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Department of Political Science and Public Administration

**COMPARATIVE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS OF ANTI-
IMMIGRATION POLICIES VIA PUBLIC OPINIONS,
POLITICAL PARTIES, AND ITS SUBSEQUENT PROGNOSIS:
CASE STUDIES: ITALY, GERMANY, CANADA AND
AUSTRALIA.**

Master Thesis

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The thesis study of Faith Omoye ABHULIMEN titled as Comparative Studies And Analysis of Anti-Immigration Policies Via Public Opinions, Political Parties and Its Subsequent Prognosis: Case Studies: Italy, Germany, Canada and Australia, has been accepted as MASTER THESIS in the department of Department of Political Science and Public Administration by out jury.

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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate my thesis firstly to God almighty for seeing me through a difficult time in my life and always being there for me to rely on. Then I would dedicate my work to the entire ABHULIMEN family: Jude, Mary-Joy, Opeyemi, Francisco, Veronica, and Emmanuel, for being the support system I never knew I needed. For not giving up on me and loving me through the storm.

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SUMMARY

During the last decades, immigration intolerance has grown over the globe, particularly inside the EU countries. Commonly the United States and other Western countries are opposed to the government adopting anti-immigrant legislation and measures. Also, the Gallup Migrant Acceptance Index shows that the tolerance of migrants has decreased worldwide between 2016 and 2019.

For instance, the global average score declined from 5.34 in 2016 to 5.21 in 2019 whereas Belgium and Switzerland recorded the sharpest decline in intolerant attitudes. Belgium as the home of the European Parliament recorded a decline of 1.33 points. Moreover, the Gallup data reveal that Türkiye hosts around 4 million refugees, as part of a deal with the European Union, but the country is the tenth least accepting country for migrants. In this context, the current study aims to show the rise in anti-immigration policies across the European Union and compare these changes to those of other regions (non-EU). Inductive analysis is used for some case studies to investigate the reasons for these sentiments. Online questionnaires and secondary data were used to empirically portray the hypotheses on a rise in anti-immigration through analysis of public opinions, the rise in far-right parties, and a prognosis of the future.

The results of the study show that Germans appeared the most resistant compared to other European states such as Italy, which has a better acceptance rate and immigration policies towards immigrants; out of 200000 applicants, it had only accepted less than 39000 while Italy accepted 7193 applications out of over 76000 applicants. Data from Australia's application acceptance rate was acceptance of only 3277 applicants out of 19,148 applications while Canada- was the most accepting, with 27282 acceptances with over 11000 reviews out of its 94246 applications during the 2022 world data collection. Empirically results showed that Canada had the most favorable immigration policies with the acceptance rate of 68.5% followed by Germany with 45%, making Australia and Italy the least favorable with 20.5% and 16% respectively. States with favorable policies and acceptance have seen reasonable growth economically as it has had less use of anti-immigration sentiments as a reason to get power.

Keywords: anti-immigration, asylum seekers, far-right groups, political parties, public opinion

ÖZET

Son on yılda, göçmenlere karşı hoşgörüsüzlük tüm dünyada, özellikle de AB ülkelerinde artmaktadır. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve diğer Batılı ülkeler genellikle hükümetin kabul ettiği göçmen karşıtı yasa ve önlemlere karşı çıkmaktadır. Ayrıca Gallup Göçmen Kabul Endeksi, 2016-2019 yılları arasında dünya çapında göçmenlere toleransın azaldığını göstermektedir.

Örneğin küresel ortalama puan 2016'da 5,34'ten 2019'da 5,21'e düşerken hoşgörüsüz tutumlarda en keskin düşüş Belçika ve İsviçre'de kaydedildi. Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun evi olan Belçika 1,33 puanlık bir düşüş kaydetti. Üstelik Gallup verilerine göre Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği ile yapılan anlaşma kapsamında 4 milyona yakın mülteciye ev sahipliği yapıyor ancak Türkiye, göçmenleri en az kabul eden onuncu ülke konumundadır. Bu bağlamda mevcut çalışma, Avrupa Birliği genelinde göç karşıtı politikaların artışı göstermeyi ve bu değişiklikleri diğer bölgelerle (AB dışı) karşılaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Araştırmanın sonuçları, göçmenlere yönelik kabul oranı ve göç politikaları daha iyi olan İtalya gibi diğer Avrupa devletleriyle karşılaştırıldığında Almanların en dirençli görüldüğünü; 200.000 tekliften yalnızca 39.000'den azını kabul ederken, İtalya 76.000'in üzerindeki tekliften 7193 başvuruyu kabul etmektedir. Avustralya'nın başvuru kabul oranına ilişkin veriler, 19.148 başvurudan yalnızca 3.277 adayın kabul edilmesini sağlarken, 2022 dünya veri toplama sırasında 94.246 başvurudan 11.000'den fazla incelemeyle 27.282 kabulle Kanada en çok kabul gören ülke olmuştur. Ampirik olarak sonuçlar, %68,5 kabul oranıyla Kanada'nın en olumlu göç politikalarına sahip olduğunu, onu %45 ile Almanya'nın takip ettiğini, Avustralya ve İtalya'nın sırasıyla %20,5 ve %16 ile en az olumlu göç politikalarına sahip olduğunu gösterdi. Olumlu politikaları ve kabulü olan devletler, iktidara gelme nedeni olarak göçmenlik karşıtı duyguları daha az kullandıkları için makul bir ekonomik büyüme gördüler.

Anahtar Kelimeler: göç karşıtlığı, sığınmacılar, aşırı sağ gruplar, siyasi partiler, kamuoyu

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFD	:	Alternate for Germany Alternative fur Deutschland (political party)
UK	:	United Kingdom
EU	:	European Union
FDI	:	Fratelli d'Italia- Brothers of Italy (political party)
OECD	:	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
GDP	:	Gross Domestic Product
EKOS	:	EKOS politics - https://www.ekospolitics.com/
USA	:	United States of America

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INTRODUCTION

The last decade has witnessed the anti-immigration sentiments, especially with the 2015 immigration crisis across Europe. Accordingly, the far-right political parties have become a poll for public opinion to express their disdain for the loose immigration policies that plagued Europe. The media also contributed to promoting much discourse that led to the 'WE' versus the 'THEY' narrative and people felt their concerns ignored, the immigrants escaping from critical situations and people accepted the anti-immigration feelings. This political atmosphere has led to a proliferation of many academic papers that examined the difference between theory versus practicality using the base standard of the United Nations directives and the applications/implementation used by stipulated countries. In fact, people experience marginalization and distress a latent concern that can easily intensify and become a serious problem. Previously Europe witnessed such a problem, which shifted from a social to a political concern. Firstly the anti-immigration opinions and far-right groups are a latent causation of an even bigger problem and its evolution depends on the way by which the States manage it over the years. For this reason, some countries choose to implement policies to re-integrate immigrants into the society whereas others have suffered push-back from their citizens This has resulted in anti-immigrant internal policies, particularly in European countries, via far-right movements. During the current research, I aim to explore the relationship between immigration policies- in some European countries and the Western world and to examine the difference (if any) in policies in countries like Italy and Germany versus countries like Australia and Canada. This implies investigating the causative factors of these states, including a periodic time sheet of historical prevalence as well as contextualizing time. States in recent years have seen a surge in immigration, creating an arena for a rise of anti-immigration policies, these policies have in turn shaped the attitudes states have chosen in their position on immigration. The question therefore lies; have these states always had these policies? Or are they just creating them? Did these states follow the UN guidelines on immigration and all it encompasses? How different are said states compared to others? Why (if any) are these states different?

CHAPTER ONE

A BACKGROUND OF STUDY

1.1 Study Problem

The research deals with the questions on immigration and targets to compare the empirical question of what the immigration laws are of certain countries and if they follow the UN guidelines; if they do, are they truly applied? It would be important to note that this research does not aim to criticize any country, but only to contribute to understanding how policies change over the years. What are the sources of these temporal changes? Do political parties play a role in policymaking? If they do, to what extent they shape such policies? How does public opinion contribute to policymaking?

The immigration wave of the late 2000s has driven a lot of debates about the rise of immigration and the way this affected the policy-making process of some states. The question then is, why when some countries close their borders, others seemingly open theirs? When Britain had Brexit most European countries pondered the fate of the Union, however, a few years later the same country sought the immigration of new workers. The UK is not the only state on the ‘open’ border approach, but it will be key to note, the question lies on the ‘why’? What are the related causes? What are their repercussions?

When people feel marginalized and fear cripples any form of reason, a latent concern can easily escalate into a serious problem. Europe has seen this before and now it seems to have metamorphosed from a social to a political problem. The rise of anti-immigration opinions and far-right groups is a latent causation of an even bigger problem. How states have chosen to handle these concerns and rises have differed over the years showing the successful implementation of re-integrating immigrants into their societies while other states have suffered push-backs from their citizens hence creating anti-immigration internal policies through the channel of far-right groups, especially in European states.

1.2 Importance of the Study

Most scholarly studies have analyzed the link between public opinions through far-right groups and anti-immigration sentiments from either a group dynamic or state-to-state level. From

the analysis of contact theory to group threat theories, scholars have revealed both the dynamics and relationship of the phenomena. For instance, Teitelbaum & Weiner (1995) analyzed the effect of immigration from a state level and uncovered that added to demographic and economic issues, security is a concern for many host states. In theory, high levels of immigration might pose security risks if migrants overwhelm the integration capacity of the host states and breed intergroup conflict. Rudolph (2003) and Ireland (2004) noted that the security implications of large-scale international migration to industrialized countries have been limited primarily to cultural concerns in practice. Recently, Valentina (2022) indicated that the cultural backlash contends the rising support for far-right parties represents a rejection of values such as cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism. Recent studies have sought to show how economic and cultural variables interact to boost support for the extreme right. However, most researchers have not addressed a political perspective on the rise and the future holds from a state-level study based on individual leadership reflection. Accordingly, scholars have comprehensively shown the relation as partaking each variable without a double intake on both variables as co-variants based on an application/implementation analysis. There have been assessments of many states, but there has been no relationship between what was and what is. This study aims to demonstrate how European powerhouses, such as Germany and Italy, have a domino effect in European politics, and how these feelings serve primarily as a means to a goal in comparison to other Western governments such as Canada. This idea originates from an intellectual foundation based on the premise that governments are democratic and, as such, have a channel for policy-making supported by their population. Academically, the inclination to over-generalize studies is widespread.

This research is based on qualitative analysis from open-ended questions and in-group observation research conducted on a mixed group. Despite the fact that this group was not controlled during the experiment, the comparisons performed during the research would be based on public opinions, implying an individual level of analysis. The aim of this research to investigate differences in policies and how they are shaped. Then offer a prognosis for future analysis. The goal was first to define what the variable 'immigrant' meant, which was concluded to be asylum seekers (as using regular immigrants such as students and tourists was discovered to not be the latent reason for the majority of the backlash of the public against immigration); which became an easier variable to measure in analyzing the acceptance rates of each case study. In recent years, politicians and their parties have come out to disapprove of immigration laws, which in turn led to

the rise of an increase in political participation. This stipulates that individuals have impacted the policymaking and therefore the laws governing a state. For instance, the opening of borders by Germany with Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and the former Yugoslavia between 1955 and 1968 with an expectation that most people would return back to their native countries. However German immigration realized that most immigrant workers were not returning after work which led to the restrictions on issuing work permits.

The fact that Germany offered social benefits to incoming immigrants during the post-war period made it a target for most immigrants. However, this caused discord within the political system, and a mix of unemployment and low social amenities led to a rise in racism, civil unrest, violence, and systemic discrimination of foreigners. Populist politicians created the impression that it was critical to close the country's borders by limiting the right to political asylum. This led to a growing racism perpetuated by radical right-wing party members, which frequently degenerated into pure violence. From 1993 onwards, an immigrant could not obtain asylum if he entered Germany from a 'safe' country of origin. The legal reforms were a huge success: there were only 21,000 applications in 2006, the lowest level since 1983.

To understand the immigration laws of countries the study analyzed both the state level as well as the individual levels. Public opinions and political parties are an integral part of a state's structure. For a state to be considered democratic (as with this study, we assume that states are by nature democratic) they have to allow some sort of political participation that allows its citizenry a 'say so' in its policy-making. To discard the roles in which these non-state actors play in the political decision-making process would limit the study. Over the years, especially with the growing economic crisis, mixed with the recent Russia-Ukrainian war, there is a growing resentment of the massive influx of immigrants into 'safer' countries. In recent studies, some scholars have shown the bias that exists between immigrants from Europe versus the ones from North Africa, Africa, and the Arab nations (Anthony Heath, Lindsay Richards, 2017). Although the preference for migrants has always existed from time immemorial, the preferences do switch across states from Jews to Muslims to fellow Europeans and so on. This study focuses on the role of these non-state actors comparing and giving an analytical perspective to the empirical qualitative and quantitative analysis of anti-immigration laws from the year 2015 to now; using its

historical contextualization to understand the political environment of these states, especially European and some non-European states.

1.3 Study Questions and Hypotheses

We had previously discussed certain hypothetical questions in this paper that we wish to illustrate or show over time. With the assumption that states are by nature democratic and as such non-state actors play a role in the decision-making process of each state; seeking to show the relationship between public opinions and political parties. Hence, with this assumption, do political parties or public opinion affect policy-making? Moreover, if they do, to what extent? This is very important to note, as it would show the extent to which these anti-immigration laws were made. Nevertheless, here lies the dilemma, if public opinion matters, then how do politicians shape these opinions? In addition, if politicians themselves are shaping them does that count as a truly democratic system? The propaganda model by Chomsky focuses on using the five filters, which elaborate on the effects on mass media, its interests, and choices. However, without oversimplifying the effects mass media plays in policy-making, we can by defect speak to the individual level of analysis in which politicians play in assigning specific interests that would peak its personal or party goals. Now when a state is truly democratic of which, studies have established that no state is truly democratic; politicians in recent years have played a role in the resurrection of far-right groups that have led to an uprising of a political arena of anti-immigration policies. The European states have by default been open to ‘only specific’ immigrants; contrastingly, in the last few years have created a world of ‘we don’t want them, so let’s ship them to the nearest, ‘want-to-be’ state’. So if they are shipped to another state, why do these states still have latent anti-immigration laws? Do these laws really exist, and what are the repercussions of these? Let's take into consideration the historical context of things. To disregard a country’s history would be subjective and as such lead to unempirical results.

Does a state's political history really matter? If it does to what extent, can we play a country’s reaction to recent issues as having a historical aspect or facet? In general, political history refers to "the formation, rise, development, and fall of states" (Ünal, 1985:5). In other words, political history teaches us about states, their formations, development, and "fall," as well as their political and economic relations with one another. (Mediha, 2022). The Washington Post defined the importance of history as being the bedrock for a stronger democratic state. It places the vitality of the sustenance of democracy on the acknowledgment of the historical contextualization of politics

on a political state. To know where a state's interests come from is to understand why said the state has that interest in the first place. Why do some states like Australia or Canada, have seemingly less aggressive anti-immigration laws? On the other hand, are they by definition less outspoken than states that have had strong politicians speak out against immigration? Hence, is there a rise in anti-immigration laws? Where are these present? And how did they come about? Is there a rise in far-right groups? Can these changes be linked back to the rise of anti-immigration laws? In what states are these present? How are the case studies affected by these assumptions? What is the application of immigration laws in the case study states, and its correspondence to the stipulations laid out by the United Nations? - its comparative analysis would be essential in understanding the correlation between the immigration laws of stipulated states and their applications.

Hence, the hypothesis is that states have become more restrictive in immigration policies because of rising public opinion through its growing support of far-right parties against immigration. The variable, however, is all immigrants both legal and 'illegal' (asylum seekers) across all backgrounds.

Conclusively, would be the see if there was a pattern of policymaking that in the end affects the international community. Is there a rank path from the gribbles against immigration to the anti-immigration laws to conflict or not? What does the future hold for all states in dealing with immigration that exists? As we know, migration is the one constant variable in the study of these comparative analyses, and as such how do states intend to handle this situation. At what cost? To what extent?

1.4 Assumptions and limitations

During the course of this academic paper, it would be assumed that there is an existential effect that a state has on international politics. It would be assumed that states such as Germany and Italy, (which have a history of extremism easily) are affected by far-right groups till date whereas states such as Canada and Australia, (despite having an existence of extremism in terms of race) appear to have successfully switched to better inclusive immigration policies and are less prone to far-right groups. This research would also assume that analysis of these specific states bears enormous similarities with other states. That a state by nature is democratic to the extent that

it could be shaped by public opinions. There is also the assumption that the recent rise in far-right groups has a correlation with these parties and is serendipitous in these policies. There would be an assumption of a historical stern point of which there might be similarities across stipulated case studies. To say that stipulated states already have a presence of anti-immigration laws which are caused by or affected by public opinions and political parties; assuming that a link exists between all terms.

This research would have some difficulties pertaining to the area and scope of the study, due to the enormous area of concentration. The difficulties would be to properly keep within the scope of social phenomena and the often interchanges between terminologies. However, after due analysis, this academic paper hopes to give a better clarification in terms of written principles and practical implementation by creating a path of time analysis between states that are immigrated to. This would be through careful analysis of various states not just limited to case studies- as they only serve as empirical examples. The info-graphics needed for a comprehensive comparison are outdated or unavailable which caused the data representation to appear dimmed.

1.5 Study methodology

Analyzing the political atmosphere of political situations in various states can better reveal and explain the growing concern about the rise of public opinions via far-right groups/political parties in current-day Europe in comparison to other states.

This research seeks to use classical realism on human nature in which man by nature is self-seeking and interest-driven; using political actors to explain the dynamics within a state and how this could have a domino effect in seeking to understand and connote the effects of the growing increase it would have on the world at large. Using an inductive empirical analysis into the differences of sentiments in order to determine if the states have positive or negative attitudes towards immigration – although, most states seemed to have fair immigration policies, a deeper analysis into the acceptance rate through graphical and tabular data analysis discovered the differences across these states. Using an individual analysis, one uncovered through in-depth study of the individual policies of each state, the human factor played into the acceptance rates figures. Hence a state with a less-than-accepting attitude toward immigration is likely to have a higher rejection than acceptance rate.

The study of official online journals, articles, and academic papers gave an academic understanding and a scholarly theory of anti-immigration sentiments- its reasons and possible effects.



CHAPTER TWO

STUDY METHODOLOGY

2.1 Study Methodology

For the purpose of this academic study, I started with a quantitative level of analysis but then included a qualitative analysis to empirically discourse and create a hypothesis. This I did by understanding the graphs placed by the United Nations as well as from external sources. I tried to understand the differences in immigration flows from various European States. Using my case studies to understand other states as to why there is an increase in far-right groups in Europe and the recurring rhetoric of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. It is observed that it was latently formed around the 2015 immigration crisis, with most European governments gradually closing their borders to immigrants leaving their own countries. Also, it is since 2015, there has been a large rise in immigration from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East to the nearest safest destination they could find or afford, with the majority ending up in Turkey. Data analysis from the OECD and the United Nations were analyzed to understand the difference in policies in these states and if there is an increase in public opinion on the subject; sought to understand whether there is a growth in anti-immigrant policies; how these public beliefs were produced; who aided them; and if these policies have a historical basis. And why aren't these policies being phased out? Why do they exist in certain states but not in others? As a result, my hypothesis was that there was a massive increase in immigration, which led to an increase in far-right groups, which led to an increase in political participation via public opinion through rhetoric, which subsequently led to a change in immigration policies (anti-immigration) of most European states. As a result, most of these states with an increasing number of far-right political parties- the variable (such as Germany and Italy) had a different immigration policy prior to the 2015 migrant crisis, and this changed- hence the variable. When compared to other countries with less hostile immigration policies, such as Canada and Australia. Though from two different continents, A Path of Dependence theory was used to show a comprehensive analysis of how immigration policies have changed over the years. The study showed how the influx of immigrants seems to always change the course of action of states either from open to closed or closed to open. Through questionnaires distributed to several

Randomly selected persons, evidence was obtained on the attitudes of individuals toward immigration; then the participants were questioned randomly about immigration while watching their facial expressions and evaluating their replies. Asking a variety of questions from if they have participated in politics before or not. The stronger answers to my questions came from a closed private group (whom from fear of being deported or of being judged have requested to stay anonymous). Thus, with months of closed observation from different backgrounds, I added a qualitative level of analysis.

During the course of the next few chapters, I will proceed to analyze and conclude on my hypothesis that there had been previous immigration policies that pre-existed the 2015 immigration crisis; by analyzing the following criteria:

CONTEXT: How these states make their immigration policies, and what were the reasons behind their decisions?

COMPARISON: How do these states treat immigration as a phenomenon: what serves as a criterion for acceptance and denial of immigration status according to the UN's requirement?

DIFFERENCE: What had/has affected these policies and if political parties have any effect or influence? Then the difference of Immigration policy before and after 2015?

PROGNOSIS: does the immigration crisis somehow disconcert the international community creating a pathway for war?

It is critical to understand the environment in which a policy is established. Before making comparisons, I had to understand the framework within which each of the various immigration policies was developed. In the analysis, we must understand that the object of study is humans, and as such, I had to take into account the fact that humans are unpredictable and, as such, are moved by emotions. With this in mind, the political disquisition that was made by various politicians prompted the interest to search if there was an adverse effect on policy and public opinion. Sociologists argue that people behave differently in groups versus individually. So have these public opinions pre-existed before the rise of far-right groups? Have these far-right groups existed before? And what were the consequences? The reasons why the policies are made were just as important. Immigration in recent years has taken center stage for various other reasons. Immigrants have increasingly become the yardstick to measure how badly a country is doing. Most

states while advocating for an open-door policy, have not asserted that access is limited to a select few or specific criteria. However, the question remains: should such criteria be in place? Is the United Nations' goal for an all-inclusive society possible? What happens to those left behind? States seemed to have been influenced by political parties using the rhetoric of 'returning them home' to gain political power; this stems from a conversation that is stirred by public opinion that is from a discourse of the negative effects of immigration; though disputed by the United Nations, most people especially in states prone to extreme conservative ideas than other, or is this just a political step stone to power by a few states? During the course of this academic paper, I got to understand that most immigration policies have a criterion by which they are made. There seems to be an element of international events that catalyzed the rapid influx of immigrants shipping into the most favorable states depending on proximity. Canada after the war; Australia after the Gold Rush; as well as other states. This then influences the creation of either a closed policy or an open one; most times a closed state. The preservation of statehood could be traced back to the basic realistic school of thought that argues that states seek their individual interests above anything else. The fact that a state would close its borders to an influx of fleeing immigrants seems not to be the issue but for my research the fact that the classification of those accepted versus those rejected; with an exemption of criminality as a factor serves to make a "refugee from an immigrant"? With no bias or pun intended for purely academic purposes, I hope through a comparative analysis of some states as case studies to understand these policies at a larger scale in order to create a pathway through which anti-immigration policies are made.

2.2 Sample Community

It is a bit ambiguous as getting information or resources about the research question that had been scarcely done. Most of the research used different sources of literary review. The study was conducted on closed observation of a particular group chosen randomly across various ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic backgrounds. This was due to the fact that due to restriction of movement and the fact that the study was conducted in a different country of study. Accordingly, an open-ended questionnaire was used in order to take an aggregate of opinions.

2.3 Study Sample

As of the first round of the ESS in 2002/03, a number of these European States have experienced significant inward migration, and as a result, the total stock of foreign-born populations has increased both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total population. Between 2002/03 and 2016/17, there was a significant increase in the number of people entering Western and Northern European countries like Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. East European countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Poland, on the other hand, did not experience the same high levels of inward migration. The refugee crisis of 2015 and 2016 boosted immigration rates even further, with particularly large inflows to Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Sweden. (OECD 2019). Germany had no successful right-wing populist movement before the AfD emerged in 2013 as an anti-euro and anti-Greek-bailout party. Given that trade as a percentage of GDP had been stagnant since the 2008 financial crisis, the party quickly shifted its emphasis to xenophobia and anti-immigrant policies. The AfD's political trajectory reflects its popularity in eastern Germany, where the party received 27.5% and 23.5% of the vote in Saxony and Brandenburg, respectively - roughly twice its share in western Germany. (The Guardian 2017)(Politico 2021)

In Italy the triumph of Georgia Meloni of the FDI political party (a party with only 4 percent vote in 2018 to 24 percent in 2022) sent a shock wave across Europe as the fear of the return of far-right groups sweeping across Europe and with this unprecedented win, Europe seems to be gearing towards a re-birth of conservatism and extremism. (Broder 2022-The Guardian) By October 2017, roughly two years after the refugee crisis began, 24 European countries had right-wing nationalist parliamentarians. In the May 2017 French Presidential Elections, far-right Presidential Candidate Marine Le Pen received 34% of the vote, the Front National's best electoral result ever. In the October 2017 elections, the anti-immigrant Freedom Party of Austria (FP) received 26 percent of the vote (up from 20.5 percent in the previous elections) and joined the governing coalition. Milo Zeman, a staunch opponent of immigration, won the majority vote (52 percent) in the Czech Republic, ensuring his second five-year term in office. The Volya movement, which won seats (12) for the first time in Bulgarian history, was included in the 2017 elections. Viktor Orbán, the far-right populist Fidesz party's Hungarian leader, won a third consecutive term in 2018. Janez Jana's right-wing opposition won 25% of the vote and formed the government after

campaigning on a 'Slovenia First' platform (similar to Trump's 'America First').(Pew Research center, 2017,October 2022) Even in Sweden, one of Europe's most liberal countries, the far-right Sweden Democrats, who arose from the white supremacist and neo-Nazi fringes, massively increased their vote share in 2018, securing 17.6 percent of the vote and becoming the third-largest party in Sweden's Parliament. In the most recent Lowy Institute Poll, most Australians (54%) believe the "total number of migrants coming to Australia each year" is excessive. This is a 14-point increase from 2017, supporting the sharp spike in anti-immigrant sentiment'.

However, Canada anti-immigration sentiments are not as strong as the others. People do believe that the increment in immigrants could be problematic or even have an effect yet the majority of Canadians still have a fair sentiment towards immigration. Politically, most of its parties have stayed either neutral or avoided the rhetoric as a whole. EKOS politics pollsters discovered in 2019 that 40% of Canadians were concerned about "visible minority" immigrants.

2.4 Questionnaire Validity

Where are you from?

(to get demographics)

Does political leaders or propaganda influence you? If yes, what is it based on?

(To rate the political participation of each individual active versus a passive member of the state as well as to rate the intensity and context of political participation; a reactive or proactive approach to policy making).

Have you ever participated in politics in your country? In what capacity?

(To get the influence of the individual people to make the state versus the state makes people; this would create a pathway for understanding the individual influence to political decision making-as it partakes the source; is state influenced by people or people by state)

Has a political party ever affected your decision on a policy?

(To measure the level of influence political parties, have in decision-making)

How do you feel about immigration in your country?

(To get the opinion as well as measure the sentiments concerning the concept)

Do you think your country has strong anti-immigration policies?

(To measure the response and reaction of people towards the immigration policy in their respective country in order to measure the perspective on government policies Did you have a different opinion/perspective before 2015? Please state when your opinion changed.

(This is in order to show a comparative analysis on immigration policy; to measure the difference of opinion if it is time effect. Especially to measure the time factor to which sentiments were gotten from)

Do you think immigration has more negative than positive effects?

(To measure the level of negative connotations of immigrant/immigration)

How do you think immigration affects your country?

(a lot of people hold sentimental values on immigration based on the effect they think it brings to their country. Through this question, I aimed to show if the perceived effects of immigration influenced the sentiments held)

What future policies on immigration would you like to see?

(In order to give a prognosis on future perspective that could be held by individuals)

All questions are subjected to rephrasing depending on the level of understanding of the sample groups.

2.5 Study Tools and Statistical Methods

For getting a clear comparative analysis of anti-immigration policies, empirically I used graphs with longitudinal and correlational studies across various periods in order to get a proper look at before and after policies. The use of questionnaires and a study group through discourse to observe the origin or the creation of sentiments; whether in favor of or against immigration and its government's decisions on immigration. This was in order to get an understanding; of if people through varying factors change the policy or governments through political parties' push agendas. These graphs and charts aim to show the differences of opinions as well as the reasons why there are differences, sub-focusing on my case studies to make an inductive empirical study. The use of government reports and articles to support these studies as the goal is not only to show a theoretical viewpoint of these anti-immigration policies but also a practical one. To understand the concepts

(far right, immigration, anti-immigration, sentiments) beyond the abstract to the viability of each policy. Hoping to show that there is an increase in these sentiments



CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERARY REVIEWS

3.1 Anti-Immigration from a Cultural and Socio-Economic Perspective

The essential terminology would be to understand the phenomenon of anti-immigration as this bears the centerpiece of the study. One has to realize where the term could be connoted from. To follow the path to which this concept has come to play such a role in the formation of state and statehood. The year 2015 witnessed a crusade of immigrants fleeing their countries for whatever reason they saw fit, but were met with a stumbling block from the receiving states because this was simply seen as 'bad timing' as most of these migrants had targeted Europe, which was still dealing with certain economic uncertainties as it had just battled/is still fighting its own economic crisis. The disparate responses of individuals, groups, and nation-states to the increase in immigrant and refugee arrivals imply that sentiments toward immigrants and immigration are influenced not only by individuals' beliefs and immediate social circumstances, such as employment status, but also by the cultural, economic, and human security circumstances of the nation states within which individuals' attitudes form (Soysal, 1994). The custom of social science scholarship on xenophobia and prejudice provides a foundation for understanding individuals in which countries are inclined toward welcoming immigrants and favoring open borders, versus those who are more skeptical and wish for closed borders or entry for a select few. "Threat, contact, and context are all salient in the production of attitudes toward immigrants," writes Fussell (2014:486). Scholars have advanced their understanding of the contexts that fuel anti-immigrant prejudice and xenophobia, thanks to a slew of cross-nationally comparative survey projects like the International Social Survey Program, Eurobarometer, and World Values Surveys. Much of this research has focused on individual-level insecurities and hostility toward immigrants because they are perceived to threaten self-interested entry to limited and expensive economic resources or even the preservation of cultural homogeneity and dominance (Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Nagayoshi and Hjerm, 2015). Previous researchers have found that anti-immigrant sentiments often stem from perceptions of immigrants as sources of competition or threat, whether economically, politically, or culturally (Blalock, 1967; Golder, 2003; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000; Quillian, 1995; Schneider, 2008). Currently, as in the past, immigrants are portrayed as human security threats, which are then used to justify anti-immigrant attitudes and policies. While public opinion on

immigration policy varies significantly across the globe, it frequently demonstrates significant distrust and hostility toward immigrants and a preference to limit immigrant mobility and settlement (Canetti-Nisim and Pedahzur, 2003).

The significant electoral successes of anti-immigrant parties (see, for example, Anderson, 1996; Lubbers et al., 2002) demonstrate that, in some Europe, a significant number of citizens perceive immigration to have negative consequences—both economic and non-economic—leading them to prefer a more restrictive immigration policy (Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005). Exclusionist attitudes are prevalent in large segments of endemic populations, according to survey data. There is a wealth of literature on attitudes toward ethnic minorities, immigrants, and immigration. The majority of these studies concentrate on the social location and other correlates of such attitudes, both at the individual and contextual levels. In several academic research with findings in educational level, substantial evidence has been given that outgroup views are strongly associated to characteristics such as (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003, Hagendoorn and Nekuee, 1999, Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007), economic interests (Citrin et al., 1997, Dustmann and Preston, 2004, Fetzer, 2000), religiosity (Billiet, 1995, McFarland, 1989), human values (Davidov et al., 2008, Sagiv and Schwartz, 1995), perceived threat (Scheepers et al., 2002, Semyonov et al., 2004), right-wing voting behavior (Semyonov et al., 2006), and the economic context and the size of the immigrant population (Quillian, 1995, Schneider, 2008, Semyonov et al., 2008).

3.2 A Path of Dependence Theory

Without history, the difficulty in understanding a state's reason for whatever happens currently will be with prejudice as we would be analyzing data that we might not really understand which variables they were chosen from. The historical context of a political situation helps us to understand the bases for which a policy would be made. During this section of the academic paper, we analyze the longitudinal time series of which anti-immigration policies have been made. What was before? What it is now? Did it exist before? The path of dependence theory takes into account the reasons why a state makes institutionalized positions; therefore, giving us the capacity to understand its current position in policy-making and even a futuristic land map of what it could do. States like Germany and Italy as case studies portray Europe's decision in taking a more restrictive approach towards immigration. However, according to the United Nation's guidelines on immigration is this allowed? The 'Target 10.7' of the United Nation's sustainable development

goals calls on countries to facilitate orderly, safe, regular, and responsible migration and the movement of people, including through the implementation of well-planned and managed migration policies. Migrant status determines access to basic social protection and health care in most European countries, which host roughly one-third of the global migrant stock. Regrettably, migration and border control are increasingly being integrated into security frameworks that emphasize policing, defense, and criminality, which may undermine the human rights-based approach (UN News Centre, 2013). This is clearly shown in the difference in approach between the 'welcoming' nations in Europe versus the 'we don't have enough space'. These states like Italy and Germany have chosen a more restrictive policy. Nevertheless, through time we will see that Italy and Germany have always been restrictive even before now.

Over the centuries, many people were forced to flee Germany due to ongoing wars, religious conflicts, famines, political grievances, and a lack of prospects. The relative population loss in the land was enormous. Between 1820 and 1920, an estimated six million Germans emigrated. A significant majority immigrated to the United States. Beginning in 1890, the tide of emigration began to recede as the industrial era brought economic success to the German Empire. From then on, the number of people coming to Germany outnumbered the number of people leaving. Foreign laborers were especially welcome in the thriving coal and steel industries. In West Germany, its economic recovery and subsequent boom exceeded even the most optimistic predictions. Economic growth rates of up to 12.1% have shocked the country. Over a relatively short period, the unemployment rate fell from 11% in 1950 to less than 1% in 1961. To compensate for labor shortages, the federal government used a traditional strategy of recruiting and temporarily employing foreign workers. In 1955, the first "Agreement on Workforce Recruitment and Placement" ("Abkommen über Anwerbung und Vermittlung von Arbeitskräften") was negotiated with Italy. Contracts were soon signed with Greece and Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1966). (1968). The recruitment ban (Anwerbestopp), enshrined in a directive on November 23, 1973, effectively ended the era of foreign labor recruitment to West Germany. The ban prohibited the entry of "guest workers" from countries that were not members of the European Economic Community (EEC). (Infomigrants 2019, July 11)-Those seeking to justify the decision pointed to the "price shocks" associated with the 1973 oil crisis. However, the oil crisis was simply a convenient time to try to reduce the foreign population. In Italy, the presence of Catholic parties in both center-right and center-left coalitions

has implied relative policy continuity regardless of the color of the government in power. These pivotal parties in the political center represent a window of opportunity for the immigrants' advocacy coalition, which is primarily comprised of Catholic organizations. 'Continuity is not continuous,' however. Political and electoral cycles influence it. At the start of their mandate, government coalitions tend to keep their electoral promises and emphasize their break with the previous majority. However, the degree of discontinuity in electoral promises can be influenced by the expectation of a comfortable future victory. Italy is a late adopter in the world of immigration. Inflows began following after the 1973-74 oil shock, when the United Kingdom, Germany, and, in particular, neighboring France had closed their borders. As a result, flows were partially diverted toward Southern Europe. Italy was primarily regarded as a transit country then, but the 1981 census revealed an unexpectedly 'high' number of foreign residents (210,937), primarily of Italian origin. However, the first large-scale migrations occurred between 1984 and 1989, when 700-800,000 people entered the country. It is estimated that 300-350,000 of these people entered or remained in Italy without a valid residence permit (Mauri and Micheli 1992). It must be noted that relevant policies focused on controlling inflows and the legal treatment of foreigners as potential immigrants began only in the late 1980s, whereas the fundamental features of the legal framework on the acquisition and loss of nationality date back much further, to the period immediately following the country's unification (Giovanna, 2008). Most of the regulations concerning immigrants' rights and immigration flows in Italy were the result of three major Acts, the 1992 Nationality Law (no. 91, 5 February), 1998 On the Regulation of Immigration and the Legal Status of Foreigners in Italy (no. 40, 6 March; then Consolidated Act no. 286, 25 July), and the 2002 center-right reform, Norms Concerning Immigration and Asylum (no. 189, 30 July). The laws in 1988 were heavily influenced by the desire to be members of the EU, and as such prove to their fellow counterparts, especially Germany, that it was ready to play by the rules of having a more restrictive policy on immigration than previously accepted. The Italian immigration policies were thus heavily reliant on the role played by the then Minister of the Interior, Giorgio Napolitano (Giovanni, 2008). The historical pattern of Canada was not different from these states during the early creation of Canada. Since 1869, Canada has had laws and regulations that regulate immigration. Immigration policy has evolved and changed over time, influenced by shifting social, political, and economic conditions, as well as dominant beliefs about race, desirability, and

integration. The late-nineteenth-century open-door policy gradually gave way to more restrictive measures that discriminated based on race, ethnicity, and national origin. Discriminatory practices remained a feature of Canadian immigration policy until the latter half of the twentieth century, when skill and education became the primary criteria for admission, leaving some elements of discrimination in place. Since Canada's official adoption of multiculturalism in 1971, the cultural diversity of Canadian immigrants has been promoted as an important component of Canadian identity. Immigration legislation reflects society's beliefs and attitudes, but it also reveals Canada's history of inclusion and exclusion. It was the pressure from its citizens to have a more inclusive immigration policy. For a long time until 1947 when it finally followed the United Nations' prerequisite to be humane to refugees. It is key to note that the United Nations really had no big effect on Canada's immigration policy. In the beginning, Canada had an exclusionist immigration policy, only due to an agricultural need that certain immigrants were allowed within its borders. The acceptance of other immigrants especially after the Second World War, Canada was met by a need to succumb to the out flooding of immigrants from other countries. The citizens at the time advocated for a more inclusive policy but the need to care for 'first Canadians' was met first. Canada would not open its borders if all its soldiers and at the time their foreign brides and family have not been properly returned. (V. Knowles 2016). The role of politicians in the creation of immigration policies cannot be under-emphasized. From the role of the ministers of agriculture to Canadian historians like Arthur Lower amongst others. When Lower advocated for restrictive immigration laws via The Student Conservative Party in 1913, we see the effect on immigration laws for the next few years before the Second World War. The fact that he was from a homogenous society in Ontario played a vital role in his perspectives. This is to stipulate that most far-right politicians or conservative politicians who have advocated for restrictive policies have in some way been affected by environmental as well as cultural factors that have stemmed from the argument of man versus nature; nature versus nurture. For Australia, it's part of immigration policies traces back to its roots of racial discrimination and segregation of the 'white'- meaning British settlers versus the Australian Aborigines. The game of immigration with Australia stems back to the hitherto of conflict being a driving force for why most immigrants seek resettlement, but as one would have noticed that most countries at one point or the other held on to the conservativeness of their society. The reason for this, no one really likes new people, especially in large numbers. According to Jupp (2002), Australian immigration policies can be separated into

three facets: selection and control of the intake; services and support for those who have settled; and policies designed to manage the consequences of creating a multicultural society. Over the years, migration program planning numbers have varied according to the government's priorities and economic and political considerations. However, it is important to note that the Australian Government's immigration policy focus has shifted dramatically since 1945, from attracting general migrants (primarily from the United Kingdom) to attracting economic migrants and temporary (primarily skilled) migrants. The Migration Program is currently planning 190,000 places (it has remained at this record-high level since 2012-13), with skilled migrants constituting the majority. The increase in temporary migration has been one of the most significant changes in migration dynamics in Australia since the late 1990s. In 1999-00, the net migration gain from long-term temporary movement exceeded that from permanent movement, and there were a record number of temporary entrants. Many newcomers came on student or Temporary Work (Skilled) (subclass 457) visas. Unlike the Permanent Migration Program, demand rather than government quotas or caps determine the level of temporary migration to Australia. This is not to disregard the role public opinion had played in most of these policies; the facts still remain that to have had the drastic and dramatic shift from racially discriminatory policies to an 'accepting' policy is one for the books.

3.3 Correlation of different levels of analysis: The rise of far-right groups and political parties.

The relation in which public opinion affects the general making of policies cannot be repudiated. There is a positive relationship between public opinions and the making of policies. In recent years with the effects and use of social media public opinions have grown louder; the insatiable wants and demands of people have been made easier and hence political parties being that the end is to win elections-by defect power; seek to stay in control of public opinions through social media or any other means. Thus, through the years, we have seen an increased number of policies being shaped by public opinions. This is not to say that all policies are made into laws or even considered or documented as policies; yet, it is undeniable that people do to some degree influence policies. (Howe & Krosnick,2022)

In recent years, there has been an increase in the extent to which politicians may elicit specific attitudes that could lead to policy changes. This is not to say that such opinions have never

been had or even the fact that these effects have existed through time. However, as we would later see, the use of social media and even traditional channels has multiplied its reach in the audience as well as its outcome. Since 1998, when Italy passed its first comprehensive immigration law, immigration policy has frequently shifted between the left and right, depending on which party is in power (Perlmutter). Traditionally, the LN (Lega Nord Party) has been responsible for reversing such policies. It co-wrote the harsh, anti-immigrant Bossi-Fini Law in 2002 to counteract the left-wing Turco-Napolitano legislation of 1998, and it participated in the passage of security packages from 2008 to 2009 to increase deportation and toughen immigration into Italy (Perlmutter). Although this party had lost some of its credibility, it had however not dwindled the influence of politician Matteo Salvini. Salvini has risen to prominence in Italian politics, having served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior from 2018 to 2019 and as a Senator since 2018. Throughout this time, the public has noticed a noticeable increase in anti-immigrant sentiment. In 2018, 35% of Italians named immigration as one of the two most important issues confronting their country, up from 18% in 2014. This was significantly higher than neighboring countries' increases, such as France (6 percentage points) or Spain (3 percentage points) (Pew Research Center, 2023, May 10). The main goal of Germany's AfD party is to stop immigration. It vehemently opposes Chancellor Angela Merkel's migration and refugee policy, which has resulted in over 1.5 million people seeking asylum in Germany since 2015.

The party wants to amend German law to eliminate the right to an individual hearing in asylum cases. It also states that if a foreigner's asylum application is denied, they should be deported immediately, regardless of whether the countries to which they are sent are safe or not.

To prevent migrants from leaving for Germany in the first place, the AfD wants to close the EU's borders and set up holding camps abroad. According to co-leader Alice Weidel, the party wants to achieve 'negative immigration to Germany. In states like Canada and Australia, the use of immigration by political parties as a pawn seems to be non-existent as seemingly through the course of time these states have evolved from racially profiling and immigration preferences to now an 'open door' policy seeking to gain a strong heterogeneous society.

Though the international arena on immigration offers a wholesome and open policy towards immigration, the fact that acceptance across countries differ; the connotation still stands that the practice of these policies is determined by a level of acceptance by each citizenry. Political parties

facilitate most of these policies creation; this could be solely attributed to the fact that every political party aims at no cost expendable to win political power and election. It was discovered during the course of this research that right-wing political groups have a more intense and overt tendency to construct strong anti-immigration sentiments across Europe through their discourses during EP debates than left-wing political groups. However, it has also been demonstrated that some members of these right-wing political groups have delivered more blatant and fierce discourses on immigration, whereas others are more moderate or covert in their discourses. (Dovie et. al 2019)

Another strategy used by right-wing political groups in the European Parliament to abstractly construct an anti-immigrant Europe is to lump all asylum seekers, migrants, and refugees into a single ideology: "fundamentalist Islam," which copes with Islam's negative connotations. One of these negative connotations is the comparison of Islam to "force and violence," as seen in the excerpt above. That is, immigration is labeled and predicated as a source of "terrorism" because nearly all immigrants arriving in Europe are Muslims, and thus are portrayed as "terrorists" or a security threat to the EU. (Guler 2019)

From each level, the speeches made by Gerard Butten, EFDD (Nov. 2015), to Marcel De Graaff, ENF (Oct. 2016) down to Jussie Halla-aho ECR (Oct 2017) and Veronique Mattieu (April. 2011); each speaker at different European meetings and events about the harmful impact immigration has had or will have if "proper measures were not taken to secure the true European" country and culture. . So much for the EU's pride in the diversity of its policies and welcoming and open arms in order to build a bigger Europe.

3.4 Comparative Role of Public Opinions and Far-right Groups in Anti-immigration Policies

Global immigration intolerance has increased, especially within the EU, some of the least tolerant countries. In general, attitudes in the United States and other western countries defy the government's anti-immigrant policies. According to the recently released Gallup Migrant Acceptance Index, the global tolerance of migrants declined between 2016 and 2019.

Several of the least tolerant countries were from the EU. Recently, member states met to discuss a new joint migration policy. The report designated countries' score based on respondents' attitudes toward migrants living in their country, moving into their neighborhoods, and marrying into their

families. The global average score dropped from 5.34 in 2016 to 5.21 in 2019. The most significant drop in intolerant attitudes toward migrants were observed in South America, where several countries have experienced a large influx of Venezuelan refugees. In Colombia, which bore the brunt of the exodus, the percentage of respondents who had a favorable opinion of migrants living in the country fell from 61 percent to 29 percent. Belgium and Switzerland experienced some of the steepest declines in intolerant attitudes. Belgium, which is home to the European Parliament, saw its score drop by 1.33 points. According to the poll, EU member states such as Hungary, Croatia, Latvia, and Slovakia were among the top ten least accepting countries, with four Balkan countries also making the list. Another country that has played a significant role in the EU's immigration policy has also been revealed to have overwhelmingly negative attitudes toward immigration. According to Gallup data, Turkey, which took in 4 million refugees as part of a deal with the European Union, was the tenth least accepting country for migrants.

However, in one eastern European country with a historically low tolerance for immigration, positive and tolerant attitudes have increased. A share of 42 percent of Polish respondents said that migrants living in the country were a good thing, up from 29 percent three years ago. Regardless of the drawbacks, countries such as Canada topped the list of the most welcoming of immigrants, with 94 percent of respondents favoring immigrants living in their country, followed by Iceland and New Zealand. Only Sweden and Ireland made the top ten in the EU.

In terms of public opinion, we have established a growing change in attitudes and behaviors, especially from a deeper analysis of not just who is allowed but how people feel in general about the policy placed on immigration by the government. The most obvious decline in policy as well as public acceptance was the 2015 refugee crisis. During the crisis, massive flows of asylum seekers arrived, primarily from war-torn Syria, but also from Afghanistan, Iraq, and parts of Africa. According to Eurostat, over 1.2 million first-time asylum applications were received by EU member states in 2015, more than doubling the previous year. In 2015, four states - Germany, Hungary, Sweden, and Austria - received roughly two-thirds of the EU's asylum applications, with Hungary, Sweden, and Austria receiving the most asylum applications per capita. Furthermore, over one million migrants crossed the Mediterranean Sea in 2015 (a figure that has since dropped to 364,000 in 2016), with many of them landing in Italy. Other countries, particularly those in

western Europe, saw relatively small flows and more modest increases in the number of people seeking asylum over time. For example, refugee flows to Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom were relatively low.

The rapid rate of European immigration has given rise to far-right political movements, which, if they continue to gain power, may pose fundamental challenges to Europe's governing institutions as well as the continent's continued development as a modern, post-ethnic society. In general, the potential for immigration to disrupt political equilibrium within European countries suggests that immigration policy should not be viewed in isolation.

Given far-right political parties' strident anti-immigrant rhetoric, it is natural to wonder to what extent these phenomena are linked. Indeed, a significant body of scholarship has emerged that investigates the impact of immigration on the success of far-right parties. These studies, for the most part, conclude that increases in immigration play an important role in the success of contemporary far-right parties in a number of European countries. Brunner and Kuhn (2014) discover that the effect of immigration on the electoral success of far-right parties is transmitted through cultural differences between immigrants and natives, whereas Harmon (2017) discovers that increases in local ethnic diversity due to immigration explain rightward shifts in Danish election outcomes. Dustmann et al. (2016) take advantage of Denmark's quasi-random refugee allocation to highlight the heterogeneity effect associated with immigration's impact on rightwing voting by focusing on municipality-level characteristics such as urbanization, pre-policy immigrant shares, unemployment rates, and crime rates. In the largest and most urban municipalities, for example, they discover that refugee allocation has the opposite effect on far-right voting. They find a prominent response to refugee allocation in less urban municipalities with high pre-policy immigrant shares and in urban municipalities with high unemployment. Ultimately, they discover a consistent effect of higher pre-policy crime rates in strengthening the link between refugee flows and anti-immigrant party support.

Following the Global Financial crisis of 2007-2009, liberal democracy appears to be under attack in many Western countries by a surge of "enemies of an open society." It has also become commonplace for such demagogues to base their political success on blaming immigration (and globalization) for economic insecurity, rising income inequality, and the decline of the middle class. Observations include Donald Trump's presidential campaign in the United States in 2016

and the "Leave" movement in the United Kingdom. Similarly, several European parties with a clear anti-immigrant platform (for example, France's "National Rally" led by Marine Le Pen, Italy's "Five Star Movement" led by Beppe Grillo, and Germany's "Alternative for Germany") have seen their vote shares steadily increased over the last decade. Not surprisingly, since the mid-2000s, xenophobic and racist parties have grown in popularity in Greece while Forza Italia, the center-right party in Italy led by former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, has run on a well-known anti-immigrant platform, with Berlusconi declaring, "Migrants are a social bomb." The aforementioned two groups in France and Germany are essentially united in their strong objections to mass immigration and European cultural liberalization. Even though it would be reductive to attribute this surge in populism solely to the influx of immigrants, it has unquestionably been a decisive factor, as far-right parties have recently won elections by unexpected margins across Europe. Unsurprisingly, these parties have focused their campaigns primarily on "anti-immigrant" issues. Furthermore, recurrent electoral defeats have compelled Europe's center-left parties to abandon long-held positions on migration. The anti-immigrant sentiment is here to stay, with even Europe's left turning right on immigration and far-right ideologies gradually infiltrating the mainstream. Noteworthy is the fact that Europe is seeing its largest influx of immigrants since the Second World War and has a raging number of over 1 million people and counting. This large-scale immigration has raised security and cultural concerns among Europeans, as well as fears of economic displacement. Far-right parties across Europe have managed to change the political balance in Europe by scoring unprecedented victories in Parliaments by capitalizing heavily on this widely prevalent anti-immigrant, anti-internationalist sentiment. By October 2017, roughly two years after the refugee crisis began, 24 European countries had right-wing nationalist parliamentarians. In the May 2017 French Presidential Elections, far-right Presidential Candidate Marine Le Pen received 34% of the vote, the Front National's best electoral result ever. In the October 2017 elections, the anti-immigrant Freedom Party of Austria (FP) received 26 percent of the vote (up from 20.5 percent in the previous elections) and joined the governing coalition. Milo Zeman, a staunch opponent of immigration, won the majority vote (52 percent) in the Czech Republic, ensuring his second five-year term in office. The Volya movement, which won seats (12) for the first time in Bulgarian history, was included in the 2017 elections. Viktor Orbán, the far-right populist Fidesz party's Hungarian leader, won a third consecutive term in 2018. Janez Jana's right-wing opposition won 25% of the vote and formed the government after campaigning on a 'Slovenia

First' platform (similar to Trump's 'America First'). Even in Sweden, one of Europe's most liberal countries, the far-right Sweden Democrats, who arose from the white supremacist and neo-Nazi fringes, massively increased their vote share in 2018, securing 17.6 percent of the vote and becoming the third-largest party in Sweden's Parliament.(Pew Research Online 2022, October)

This rhetoric for some reason is seemingly insignificant or non-existent in Canada or Australia, for with these states the goal previously has seemed focused on creating a strong heterogeneous society devoid of any politicization of immigration. Though an argument may stem from the fact that these states are farther than these European states and at such much harder for immigrants fleeing or seeking greener pastures or may be from the fact that these states have stronger and proof-bound policies on the acceptance of immigrants or refugees.

CHAPTER FOUR

STATISTICS ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESIS

4.1 Presentation of Results

Governments' policies to influence the level of documented immigration by region, 2015

	Raise	Low	Maintain	No Intervention/Official Policy
World	12	61	13	14
Africa	4	43	13	40
Asia	10	65	23	2
Europe	32	55	9	5
Latin America and the Caribbean	6	76	9	9
North America	0	100	0	0
Oceania	6	94	0	0

Table 1. Source (UN , Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2016). (un.org)

(Notes: Based on 196 countries with available data)

Globally, the majority of governments (61%) has a policy to keep current levels of immigration. Among the remaining governments with data, 13% has policies to reduce documented immigration into their country, 12% has policies to increase it, and 14% has either no official policy or do not seek to influence immigration levels. Europe has the highest proportion of countries seeking to increase immigration levels (32%), followed by Asia. (10 per cent). Asia has the highest proportion of countries attempting to reduce current levels of immigration (23%), followed by Africa with (13%).




Figure 4:1. The flow of migration across the world.(unhcr.org)




Figure 4:2. The benefits migration between 2002-2014 (unhcr.org)





Figure 4.3. Sentiments of Immigrants towards EU and Non-EU migrants (2014-2017) (migrationpolicycentre.eu)

To understand the comparative studies done on the differences in opinions and policies towards immigration would be first to distinguish between the preference and salience face values of opinions and how they affect/have led to an increase or change in perspective. Mostly as social scientists, the focus has been on salience- as Preference refers to the level of immigration that the individual prefers, whereas salience refers to the importance that the individual places on immigration as a policy issue. In other words, preference is an evaluative dimension, whereas salience is a cognitive dimension.

Therefore, for the sake of this academic paper a salience calculation of empirical studies would be used to show ‘how’ these changes come to be as well as ‘what’ from the OECD database. Between 2002/03 and 2016/17, there was little change in the extent to which the European public felt that migration made their countries a better or worse place to live. In assertion, the European public has become slightly more optimistic about the benefits of immigration. There was also significant consistency over time in terms of which countries' publics were more welcoming of migrants and which were not. Nordic countries such as Sweden, Norway, and Finland fall into the

first category. Eastern countries such as the Czech Republic and Hungary fall into the latter category.

Individual Variables



Source: Authors' calculations.

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Figure 4:4. Employment spread of Migrants based on individual variables. (info.institute)

On one of the more specific policy issues of how many migrants from poorer countries outside Europe should be allowed to enter, attitudes remained stable between 2002/03 and 2016/17. However, the overall stability masked significant variation in the direction and magnitude of changes in public opinion across countries. Several countries, including Germany, Norway, Portugal, and Spain, became more favorable during this period, while others, including Italy and Hungary, became more negative. This means that attitudes toward this particular policy issue were becoming increasingly divergent among European countries. In this regard, Europe has become

less united. In addition to rising country divergence, a number of nations saw internal polarization, with increasing percentages of both proponents and opponents of immigration.

4.2 Results of Study Questions

In contrast, following the 2015 refugee crisis (that is, between 2014/15 and 2016/17) there was a significant overall shift in a negative direction in public opinion about how generous the government should be to refugees. The majority of countries' publics have become significantly more critical of government policy. Countries with large inflows of asylum seekers, such as Austria, Germany, and Sweden, saw particularly large drops in public support for generous government policies toward refugees. However, these shifts in public opinion appeared to be specific to the refugee issue and were only weakly reflected in changes on other issues. As immigration criteria, 'way of life,' language, and work skills were generally regarded as more important than religious and racial background. There are three broad clusters of European countries that can be distinguished based on the criteria that they prioritize: a west European cluster that prioritizes work skills, an east European cluster that prioritizes work skills and religion more or less equally, and a Nordic cluster that prioritizes neither. There was a clear hierarchy in the types of migrants who were preferred in all countries – notably, migrants of the same racial or ethnic group as the majority were preferred over those of a different ethnic group or from poorer countries in Europe, who were preferred over those from poorer countries outside Europe. New questions asked for the first time in 2014/15 reveal relatively positive attitudes toward Jewish migrants (who are only slightly less preferred than those from the same racial or ethnic group as the majority), but more negative attitudes toward Muslim migrants. Most countries have preference orderings for different types of migrants that are similar. That is, most countries prefer migrants of the same race or ethnic group over Jewish migrants, who are then preferred over migrants from poorer European countries, poorer non-European countries, and Muslims. There were some exceptions, with the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, and Germany being relatively more welcoming to Muslim migrants. These exceptions support the theory that contact tends to reduce prejudice because nearly all countries with large Muslim populations are relatively welcoming of Muslim immigration.




Figure 4:5: Public opinion of Immigration in USA (news.gallup.com)




Figure 4:6: Satisfaction of Immigration levels in USA (news.gallup.com)

In the above representation, 58% of Americans are dissatisfied with the current level of immigration into the United States, while 34% are satisfied. This represents an eight-point increase in dissatisfaction over last year and a return to the 2019-2020 range. The 58% dissatisfied include 35% of all Americans who want immigration to be reduced, 9% who want it increased, and 14% who want it to stay the same. Last year, those who were dissatisfied were roughly equally likely to favor an increase as a decrease, but now the majority of those who are dissatisfied favor less immigration. The proportion of citizens who want less immigration has nearly doubled from 19% in 2021 to 23% in 2019 and 25% in 2020. Simultaneously, calls for increased immigration into the country have fallen.

In recent years, a surge in migration has focused public attention on migration-related issues, leading to the rise of political parties in some destination countries that question national immigration policies. Since 2015, over 2 million migrants have sought asylum in Europe. Thousands of Central American families and children have attempted to enter the United States through the Americas. (Recently, immigration has declined as an issue of public concern in parts of Western Europe, even as it has remained a top issue in U.S.).


The 27 countries surveyed by the Pew Center for Immigration Studies account for more than half of all international migrants. With 44.5 million immigrants in 2017, the United States has the world's largest foreign-born population, followed by Saudi Arabia (12.2 million), Germany (12.2 million), and Russia. (11.7 million).

Furthermore, among the countries polled, immigrants account for the highest proportions of national populations in Australia (29%), Israel (24%), Canada (22%), and Sweden (18%). About 14% of the US population is foreign born, which is comparable to Germany (15%), the United Kingdom (13%) and Spain (13%).

(See Fig 4:7-Pew Research center).

Around the world, few want more immigration


In your opinion, should we allow more immigrants to move to our country, fewer immigrants, or about the same as we do now? (%)



Note: Responses of "Fewer" and "None" are combined based on rounded numbers. Responses of "None" are volunteered. Voluntary responses of "Don't know" and "Refused" not shown.

Figure 4:7. Opinions on Immigration across Europe. (above) (Pew Research Center)

1980-2015



Source: Federal Statistical Office (2017); Federal Office for Migrants and Refugees (2017).

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Figure 4:8. Asylum requests across states between 1980-2015 (info.institute)




Figure 4:9. The growth of far-rights political parties in the EU. (the New York Times 2016)





Figure 4:10. Asylum claims in Germany between 1976-2017 (worlddata.info)



Source: Eurostat, “Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex, Monthly data (rounded),” accessed May 1, 2016, available online Figure 4:11. Decisions on asylum claims and protection Quota 2011-2016




Figure 4:12. Asylum claims in Germany and EU between 2008-2015 (oecd.org)

Immigration and far-rights groups are linked together as having a positive correlation between these phenomena. To understand this is to take note that pre-2015, this correlation has been less than compared to post 2015 anti-immigration sentiments increasing.

Recently held elections in Italy and Sweden were resounding victories for right-wing populist parties, highlighting the growing electoral strength of such parties in Europe in recent years.

In Italy, the right-wing populist Brothers of Italy party received the most votes in the recent election, making its leader, Georgia Meloni, the likely prime minister. Sweden Democrats emerged as the country's second-most popular party in the country's recent election. Their strong performance is the culmination of six years of steady growth and a nearly doubling of their vote share since the 2014 election.

According to a Pew Research Center analysis of data primarily drawn from ParlGov, a clearinghouse for cross-national political information, populists – particularly those on the ideological right – have been winning larger shares of the vote in recent legislative elections across

Europe. The Center defines populists using three academic criteria and categorizes them as right- or left-leaning based on expert assessments of their ideology.

(See Figure 4.13)

In Italy, for example, approximately four-in-ten voters voted for one of the three major right-wing populist parties: Brothers of Italy, Forza Italia, and Lega, up from approximately a third in 2018 and approximately three in ten in 2013. Five Star, a centrist Populist Party, on the other hand, has seen its vote share fall by roughly half since 2018, when it governed in a populist coalition with the Lega Party.

While the overall share of voters supporting populist parties has increased significantly in recent years in Belgium and France, both right- and left-leaning populist parties have gained ground. The right-wing Flemish Interest party received around 12% of the vote in Belgium in 2019, making it one of its most successful elections since 2007. However, the left wing Worker's Party of Belgium has risen to around 9% of the vote in 2019, up from less than 1% in 2007.

Populist parties have increased their vote shares in many recent European elections

Vote share in national legislative elections




Figure 4:13. Vote shares for Parties in the Election in the EU between 2002-2022 (Pew Research Center)




Figure 4:14. Weapon and Target Type for Right-Wing Attacks, 2007-2017 in America (csis.org)




Figure 4:15. Right-Wing Terrorist Attacks in the United States, 2007–2017 (csis.org)




Figure 4.16. Extreme Right-Wing Attacks in Europe, 2012–2017 (Pew Research Center)

However, not all populist parties are growing in popularity. Germany and Greece, according to research, buck this trend. In Germany, support for the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) dropped nationally in the country's most recent election in 2021, dethroning it as the largest opposition party and the third-largest party overall, though it remains a force in eastern Germany.

According to Pew Research Center polls, despite electoral gains in many countries, most populist political parties in Europe, both right and left, are widely unpopular. In fact, no party receives favorable ratings from a majority of the public outside of Hungary, where the ruling right-populist party Fidesz is viewed favorably by 55% of the public. Still, as Italy demonstrates, being perceived positively is not a prerequisite for electoral success. When the Center polled the country this spring, only about a third of Italians (32%), Forza Italia (30%), or Five Star (29%) viewed Brothers of Italy favorably, and even fewer said the same of Lega (23%). Since 2020, the proportion of Italians who support some of these parties has actually decreased. Nonetheless, record low turnout in Italy, combined with the limited popularity of other parties, including the Democratic Party (38% in 2022, down from 42% in 2021), was sufficient to propel the populist coalition to victory.

(See Figure 4:17)

Most populist parties in Europe – on the ideological right and left – do not have majority support

*% who have a **favorable** view of ...*

	L/R		2021	2022	'21-'22 change
			%	%	
Hungary	Right	Fidesz*	46	55	▲ 9
France	Left	La France Insoumise	33	39	▲ 6
Spain	Right	Vox	23	26	▲ 3
Sweden	Right	Sweden Democrats	27	29	▲ 2
France	Right	National Rally	25	27	▲ 2
Belgium	Right	Flemish Interest	21	22	▲ 1
Germany	Right	AfD	15	15	0
Hungary	Right	Jobbik*	13	13	0
Spain	Left	Podemos	28	27	▼ 1
Italy	Right	Lega	27	23	▼ 4
Greece	Left	Syriza	25	20	▼ 5
Italy	Right	Forza Italia	36	30	▼ 6
Greece	Right	Greek Solution (EL)	22	16	▼ 6
Poland	Right	Law and Justice*	45	38	▼ 7
Netherlands	Right	Party for Freedom (PVV)	31	24	▼ 7
Italy	Center	Five Star Movement	38	29	▼ 9
Netherlands	Right	Forum for Democracy (FvD)	25	15	▼ 10
Italy	Right	Brothers of Italy	-	32	-

*Hungary and Poland were not surveyed in 2021; data shown is from 2019 and change shown is 2019-2022.

Note: Brothers of Italy was not asked about in 2021. For more information on European populist parties, see Appendix.

Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Figure 4:17. Opinion based on favorable (Pew Research Center)




Figure 4:18. Incoming Asylum application in Italy 2002-2022 (worlddata.info)

(The top line represents the total number of asylum applications (first applications + reviews))

(Below are the number of recognized refugees (green) and rejected applications (red)).

The data above is subject to change, as the Italian government might not have added new or pending cases.




Figure 4:19. National Migrant Stock in Italy from 1960-2022 (worlddata.info)

According to the UNHCR, 76,830 migrants applied for asylum in Italy in 2022. The majority of them were from Egypt, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Initial applicants have received 45,037 decisions. About 16% of them received affirmative responses. 84 percent of requests for asylum have been turned down right away

About 11% of the population (6,386,998 migrants) resided in Italy in 2020. These are all citizens who were born abroad but now dwell permanently in the nation. Awarded refugees are included in the statistics, but no asylum applicants. The information is based on census findings as well as projections and estimations from the United Nations Population Division. Yemen and Central Africa seem to have the most successful rates thus far.

4.3 Hypothesis Results

New Applications					Reviews			
Destination rate	Applied	Accepted	Rejected	Acceptance rate (%)	Applied	Accepted	Rejected	Acceptance rate (%)
Canada	71	5	17	27	31	0	16	0.0
United States	67	0	0		51	0	0	
Brazil	22	0	0		0	0	0	
Australia	11	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Switzerland	8	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
France	7	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
United Kingdom	7	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Germany	5	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Mexico	5	0	0		0	0	0	
Norway	5	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Totals	208	5	47	9.6	82	0	0	0.0

Table 2. Figure 4:20. Asylum applications of Refugees from Italy. (worlddata.info)

This graph shows the applications of asylum seekers from Italy as well as the review rate of each country on answers to the status of the application process to other countries while figure 14:21 shows the applications of other countries to Italy as well as its review rate

Applications					Review		
Origin	Applied	Accepted	Rejected	Acceptance Rate (%)	Applied	Rejected	
Bangladesh	14,590	123	6,821	1.8	0	0	
Pakistan	11,365	361	6,455	5.3	0	0	
Egypt	8,834	56	3,596	1.5	0	0	
Tunisia	5,364	112	1,980	5.4	0	0	
Georgia	3,239	130	1,532	7.8	0	0	

Peru	2,999	72	774	8.5	0	0
Ukraine	2,993	98	179	35.4	0	0
Morocco	2,788	72	785	8.4	0	0
Afghanistan	2,031	2,716	182	93.7	0	0
Nigeria	1,804	748	4,757	13.6	0	0
Colombia	1,766	73	450	14.0	0	0
Ivory Coast	1,578	131	894	12.8	0	0
Venezuela	1,352	92	188	32.9	0	0
Albania	1,278	49	571	7.9	0	0
El Salvador	1,221	196	651	23.1	0	0
Turkey	1,170	105	312	25.2	0	0
Somalia	1,017	517	91	85.0	0	0
Mali	795	72	891	7.5	0	0
Russia	699	56	102	35.4	0	0
Iraq	698	161	187	46.3	0	0
Guinea	640	36	481	7.0	0	0
Senegal	611	33	955	3.3	0	0
Serbia	604	17	249	6.4	0	0
Cameroon	574	64	277	18.8	0	0
India	532	0	190	0.0	0	0
Gambia	460	31	1,182	2.6	0	0
Ghana	441	19	611	3.0	0	0
Sri Lanka	414	10	145	6.5	0	0
Syria	410	228	67	77.3	0	0
Brazil	355	70	143	32.9	0	0
Moldova	315	10	123	7.5	0	0
Sudan	269	100	43	69.9	0	0
Burkina Faso	252	5	103	4.6	0	0
Cuba	245	20	97	17.1	0	0
Belarus	183	28	47	37.3	0	0
Honduras	183	10	60	14.3	0	0
Algeria	177	16	89	15.2	0	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	162	0	154	0.0	0	0
China	149	11	137	7.4	0	0
Kyrgyzstan	149	5	65	7.1	0	0
Libya	145	30	35	46.2	0	0
Sierra Leone	122	5	72	6.5	0	0
Eritrea	117	102	20	83.6	0	0
Iran	116	48	31	60.8	0	0

Lebanon	113	10	32	23.8		0	0
unknown	101	91	188	32.6		0	0
North Macedonia	89	5	41	10.9		0	0
Nepal	89	12	47	20.3		0	0
Congo (Dem. Republic)	87	27	25	51.9		0	0
Palestine	87	56	16	77.8		0	0
Ethiopia	72	27	17	61.4		0	0
Togo	71	5	93	5.1		0	0
Argentina	68	5	17	22.7		0	0
South Sudan	67	10	0	100.00		0	0
Ecuador	61	0	30	0.0		0	0
Congo	56	5	12	29.4		0	0
Philippines	55	5	33	13.2		0	0
Armenia	54	0	53	0.0		0	0
Benin	52	5	50	9.1		0	0
Liberia	39	5	29	14.7		0	0
Dominican Republic	37	0	16	0.0		0	0
Nicaragua	36	0	14	0.0		0	0
Chile	33	5	10	33.3		0	0
Guinea-Bissau	31	0	99	0.0		0	0
Mauritius	29	0	17	0.0		0	0
Azerbaijan	27	0	12	0.0		0	0
Niger	25	5	33	13.2		0	0
Guatemala	24	5	15	25.0		0	0
Paraguay	22	0	10	0.0		0	0
Yemen	20	17	0	100.0		0	0
Mexico	19	0	12	0.0		0	0
Kenya	15	14	5	73.7		0	0
Montenegro	15	0	17	0.0		0	0
Kazakhstan	14	0	15	0.0		0	0
Chad	12	0	25	0.0		0	0
Tanzania	12	0	10	0.0		0	0
Myanmar	11	10	0	100.0		0	0
United States	10	0	10	0.0		0	0
Uzbekistan	10	0	5	0.0		0	0
Jordan	9	5	5	50.0		0	0
Thailand	9	0	5	0.0		0	0

South Africa	7	5	0	100.0	0	0
Uruguay	6	0	10	0.0	0	0
Angola	5	0	5	0.0	0	0
Burundi	5	0	5	0.0	0	0
Central Africa	5	16	0	100.0	0	0
Gabon	5	0	5	0.0	0	0
Rwanda	5	5	0	100.0	0	0
Vietnam	5	0	5	0.0	0	0
Mauritania	0	0	12	0.0	0	0
Malaysia	0	0	5	0.0	0	0
Malawi	0	0	5	0.0	0	0
Totals	76,830	7,193	37,844	16.0	0	0

Table 3. Figure 4:21. Asylum applications of countries to Italy. (worlddata.info)

New Applications	Reviews								
	Origin	Applied	Accepted	Rejected	Acceptance rate (%)	Applied	Accepted	Rejected	Acceptance rate (%)
	Syria	70,976	15,078	34	99.8	14,310	1,100	3,747	22.7
	Afghanistan	36,358	7,298	146	98.0	12,244	2,046	474	81.2
	Turkey	23,938	2,766	5,488	33.5	8,015	962	2,633	26.8
	Iraq	15,175	2,838	11,694	19.5	16,315	358	4,194	7.9
	Georgia	7,963	5	5,172	0.1	5,803	12	1,442	0.8
	Iran	6,322	969	1,586	37.9	3,923	1,902	2,470	43.5
	unknown	4,675	2,363	750	75.9	1,769	184	438	29.6
	Somalia	3,938	2,123	712	74.9	1,940	137	337	28.9
	Eritrea	3,923	2,585	259	90.9	617	38	198	16.1
	Russia	2,851	142	832	14.6	2,650	228	1,739	11.6
	North Macedonia	2,755	0	2,041	0.0	5,045	5	635	0.8
	Moldova	2,589	0	2,037	0.0	4,195	0	959	0.0
	Nigeria	2,363	179	1,762	9.2	3,322	83	2,854	2.8
	Venezuela	1,822	52	745	6.5	797	15	51	22.7
	Lebanon	1,756	30	661	4.3	1,107	32	260	11.0

Albania		1,744	5	1,369	0.4	1,828	5	405	1.2
Pakistan		1,594	149	728	17.0	1,716	402	953	29.7
Serbia		1,540	0	1,206	0.0	3,030	0	481	0.0
Algeria		1,446	12	534	2.2	775	10	222	4.3
Colombia		1,379	5	982	0.5	950	19	262	6.8
Guinea		1,319	385	344	52.8	878	64	652	8.9
Tunisia		1,271	16	307	5.0	535	13	123	9.6
Azerbaijan		1,128	26	356	6.8	941	63	605	9.4
Armenia		1,094	5	472	1.0	825	0	392	0.0
Yemen		1,043	103	259	28.5	374	13	125	9.4
Morocco		1,001	21	407	4.9	549	19	165	10.3
Vietnam		954	0	621	0.0	151	0	43	0.0
Tajikistan		950	45	316	12.5	438	38	118	24.4
Ethiopia		919	254	343	42.5	724	61	629	8.8
Libya		888	42	184	18.6	596	5	86	5.5
Egypt		738	107	290	27.0	460	36	236	13.2
India		722	5	210	2.3	175	11	123	8.2
Ukraine		705	5	104	4.6	629	15	74	16.9
Cameroon		662	23	231	9.1	413	38	452	7.8
Palestine		624	77	529	12.7	648	15	38	28.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina		576	0	605	0.0	1,438	0	132	0.0
Burundi		527	14	5	73.7	22	5	0	100.0
Gambia		460	51	187	21.4	480	16	267	5.7
Ivory Coast		431	26	161	13.9	294	10	245	3.9
Rwanda		397	50	98	33.8	120	21	56	27.3
Congo (Dem. Republic)		373	13	106	10.9	170	0	88	0.0
Ghana		355	5	237	2.1	234	5	98	4.9
Belarus		351	10	68	12.8	299	0	79	0.0
Sudan		344	74	86	46.3	232	15	91	14.2
stateless		309	192	85	69.3	200	39	76	33.9

Jordan		276	22	114	16.2	164	5	101	4.7
China		217	63	68	48.1	79	48	80	37.5
Nicaragua		198	5	51	8.9	56	0	0	
Sierra Leone		188	13	56	18.8	147	10	126	7.4
Angola		185	5	76	6.2	96	5	51	8.9
Cuba		182	5	54	8.5	57	0	10	0.0
Sri Lanka		173	24	66	26.7	181	31	111	21.8
El Salvador		165	0	43	0.0	42	0	0	
Kenya		164	0	75	0.0	116	5	118	4.1
Uganda		155	10	33	23.3	57	5	46	9.8
Myanmar		129	21	15	58.3	44	112	30	78.9
Mali		127	11	42	20.8	102	0	79	0.0
Montenegro		126	0	144	0.0	372	0	63	0.0
Togo		122	5	48	9.4	91	5	80	5.9
Liberia		116	5	41	10.9	94	0	58	0.0
Senegal		116	5	54	8.5	121	0	54	0.0
Benin		115	0	51	0.0	72	0	28	0.0
Uzbekistan		114	5	48	9.4	42	0	5	0.0
Tanzania		107	5	31	13.9	58	0	50	0.0
Turkmenistan		104	5	41	10.9	49	12	5	70.6
Mongolia		103	0	46	0.0	89	0	28	0.0
Burkina Faso		92	5	13	27.8	64	0	33	0.0
Bangladesh		88	10	55	15.4	92	10	74	11.9
Kazakhstan		83	0	24	0.0	60	0	42	0.0
Peru		75	5	27	15.6	27	0	5	0.0
Zimbabwe		72	10	20	33.3	27	13	38	25.5
Kyrgyzstan		62	16	26	38.1	37	5	25	16.7
Niger		52	0	14	0.0	20	0	27	0.0
Congo		51	5	13	27.8	15	0	13	0.0
Mauritania		40	0	5	0.0	14	0	5	0.0
Djibouti		39	0	5	0.0	17	0	0	

Brazil	38	0	15	0.0	17	0	23	0.0
Kuwait	38	0	33	0.0	66	0	0	
Saudi Arabia	38	20	10	66.7	8	0	0	
Guinea-Bissau	37	0	12	0.0	29	5	16	23.8
Nepal	36	0	11	0.0	5	0	0	
Chad	34	5	10	33.3	39	0	17	0.0
Honduras	31	0	18	0.0	39	0	34	0.0
South Sudan	30	10	5	66.7	22	0	0	
Namibia	29	0	25	0.0	20	5	11	31.3
United States	26	0	14	0.0	8	0	5	0.0
Haiti	24	0	15	0.0	16	0	5	0.0
Ecuador	21	0	5	0.0	0	0	5	0.0
Jamaica	21	13	0	100.0	11	0	5	0.0
South Africa	21	0	11	0.0	17	0	24	0.0
Philippines	19	0	0		10	5	0	100.0
Thailand	18	0	11	0.0	8	0	0	
Chile	16	0	5	0.0	5	0	0	
Panama	12	0	5	0.0	5	0	0	
Israel	11	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Bolivia	9	0	10	0.0	9	0	0	
Malaysia	9	0	10	0.0	12	0	12	0.0
Cambodia	8	0	0		7	5	12	29.4
Argentina	7	0	5	0.0	0	0	5	0.0
Mozambique	6	0	0		5	0	14	0.0
Central Africa	5	0	0		5	0	0	
Equatorial Guinea	5	0	5	0.0	5	0	0	
Gabon	5	0	0		5	0	13	0.0
United Kingdom	5	0	0		0	0	0	
Italy	5	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	

Mauritius	5	0	5	0.0	5	0	5	0.0
Netherlands	5	0	5	0.0	5	0	0	
Portugal	5	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Romania	5	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Slovakia	5	0	5	0.0	11	0	0	
Norway	0	0	5	0.0	0	0	5	0.0
Spain	0	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Suriname	0	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Totals	217,673	38,461	47,028	45.0 %	105,072	8,326	31,343	21.0 %

Table 4. Figure 4:22. Asylum Applications from other countries to Germany. (worldinfo.data)




Figure 4:23. Incoming asylum applications in Germany 2002-2022. (worlddata.info)

(The top line represents the total number of asylum applications (first applications + reviews). Below are the number of recognized refugees (green) and rejected applications (red)).




Figure 4:24. National migrant stock from 1960-2020 (worlddata.info). - (figures are in millions)

New Applications					Review				
	Origin	Applied	Accepted	Rejected	Acceptance rate (%)	Applied	Accepted	Rejected	Acceptance rate (%)
	Mexico	16,620	1,251	1,420	46.8	2,035	398	1,281	23.7
	Haiti	11,194	887	682	56.5	267	83	287	22.4
	Turkey	9,196	1,082	36	96.8	33	12	18	40.0
	Colombia	7,833	1,954	551	78.0	702	208	287	42.0
	Iran	4,768	2,647	44	98.4	96	55	65	45.8
	India	4,273	2,918	3,191	47.8	4,095	523	2,284	18.6
	Pakistan	2,649	978	235	80.6	407	239	308	43.7
	Unknown	2,146	4,135	1,609	72.0	137	101	56	64.3
	Venezuela	1,929	474	66	87.8	93	24	62	27.9
	Nigeria	1,892	1,038	590	63.8	1,307	454	831	35.3
	Chile	1,703	77	165	31.8	92	5	54	8.5
	Congo (Dem. Republic)	1,371	366	395	48.1	312	38	201	15.9
	Afghanistan	1,340	611	29	95.5	32	28	15	65.1
	Brazil	1,281	68	109	38.4	58	10	34	22.7
	Sri Lanka	1,181	363	89	80.3	151	79	75	51.3
	United States	1,133	13	474	2.7	116	5	62	7.5
	China	1,023	602	218	73.4	546	195	454	30.0

Romania		986	79	33	70.5	35	25	10	71.4
Peru		965	93	56	62.4	59	11	27	28.9
Bangladesh		862	409	169	70.8	234	88	159	35.6
Hungary		857	117	18	86.7	25	5	15	25.0
Lebanon		748	325	86	79.1	127	24	92	20.7
Angola		746	221	185	54.4	301	28	113	19.9
Bahamas		728	227	92	71.2	112	21	57	26.9
Uganda		701	230	16	93.5	39	5	34	12.8
Ethiopia		698	364	10	97.3	45	32	17	65.3
Jordan		672	283	72	79.7	96	30	39	43.5
Nicaragua		661	123	25	83.1	19	5	12	29.4
Cuba		594	141	43	76.6	59	10	28	26.3
Yemen		569	188	0	100.0	0	5	0	100.0
Sudan		551	140	5	96.6	16	13	5	72.2
Zimbabwe		538	79	12	86.8	27	10	18	35.7
Syria		510	154	10	93.9	31	0	18	0.0
Ghana		452	78	65	54.5	107	19	73	20.7
Cameroon		435	181	44	80.4	72	17	42	28.8
Algeria		403	244	114	68.2	131	30	111	21.3
Rwanda		399	198	43	82.2	62	17	29	37.0
Egypt		390	266	14	95.0	40	29	23	55.8
Kenya		390	165	53	75.7	80	28	60	31.8
Palestine		384	204	15	93.2	19	10	16	38.5
Ukraine		377	242	25	90.6	29	21	12	63.6
Jamaica		372	145	106	57.8	99	17	50	25.4
Burundi		315	85	23	78.7	28	5	13	27.8
Iraq		307	105	30	77.8	36	15	18	45.5
Stateless		304	72	10	87.8	10	0	5	0.0
Chad		303	152	22	87.4	37	5	12	29.4
El Salvador		276	280	36	88.6	47	19	34	35.8
Eritrea		271	115	23	83.3	35	5	10	33.3

Georgia		247	64	18	78.0	43	19	25	43.2
Russia		237	57	5	91.9	20	0	15	0.0
Congo		230	35	26	57.4	34	5	17	22.7
Senegal		219	44	39	53.0	60	12	37	24.5
Honduras		213	121	37	76.6	38	5	38	11.6
Guatemala		205	85	43	66.4	43	11	31	26.2
Nepal		201	61	5	92.4	21	27	28	49.1
Barbados		196	49	19	72.1	21	0	11	0.0
Guinea		175	106	52	67.1	62	0	26	0.0
Albania		174	68	25	73.1	49	19	43	30.6
Somalia		159	48	51	48.5	78	34	61	35.8
Tanzania		146	78	13	85.7	21	12	10	54.5
Ecuador		143	39	23	62.9	21	5	17	22.7
South Africa		143	20	35	36.4	34	5	26	16.1
Vietnam		139	37	76	32.7	130	13	46	22.0
Dominican Republic		134	52	41	55.9	39	11	22	33.3
Libya		107	80	14	85.1	11	5	0	100.0
Ivory Coast		103	54	29	65.1	42	5	23	17.9
Czechia		102	21	5	80.8	5	0	5	0.0
Azerbaijan		101	25	5	83.3	15	5	17	22.7
Mali		90	30	32	48.4	30	5	16	23.8
Philippines		86	24	64	27.3	45	0	39	0.0
Saudi Arabia		86	54	5	91.5	28	15	0	100.0
Burkina Faso		81	45	20	69.2	23	0	16	0.0
Slovakia		80	10	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Morocco		79	56	26	68.3	19	5	5	50.0
France		74	0	12	0.0	0	0	0	
Italy		71	5	17	22.7	31	0	16	0.0
Tunisia		68	40	32	55.6	34	0	32	0.0

Namibia	67	5	0	100.0	7	0	5	0.0
Gambia	66	20	20	50.0	29	5	17	22.7
Trinidad and Tobago	65	12	13	48.0	11	0	11	0.0
Hong Kong	63	15	5	75.0	6	0	10	0.0
Poland	61	34	10	77.3	15	14	15	48.3
United Kingdom	58	0	11	0.0	10	0	5	0.0
Togo	54	34	5	87.2	17	0	5	0.0
Argentina	53	0	25	0.0	25	0	27	0.0
Mauritania	53	40	19	67.8	21	0	13	0.0
Spain	53	5	18	21.7	25	0	10	0.0
Uzbekistan	53	10	0	100.0	0	5	0	100.0
Djibouti	51	22	0	100.0	5	5	5	50.0
Israel	51	15	12	55.6	16	5	10	33.3
Liberia	51	35	13	72.9	20	10	16	38.5
Myanmar	50	34	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Portugal	46	0	16	0.0	9	0	10	0.0
Indonesia	42	17	10	63.0	14	0	19	0.0
Malawi	40	17	5	77.3	5	0	11	0.0
Panama	40	0	10	0.0	6	0	0	
Costa Rica	39	14	5	73.7	24	5	13	27.8
Guyana	39	17	10	63.0	18	0	16	0.0
Mongolia	38	18	10	64.3	11	0	0	
Netherlands	38	0	10	0.0	0	0	5	0.0
Sierra Leone	38	12	17	41.4	22	0	5	0.0
Germany	35	0	12	0.0	0	0	0	
Serbia	34	14	13	51.9	16	13	5	72.2
Benin	31	16	11	59.3	10	5	0	100.0
Bulgaria	29	17	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Niger	26	29	11	72.5	11	0	10	0.0

Bolivia		25	17	5	77.3	11	0	0	
Belarus		24	12	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Gabon		23	15	5	75.0	5	5	5	50.0
Saint Lucia		23	5	0	100.0	5	5	5	50.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines		23	5	12	29.4	15	0	18	0.0
United Arab Emirates		22	10	0	100.0	12	0	5	0.0
Armenia		20	5	5	50.0	6	0	0	
Malaysia		20	5	5	50.0	5	0	5	0.0
Zambia		20	11	0	100.0	5	0	0	
Ireland		19	0	11	0.0	0	0	5	0.0
Thailand		18	5	0	100.0	0	0	5	0.0
Kuwait		17	5	0	100.0	5	0	10	0.0
South Korea		16	14	0	100.0	0	0	10	0.0
Belgium		15	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Central Africa		14	16	5	76.2	8	0	0	
Oman		14	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Sweden		14	0	0		5	0	5	0.0
Antigua and Barbuda		12	5	14	26.3	5	0	0	
Kazakhstan		12	16	5	76.2	5	5	5	50.0
Greece		11	0	5	0.0	0	5	0	100.0
South Sudan		11	10	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Fiji		10	5	0	100.0	10	0	0	
Moldova		10	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Cambodia		9	12	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Mauritius		9	0	13	0.0	5	0	0	
Uruguay		9	5	5	50.0	6	0	5	0.0
Kyrgyzstan		7	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	

Paraguay	7	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Bahrain	6	5	0	100.0	5	0	0	
Botswana	6	0	0		5	0	5	0.0
Lithuania	6	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Australia	5	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Belize	5	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Denmark	5	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Croatia	5	5	5	50.0	0	0	0	
Iceland	5	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Japan	5	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Latvia	5	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Suriname	5	0	0		5	0	0	
Switzerland	5	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Comoros	0	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Estonia	0	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Grenada	0	5	5	50.0	5	5	0	100.0
Madagascar	0	5	5	50.0	5	0	5	0.0
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Slovenia	0	0	0		5	0	5	0.0
Totals	94,246	27,282	12,553	68.5	14,029	3,316	8,489	28.1

Table 5. Figure 4:24. Asylum applications in Canada. (worlddata.info)

New Applications					Reviews			
	Origin	Applied	Accepted	Rejected	Acceptance rate (%)	Applied	Accepted	Rejected
Iran	1,916	491	40	92.5	72	71	89	44.4
India	1,562	16	761	2.1	592	5	114	4.2
Afghanistan	1,542	680	12	98.3	29	32	5	86.5

China		1,540	250	3,355	6.9	3,023	48	1,396	3.3
Sri Lanka		1,149	83	300	21.7	378	73	191	27.7
Malaysia		1,030	40	2,361	1.7	2,392	106	849	11.1
Pakistan		881	159	107	59.8	139	115	110	51.1
Vietnam		721	13	375	3.4	400	40	308	11.5
Indonesia		705	15	468	3.1	408	0	37	0.0
stateless		671	160	40	80.0	5	12	0	100.0
Vanuatu		642	0	184	0.0	56	0	0	
Tonga		621	5	206	2.4	104	0	14	0.0
Myanmar		549	217	15	93.5	13	5	0	100.0
Fiji		498	5	356	1.4	285	15	126	10.6
Thailand		474	0	994	0.0	1,051	5	259	1.9
Ukraine		419	5	5	50.0	0	5	0	100.0
Iraq		340	78	19	80.4	39	76	37	67.3
Timor-Leste		322	0	179	0.0	160	0	0	
Samoa		286	5	72	6.5	35	0	0	
Solomon Islands		280	10	55	15.4	34	0	5	0.0
Nepal		222	5	18	21.7	9	5	29	14.7
Sudan		193	34	11	75.6	0	5	0	100.0
Bangladesh		192	29	59	33.0	57	30	76	28.3
Lebanon		188	44	40	52.4	35	10	19	34.5
Philippines		175	5	856	0.6	684	0	16	0.0
Papua New Guinea		149	121	97	55.5	91	35	5	87.5
Turkey		130	70	16	81.4	10	15	5	75.0
unknown		118	24	14	63.2	32	0	0	
South Korea		112	0	12	0.0	5	0	5	0.0
Nigeria		99	41	16	71.9	15	10	34	22.7
Colombia		95	18	201	8.2	187	0	11	0.0
Cambodia		91	5	284	1.7	253	0	0	
Hong Kong		85	0	13	0.0	0	0	0	

Somalia		73	68	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Kenya		70	27	59	31.4	54	5	10	33.3
Egypt		68	25	10	71.4	15	11	38	22.4
Russia		68	12	18	40.0	17	0	0	
Ethiopia		61	85	33	72.0	32	62	18	77.5
South Africa		60	0	14	0.0	6	0	13	0.0
Laos		59	0	327	0.0	270	0	0	
Syria		53	20	5	80.0	0	0	0	
Palestine		51	10	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Brazil		50	5	261	1.9	220	0	0	
Mongolia		47	0	15	0.0	5	0	5	0.0
Yemen		44	69	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Peru		41	10	19	34.5	23	0	5	0.0
Zimbabwe		35	11	5	68.8	5	14	0	100.0
Jordan		31	26	18	59.1	14	12	0	100.0
Venezuela		30	84	27	75.7	26	12	0	100.0
United Kingdom		24	0	39	0.0	27	0	0	
Ireland		22	0	56	0.0	52	0	0	
Eritrea		19	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Saudi Arabia		19	24	13	64.9	10	0	0	
Chile		16	11	29	27.5	25	5	0	100.0
Sierra Leone		16	0	14	0.0	5	5	15	25.0
Albania		12	5	5	50.0	5	0	0	
Ghana		12	12	5	70.6	6	10	28	26.3
New Zealand		12	12	0	100.0	5	0	0	
Italy		11	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Mexico		11	14	5	73.7	7	5	0	100.0
Morocco		11	5	5	50.0	0	0	0	
Mauritius		11	5	62	7.5	57	0	5	0.0
Burundi		10	13	0	100.0	7	0	0	

United States	10	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Uzbekistan	10	5	14	26.3	14	0	0	
Congo	9	11	12	47.8	0	0	0	
Uganda	9	12	5	70.6	7	5	0	100.0
Cameroon	8	5	0	100.0	0	14	0	100.0
Libya	7	17	0	100.0	0	5	0	100.0
North Macedonia	7	0	34	0.0	30	0	0	
Tanzania	7	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Liberia	6	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Zambia	6	0	5	0.0	5	0	0	
Israel	5	0	5	0.0	6	0	0	
Japan	5	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Kyrgyzstan	5	0	5	0.0	5	0	0	
Kuwait	5	0	5	0.0	0	0	0	
Rwanda	5	5	0	100.0	0	5	0	100.0
Argentina	0	0	5	0.0	6	0	0	
Bahrain	0	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Bhutan	0	0	24	0.0	22	0	0	
Maldives	0	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	
El Salvador	0	5	13	27.8	13	0	0	
South Sudan	0	11	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Tunisia	0	5	0	100.0	0	0	0	
Uruguay	0	0	0		6	0	0	
Totals	19,148	3,277	12,732	20.5	11,600	888	3,877	18.6

Table 6. Figure 4:25. Asylum applications in Australia. (worlddata.info)

According to the UNHCR, about 19,148 refugees applied for seeking asylum for Australia in 2022. The majority of them were from Afghanistan, India, and Iran. Initial applicants have received 16,009 decisions in total. About 20% of them received affirmative responses. Eighty percent of asylum requests have been initially denied. Refugee applications from Yemen and Somalia have had the best results. (World data 2022)

According to UNHCR, 94,246 asylum requests from refugees were submitted to Canada in 2022. The majority of them were from Turkey, Haiti, and Mexico. Initial applicants have received a total of 39,835 decisions. About 68% of them received affirmative responses. 33 percent of requests for asylum have been turned down right away. The most successful being Yemen and Myanmar. (World data 2022)

These numbers are reflected to show the general application as well as pending cases still in review. Hence the total number may be higher as updated statuses were added.



CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSING THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Key Findings and Analysis:

The United Nations acknowledges that migration is a complex issue that requires a comprehensive and coordinated approach. The UN promotes the protection of human rights and dignity of all migrants, regardless of their status. It recognizes the positive contributions that migrants make to society and the need for international cooperation in addressing the challenges of migration. In 2018, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, which provides a roadmap for the international community to work together on migration issues. The compact sets out 23 objectives to improve the management of migration and promote the rights of migrants while addressing the concerns of countries of origin, transit, and destination.

Some states' immigration rules in the United States have evolved throughout time and they have adopted restricted policies regarding immigration, while others embraced more welcoming and inclusive laws. For example, some states have passed laws that restrict access to public benefits for undocumented immigrants or require employers to verify the immigration status of their workers. Other states have passed laws that provide undocumented immigrants with access to driver's licenses, in-state tuition, and other benefits. Overall, the federal government determines immigration policy, although individual states have some leeway in how they administer and enforce federal immigration rules.

Some U.S. states have implemented more restrictive immigration policies in recent years. Some of these states include Texas, Arizona, Georgia, and Alabama. For example, in Texas, a law was passed in 2017 that prohibits sanctuary cities in the state. This law requires local law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration authorities and allows police officers to ask people about their immigration status during routine stops. In 2010, Arizona approved legislation requiring law enforcement personnel to examine the immigration status of anybody suspected of being in the country illegally. This legislation was challenged in court, and some of its provisions were overturned. Employers in Georgia and Alabama were obliged by law to utilize the federal E-Verify system to check the immigration status of their employees. This legislation sparked debate

and legal challenges, with some claiming they would lead to discrimination and labor shortages. It is worth mentioning that these laws have been contentious and are still being challenged in court.

In reaction to the enormous number of refugees and migrants that have come in Europe since 2015, European nations have altered their immigration laws. The magnitude of the crisis created huge political and social issues, as well as concerns about countries' ability to manage the flood of people. Some nations have implemented more stringent regulations, such as border controls and tougher limitations on asylum requests. Others have taken a more welcoming approach, with policies aimed at integrating refugees and migrants into society. For example, Germany, which received the largest number of refugees and migrants during the crisis, has implemented policies to improve the integration of refugees into German society, such as language courses and job training programs. Other countries, such as Hungary and Poland, have been more restrictive in their policies towards refugees and migrants. These countries have implemented policies such as border walls, detention centers, and restrictions on asylum applications. Overall, the refugee and migrant crisis has led to a range of policy responses across Europe, reflecting different political and social contexts.

There has been an increase in far-right groups in some European countries in recent years. The refugee and migrant crisis, along with other factors such as globalization and the rise of populist politics, have contributed to the growth of far-right movements across the continent. These groups often advocate for anti-immigrant policies and are critical of the European Union, globalization, and multiculturalism

They have acquired support in nations such as France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden, among others. In certain situations, far-right groups have organized rallies and participated in violence against migrants and refugees. This has raised worries about the increase of xenophobia and intolerance in Europe, as well as reservations about governments' ability to manage these issues. It is crucial to stress that not all Europeans support far-right groups or their agendas, and there is tremendous debate and disagreement about how to solve the issues connected with migration and diversity.

Several European countries have seen significant changes to their immigration policies since 2015, including Germany, France, Italy, and Sweden. These changes have included border controls,

tighter restrictions on asylum applications, and efforts to improve the integration of refugees and migrants into society. Some countries have also seen an increase in far-right groups, which have advocated for stricter immigration policies and have been critical of the EU's handling of the crisis.

Germany has implemented several immigration policies in response to the large numbers of refugees and migrants who arrived in the country since 2015. Some of these policies include

1. Asylum process: Germany has implemented policies to expedite the processing of asylum applications and increase the capacity of the country's asylum system.

2. Integration policies: The German government has implemented policies to support the integration of refugees and migrants into German society. This includes language courses and job training programs, as well as efforts to improve access to housing and education.

3. Border controls: Germany has implemented temporary border controls in certain areas to manage the flow of migrants and refugees.

4. EU policies: Germany has advocated for greater EU cooperation and solidarity in managing the refugee and migrant crisis, including the development of a common EU asylum system.

5. Changes to family reunification: In 2016, the German government implemented changes to its family reunification policies, making it more difficult for refugees to bring family members to Germany.

6. Deportation policies: Germany has also implemented policies to increase the deportation of failed asylum seekers and other migrants who are not authorized to stay in the country.

All in all, Germany's response to the refugee and migrant crisis has been complex and multifaceted, reflecting the political and social challenges associated with managing large numbers of people arriving in the country.

Italy has implemented several immigration policies in response to the large numbers of refugees and migrants who have arrived in the country since 2015. Some of these policies include

1. Search and rescue operations: Italy has implemented policies to conduct search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea, in cooperation with the European Union.

2. Asylum process: Italy has implemented policies to expedite the processing of asylum applications and increase the capacity of the country's asylum system. Though it still has one of the highest rejection rates.

3. Deportation policies: Italy has implemented policies to increase the deportation of failed asylum seekers and other migrants who are not authorized to stay in the country.

4. Border controls: Italy has implemented policies to increase border controls and prevent unauthorized entry into the country.

5. EU policies: Italy has advocated for greater EU cooperation and solidarity in managing the refugee and migrant crisis, including the development of a common EU asylum system.

6. Changes to citizenship laws: In 2018, the Italian government implemented changes to its citizenship laws, making it more difficult for children born to non-Italian parents to obtain Italian citizenship.

Basically, Italy's response to the refugee and migrant crisis has been complex and controversial, reflecting the political and social challenges associated with managing the influx of people arriving in the country.

Canada has implemented several immigration policies in recent years, including some changes that occurred after 2015. Some of these policies include

1. Increased refugee resettlement: In 2016, Canada announced a plan to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees and has continued to increase the number of refugees it accepts each year.

2. Express Entry system: Canada has implemented the Express Entry system, which allows skilled workers to apply for permanent residence in Canada based on their work experience, education, and language proficiency.

3. Family reunification: Canada has increased the number of family reunification applications it processes each year, allowing more people to be reunited with their loved ones in Canada.

4. Changes to citizenship laws: In 2017, Canada implemented changes to its citizenship laws, making it easier for permanent residents to become Canadian citizens.

5. Integration policies: Canada has implemented policies to support the integration of refugees and immigrants into Canadian society. This includes language training, job training, and other services to help newcomers adjust to life in Canada.

6. Provincial nominee program: Canada has implemented the Provincial Nominee Program, which allows provinces and territories to nominate a certain number of immigrants each year based on the needs of their local labor markets.

Hence, Canada's immigration policy has focused on attracting skilled workers, supporting family reunification, and resettling refugees. The country has a reputation for being welcoming to newcomers and has been recognized as a leader in resettling refugees.

Australia has implemented several immigration policies in recent years, including some changes that have occurred since 2015. Some of these policies include:

1. Border control policies: Australia has implemented policies to manage its borders and prevent unauthorized entry into the country. This includes processing asylum seekers offshore and turning back boats carrying asylum seekers.

2. Skilled migration program: Australia has maintained its skilled migration program, which allows skilled workers to apply for permanent residence in Australia based on their work experience, education, and language proficiency.

3. Family reunification: Australia has continued to process family reunification applications, allowing more people to be reunited with their loved ones in Australia.

4. Temporary visas: Australia has implemented several temporary visa programs, including the Temporary Skill Shortage visa, the Working Holiday visa, and the student visa.

5. Refugee resettlement: Australia has continued to resettle refugees, primarily through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and has pledged to increase its refugee intake.

6. Changes to citizenship laws: In 2017, the Australian government proposed changes to its citizenship laws, making it more difficult for permanent residents to become citizens. However, these changes have been controversial and have not yet been implemented.

Overall, Australia's immigration policy has focused on attracting skilled workers, managing the country's borders, and supporting family reunification. There has been significant debate and controversy around some of the country's policies, particularly those related to the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees.

5.2 Conclusion and Recommendations

When 2015 came the world was unprepared for the baggage it carried. The on/off crisis of the Middle East had become such a norm that the majority of countries were unsure of the effects of the inflow of immigration. From the 1st of January to the 30th of June the number of migrants was about 70000-100000 (accounted for), with illegal migration using the Balkan region as a means of commuting rising from previous years of 20000 to about 100000; this meant that the latter number has almost increased by 200%. The number of people applying for asylum rose to 75000 with at least half of them being first-time applicants. Syria, Kosovo, and Afghanistan have the highest number of migrants with Syria leading with more than 25% compared to other states. For most Syrians, the reason for asylum application was more of a frantic attempt to seek refuge for the increasing threat to livelihood in their country as well as an incessant civil crisis in the State. Consequently, we can say that there was definitely an increase in immigration from the year 2015 till date, particularly the year 2015.

In the wake of the 2015 crisis, it was difficult for scientists to have predicted the repercussions or rifts that this phenomenon would bring across the world. In the European world, it was and still is the fear of people encroaching into an already struggling economy especially after the European Union had just survived the economic depressions that had just ripped through Europe. Then politicians seeking to gain power fueled the fear by feeding off it with the over-emphasizing of a division- the 'us versus them' was re-born. This is to say that, throughout history, there has always been the use of the fear of a growing uncertainty of a certain crisis as a political stepping stool into power. Through academic research, it was observed that states such as Germany, and Italy with a previous history of extremism, especially nationalist states, were more easily prone to using social phenomena as power-gaining tools. Comparatively, the states like

Canada, and Australia with a bigger time span between extremism, especially if it were less occurrence- meaning less than twice, seemed to be more skilled in dealing with the weaponization of social phenomena for political gains.

For the immigrants fleeing a war-torn country was more of a life-and-death situation, especially for families that had more things going for them than now. Most of these immigrants stated that the feeling of being unwanted was met at the border of most states they had entered. The fact that some of these states hand-picked those they wanted versus those it by classifying them into ‘immigrants and refugees. A refugee under the United Nations criteria would be any individual fleeing from a country without proper documentation regardless of class, economic background, religion, or belief system. However, some refugees had claimed that siblings who seemed to be better educated or better financially were quickly upgraded to ‘immigrant’ status (given paper) than others who were otherwise.

In Germany, the discourse was centered on the fact that most European States didn’t stick to the Dublin Accords that required the burden of asylum seekers to be evenly divided between the states, which had now fallen on Germany with a 24% increase in 2015 from previous years (figure 4:12); on the other hand, European states blamed German chancellor Merkel for being the reason Europe was suffering this burden of acceptance because of the relaxed immigration laws stipulated. This was what spearheaded the EU-Turkey deal in 2016 of accepting and processing asylum seekers, giving them a place to be while in turn increasing its ease of access to the EU, this meant most seekers were stuck in Greece- which easily turned them back to Turkey; although widely criticized by the citizens of Turkey as it was just recovering from a failed coup attempt, added to the fact that the UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) as well as other Human Rights groups for being a deal with a high probability of Asylum seekers being sent back to Syria. The numbers for the EU greatly reduced from 25000 to barely 2000 in the aftermath. In 2016, Germans’ fear of the possibility of Islamic-based terrorist attacks was less than expected compared to other areas like France, Italy, and some other states; though the few incidents of a Syrian suicide bomber hurting four people at a festival, to an Afghan asylum seeker attacking four people in a train amongst others. Germany might have hope as it is starting to embrace its uniqueness and ambiguity in the origination of its people, yet the fears of a few can be traced to the use of far-right groups in accumulating power as well as rising. In 2017 most European states saw a rise in far-right political parties with a margin of 30% (figure 4:16), though unlike Italy and

Hungary with 53% and 58% respectively, Germany seems to have the Alternative for Germany (Afd), rising by merely 10% (figure 4:13) although by 2021/22 maintained a growth rate of only 15% (figure 4:17). Hence the rhetoric of anti-immigration as a means to an end may have seen a futile usage in Germany. The biggest criticism of the German immigration policy seems to stem from the fact that it includes rigorous, stiff, harsh, and sometimes discriminatory attitudes and policies towards immigrants, especially, asylum seekers. The government had certified that the bureaucracy in charge is being cleaned and constantly monitored to avoid such accusations. These accusations range from the difficulties in procedures and application process to the burden of proof resting on the shoulders of each asylum seeker, which in a sense remits a refusal as most of these candidates don't have enough legal documents nor do they meet the criteria for acceptance. Special attention and attendance are given to those who are from the "safe countries of origin" which includes Kosovo, Ghana, Senegal, and EU member states, amongst others as well as applicants who had arrived by plane. This criterion already negates most applicants from poorer states or even the middle east. This serves as discriminatory. Most applicants have to reside in given accommodations and are not allowed to work or leave without permission from the officials, this also entails the fact that applicants who haven't received a response within 6 months have to await deportation or 'return'. Appeals are available as rejection could be outright rejection (in which applicants have 30 days to leave or appeal and if granted can stay else must leave either voluntarily or coercively) or "manifestly unfounded" (in which applicants have only a week for appeals or face deportation). In 2015, Germany had 65% total asylum applications/applicants and yet had a 35% in 2015 and 30% in subsequent years of refusals this might be in affiliation with the fact that most German (more than 50%) do not consider immigration favorable with is evident in the process. (Figure 4:11-12) So while Germany might seemingly be embracing its new dynamic immigration policies it still has an arm's length of ensuring that refugees have a better chance than going home.

Italian policies over immigration have seen a drastic change between the year 2017 till now. The attitudes of Italians towards immigrants consider it as a negative phenomenon, measuring 71% (figure 4:7) one of the highest medians in the European Union. (EU). Within the peak of immigration influx highest in 2017, we see a general tone of Italians towards immigrants as a whole though with a drastic 20 percentile difference between EU member states at the 60 percentiles to non-EU members at the 80 percentiles (figure 4:3). As earlier established public

opinions affect government policies and political parties by default use each social phenomenon as a yardstick into political power. When populist left-wing parties like Five Star Movement leaned to the right above 25 while right-wing parties such as LEGA, and Brothers of Italy leaned more right at 45-48 it showed clearly where the people were at concerning immigrants and immigration in general, concerning that at a mean of 58 this momentous change showed the policies the governments would be prone to take (figure 4:13). Although the LEGA party had a 4% drop by 2022 (figure 4:17), this doesn't affect much political policies nor decisions already made on immigration. This is evident in that the questioner are ones who make the decisions on asylum seekers who are collected from the pool of Italians (of whom are biased or have a family member biased towards immigration), how does this process prove fair? During analysis, certain policies on asylum seekers' procedures are criticizability as some of these include easy refusals or lack of transportation to those who seek asylum. With data showed comparing the rate at which asylum seekers are viewed positively in ratio to negatively seemed vastly disproportionate compared to the values seen when Italian asylum seekers applied and were viewed positively; though many of whom were accepted in Canada. One thing stemmed clear (figure 4:20-21) while most states might claim policy-wise to be open to immigration, it has been shown several times that this is only concerning the positive interests each bears on the state. Using political realism as a basis of arguments, states would always seek first their interest before any morality or humanity clauses.

CONCLUSION

In the study, the proof of burden had always been to analyze comparatively the disparity of policies and the anti-immigration sentiments; that whilst states might have policies stating that all immigrants are welcomed in the process of granting such status as well as a difference in values of immigrants and asylum seekers have always been an issue most states grant negatively. For countries, the goal is to always buttress their interests above all else. Social phenomena like immigration could easily be used as a political tool into power and one state can't claim acceptance in policy if it has a high rate of anti-immigration sentiments, this is because the human factor plays a key role in the implementation of the policies are picked from random individuals and any of these individuals could carry the anti-immigration sentiments, hence the status has a higher likelihood of being negative.

The natural security conundrum is how governments will address the situation if immigration has the potential to cause social unrest. The decision of whether to increase preventative militarism in response to security concerns (caused by immigration) is more essential. Assume that social concord is protected by intense (preventive) militarism. Other public goods (including infrastructure and education) that are provided by the economy may suffer as a result (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999).

On the other hand, there is conflicting evidence in the literature on the function of militarism in preserving peace in sharply divided countries. De Soysa and Numayer (2008), for instance, do not link preventive militarization with peace (in a variety of countries), despite Blomberg (1996) linking some degree of political stability (and harmony) to rising defense spending.

Our investigation into whether immigrant-receiving nations have increased military building in preparation for societal unrest or whether the phenomenon is entirely fictitious is prompted by this contrasting information. This led to a comparison with states like Australia and Canada. The fact that these states had not publicly made any threat of militarization as a preventive tactic against the dangers of immigration, they have each shown however to be more favorable to middle eastern states in regards to acceptances. The biggest contrast within the European Union has been that of Italy with the lowest accumulated acceptance rate of 16% compared to Germany with 45%; whilst Canada scored the highest accumulative acceptance rate of 68.5% to Australia a 20.5%, making Australia the lesser of the two. Using a path of dependence (which is a historical comparatist of

contextualization), we see that states like Australia and Canada, which had unfavorable policies in the past, have changed their policies due to the influence of their people as well as political parties rarely using immigration as a tool (but other phenomena), as have European states like Germany and Italy. The immigration variable will always be an issue that can be readily exploited, but it is reasonable to argue that, while easily permeable it is still a natural occurrence since, as long as states and people exist, there will be a motive for mobility. The United Nations has determined that immigration has better consequences than negative effects, but the fear of the unpredictable and unlearned is what causes societal contact. By the year 2019, a lot of states had amended their policies by either making it closed or implementing harsh and publicly humiliating deportation of 'illegal immigrants' that placed fear in others on always updating their status. The fact that by the year 2022 after the Covid, there seemed to be a new issue to which people had switched as such most states re-amended their policies into being more favorable towards immigration. The majority of the contention had always been as much as the human value was added in which calculated the profit of such individual to the society there seems to be a positive reaction.

The heat of the anti-immigration wave gave rise to far-right groups which gave rise to highly nationalistic parties having a stronger voice choosing strong harsh immigration policies. This was further demonstrated by political leaders seeking more border control which led to the focus of political actions on territorial wars and disparity. Could this have been a stepping stone to the now Russia-Ukraine war? This is uncertain.

The world could learn from a heterogenous society than a homogenous one as it bridges gaps between class, religion, culture, and intellectual benefits.

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