secular parties have carved themselves a place in the political scene, despite the fact that all communities appear to be unified in monolithic blocks. All of the key participants were former opponents of Saddam's government, either organized in exile or clandestinely, because the Baath party was banned and its former members were barred from running for office (Kristina, 2012).

Despite tensions and a new conflict in 2014 as a result of ISIS's advance throughout the northwestern part of the country, the Islamic-dominated regime has been surprisingly peaceful since 2005, with elections held on a regular basis. Over time, this normalization allowed for more intra-group competition. Shia Arab coalitions won the most votes due to their larger demographic weight, whereas Sunni Arabs originally boycotted the election. The quota-sharing system, on the other hand, assured that the government would be formed up of coalitions, with a rotating distribution of posts among the three factions. Alliances between secular and anti-sectarian organizations have also gained traction. The secular list Al-Iraqiya, united against Shia Prime Minister Maliki's slide, came in first in the 2010 elections, but received primarily Sunni votes (Spencer, 2013).

While political elites progressed from fractionalization to cooperation around power-sharing, popular Iraqi Security Forces action grew to transcend identification lines. Since 2015, growing public protests have erupted across the nation, particularly in Shia areas (Costantini, 2020). Moving beyond demands for basic services, the social movement rapidly denounced the state's failings as a whole, calling into question the legitimacy of the state's identity style of governance. With the 2018 elections, for the first time, the anti-sectarian position resonated well in the Shia political group, and a new coalition was able to rearrange the deck, reflecting this desire for out-of-the-system partnerships. Nonetheless, both unprecedented abstention and continuous demonstrations since October 2019 have cast doubt on the 2003 regime's ability to rebuild itself (Dodge 2020). Inequalities in space and sectarianism in voting Iraqis'

socioeconomic conditions have worsened significantly as a result of more than three decades of fighting. Poverty has been expanding in an economy driven by the resource curse, with infrastructure and institutions in shambles (OPHDI, 2017).

The post-2003 era's major security concern, as well as inadequate administration, has slowed any progress in the situation for a populace that still lacks basic amenities (World Bank, 2014). During this time, no substantial reductions in poverty or economic disparity have been recorded. The twin crises of 2014, the deterioration of economic conditions owing to the fall of oil prices and the revival of violence with the formation of ISIS, wiped out any progress achieved in reducing poverty since the civil war began (Krishnan and Olivieri, 2016). As a result of the worldwide pandemic, the proportion of the population living in poverty has remained stable at approximately 20% and it rose by at least 10% by 2020. (UNDP, 2020). However, acute poverty is unevenly spread across the country, resulting in ethnic disparity. Despite the lack of an ethnic census, government figures from 2010 suggest that about 65 percent of Iraq's population is Shia and 35 percent is Sunni, with Kurds accounting for 15 to 20% of the population, mostly Sunni. The three main ethno-religious communities are generally concentrated in defined areas: Kurdish in the north, Sunni in the center, and Shia in the south (Spencer, 2013).

Regional disparities, on the other hand, have corrected over time. While Shia and Kurdish areas have historically been the poorest, the latter has had a change of fortune. After 12 years of governmental persecution and ethnic cleansing efforts, the Kurdistan region has enjoyed a period of relative peace and prosperity, thanks to a de facto autonomy system in place since 1991, which was formalized with the 2005 semi-federal constitution (Natali, 2010). The series of battles, on the other hand, had a more obvious geographical divergence impact, favoring the Sunni North-West. Increasing geographical disparities exacerbated ethnic divisions, culminating in a referendum on independence for the Kurdistan Region in 2017, whose legitimacy was challenged by the federal government. With the battle against ISIS, the Kurdish-Shia alliance has been called into doubt as a united front against Saddam Hussein's (McEvoy and Aboultaif, 2020).

The Iraqi system's sectarian nature leads to significant regional cleavages as a result of its creation. The ethno-religious split is virtually fully captured by the

geographical variable. Decomposing Iraq into three major factions occupying separate regions, on the other hand, is a simplistic misrepresentation. Mixed provinces remain significant, such as the capital Baghdad or the disputed province of Kirkuk, and only one-third to one-half of Iraq's governorates are controlled by a single ethnic group. Beyond support for secular and anti-sectarian alliances, the geographical fragmentation of political outcomes supports the existence of inter-sectarian votes. Kurdish votes, on the other hand, follow a different pattern, with virtually no national party participating in Kurdish politics (Mansour, 2017).

3.2. Security Model Of the Foreign Policy Of Iraq

The Arab country of Iraq is located on a number of major lines in the Middle East, which represent an important point of relation between Kurdish-Arab, Sunni-Shia, and Arab-Persian, and it has one of the world's greatest oil deposits. Iraq has the opportunity to either be a driver for regional peace and stability and an engine for economic progress, or a furnace for a sectarian war, as a pivotal country in the wealth and dangerous center of the Middle East. As such, its international policy affects Iraqis, regional states, and the rest of the global country (Archibugi, Daniele,2004). Iraq, on the other hand, will not have a cohesive foreign policy until it settles profound and lasting domestic disagreements and conflicts over sharing power, territory, and resources. Iraq has a diverse collection of external interests which can be considered as a part of the security model of Iraq in its international relations with other countries, including strengthening military capabilities, stimulating growth of the economy, particularly in the energy sector, and ensuring water , nutrition and power availability. Furthermore Iraq's present foreign policy's incoherence originates from the country's shattered, split domestic politics, as well as the remaining pressures of conflicting outside forces in both Iraq and its unpredictable regional neighborhood ,particularly with the Syrian war next door (Wendt, Alexander,2000).

Iraq's national interests would be better served by following a moderate foreign relations and cultivating positive relationships with a diverse range of regional and global allies, and certain forces inside the country appear to be doing exactly that. These endeavors have so far proven fruitless. Iraqi international relations has neither been consolidated nor established successfully. Baghdad's central government, under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, wields the majority of authority. It gets enormous oil

income, has budgetary control, commands the national army, and has the constitutional ability to make good foreign relations based on the security model that the country wants. The foreign ministry in Baghdad is chaired by Kurdish democrat Hoshiyar Zebari, although the prime minister's office essentially makes all major government foreign policies. This structure illustrates Maliki's attempts to consolidate power in his hands, which he has pursued since taking office in 2006 (Sigwart, ,2013).

But when Iraq started to build its own model of security, it was faced by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which was located in Erbil and was lead by President Massoud Barzani, who challenged Baghdad's dominance. Since Saddam's demise, the Kurdistan regional government has enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy.

From the other side the Kurdistan regional government successfully established its own external contacts with foreign oil firms and regional powers such as Turkey , and it is following its own policies in Syria's civil conflict and that threaten the model of security which Bagdad tried to build . Besides, the Kurds aren't the only ones challenging Baghdad's model of security and foreign policy authority. Various Shia and Sunni political organizations and leaders are doing that., including Muqtada al-Sadr, the opposition leader Shia Sadrist Trend political organization; Ahmed Chalabi, a notable Shia politician; and others. Former vice president, Tariq al-Hashimi, who was thrown out of office by Maliki in late 2011, and Ayad Allawi, the head of the opposition Iraqi alliance, both have their own international ties out of the model that the government tried to build without giving any consideration to these organizations, whether with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or Turkey. As a result, the Maliki government's security model in Baghdad does not necessarily represent national agreement, nor does it always exclude Erbil or other leaders from pursuing their own foreign policy. Iraq's external relations and security model are influenced by the domestic fight for political benefit among the country's various conflicting groups. The model of security that lead the foreign relations of Bagdad , should at least serve national interests, diplomatic ties and international policy. However, these are frequently undertaken by state or arranged by random players in severely plural societies like today's Iraq or indeed today's Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and pre-secession Sudan to improve their political stances in internal politics (Miller, et al ,2010).

As the challenge from the Kurdistan regional government and other Iraqi Sunni groups has grown, Maliki has inched closer to the Iranian government and considered it the core of its security model and foreign relations. The Kurdistan regional government has edged closer to Turkey as its differences with Baghdad have grown and considered it the core of its security model and foreign relations also. The Sunni leaders have managed to reach out to Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia in their contest with the Shiite central Iranian government. External forces' influence in Iraq has hampered Baghdad's efforts to develop a cohesive foreign policy , international relations and security model. The United States of America had massive impact over its security model and both internal and international affairs in Iraq until its soldiers withdrew in late 2011, but that influence has substantially decreased since then. Iran continues to have a significant effect through its immense political, religious, and security networks. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and, until recently, Syria, all have influence with one or more factions within the nation. And each of these external parties has specific and frequently conflicting interests in Iraq's security model and foreign relations that they want to see represented (Acharya, ,2016).

Iraq's security model and foreign relations are shaped in great part by Iraq's varied interests. These include shifting from a Saddam-era strategy of isolation and expensive wars to one distinguished by cooperation with global powers; expanding military capabilities; fostering energy sector expansion; assuring the Iraq's resource requirements; and growing commerce and foreign investment. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the United Nations (UN) Security Council placed near-total economic and financial restrictions on the country, which decimated the Iraqi economy and society. After Saddam Hussein's administration fell in 2003, the bulk of these restrictions were lifted. Since the last time, one of Iraq's key goals has been to reclaim international legitimacy , building its string own national security model and restoring regular ties with the region's and world's countries (Sigwart, ,2013).

After the terrible costs and effects of military expeditions and confrontations, the post-Saddam security model and international relations have been to avoid foreign military conflict and the severe external alignments that may bring it about. Iraq has been attempting to reclaim domestic political autonomy after Saddam's demise. The first official stage was the handover of authority from the invading forces' Coalition Assumed Power to the temporary Iraqi council in June 2004. Following that, a new

constitution was drafted, elections took place in 2005, and the first constitutionally constituted government was formed in 2006. However, foreign soldiers especially American troops stayed until December 2011.

3.2.1. Iraqi security model : The military side

Building security model of Iraq leads Baghdad's foreign relations to be influenced by the necessity to buy weapons and construct the national army. The Maliki-led central government has been attempting to reclaim control of the Iraq's borders, territory, and airspace by establishing the national army of Iraq. It has also been rushing in the previous year to deal with the problems posed by a resurgent al-Qaeda. The Iraqi army, which now numbers more than 350,000 soldiers, was constructed and trained under American supervision, but it lacks considerable airpower and motorized armor, and it is unable to defend itself against invasions especially from the other countries if and when they arise. Its anti-terrorist capabilities are similarly limited. Furthermore, the Iraqi national army coexists uncomfortably with the Kurdish armed forces, which guard and police the Kurdistan regional government and number over 250,000 people. In terms of security model and foreign relations, establishing the national army has necessitated the development and maintenance of relationships with nations that can offer modern and effective weapons. Iraq's principal weapons manufacturing partner is the United States, and it will likely stay so for the foreseeable future (Acharya, ,2016).

A total of \$18 billion in existing and prospective arms transactions exist between Washington and Baghdad. The Iraqi leader Al-Maliki stated during a visit to Washington in 2013 that Baghdad and the US must remain allies in the battle against terrorism in the region. Baghdad has been trying to diversify its armament supply recently. The government of Iraq in 2012 has announced about \$5 billion arms contract with Russia, as well as a \$1 billion transaction with the Czech Republic. Iraq will get assault helicopters, fighter planes and missile-launch systems as part of the Russian arrangement. From what we mentioned above we can see that the governments of Iraq in its national security wants to diversify its arms partners and military relations with other countries. From the other side we also can notice that while Baghdad and Tehran maintain tight ties and work together on security issues indeed, they just declared their desire to sign an agreement on border security, smuggling, commerce, and pilgrim

security. Iraq does not rely on Iran for significant military assistance. Iraqi governments will continue to rely on other foreign capitals for military transactions since Tehran does not have an armaments sector that can match Baghdad's demands (Brown, ,2012).

The 2002 National Security Strategy were formalised in the national security policy of 2002, which was drafted by Rice's National Security Council. No longer facing a Cold War threat that can be deterred through multilateral restraint, America needed a new prescriptive structure to deal with the threat of "radicalism and technology," as well as enemies trying to pursue weapons mass destruction a framework that could act "against such new risks before they can be fully formed. The plan began by presenting America as the winner of "a tremendous battle of ideas: destructive totalitarian ideologies versus liberty and equality" (Miller, et al ,2010).

3.2.2.Iraqi security model : The economic side

Iraq's rapid economic resurgence is dependent in large part on recovering its thriving oil industry, which suffered greatly during Iraq's isolation and subsequent invasion by the United States. Following Saddam Hussein's demise, post-Saddam governments have focused on restoring domestic and international investment in the industry, as well as pursuing diplomacy to open up outside markets and exit routes for this energy. This has pushed Iraq's economic national security model to maintain outstanding relations with all of its neighbors, which it needs for energy export routes, as well as strong ties with both the United States of America and Asian countries like China and India, which are Iraq's main oil consumers. Iraq has the world's fifth-largest verified oil reserves, with over 100 billion barrels, and further development could lead in even larger reserves. Oil production had been dwindling due to Iraq's isolation, and it had completely collapsed during the invasion of the United States of America (Acharya, 2016).

However, it has recovered to roughly 3.5 thousand gallons per day, which was its high around 1980. Iraq has already eclipsed Iran as an oil exporter, with export levels of about twelve million barrels per day expected by 2022. Because of a significant brain drain and infrastructural damage after 2003, the oil sector's recovery has been delayed although it has represented the core revenue for the security model in Iraq. Aside from oil, Iraq possesses enormous natural gas reserves of roughly 6

trillion cubic meters, which are fairly evenly spread between the Kurdistan regional government and the rest of the country. This market is still mostly untapped. Iraq produces over 1,000 million cubic meters per day, but flaring burns off roughly 60% of gas from southern sources, whereas the Kurdistan regional government has a no-flaring policy. Furthermore, no pipelines or liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure exist to facilitate large-scale exports. A part of this gas is presently being used to fulfill the country's electricity generating demands. A projected gas pipeline connecting Iran, Iraq, and Syria is the major project. (Chwieroth, 2009).

This would let Iraq to export gas to Europe via Syria, as well as bringing Iran's huge South Pars gas output online and allowing access to European trade. The Iraq–Syria portion of the project is on hold until the Syrian war is ended; Iran and Iraq have considered diverting their part of the pipeline through Jordan's Aqaba. In the long run, the Iran–Iraq–Syria pipeline could perhaps allow Iraq to pump gas east, connecting with planned Iranian pipelines that would go from Iran to Pakistan and then directly to China and India's massive markets. While the idea of a gas pipeline running through Turkey has been considered, no concrete steps have been taken. Baghdad's administration has also ordered feasibility analysis for a liquefied natural gas project off its short southern shore, which will be considered in the future. Iraq's current and future reliance on oil exports, as well as its need for big and diverse export channels, along with its mostly landlocked location, necessitates a diversified and positive foreign policy with various neighbors and worldwide clientele. Iraq's acute water demands play a role in its foreign policy. Iraq receives all of the country's overland water from its neighbors (Brown, ,2012).

The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which both originate in Turkey, are its primary water supplies. Some branches of the Tigris as well as other minor rivers that irrigate sections of eastern Iraq originate in Iran, while the Euphrates flows via Syria before reaching Iraq. Iraq's already poor water levels might become substantially lower unless it maintains good ties with its neighbours. Iraq's arable land area is 1.9 million hectares. The country is suffering from substantially falling river inflows as well as multiple years of below-average precipitation. It was once the breadbasket of the Middle East. The reduction in river flows has multiple consequences: it reduces irrigation, increases soil salinity, and reduces hydroelectric input. Iraqi officials claim that less than half of the country's arable land is in use, down from 100% in earlier

decades, and that the area that is being exploited produces lower yields. Several communities in the south have been deserted as a result of high salt in the water, which has devastated agricultural and farm animals.

Baghdad's new elites understand that elevated concentrations of trade and investment are required to achieve sustained growth. Many of them seem to be new company elites who advantage from these market prosperity, or are tightly connected to them. Politicians and businesspeople have formed mutually advantageous partnerships in a pattern known as crony capitalism. The occupying forces, led by the United States, pushed for policy reforms that turned this historically semi-socialist, central planning, government economy into a market one. This development has been welcomed by the selecting the most effective. Despite the insecurity of the previous decade, Iraq's economy is among the quickest increasing in the region, up nicely trade and investment opportunities. From a GDP of around \$20 billion on the occasion of the 2003 US incursion, the GDP has grown 575 basis points to around \$115 billion, with the energy sector accounting for nearly 70% of the total. The rate of growth for 2013 is expected to be a healthy 9%. The United States is Iraq's biggest trading partner, with annual bilateral trade worth around \$14 billion, followed by India, the European union, China, South Korea, and Turkey. Energy exports continue to dominate this trade (Acharya, 2016).

The governmental sector controlled the Baathist industry, but post-Saddam administrations in Baghdad and Erbil have liberalized the economic system to allow private sector investment. Iraq is in desperate need of repair, infrastructure, and performance as a means of sanctions and conflict. Furthermore, a diverse range of regional and global investors and companies have opportunities to participate in Iraq's growth.

3.3.Political Islam In Iraq and Foreign Policy

Iraq has been one of the most significant and prominent regional actors in the wider Middle East since the second part of the twentieth century, with its advances, actions, and exploits continually influencing its neighbors. Iraq ascended to the top owing to a variety of causes. Iraq, with the world's fourth-largest oil reserves and a population of more than 32 million people, possesses the critical economic and demographic capacity to sustain dynamic regional politics, whatever their significance

and direction may be, as its turbulent international and regional relations have demonstrated. Iraq also occupies a crucial geopolitical position in the area (Marr, 2007).

Indeed, the United States' goals and plans to restrict and limit Iraq's traditional regional and international sovereignty provided the impetus for Iraqi Freedom. However, the military operations' uneven progress took Iraq far beyond these original projections, resulting in the collapse of the Iraqi state system following Saddam Hussein's and the Ba'athist regime's demise. This has necessitated a tough reconfiguration of the internal power balance, which is currently being finalized. As a result, Iraq has changed from a regional power capable of destabilizing the whole region to a country with the potential and resources to play an influential role within the wider Middle East but is now subject to foreign pressures and exploitation. This situation not only poses a constant threat to the country, but also makes it a potential source of destabilization for its neighbors (Marr, 2007).

The fall of Baghdad signified the beginning of a sequence of events that have drastically transformed the regional landscape, disrupting long-standing patterns of regional and global partnership and rivalry. At the same time, the state's dissolution and the invading force's inability to restore order quickly strengthened sub-state actors, militias, and political groupings. It also allowed neighboring nations (particularly Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey) to pursue their own goals within Iraq's borders, flexing their muscles and taking advantage of internal splits, rivalries, and susceptibility among various factions. Iraq descended into a tangled and vicious spiral of organized violence after 2003, culminating in an essentially sectarian conflict in 2005 and 2006, owing to internal and external exploitation of Iraq's cultural and religious divisions (Gerber, 2003).

In the years that followed, the United States of America reaffirmed its commitment to rebuilding Iraq's civic and military capacities. Increased military intervention has favored the restriction and limiting of sectarian players' maneuvering space since 2007. This was accomplished through implementing a counter-insurgency policy in Iraq and launching the surge, as well as promoting the security forces' post-2007 reforms and the Sons of Iraq program. The Sons of Iraq program was led by United States of America and was a sponsored initiative to spread the success of the

Anbar Awakening to other Sunni regions, particularly diverse communities, and was not wholly supported by the Iraqi government. The long-term effects of this technique are yet to be identified. On one side, the focus on security issues undermined efforts to develop state civilian institutions, limit the powers of the ruling class, and promote pluralism and social justice. In reality, this approach led in increasing power consolidation, especially near the end of Prime Minister al-term, Maliki's as well as the growth of Iraq's force (Marr, 2007).

On the other hand, the same method allowed Iraq to emerge from its civil war. After Saddam Hussein's collapse in 2003, Iraq held its second national elections, which saw a first attempt to overcome sectarianism by rejecting the elite's coalition through Allawi's Iraqiyya program. Furthermore, once the last US forces withdrew at the end of 2011, Iraq restored complete control over its land (McEvoy and Aboultaif, 2020).

Since regaining sovereignty in 2011, Iraq's foreign policy has been guided by a non-alignment position, favoring the improvement of ties with neighbors, many of whom Iraq has had varying degrees of animosity with in the past. This stance is echoed in the prime minister's Da'wa party's foreign policy strategy for 2013. At the same time, non-alignment has been viewed as the only viable choice for a country riven by severe ethno-sectarian divisions. Despite the fact that there are still differing views on non-alignment, this might lead to an agreement among Iraq's many groups, avoiding direct engagement in regional war and therefore deepening domestic divides (McEvoy and Aboultaif, 2020).

As a result, the success or failure of this strategy is largely determined by Iraqi groups' ability to agree on how to implement the required policies in a cogent manner in order to promote and solidify Iraq's regional position and role. This is a delicate matter, given the mutual hatred among Iraqi political forces and the highly destabilizing repercussions of connections with neighboring countries on Iraq's internal field. While Iraq's diplomatic policies have strengthened since 2011, strengthening its regional position, its foreign policy remains hampered by basic weaknesses. To begin with, it appears to be the subject of several manipulations by diverse state agents as a consequence of their competing political objectives. Second, Iraqi foreign policy has shifted often in reaction to al-ambition Maliki's to consolidate his power structure and exert personal control over state agencies. As a result, given the unpredictable regional

and international context, these flaws might have a significant influence on Iraqi foreign policy, leading to a loss of direction and cohesion (McEvoy and Aboultaif, 2020).

3.3.1.The Future of Political Islam In Iraq

While the struggle to reclaim Mosul by the Iraqi Security Forces and its partners has been brutal and drawn out, it finally looks to be nearing its end. The central government is focusing on plans for mop-up operations in other regions where the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is still active.

But, beyond the subject of Mosul and what happens next, more pressing concerns continue to loom over Iraq's future. The three unresolved concerns that have plagued Iraqi leaders since 2003 are at the heart of these discussions.

- The Iraqi national identity is the primary problem. Is it feasible for the Shi'a leadership to rule in a way that promotes cooperation and acknowledges and accommodates Iraq's ethnic and religious minorities?

- Second, can Sunnis accept their place as a minority and work within the system to achieve political goals, rejecting entitlement, grievance, and violence as political strategies?

- Finally, can the Kurds combine their desire for more autonomy inside Iraq with maintaining a base in Baghdad and acknowledging Baghdad's legitimate and vital role in the north?

The need for a semblance of unity and national purpose in the face of the Islamic State of Iraq threat has pushed all of these serious concerns to the side. Nonetheless, eighteen years after the assault that toppled Saddam Hussein's, they are as tough and crucial as ever. The responses will determine the future stability of Iraq as a unified state after Islamic state of Iraq.

Iraq's political elite has yet to make a significant break with the ethnic and sectarian politics that have afflicted the country for almost a decade and a half. Following a somewhat promising electoral cycle in the 2010 national elections, in which a number of electoral slates were established across ethnic and ideological lines, Iraq's leaders swiftly reverted to zero-sum politics and sectarian agendas. The internal political scenario hasn't altered much recently. There has yet to be articulated, let alone

executed, a credible approach for national reconciliation among conflicting factions. Political gridlock has made progress on most major topics virtually impossible. It also severely restricts Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's to operate freely (Kristina, 2012).

In the run-up to national elections next spring, rival groupings and individuals have little motivation to provide legislative successes to the prime minister or one another as they strive to improve their own electoral chances. Despite being favored for a second term by pluralities in the southern and central provinces due to his victories against the Islamic State of Iraq, the party's leader faces numerous challenges from former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who is putting together an electoral slate in preparation for a third term, and possibly Iyad Allawi, another former prime minister. As a result, Iraq runs the danger of missing yet another critical window of opportunity at a time when the Islamic State of Iraq is on the verge of collapse ,as “people [are] tired of war, and the economy [is] propped up by external help.” Many in Iraq's important neighborhoods and power centers, on the other hand, are looking ahead to the next battle(Wing, J., 2017).

The situation among Iraq's Sunnis remains tense. The Sunni heartland, located in the provinces of Anbar, Ninevah, and Salaheddin, is economically impoverished and politically insecure as a result of years of conflict and insurgency. Since 2014, six million Iraqi Sunnis have been internally displaced or made homeless as a result of the fight against Islamic State of Iraq . Much of the infrastructure is in ruins, and Baghdad has provided nothing in the way of rebuilding and humanitarian help. Many Sunnis are skeptical of and dissatisfied with the government, which they perceive as at best inattentive and inept, and at worst as a hostile foreign occupier propped up by Iran and Shi'a militias (Wing, 2017).

After a horrific period of relocation, destruction, and political disenfranchisement, the issue for many Sunnis is how to reset their connection with the center. Experiments in supporting Al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2005 and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in 2014 as a counterbalance to the Baghdad government failed miserably. External assistance from the Gulf's Sunni governments for another wave of violent rebellion to the government seems unlikely. Iraq's Sunnis continue to have substantial internal political differences. All of these issues severely constrain the

Sunni community's options in interacting with Baghdad. Sunni leaders will be under pressure to strike the best political agreement possible and get huge sums of reconstruction funding while avoiding seeming to kowtow to Shi'a political leaders. In the past, this has been a near-impossible task (Al-Arian, Abdullah. ,2020).

After Islamic State of Iraq is vanquished, the Kurds will have to make decisions as well. The Kurds might opt to leverage their important role in halting the Islamic State's progress into a better political-economic arrangement with Baghdad. The Kurds, on the other hand, seem to have opposing viewpoints at the moment. Negotiations with Baghdad to set the terms for ultimate Kurdish independence are conceivable, according to one top Kurdish advisor during a recent visit to Washington; nevertheless, the government's botched initial response to the Islamic State of Iraq incursion, as well as its ongoing inability to manage a true public conversation to find permanent solution to bitter territorial, financial, and private conversation issues, has fueled Kurds' desire to break completely away from Baghdad (Marr, 2007).

The two main political parties in the Kurdish Regional Government, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have announced that an independence referendum will be conducted later in 2017, in April, The Kurds, according to one Kurdish Democratic Party politician, have given up hope of living inside a unified Iraqi state and anticipate that the referendum will result in a vote for independence but this hope didn't comes to reality . During the conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq, the Kurds have greatly expanded their authority over Iraqi territory; the raising of the Kurdish flag over Kirkuk in April, in a region vying for control of about 4% of the world's known oil resources, has sparked concern that the Kurds will pursue these territories as part of an independent nation or use them as a strong bargaining chip for concessions. The Kurds looked to perceive an opening with the Trump presidency, which backed them due to their strong cooperation with the US military and effective involvement in the war against the Islamic State of Iraq in northern Iraq. At the very least, the administration was interested in developing closer ties with the Kurdistan Regional Government and brokering a deal between Turkey and the Kurds. Despite the fact that many Kurdish leaders and analysts expected Trump's fondness for the Kurds would transfer into support for Kurdish independence in northern Iraq, the administration appeared to be open to the possibility (Wing, 2017).

The existence of armed Shi'a militias, which Baghdad has relied on for years in its efforts to manage the nation, but notably in the last two years as it fought the Islamic State of Iraq, has exacerbated the political and security situation. In today's iteration, the mostly Shi'a Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Sha'bi in Arabic) have played a critical role in assisting Iraqi Security Forces in the battle.

Under Iraq's new militia legislation, the popular mobilization army was recently brought under the legal authority of the Iraqi government. Many of these organizations, nevertheless, are directly backed by the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and there are worries that Tehran would try to turn the popular mobilization forces into a Lebanese Hezbollah-style state-within-a-state. The popular mobilization forces would very definitely strive to consolidate its control with Iran's assistance by leveraging their military gains—possibly by retaliating against increasing Kurdish assertiveness in Mosul and elsewhere. The government and the rule of law are also being challenged by tribal groups and criminal gangs. Baghdad, according to several sources, has lost control of major areas of the country, including Basra and other southern cities. These organizations will go to great lengths to keep their profitable circles of influence (Al-Arian, Abdullah. ,2020).

3.4. Political Islam In Iraq and International Relations

3.4.1. Foreign Relation of Iraq With Neighbors

3.4.1.1. Iraqi- Turkish relations

Following a reasonably stable period from 1960 to 1990, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 shattered the previously positive Turkey-Iraq relationship. Turkey granted UN forces permission to fly operations from its air bases. The united alliance met its goal and had neither the mandate nor the willingness to go farther into Iraq. In 1991, a cease-fire agreement was struck in Safwan. Prior to 2000, Turkey's ties with Iraq changed into a new era, notably following the invasion of Iraq. The unity of Iraq is as crucial as the PKK situation for Turkey-Iraq ties in this moment. The arguments revolve over the status of Kirkuk and the rights of Turkomans. Turkey was asked for the invasion by the US prior to the invasion, but the Turkish parliament opposed being an active participant of the US-led coalition troops in Iraq in 2003. The Turkish parliament's vote was perceived as a reaction to the United States' unilateral intervention in the Middle East as well as a wish to keep Turkey out of the Iraq conflict (Marr, 2007).

Parallel to these two incidents, which sent a clear message to Baghdad about Turkey's determination to pursue a more active regional strategy with Saudi Arabia, putting an end to al- Maliki's ambitions, the Ankara-Erbil-Baghdad triangle continues to remain among the most urgent issues in the Iraq-Turkey relationship. Increased Turkish economic cooperation with the Kurdistan Regional Government is considered as a strategic approach to limit the impact of Iraqi Kurdish independence on Turkey's own Kurdish minority, as well as a lucrative industry. The possibility of building a pipeline to transport oil and gas from the Kurdistan provincial government's region to the global market via Ceyhan port is also significant, as it would reduce Turkey's reliance on Basra and the Strait of Hormuz, effectively turning Turkey into an energy hub. Nonetheless, the Iraqi central government must determine whether to establish such a project in partnership with the Kurdistan regional administration or utilizing existing Iraqi federal infrastructure and legal frameworks. The first option will have a substantial impact on Iraq's internal power balance, bolstering the ambitions of a region with foreign ties that are irreconcilable with its own. Similar concerns and opportunities may push Turkey and Iraq to integrate hydrocarbon finding and exports

in the long run, boosting Iraqi internal stability while also promoting Turkish objectives (Marr, 2007).

3.4.1.2. Iraqi - Arab countries relations

Before the American invasion Iraq has had a wide range of relationships with the Arab world. Iraqi and Egyptian ties were dramatically shattered in 1977, when Iraq condemned Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's peace attempts with Israel. Baghdad held an Arab League conference in 1978 that criticized and shunned Egypt for signing the Camp David Accords. Iraqi-Arab ties were severed in 1990, when the majority of Arab countries supported the United Nations alliance that drove Iraq out of Kuwait. In recent years, relations have progressively improved, and Egypt is now one of Iraq's most important trading partners (Stratton, 2017).

After 2005 Iraq's ties with its Gulf Arab neighbors have paralleled and attempted to offset Iraq-Iran contacts to a significant extent. Despite their long-standing tribal and political links, as well as family and commercial relationships, Iraq's Gulf Arab neighbors have typically seen the Iraqi situation through the lens of Iranian dominance in the area. Their political and economic participation has been hampered as a result of this view, favoring Tehran's agenda (Smith, 2003).

Since 2011, however, a new and more sophisticated approach has emerged, indicating a renewed desire in investing in their relationships. Iraq hoped to gain more benefits from closer ties with its Gulf Arab neighbors by eradicating old debts and renewing investments, limiting any negative effects arising from such situations, and balancing Tehran's impact. As a result, Iraq's connections with its Gulf Arab neighbors may be beneficial to the country's security and rebuilding. In reality, while Gulf Arab countries were relatively immune to Iraq's spillover, Baghdad was hit by a destabilizing influx of men and money from the region, particularly Saudi Arabia. Given Baghdad's rising importance in oil production and its fragility in the face of larger sectarian rhetoric and instability in the area, Gulf Arab governments should make it a priority (Al-Arian, 2020).

Simultaneously, they have begun to pragmatically support the growth of the Iraqi state in order to stabilize the nation, decreasing the risk of a negative spillover from Iraq and limiting Iran's influence. As a result, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have taken a less antagonistic stance toward Iraq and have increased their financial

interests there. Despite this, Kuwait's Emir was the sole Gulf leader to attend the Arab League meeting in 2012. Iraq's diplomatic connections with its Arab Gulf neighbors, on the other hand, are the most uncomplicated in the region, thanks to a shared desire to invest in them. Kuwait's desire to develop the Bubyah Island construction at the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab canal, which might imperil Iraq's Gran Faw project, for instance, provoked new tension in Iraqi-Kuwaiti ties in 2011, despite both sides attempting to address the issue through diplomatic dialogue. Similarly, Iraq reaffirmed its commitment to settling long-standing difficulties with its Arab Gulf neighbors by promising to pay \$US 300 million in damages and resolve a 1990 conflict during the Arab League summit in Baghdad in 2012. This decision was especially advantageous to Iraqi-Kuwaiti ties since it expressed a common commitment to settle unresolved boundary problems as well as the issue of Kuwaiti POWs (Dodge ,2020).

On the other hand , Iraq's ties with Saudi Arabia are difficult, as certain signs of conflict have emerged since 2012 (Al-Arian, Abdullah,2020). Riyadh dispatched a non-resident ambassador to Baghdad and signed a security pact with Iraq for the first time since the invasion in March 2003. Saudi Arabia chose to shun all communication with Baghdad after 2003. Riyadh prioritized the construction of a security fence along their shared border, limiting its activities to a kind of containment of any potential spillover from Iraq, assuring local Sunni interest in an effort to counter Iran's rising grip over the nation. As a result, Saudi Arabia has made it plain that it is concerned about the possibility of a link between the Iraqi Shia population and its own Shia nationals in the Eastern Province. Simultaneously, one of Saudi Arabia's key long-term worries is Iraq's prospective economic growth, particularly in the oil industry, which might jeopardize its position as a major oil exporter. Iraq will undoubtedly have a significant influence on Gulf Arab nations and the broader regional economy in this regard. As a result, both Iraq and Saudi Arabia should strengthen their ties to ensure that this happens in a cooperative and safe environment rather than a destabilized one (Stratton,2017).

3.4.1.3. Iraqi-Iranian relations

Before 2005, ties among Iraq and Iran had deteriorated significantly as a result of Iraq's 14 July Revolution in 1958 and subsequent fall of the Hashemite Monarchy, which culminated in the country's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. In the 1960s, Iraq's Ba'ath Party came to power, taking a more confrontational posture on border conflicts. Saddam Hussein invaded Iran following the Islamic revolution in 1979, citing boundary issues and a desire to dominate oil-rich portions of Iran's land as justifications. The war lasted eight years and finished in a standstill. Iraq utilized chemical weapons and brutality towards Iraqi Kurds and Arabs during the conflict, accusing them of collaborating with Iran. While Iran did not participate in the multinational alliance against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991, it was home to a number of Shia political organizations opposed to Saddam Hussein's authority.

Following 2005, Iraqi foreign policy aimed to gain support from both the United States and Iran while maintaining sufficient independence from both, combining its non-alignment stance with the goal of creating the required domestic and international circumstances to preserve and enhance the current system. The objective is to take a more prominent position in the region, strengthen connections with Arab countries, and remove the perception that it is an Iranian proxy. In March 2012, Iraq hosted the Arab League summit in Baghdad, which intended to mediate among Tehran and the global community over nuclear issues. This attempt was made again during a session of discussions in May 2012. As a result, both the P5+1 and the Arab League meetings should be viewed as attempts to demonstrate that Iraq is re-emerging as an independent player and recovering from its status as a battleground for rival regionalisms (Stratton, 2017).

By imposing its personal model of state, Tehran does not seek to exert direct social, economic, or political control over Iraq. In reality, Tehran has pragmatically accepted that the Shiite population in Iraq is varied and complicated. The bulk of Iraqi Shiites have always considered themselves Iraqis, and the Iraqi Shi'a mainstream leadership has never supported Khomeini's philosophy.

As a result, Tehran attempted to extend its influence over the most receptive local Shi'a components, particularly in southern Iraq, which has a vital access to the Gulf and abundant oil deposits, in order to restrict Baghdad's future hegemonic

ambitions and undermine the Iraqi state. Iran achieved this goal by using Iraq's internal problems and exploiting sectarian divides owing to the removal of Iraqi groups (Zunes, 2003).

Nonetheless, while Iraqi-Iranian relations are improving and remaining friendly, and significant differences are unlikely, Iraq ought not be regarded completely under Tehran's control. In reality, Iraq's foreign policy goals may be quite different from those of Iran. Oil wealth is a significant issue that might influence Iran-Iraq relations. Baghdad's increasing assertiveness in OPEC and the region will cause a dramatic shift in the power in the region compromise between the two countries. At the same time, the Syrian rebellion has put Iraqi decision-makers in a tough position. This is due in part to Iraq's goals clashing with Iran's backing for the Assad regime, which is concerned about violence spilling into its territory and upsetting its government. Baghdad's contradictory stance on Syria is damaging Iraq's ties with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, echoing the country's domestic lack of consensus on the Iraqi state's presence within its diplomatic ties (Plebani, 2013).

3.4.1.4. Iraqi-Israel relations

Iraq-Israel relations referred to the bilateral relationships between the State of Israel and the Republic of Iraq prior to 2005. Since Israel's founding in 1948, Iraq has refused to recognize Israel as a sovereign state, and the two nations have maintained no official diplomatic ties. The Hashemite Monarchy of Iraq was a member of the Arab alliance that launched a war on and attacked Israel shortly after its founding, initiating the First Arab-Israeli War, and the two countries have been at odds ever since. In 1967 and 1973, Iraqi soldiers took part in the Third Arab-Israeli War and the Fourth Arab-Israeli War, respectively and this situation remained until 2005 (Spencer, 2013).

But after 2005, Iraq is not classified as a hostile state, according to Israeli Ministry of Economy definitions. There are several commercial prospects between Israel and Iraq. In practically every way, the Kurdish region, Israel's safest region, need investment and development. The financial and banking institutions in this region are primitive and far from reaching 21st-century standards: credit is confined to big cities, and even then, it is not available everywhere; ATMs are scarce; and the business is a cash economy with a constant cash shortage originating in Baghdad. A firm from Israel that builds a reliable finance and banking system would be welcomed with open arms.

In addition, the region is experiencing a severe housing scarcity, which has driven up real estate prices in the cities. Nevertheless, the region's development sector is dominated by Turkish firms, and it's unlikely that an Israeli businessman will be able to compete with them (Stratton,2017).

At this point, the possibilities for a change in Iraq's political leadership's position toward Israel seem implausible. In the context of the Arab Peace Agreement, Iraq's official attitude oscillates between Iran's hardline attitude and the moderate Arab viewpoint. Even if an autonomous and separate Kurdish entity emerges from Iraq, it will be constrained in its dealings with Israel. Iraq's government is ineffective and badly run. As a result, any imposed viewpoint on a non-Iraqi topic, such as the approach toward Israel, is guaranteed to fail. The situation in Iraq as a consequence of the 2003 American invasion, on the other hand, opens the door to a novel strategy that has yet to be explored in any other Arab country. This strategy entails teaching both communities how to communicate and get to know one another through meetings, cultural exchanges, and other means. This manner, when political change occurs, will be founded on more strong fundamentals than Israel's peace deals with Egypt and Jordan, as well as the Oslo Accords, that were negotiated at the highest levels of government. Despite their paralyzing terror, many Iraqis are eager to take this road (Spencer,2013).

Defense and oil exports are two forms of commercial activity with the Kurdish area that deserve special attention. In terms of security, Israel has previously aided in the training of Peshmerga soldiers, particularly those who serve under Mas'ud Barzani. Consequently, these personnel stationed on the front lines to combat Daesh require weapons rather than instruction. To some extent, the West supplies these weapons. Kurdish troops lack both an armored corps and an air force. Extending military help to the Kurds is not suggested in the current circumstances because it will draw Israel into a messy internal Arab-Kurdish war. Oil exports are the second sort of commerce. Turkey controls practically all of the oil resources in the Kurdish area, from which only a small proportion of Kurdish oil is produced. The Kurds are unable to export oil in principle. Any effort to do so will be met with Baghdad's economic penalties and a lack of cooperation from the purchasing nations, who do not want to risk their relations with Iraq. In theory, Israel does not require Kurdish oil, and its previous agreement to store Kurdish oil in Ashqelon was only a show of goodwill for the Kurds. However,

the unconfirmed evidence we have concerns quite big oil agreements with the Kurdish area, which supplies oil to Israel at a cheaper price than the market rate. The Baghdadi administration reclaimed most of the disputed Kurdish oil resources by the end of 2017. If the current scenario persists, there are few opportunities for cooperation in the security and energy sectors (McEvoy and Aboultaif, 2020).

Iraq is an Arab country whose stance is mostly untouched by the war between Israel and Palestine. For the Kurdish area, the war is unimportant, and for Arab Iraq, it is irrelevant. The Iraqi attitude shifts among al-'Abadi's Arab pole (with Sunnis and moderate Shiites) and the more radical Iranian pole, which supports the Arab peace effort. In general, policymakers in Iraq seem unconcerned about the issue. The "conflict" may be separated into three sub-themes from the Iraqi perspective: the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, the Israeli-Arab disagreement, and the Israeli-Iranian conflict. Iraq appears to be uninterested in or involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Shiite Iraqi populace does not show solidarity with Palestinians and continues to regard them as followers of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'th Party. In Iraq, Palestinians have been implicated in a number of suicide bombs, which the Shiites frequently note, typically citing inflated suicide bomber statistics. Following 2003, people of the Sunni city of Mosul held rallies in sympathy with Palestinians, but it is unlikely that they will do so after their recovery from Daesh; instead, they are anticipated to focus on reconstructing their lives (Towns, 2012).

Officially, Iraq supports the Palestinian authority in a passive manner and has no ties to Hamas. Respect for the Palestinian Authority is tempered by Iraqis' memories of the PLO's views under Saddam Hussein's regime, as well as the reality that PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas spent several years in Iraq as Saddam Hussein's guest. Many Iraqis dislike Palestinians because they regard them as allies of Saddam Hussein.

3.4.2. The Foreign Relations of Iraq With Great Powers

3.4.2.1. Iraqi- European union relations

When we look at the relationship between Iraq and the European Union prior to 2005, we can see how discrepancies in European and American responses to the Iraqi issue emerged in the 1990s. After Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait in 1991, the United States pursued a strategy of containment. Along with this approach, the US got increasingly active in lobbying for democratization in Arab countries, a process that had no equivalent in Europe. With the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act by the Clinton Administration in 1998, the steady transition in Arab states from a strategy of confinement to one of regime change hit a key milestone. In Europe, there was no similar movement. Because of European resistance to a regime change campaign in Iraq, little thought had been given to what a post-Saddam Iraq would look like. In continental Europe, there's also a great deal of apprehension about the Iraqi opposition. Because of the sensitivity of the issue for continental Europeans, a December 2002 symposium on Iraqi democracy had to be shifted from Brussels to London. Relations between Iraqi opposition figures and official organizations were minimal in Britain, the nation nearest to the United States on Iraq (Jahn, and Beate, 2009).

Following the invasion and deposing of Saddam Hussein's regime, France's original position, as the war's principal Western adversary, was for the occupation of Iraq to be ended quickly and a unified country administration to be established in its stead. The ensuing inability of the US and its allies to locate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, over which the war was fought, served as a significant backdrop to France and Germany's later position. It has been highlighted that France and other European countries were more enthusiastic about the United Nations' engagement in Iraq than the United Nations itself. Before 2005, the fundamental dividing line in European attitudes of Iraq was between France and Germany on the one hand, and the United Kingdom, Poland, and Spain on the other. Smaller neutral countries aligned with France and Germany at the time, and a number of new member states aligned with the United Kingdom, Poland, and Spain. Spain, on the other hand, effectively switched sides in mid-2004. Zapatero stated that his country's military will be withdrawn from Iraq. Spain had sent a force of 1,400 men to the battle. Zapatero first suggested that he could be happy to see Spanish military stay in Iraq as part of a united nations-led

solution, displaying his devotion to the French interpretation of events in Iraq (Smith, 2003).

But after 2005, the European union has strengthened its diplomatic outreach to Iraq, and finances have been mobilized quickly to ensure that European union and Member State activities are coordinated. In accordance with the June 2017 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions, a new European union policy for Iraq is being developed, defining European union support for the following years. Iraq has been plagued by bloodshed and armed warfare for decades, but the effective fight to destroy Da'esh provides the country hope for a peaceful future. Iraq has reached a fork in the path. The European union is ready to help the nation develop a post-Daesh future based on inclusive government and social cohesion, as well as continuing to aid it with humanitarian, safety, stability, and rehabilitation concerns (Kim,2014).

1) Political support

The European Union is fully committed to continuing to cooperate with the Iraqi people and government for the country's stability and reconciliation, while also defending Iraq's unity, sovereignty, and national sovereignty. Mosul's deliverance, followed by Tel Afar and Nineveh Province, only strengthened the European union's already strong commitment in this regard. The European union emphasizes the significance of an inclusive national and local reconciliation process, as well as the necessity to make visible progress on political changes to enable comprehensive national reconciliation, in its discussions with Iraqi leaders. The European union is assisting regional and local authorities in developing their own local growth plans as well as better and more responsible governance for their inhabitants through programs worth over €46 million (Mansour, 2017).

These range from local programs to national initiatives aimed at breaking the cycle of sectarian bloodshed. In addition, the European union has decided to commit over €29 million to activities related to reconciliation, tend to range from resolving conflict between IDPs and host population through dialogue projects to responding to concerns about missing persons through the Intergovernmental Panel on Missing Persons' investigations into bulk and surreptitious graves.

3.4.2.2. Iraq -Russia relations

Iraqi-Russian ties are a resumption of Iraqi-Soviet relations, which were restored in 1959 following the breakdown of the Baghdad Pact and the foundation of a republic in Iraq on the ashes of the Hashemite Monarchy, which ruled from 1921 to 1958. Iraqi-Soviet relations grew quickly over the following four decades as Iraq continued to drift away from its historically strong ties with the West. By the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union (USSR) was Iraq's primary military supplier, and bilateral cooperation quickly expanded to cover education, farming, manufacturing power, and energy. After Iraq's oil industry was nationalized in 1972-73, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Bloc became significant markets for Iraqi oil, and Soviet oil corporations joined the Iraqi energy sector to work with Iraq's state-owned oil company (Kim,2014).

Russia was a vocal opponent of the United States of America invasion of Iraq and protested to the elimination of Saddam Hussein's regime outside of the United Nations Charter's framework. "The faster we walk down the route laid forth by international law, the better it will be," Russian President Vladimir Putin told media during a joint press conference with French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. The more we wait for a United Nations decision, the more it will appear to be a colonial scenario." Putin, on the other hand, promised to work with the new Iraqi administration and the United States of America, saying that Russia was willing to "forgive Baghdad approximately \$8 to \$12 billion in debt," as the United States of America had demanded (Jahn, and Beate, 2009).

The connection among Moscow and Baghdad, like Russia's foreign-policy connections across the Persian Gulf area during the post-Soviet period especially after 2005, is a famous illustration of Russian policy's issues, paradoxes, and intellectual meanderings following communism's demise. Russia's stance toward Iraq is the outcome of a complex mix of internal and international influences (Kim,2014).

At the same time, Russia's internal dynamics, including its complex and contradictory development, the difficult change in both elites and value systems, and the internal regional conflict, have had a direct impact on policy decisions, including foreign policy. Foreign policy was frequently enslaved by internal Kremlin strife, and its direction was monopolized by particular interest groups or sold to other lobbies.

During the Iraqi crisis, a number of elements that directly impact Russian foreign policy development all played a part. First, Russian leaders tend to base their worldview on a Cold War-era perspective of the world in many respects. Despite President Vladimir Putin's frequent mentions of global economic interests, the country's foreign policy agencies continue to prioritize state security and the protection of the country's territorial integrity in the military sense. That is how the vast majority of Russian diplomats and politicians regard the modern world. "For Moscow, the issue is stability in all its facets and dimensions, worldwide, regional, and national, as well as political, economic, sociological, environmental, and informational," argues one Russian expert. "Securing a secure and stable climate is the key strategic responsibility of Russia's foreign policy organizations." This is a common remark. This approach, which is more fit for a defense industry than a foreign affairs ministry, generates a conceptual gap among Russia and many other countries and is one of Russia's foreign policy problems (Michael , et al ,2017).

Second, Russia has yet to articulate a consistent posture toward the world's lone superpower, the USA, or the West in general. The theory concerning the inevitability of bettering ties among Russia and the United States proved to be false. Russia-US ties could not be changed because they were designed for a different political and international context and were, by necessity, unrepeatable. Instead, the nations should forge entirely new bilateral ties, based on a qualitatively different strategic and intellectual foundation. You can't keep developing the steam engine indefinitely; eventually, you'll need to move to something fundamentally different, such as a gasoline engine or an electric motor. Neither Moscow nor the United States attempted to make that jump. Both sides wasted a decade striving to enhance the steam power, and as a result, they now lack a clear strategy toward one another, which, given their size and strength, cannot but have a detrimental impact on world events (Caitlin ,2012).

3.4.2.3. Iraqi –US relations

Diplomatic relations between Iraq and the United States began when the U.S. Iraq was initially acknowledged on January 9, 1930, when Charles G. Dawes, the United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom, signed the Anglo-American-Iraqi Convention in London. Prior to the 1980s, the historiography of Iraq–US relations is regarded to be weak. When Iraq publicly killed 9 Iraqi Jews on bogus espionage

allegations at the end of January 1969, the Nixon administration was faced with an early foreign policy problem. Initially, the Nixon administration attempted to halt the murders by persuading American friends with close relations to Iraq, such as France, Spain, and India, to exert pressure on the regime. Despite a great interest in American technological competence on the part of the Iraqi administration prior to 1980, the government did not appear to be serious about re-establishing diplomatic ties with the US. The Ba'ath Party saw the US's efforts to reach "step-by-step" interim arrangements among Israel and Arab nations, as well as the diplomatic process that culminated to the Camp David Accords, as premeditated measures to keep Arab discord alive. As a result, Iraq took the lead in coordinating Arab resistance to the United States' diplomatic attempts (Michael et al ,2017).

The relations between the U.S. and Iraq has altered since the US invasion of Iraq, although the security issue remains the most crucial driver of US-Iraq ties. The prolonged presence of American troops is largely seen as a stabilizing element that has aided the Iraqi government in maintaining order and preventing violent clashes over disputed territory and political rivalries. The Iraqi government, on the other hand, publicly welcomes the withdrawal of US personnel (the overall troop presence in Iraq fell below 100,000 in early 2010) and is wary of any perception that the US participation is jeopardizing its sovereignty. Both nations are dedicated to the scheduled glide-path that started with the withdrawal of American soldiers from urban centers in mid-2009, continued with the departure of all battle forces in mid-2010, and ended with the final pullout of any remaining US powers, other than those responsible for training or the protection of US facilities, in mid-2011. The Iraqi government might ask for a postponement of this deadline, as well as a signed deal to govern new or existing missions after 2012. Overall, the security picture appears to be improving. The number of violent occurrences in Baghdad and other large cities is steadily decreasing. The number of Iraqi civilians killed each year peaked at 34,000 in 2006. In 2009, the amount was 3,000, and statistics through early March 2010 shows that the yearly figure has been further halved. The figures for US military fatalities are similar: the worst year was 2007, with 904 deaths. By 2009, the number had dropped to 149, and 12 US servicemen had been killed between January and early March 2010 (Sigwart, 2013).

Another major aspect of the security testing is Iran's influence in Iraq. One of the most persistent criticisms of US strategy and its unintended effects is that the US effort to depose Saddam Hussein presented Iran with a significant strategic asset a Shia majority government in Baghdad. A lengthy border, a particular connection with the Shia majority government, and the myriad assets the Iranians have established in all aspects of Iraqi culture and the security community all add to the persistent fear that Iran's influence will only expand when the US leaves. Regardless of the fact that Iran's closest political supporters have lost seats and impact since the regional elections of 2009, and that the rise of non-sectarian, Iraqi radical nationalist bunches may not bode well for Iran's ability to manipulate or influence Iraq's policies, this concern persists. These worries regarding lingering sources of insecurity must not be overblown. Even without the deployment of tens of thousands of American troops, the transition to Iraq's empowerment as a fully independent state was accomplished effectively some years ago, and a substantial American civilian presence might potentially play a positive role in conflict avoidance and resolution. Once the combat forces are removed, US and Iraqi authorities are in general agreement on the objective and goal of the training operation. They are already shifting their attention to armed forces leadership and professional development, as well as police capacity building. Security cooperation and close talks on regional security matters will undoubtedly be an area of common interest and responsibility in the future, and these continuous efforts in security sector reform might be an essential component of US-Iraq ties (Michael et al, 2017).

Since 2014, the US has reinforced its connections with Iraq's security forces and given much-needed economic and humanitarian aid, but Iraqis continue to differ over how US-Iraq relations should progress. In March 2017, President Trump and Prime Minister Abadi met in Washington, DC, and "decided to build a broad-based political and economic collaboration based on the 2008 strategic framework agreement," including sustained security cooperation, according to the White House. Some Iraqis have welcomed US involvement and help, while others have viewed the US with hatred and distrust for a variety of reasons. Prime Minister Abadi has stated a willingness for the United States to continue to help and train Iraq's security forces, but other Iraqis, particularly those with close links to Iran, have been vocal in their opposition to plans for a permanent US military presence in the country. Decisions by the United States on matters such as Iran policy, the Syrian crisis, the Israel-Palestinian

conflict, and ties with Iraqi Kurds and other subnational groups may have an impact on future bilateral dialogues and collaboration chances (Dyer, and Hugh, 2014).



CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Depending on what we mentioned above we can conclude that :

Islamism, as a fundamental aspect of Muslim and particularly Arab, politics, is bound to play a significant role in the future of Iraqi politics.

While Iraq has a strong secular past, the Ba'ath administration provoked enormous resentment in Iraqi society, which will eventually emerge. More importantly, a massive moral and intellectual void has arisen in Iraq, and political Islam is well suited to giving a new moral compass to the people.

The Iraqi constitution is the result of a political agreement reached amongst Iraq's main opposition groups before to the conflict. These parties agreed that a future Iraqi state would embrace Islam, democracy, pluralism, federalism, and human rights (although at a high level of generality).

Following the war, former Iraqi oppositionists returned to their homeland and began implementing their political ideology and one of that ideologies was the ideology of political Islam . Despite agreement on basic political ideals, Iraqi politicians participated in a number of contentious discussions over how to put these ideas into practice. Shi'i Islamists became stronger as the constitutional process became more democratic particularly after the historic Iraqi election on January 30, 2005--and were able to sway constitutional results in their favor. Nonetheless, no single party was capable of unilaterally controlling the process, and all Islamic political parties made significant concessions and compromises during the discussions. The severity of the disputes, however, demonstrates that, while a constitutional accord has been reached, there is still no fundamental agreement on the role of Islamic politics in Iraq's growing democratic regime.

Despite the formal acceptance of a final text in October 2005, it is vital to remember that Iraq's constitutional process is still ongoing.

The Iraqi constitution provides for a broad range of political outcomes and interpretations. Its laws are usually ambiguous, including several internal Islamic conflicts and ambiguity, particularly in its aim to integrate Islamic ideals with liberal equality and human rights provisions with the policy of controlling the country. The text also provides for significant constitutional development through regular

legislation, the makeup of the Federal Supreme Court, and Iraq's federal system's progress. Furthermore, it's probable that the Constitutional Review Commission, which was created to quell Sunni resistance to the constitution, may allow for substantial changes or clarifications to several Islamic laws.

While the constitutional language takes critical steps toward defining the connection between Islam and the state, the growth of Iraq's political party system will also define that relationship. Iraqi politics, to put it bluntly, is still in turmoil. It's unclear if ethnic and sectarian identity politics will continue to gain support after the conflict, or whether cross-confessional nationalist parties will arise and acquire traction over time.

It's also unclear if Shi'i Islamist groups will continue to see above their internal squabbles and show a united front at the national level and in the political relationships with others. Their current cohesiveness, which is partly due to Sistani's leadership, has been important to boosting the importance of Islam in the constitution. Then there's the new generation of Sunni Arab leaders who were democratically elected. It's unclear how they'll fit into Iraq's political landscape, particularly whether they'll support Shi'i Islamist efforts to strengthen the role of religion in politics or join forces with Kurds and secular Arabs to combat Shi'i sectarianism. All of these political developments will have a significant impact on Islam's final position inside Iraq's constitutional structure. Iraq's historic attempt to reconcile Islam and democracy will be determined as much by changing political circumstances as by the constitutional text's strictures.

Its success or failure will also be determined by the capacity of the Iraqi government to stabilize and protect the nation in the face of continuous insurgency and sectarian conflict. This is not to downplay the importance of Iraq's constitution; rather, it is to acknowledge that the text itself does not signify the conclusion, or even the beginning of the end, of Iraq's democratic growth, but rather the end of the beginning.

Rather than giving Iran a strong foothold in the new Iraq, the rise of Shi'ite authority in Iraq is more likely to lead to competition with Iran over time, posing a fundamental ideological danger to Iranian hardliners who support clerical control.

Both secularists and Islamists on both sides are regrettably reinforcing their positions on the Sunni-Shia divide.

Any external regional or international player's involvement should not be assumed to be the source of all Iraq's problems. Iraq's internal flaws are the major troublemakers, making it open to external intervention, notably from Iran, Turkey, and Arab nations. As a result, sectarian tensions might be viewed as a cause in regional destabilization rather than a reality or a driver in and of itself. Sectarian divides do not appear in a vacuum or as an evidence of intrinsic religious and cultural opposition; rather, they are used by political elites as part of a larger effort to determine the regional power balance.

As a result, sectarian strife is both a symptom and a consequence of a regional change that has yet to gain a foothold. However, such disagreements have divided Iraq's foreign policy, resulting in the appearance of several foreign policy orientations rather than a single, cohesive foreign strategy. Domestic stability, foreign involvement, oil production strategy, and the political evolutions of Iraq and Syria are all major aspects and issues that are inextricably linked in these entropic dynamics.

Iraqi foreign policy combined its non-alignment attitude with the goal of generating the appropriate internal and international circumstances to retain and develop the present system, with the goal of gaining support from both the US and Iran while maintaining adequate autonomy from both.

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