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An outlook into the Turkish civil-military relations after the 2016 coup

Mustafa Uluçakar [ORCID]

Political Sciences and Public Administration, İstanbul Gelişim University, İstanbul, Turkey

Correspondence
Mustafa Uluçakar, Political Sciences and Public Administration, İstanbul Gelişim University, İstanbul, Turkey.
Email: mulucakar@gmail.com; mulucakar@gelisim.edu.tr

The main aim of this paper is to analyze the efficacy of the post 15 July civil control measures by comparing them with the most common coup-proofing practices as well as the Turkish civil control measures taken between 2002 and 2010. The data gathering process of the study is based on the literature on coups, coup-proofing, and evaluating the efficacy of coup-proofing practices. Additional data were collected through the official gazette archives. The study begins with some remarks on the concepts of the coup, coup-proofing, and democratic control of the military followed by the brief history of Turkish civil control practices before and after July 15. Then it discusses the most common coup-proofing practices. This section is followed by a comparative analysis of post-15 July civil control measures with the most common coup proofing examples and the Turkish civil control measures taken between 2002 and 2010.

1 | INTRODUCTION

Throughout the adventure of its multiparty democracy, Turkey's political life was interrupted by military coups almost every decade. In this respect, the Turkish military has intervened in politics seve times since 1960. Popularly elected political authorities were ousted on May 27, 1960, March 12, 1971, and September 12, 1980, coups, while the incumbent government was forced to resign on February 28, 1997. Moreover, Turkey experienced three failed coups (February 22, 1962, May 21, 1963, and July 15, 2016).

Although there have been numerous civil control measures to prevent the military interventions within the same period, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) put the most drastic ones into effect between 2002 and 2010, parallel to the harmonization process with the EU (Sarıgil, 2012, p.168). The expressed aim of those institutional and legal reforms aligned Turkish civil-military relations with European standards. According to Ersel Aydınlı (2009, p. 581), "these reforms created an understanding that Turkey has most likely progressed beyond the era of coups due to the EU-backed 'paradigmatic shift' to change the traditional role of the Turkish Military in domestic and foreign politics". Gokhan Bacik and Sammas Salur (2010, p. 163) called JDP's measures as "needed instruments of coup-proofing" and added, "due to the development of several transformative dynamics, political elites' "coup-proofing" capacity is likely to improve" (Bacik & Sammas, 2010, p. 185).

Indeed, "coup-proofing" is defined by Quinlivan as "the set of actions a regime takes to prevent a military coup" (Quinlivan, 1999, p. 133). He further states "if the essence of a coup is the seizure of the state by a small group within the state apparatus, the essence of coup-proofing is the creation of structures that minimize the possibilities of small groups leveraging the system to such ends (Quinlivan, 1999, p. 132)". He, therefore, describes coup-proofing as; strategies and practices of "a regime" (any type of regime). Thus, prevention strategies and practices, also known as coup-proofing defined by Quinlivan is understood as strategies and practices applied regardless of regime types and/or differences in the level of development of democracy.

Nevertheless, actions taken by a regime to prevent a military coup categorically differ depending on the regime type. In societies where factors such as freedom of the press, political participation, checks, and balances in the branches of government and rule of law are present, they tend to militate against military coups. However, in political regimes where such dynamics are not strong, such as Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, or Libya, rulers have been able to prevent military coups thanks to strategies and practices specifically called as "coup-proofing." Therefore, the term "coup-proofing" generally applies to strategies and practices applied by authoritarian regimes and/or dictatorships in the related literature.

Contrary to the general view regarding "end to the coup era", Turkey witnessed a coup attempt on July 15, 2016. Fairly a small faction

in the officer corps – including high-ranking military officers – attempted to seize political power on July 15–16, 2016 but failed.[1] The JDP Government engaged in a series of further civil control measures soon after July 15. Within this context, a series of purging activities have been conducted throughout the echelons of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). A huge number of officers, including hundreds of generals and admirals, were arrested, and/or discharged. Such rigorous treatment triggered a couple of questions such as "whether the drivers, dynamics, and consequences of coup-proofing in authoritarian regimes also applies to democratic states?", "where parallels in coup-proofing exist –and do not– across regime types?", "if there are important divergences, why that is the case?" and, "whether the Turkish efforts at civil control have the deleterious effects the scholars often suppose?".[2] Undoubtedly, to provide answers to the questions raised by the above-mentioned discussions, it is necessary to carefully analyze the dynamics of the July 15 failed coup and the political-military structure that emerged after the failed coup.

In this context, the study takes the existing theory and frameworks on "coup-proofing" and applies them to a Turkish case to see if they explain how the post-15 July civil control measures hew to patterns established in the literature related to coup-proofing. Then it tries to evaluate the efficacy of post 15 July measures by comparing them with the common coup-proofing practices and the Turkish civil control measures that were taken between 2002 and 2010. The data gathering process of the study is mainly based on the literature on coups, coup-proofing, and evaluating the efficacy of coup-proofing practices. Additional data were collected through the official gazette archives.

Studying the issue of "coup-proofing in the case of Turkey" is rather difficult. Because there is almost no study that specifically examines coup-proofing due to its peculiar and impenetrable nature.[3] Moreover, Bacik and Sammas states "… difficulty originates from Turkey's political system which has fabricated a fuzzy coup-proofing model. Normally, the study of coup-proofing in totalitarian states is easy as the power holders as a homogenized group follow usual strategies such as creating alternative intelligent units or implementing sectarianism" (Bacik & Sammas, 2010, p. 165).

As it is stated by Bacik and Sammas the bulk of the difficulty originates from the Turkish political system. Therefore, at this point, although the characteristics of Turkey's political system are not the main focus of this study it is necessary to consider the fact that Freedom House no longer treats Turkey as a type of democracy but as "not free." However, the 2020 Freedom in the World report also states that "While Erdoğan exerts tremendous power in Turkish politics, opposition victories in 2019 municipal elections demonstrated that his authority was not unlimited" (Freedom in the World, 2020). In addition to that, a Freedom House Special Report states "As reflected in Freedom House's annual ratings, including Freedom in the World, Turkey is not a dictatorship. It is a country where different views are expressed and heard, with a vibrant and diverse civil society" (A Freedom House Special Report, 2020). As mentioned before, the measures placed under analysis within the context of coup-proofing have predominantly been of the type that political systems with a very poor

democratic record. In this sense, the studies examining the effectiveness of coup-proofing practices from different samples may shed light on this study.

The study begins with some remarks on the concepts of the coup, coup-proofing, and democratic control of the military followed by the brief history of Turkish civil control practices before and after July 15. Then it discusses the most common coup-proofing practices. This section is followed by a comparative analysis of post-15 July civil control measures with the most common coup proofing examples and the Turkish civil control measures taken between 2002 and 2010. The findings of this study may contribute to the literature on civil-military relations literature in general and, coup-proofing in particular.[4] The following section deals with the concepts of coup d'état and then the history of the Turkish practices to control the military.

2 | CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The idea of "controlling military" is generally accepted to stem from a famous question, "Who guards the guards?". All types of political regimes/governments, either the most advanced democracies that provide obedience through consent, or the autocracies through oppression would try to find a way to subordinate the military to the political authority. Thus, "controlling the armed forces" simply refers to the civilian supremacy over the military.

However, different norms and principals exist depending on the differences regarding cultures and political systems, although there is an agreement on the concept of the democratic control made by "The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces" (DCAF). DCAF considers the issue of "democratic control" from a broader perspective, which can be called "democratic governance". According to DCAF's definition, the aim of democratic governance is much broader than solely preventing coups (DCAF Backgrounder, 2008). Although one of the purposes of DCAF is to provide a common understanding, there is still a controversy on the concepts of "democratic control" and "civil control" that are often used as synonyms.

Cottey Andrew, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster (2002, p. 3) argue that although the Soviet Union had a very strict civil control upon the military, there is no way to consider it as democratic just because of this feature. On the other hand, as in the case of Italy—where it is believed that the culture of democracy is deeply absorbed—the personnel of the armed forces is in the key decision-making positions. Thus, civil control may not mean democratic governance. Given the latest measures regarding the governance of the security sector, "the civil control" concept would be more valid for the Turkish case.

It is generally accepted in the literature that a coup is the sudden and violently overthrow of a popularly elected government by the military. The term "coup-proofing" is generally understood as the set of strategies and actions to prevent military interventions in authoritarian regimes (Quinlivan, 1999, p. 131). Coups generally occur with the seizure of the state by a small armed group, within the state apparatus, followed by toppling the popularly elected government. The

armies are considered as political forces that can take over the administration, quickly and easily during political and economic crises with its more powerful and effective structure than other institutions of the state as well as the other social actors. In many developing countries, popularly elected governments were displaced by the military through coups before 1990 and thus coups are generally considered as the problems faced by states with weak institutional structures.

As it is mentioned above, in the history of the Republic of Turkey, since the May 27, 1960 coup, two successful coups, three civil authority changes through "memorandum," and five failed coup attempts took place and many arrangements have been made to control the military within the same historical process. Thus, the following section deals with a history of Turkish practices to control the military.

3 | HISTORY OF TURKISH PRACTICES TO CONTROL MILITARY

In Turkish political history, various measures have been taken between 1923 and 2002 to control the military. For example, "the Turkish Parliament enacted Law 385 in 1923 to force the military officers to resign in order to stand for election to public offices" (Hanioglu, 2012, p. 47). "The Chief of Staff (COS) was ousted from the cabinet and subordinated to the President in 1924... Later the COS was subordinated to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in 1949" (Hale, 1994 p. 72). "Democrat Party (DP) leadership dismissed many generals and colonels in June of 1950, as they were suspected of planning to topple the government" (Yalçın, 2007). Toward the end of 1957, Major Samet Kuscu denounced that conspiratorial groups led by junior officers who were planning to oust the political authority and reported some of the officers' names. They were detained and interrogated after his denouncement. Since he did not present concrete evidence to the court, they were acquitted after 6 months of trial, and Samet Kuscu was sentenced for 2 years on charges of sedition (Hale, 1994 p. 88). "The National Unity Committee (NUC), which ousted the DP Government through the 1960 coup, precluded coup attempts led by Talat Aydemir in February of 1962 and May of 1963 and expelled 14 (NUC) members for being inclined to authoritarian rule" (Burak, 2011 pp. 54–57). After the 1960 coup, and coup attempts in 1962 and 1963, a multitude of internal military regulations were adopted between 1960 and 1971 to distance the officers from politics. Turgut Ozal, the leader of the Motherland Party "changed the state protocol to put the politicians ahead of the generals and, instead of Necdet Oztorun, assigned Necip Torumtay as the Chief of Staff against the military's common practices regarding seniority" (Burak, 2011 p. 60). However, these regulations just did not help to prevent coups.

It is obvious that the most vigorous and drastic reforms have been made after the JDP came to power. According to Bacik and Sammas "Turkey has never been ruled by a highly homogenized group with the ultimate capacity of employing strict coup-proofing agendas until the early 2000s" (Bacik & Sammas, 2010, p. 166). They also list

the coup-proofing measures of the term as, strengthening police and police intelligence, the transformation of National Intelligence Agency, intra-army factionalism, creating a new media and new judiciary elites (Bacik & Sammas, 2010, p. 173).

Zeki Sarıgil provides detailed information about the measures to control applied until 2012. Some of the modifications are: "Changes in the duties and composition of the National Security Council, the removal of military members or representatives from public bodies such as the Council of Higher Education responsible for coordinating and regulating university education and the Radio and Television Supreme Council which oversees radio and television broadcasting; the empowerment of civilian courts vis-a-vis the military (e.g., the detentions and trials of several military officers); greater civilian oversight of military spending and promotions and increasing criticisms of the military's role in politics by societal actors (e.g., columnists, academics, intellectuals, civil society organizations), reducing the military's overall influence in foreign policy" (Sarıgil, 2012 pp.178–181).

"The national security courses were excluded from the secondary education curriculum in 2012. In 2013, Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law that is perceived as the legal source of coups in Turkey was amended. Within this framework, the Turkish Armed Forces' duty definition was amended, and it was also ruled that the members of the armed forces would not be allowed to participate in internal security operations except for terrorists" (Ulucakar & Caglar, 2017 p. 48). Furthermore, trials and lawsuits, such as Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer), continued between 2007 and 2014 against the soldiers with the allegation of carrying out activities to overthrow the JDP Government. In this context, many officers and noncommissioned officers, including generals and admirals, were arrested and dismissed from the armed forces.[5] Former COS Ilker Basbug, was arrested in January 2012 on charges of overthrowing the government and being a member of a terrorist organization. According to Metin Gurcan (2018), the TAF has been dragged to the right as a block because of those developments, and this situation has provided the ground for Fethullahist terrorist organization (FETO) members to be in key positions. Hence FETO members taken the key positions masterminded the July 15 coup attempt.

A great number of not only the military personnel but also civil servants, judges, academics, and political opponents were arrested and purged. Under the Decree of July 31, the composition of the Supreme Military Council and the subordination of the General Staff was changed. This decree also allowed The President to get information directly from all the force commanders and to give them orders (Haugom, 2016, pp. 4–6). The decree also closed all of Turkey's war academies, military high schools, and high schools that train non-commissioned officers by replacing them by a new university called the National Defense University under the Defense Ministry. They (except the military high schools were replaced by the National Defense University was established under the MOD to raise the officers with a graduate degree, academies to educate staff officers with a postgraduate degree and vocational schools to raise petty officers.[6] The same decree also assigned all the military hospitals under the Ministry of Health. The military bases, which, sent out tanks and

helicopters during the July 15 Coup Attempt were closed (Kasap, Eda-Unlu, & Ozen, 2016).

Lots of personnel serving in the public service were discharged with Decree No. 677. Decree No. 681 changed the principles regarding the assignment and terms of office for the force commanders and gave the authority to MOD to determine and organize the Supreme Military Council. Amongst other amendments, the abolishment of military high courts is substantial. Furthermore, the members of the Constitutional Court were reduced to 15 because of the removal of two military members. State Supervisory Council, led by the presidency was authorized to inspect TAF (Asylum Research Consultancy, 2017, pp. 22–33). The Turkish Presidency to implement more civil control measures aimed at eliminating the risk of a military coup. In that respect, to help to analyze post-15 July measures with the aid of the literature which specifically deals with coup-proofing, the following section of this paper deals with the most common coup-proofing practices in authoritarian regimes.

4 | THE MOST COMMON COUP-PROOFING STRATEGIES AND PRACTICES

Michel Makara (2014, p. 336) lists three common coup-proofing measures as; "distributing material incentives, exploiting communal ties and building parallel security institutions." Similarly, according to Quinlivan (1999, pp. 133–136) and Holgert Albrecht (2015, p. 661), "the common characteristics of coup-proofing are having parallel militaries, creation of multiple internal security agencies which will work together with jurisdiction to constantly monitor the military, fostering professionalism in the regular military, financing of such measures, and the exploitation of ethnic and religious loyalties". Moreover, Constantine Danapoulos (1992, p. 15) adds other measures such as "geographic dispersion, party penetration, divided command authority and, civilian command structures."

Parallel militaries and multiple security services allow political leaders to monitor the armed forces, to be aware of any possible coup plots in time, and thereby help to suppress them. To maintain loyalty to the political authority, it is necessary to distribute the material benefits to armed forces personnel and keep them well funded. Robust security apparatus, capable of repressing popular dissent is the key to secure the effectiveness of the coup-proofing strategies and practices. For that reason, the security apparatus is given the privilege to access better salaries as well as accommodation and medical opportunities (Makara, 2014 p. 336). Regimes become vulnerable if the regular armed forces are unable and/or unwilling to protect the political authority.

Coup-proofing may reduce military effectiveness (Brook, 2006; Cann & Constantine, 1997) and detrimentally affect combat capacities of the army during the domestic unrest (Pilster & Bohmelt, 2012). For example, in Zaire, Mobutu's coup-proofing efforts significantly diminished military capabilities (Powell, 2012, p. 11). On the other hand, coup-proofing may result in enhancing professionalism in the military (Quinlivan, 1999, p. 133). Nevertheless, as Mehran Kamrava says

"professionalism enhances the autonomy of the military and, if not checked politically, it can increase its tendency to intervene in the affairs of the state. (Kamrava, 2012, p. 69)." Thus, "regimes become vulnerable if the regular armed forces are unable and/or unwilling to protect the political authority" (Makara, 2014, p. 338).

According to Jonathan Powell, "harsh coup-proofing practices can reduce not only the military's effectiveness but also the mobilization capacity of the state" (Powell, 2012, p. 11). In such a case, the regime's ability to conduct counter-insurgency operations will be insufficient because crucial resources are allocated to coup-proofing units and the expertise level in the regular forces is limited. Jeffrey Herbst has noted, "In many African countries, regular armies have failed to mobilize their military against domestic crises due to the coup-proofing measures" (Herbst, 2004, p. 364). For example, in Mali, the military refused to fight against the Tuareg insurgency due to the insufficient resources in the March 2012 coup (RFI, 2012).

Powell also argues that coup-proofing creates vulnerabilities in terms of resisting foreign aggression, thus leaders of such states are less likely to take the role in international conflicts. However, it is also possible that dictators may utilize external conflicts to legitimize vigorous coup-proofing measures (Powell, 2012, pp. 13–14). In such cases, they generally prefer to keep their coup-proofing apparatus out of the external conflict. For example, Saddam Hussein kept the Republican Guard at home during the war against Iran in the 1980s (Quinlivan, 1999, p. 145).

As for the massive purges, as part of coup-proofing in militaries, Powell argues that purges potentially increase the possibility of rebellion (Powell, 2012, p. 14). Furthermore, Albrecht states, "coup-proofing policies in authoritarian regimes can be partially successful to reduce coup risk. Yet, general coup risk remains high if authoritarian rule persists (Albrecht, 2015, p. 660)". Given the discussions on increasing authoritarianism in the Turkish context, it may also imply the Turkish case.

In fact, the study's broader puzzle is about the analyses of post-15 July measures in terms of their effectiveness. Hence, the study tries to find analytical and empirical substance by comparing post-15 July with coup-proofing and previous ones. For that reason, the following section covers the analysis of the JDP's and the Presidential civil control measures.

5 | COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE POST-15 JULY CIVIL CONTROL MEASURES

As mentioned above, the post-15 July civil control measures triggered discussions—mostly among academic circles and media outlets—on the effectiveness of those measures to end the coup risk as well as their possible deleterious effects. Because scholars examining coup-proofing suggest that the most common coup-proofing strategies and associated practices had some deleterious effects such as a decline in military effectiveness externally and capacity to manage domestic threats, which may push the states into a vulnerable position in front of not only against external but also domestic intimidations and aggression.[7]

It seems that the introduction of civil control measures before July 15 with the democratization approach and placing them within the framework of harmonization program with the EU, to a great extent, eliminated the possible doubts about these regulations in all segments of the society, especially in the TAF. Although the Chief of General Staff of the time had a stance against "Almanac" on democratic oversight prepared by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation in 2006 and the presidential election in 2007, this opposition was not respected either in the political circles or in the TAF.

It can also be said that the arrangements made by the JDP Government within the scope of the harmonization program with the EU are highly compatible with the widely accepted democratic control standards. However, they also have failed in preventing the July 15 coup plot like the other failures of Turkey's political history in the promulgation of the impact of prevention measures. This shows that having strong dynamics to prevent coups is not only about making civil-military arrangements to prevent military tutelage. As mentioned above, the dynamics to prevent military coups can only be very powerful in societies which inherit strong democratic values and institutions.

As it is mentioned in the previous sections, political authorities/leaders; fearing coups, tend to intervene in the procedures by building and fostering of multiple internal security agencies and/or parallel security institutions, which will work together with jurisdiction to constantly monitor the military. Another coup-proofing tactic is the intervention in the procedures of recruitment, promotions to make the armed forces loyal, and assignment distribution of material benefits to armed forces personnel and keeps them well funded. Similarly, leaders employing coup-proofing methods will often have Iranian Revolutionary Guards or Saddam's Republican Guard type units by the exploitation of ethnic and familial loyalties to the regime. Following paragraphs aims to make a comparison between the common coup-proofing practices and post-15 July measures.

As for "building creation and fostering of multiple internal security agencies and/or parallel security institutions, which will work together with jurisdiction to constantly monitor the military, which is one of the typical practices of coup-proofing." There are some doubts in Turkey originating, mainly, due to the lack of transparency in the process of filling out the source of the officer's corps, which is largely dismantled. For example, Yaprak Gursoy argued "military high schools and academies were closed down, the path that would allow civilian and high school graduates to become officers... the government has been involved in military promotions and is likely to curb the autonomy of the military" (Gursoy, 2018, p. 170). Furthermore, there are some allegations surfaced over Adnan Tanrıverdi, a former security aide to President Erdoğan and SADAT. Tanrıverdi is a retired army general—known as having Islamist affiliations when he was in the army—and the director of SADAT, which is the first and only private firm that internationally provides consultancy and military training services at the international defense and interior security. Although there are allegations over SADAT of being a parallel army and having the potential to affect the recruitment policy of the Armed Forces, SADAT's size of personnel (23 Officers and NCOs retired from various units of TAF)

cannot be compared to the parallel units such as Iranian Revolutionary Guards or Saddam's Republican Guard. To sum up, however, despite all these ambiguities, there is no objective and concrete evidence showing that army composition after July 15 is very much similar to the army structure formed by the exploitation of "ethnic and religious affiliations" as seen in common coup-proofing practices.

As for the issue of building parallel security units and loyal guards by exploiting ethnic and religious loyalties which are the typical practice of coup-proofing. It is a common practice for leaders/dictators to have strong security units that are solely designed and equipped to guard the political regime and/or leaders. Turkey has armed elements outside the TAF, such as police, gendarmerie, and National Intelligence Agency (MIT). It is a fact that armed elements outside the TAF, such as police, gendarmerie, and National Intelligence Agency (MIT), were strengthened in terms of personnel and equipment, especially after the 1990s. They even equipped with armed personnel carriers, armored combat vehicles, and helicopters. For that reason, the coup plotters first tried to neutralize these institutions. Likewise, it is now more than clear that the police and the judicial jurisdiction were appointed by the FETO to control and monitor part of the TAF before 15 July. At first glance, the facts related to the police and gendarmerie provide a supportive view of the claims about parallel security institutions build up like the coup-proofing practices in authoritarian regimes. However, it is also a fact that to deal with the security problems that pose a hybrid character, it is a necessity for the police, and the gendarmerie to be similar to the armed forces in terms of function, organizational understanding, weaponry, and equipment composition. In addition to that, Turkey has been facing serious internal security problems since 1984. It is the main responsibility of those forces, as internal security forces, to deal with the terrorist groups some of whom are heavily armed too. Therefore, it is more plausible to associate the changes in the structure of the gendarmerie, MIT, and the police in Turkey with changing security concerns, rather than avoiding the risk of a military coup.

Political authorities/leaders employing coup-proofing methods in authoritarian regimes and/or dictatorships will often create and strengthen armed units by the exploitation of ethnic and familial loyalties to the regime. As for the "creation and strengthening armed units by the exploitation of ethnic and familial loyalties to the regime" in the case of Turkey. Turkey has the Presidential Guard Regiment. The Presidential Guard Regiment is a military unit responsible for Presidential protection and honor guard ceremonial duties (Global Security. org, 2016). The composition and the responsibilities of the Presidential Guard Regiment Command are radically changed within the context of the democratic governance process parallel to the harmonization with the EU (2002–2010) and after July 15. But those changes did not lead the political authority to strengthen the Presidential Guard Regiment by the exploitation of ethnic and familial loyalties to the regime. Contrarily, the political authority considered abolishing the Presidential Guard Regiment because some of the Regiment members were involved in the coup attempt. According to the local media reported on July 24, 2016. The last Prime Minister of Turkey, Former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, in a televised interview

with A-Haber TV, said: "There will no longer be a presidential guard, there is no purpose, no need" (Global Security.org, 2016). Hence, developments after July 15 indicates that the current appearance of the Presidential Guard Regiment is not like the examples that we encountered in authoritarian regimes (e.g., Saddam's Republican guards or Iranian Revolutionary Guards).

Another common coup proofing tool is to intervene in the procedures of recruitment, promotions, and distributing material benefits to armed forces personnel by keeping them well funded to make the armed forces loyal. Political authorities/leaders in authoritarian regimes intervene in the procedures of recruitment, promotions, assignments to minimize the coup risk. Moreover, they distribute material benefits to armed forces personnel and keep them well funded. The privileges such as housing, officer's clubs, recreation camps, medical care, and other economic concessions are welcomed as the key to coup-proofing practices of authoritarian regimes as well. In terms of material incentives given to security units to ensure loyalty in Turkey, there have been no remarkable improvements in employee rights (salaries, accommodation, and health opportunities) of the neither TAF nor other security personnel after 15 July. On the contrary, most of the military facilities, seen as a kind of privilege, such as officer's clubs, dwelling-houses, canteens and recreation camps have almost completely lost their advantages not only due to the reduction on maintenance and repair costs but also due to the transfer of their operation rights to the civilians. Moreover, all the military hospitals of the TAF were closed.

Considering these findings, at least for the time being, there is not enough data to allow us to establish a similarity between coup-proofing practices in authoritarian regimes and post-15 July civil control measures. Thus, the following paragraphs deal with the analysis of the post-15 July measures' possible deleterious effects by decontextualizing them from the coup-proofing measures of authoritarian regimes and/or dictatorships.

As mentioned above 15 July Coup Attempt is somewhat, a quite "sui generis" case. However, it seems similar to the 1960 coup because it took place outside the chain of command, and the 1962 and 1963 coup attempts in terms of having been failed, it differs from all military interventions since many of the soldiers who participated in the coup attempt were the part of a religious sect. Government officials blamed Fethullah Gulen (leader of a religious sect) as the chief in charge of the coup and requested immediate extradition from the United States. Although the coup planners declared themselves as the protector of secular democratic targets in the coup manifesto, they broadcast on state television to support the coup attempt, and they failed to provide enough credibility and public support.

Some of the resisting civilians were killed and helicopters and fighter jets attacked some key institutions including the Turkish Grand National Assembly during the July 15 coup attempt. The psychological impact of these attacks on civil society was strong and created a huge consolidation against military interventions in society. This encouraged the JDP government to take a series of harsh measures to revert the Turkish military's autonomous role. It is obvious that those measures deeply affected the institutional autonomy of the military.

In fact, modern armies must acquire a certain amount of military autonomy consistent with commonly accepted rules of civil-military relations. David Pion-Berlin defines two different forms of military autonomy. "The first is political autonomy; the second is institutional autonomy. Institutional autonomy helps to guard the military's core professional functions while political autonomy could seriously weaken the democratic process and institutions of the state. Civilian recognition of institutional autonomy can promote better civilian control as the military reciprocate with respect for civilian authority in political affairs. In that respect, civilian authorities should work to reduce political autonomy while gratifying institutional autonomy" (Pion-Berlin, 1992, p. 84). The most renowned theorist on civil-military relations, Samuel P. Huntington (1981, pp. 80–82), also argues that "through objective control, the military can have autonomy in military matters while pursuing the political goals set by the political authority as well as in carrying out their orders. For example, the civilians do not give orders to the military about the internal regulations required to conduct an operation, while the military has no right to question their subordination to the civilians."

Concordance between the political and the military elites is an essential and paramount part of all known democratic civil control models. The post-15 July civil control measures, which seem to be unilateral, will possibly be questioned in the mid-term by the military elites. In such a case, there will be a necessity for coordination—even concordance—between elites on the issue of civil-military relations. Nevertheless, that may not be enough to coup-poof Turkey. For the civil control measures to be effective in terms of ending the risk of coups in Turkey, wider societal support against military intervention would be necessary. In other words, post-July 15 civil control measures will be effective to end the coup risk in the long term, if they comply with societal perceptions related to democracy, and they are legitimized by all segments of the Turkish society.

As for the effect of post-15 July civil control measures on fighting capability of the military, it is rather easier to assess. Turkish officer corps has lost much of its elite personnel resources initially through alleged coup trials, then through the purges after the failed coup attempt.

As explained above, all 236 suspects were acquitted of the Sledgehammer trial since the digital data submitted as the basic evidence did not constitute evidence in 2015 for being created artificially by FETO members. However, most of the high-ranking officers were forced to retire because of judicial procedures. It is commonly believed that purges during the alleged coup trials occurred with the aid of Gulenist supporters within the military, police, and judiciary. Purging of high-ranking military officers after the alleged coup trials demoralized officer corps. Furthermore, it led to the loss of the most valuable personnel resources. It also negatively affected recruitments and retentions, due to the loss of the credibility of the military profession. Most of the dismissed generals and admirals were replaced through promotions from lower ranks following the trials. Moreover, it is a fact that the liquidation processes carried out with different forms of FETO calipers. Some of them are not even known by the public (one example is the retirement of some high-ranking officers

due to the illegal wiretapping). This inevitably raised questions of experience and competence.

Moreover, the Turkish military lost almost 4,500 more officers and almost half of the generals and admirals after the coup attempt. Most of them have extensive combat experience. Those trials also make certain parts of the society doubt about intention and motivation of the political power to end military tutelage and spread suspicions about condoning and/or supporting the liquidation of intellectual accumulation against JDP. Such a tremendous loss in the personnel echelons in terms of both quantity and quality is most likely to diminish the combat capability of the TAF, at least in the short term. It is going to be difficult to fill the gap stemming particularly from the discharge of, commanding officers of Special Forces, marine corps, commando, airborne and gendarmerie personnel having huge experience in ongoing internal security operations and cross-border operations in Iraq and Syria as well as the fighter jet and helicopter pilots. It will also create a deficiency in terms of assigning qualified personnel not only to NATO, the OSCE, and the UN missions but also to other military posts abroad.

The president's relations with the force commanders may break the traditional command-control practices and likely to stir up controversy in the Turkish officers' corps. Likewise, possible political appointments and promotions may break the long-established traditions of meritocracy and solidarity in the military. Closing of the military education and health care institutions with traditions that go back well over a century and the establishment of National Defense University and University of Health Sciences possibly may hurt fighting capability of the Turkish military. It takes time to gain the previous momentum and effectiveness in military education and health care systems, because of a lack of previous military expertise in education, tutoring, and military health services. It would also take years to have the previous level of military expertise in defense matter both in the military and civilian bureaucracy. Finally, JDP's harsh coup-proofing measures taken by the presidency may hurt battle preparedness and fighting capability on the TAF at least in the short term.

6 | CONCLUSION

Since coup-proofing is generally observed in authoritarian regimes and/or dictatorships, there is a tendency to the similarity between post-15 July measures and coup-proofing measures and call them as the dictator's rules to control the military. This tendency generally stems from the doubts related to the intention of an army design that is ideologically compatible with the existing political power. Indeed, suspicions arose due to the lack of transparency specifically of the processes on how to fill the TAF's highly depleted personnel resources. However, despite all these ambiguities about the intention and motivation of the political power, the results of this study show that the military's post-July 15 composition does not resemble an army structure formed by exploiting ethnic and religious allegiance as part of coup-proofing practices.

Hence, it would not be fair and objective to see the Turkish civil control measures the same as the coup-proofing measures of authoritarian regimes and label them as "the dictators "rule". On the contrary, the civil control measures and practices have clear cut differences from the ones in authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, most of them—especially measures taken between 2002 and 2010, as it is reported by the EU Commission Staff Working Document, are quite convenient with the commonly accepted democratic control standards (Turkey Report, 2019).[8]

The rationale behind the post-July civil control measures of the Turkish Presidency is quite understandable. Because there is a definite need to transform the Turkish military into a more capable of handling security challenges, without becoming a threat to the civilian authority. It is also legitimate even for the sake of stable civil-military relations to purge military and security personnel attending or supporting the coup attempt as well as susceptible members of the Gulenist-type movements. Furthermore, it is not only mandatory but also of great use to purge all the soldiers, having pro-coup thought patterns. Nevertheless, there is a risk to have a more politicized and less functional military, with internal rivalries in it. Such developments may provide a suitable ground for even more restive officer corps having different types of political factionalism in it. It is also very critical, in that respect, not to allow societal divisions.

The results of this study are very much similar to the results of the civil control measures in authoritarian regimes in terms of being effective in preventing coups. Indeed, the post-15 July process helped a lot to improve the coup-proofing capacity of a popularly elected government by ending militaries veto role power. However, failures in almost all previous Turkish coup-proofing measures make the new sets of harsh civil control measures questionable in terms of their durability. Because the Turkish history of civil-military relations clearly shows that having strong dynamics to prevent coups is not only about making civil-military arrangements to prevent military tutelage.

Regarding the possible deleterious effects of the post-15 July measures and measures, they seem to affect the TAF's fighting capability. Especially such as loss of personnel having huge combat experience, changes in the command-control system, and closure of the military education and health care institutions may diminish the effectiveness and battle preparedness of the TAF, at least in short term.

To sum up, the results of this study indicate that there is not enough data to allow us to establish a similarity between coup-proofing strategies and practices in authoritarian regimes and post-15 July civil control measures. In other sayings, the post-15 July civil control measures do not hew to patterns established in the literature related to coup-proofing in authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, the existing theory and frameworks on "coup-proofing" are not convenient to explain Turkish case, at least for the time being.

Finally, the primary aim of democratic governance is to subordinate the military to political authority. However, civilian control may not necessarily mean democratic control. It necessitates the political authority to rule democratically. Only in this case, it is possible to talk about democratic governance in civil–military relations. Moreover, the success of civil control measures is highly dependent on wider societal

acceptance. In other sayings, they can only be legitimized by all segments of Turkish society to the extent that they comply with their perceptions of democracy. In that respect, especially in the Turkish case, the power, and the impact of creating a collective political culture pattern that will assimilate democracy is much more important than applying legal and institutional measures to control the military.

ORCID

Mustafa Uluçakar [ID] https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1607-1802

ENDNOTES

[1] It can be argued that July 15, 2016 coup attempt is different from all previous conventional coup patterns in the Turkish context. It is, somewhat, a quite "sui generis" case in the sense that the available shreds of evidence suggest that an Islamist faction within the secular military attempted to remove conservative/Islamist government from power. Hence, this unique case may not be regarded as evidence for the continuity of military tutelage in Turkey, at least in its conventional form.

[2] Indeed, some of the scholars suggest that coup proofing strategies and associated practices in developing states may result in "decreased military effectiveness" (Biddle & Long, 2004; Pilster & Bohmelt, 2011; Quinlivan, 1999) and, "make states vulnerable to international opponents and possibly even domestic enemies as well" (Cameron, Fariss, & McMahon, 2016, p. 2).

[3] Gokhan Bacik and Sammas Salur's paper (2010) titled "Coup-Proofing in Turkey" and Ramazan Erdağ's paper (2019) titled "After the Failed Military Coup: The Need for the Organizational Reform in the Turkish Military." Both papers point out the necessity of military reforms in Turkey at the operational level rather than evaluating the efficacy of the civil control measures.

[4] A study (in Turkish) related to the post-15 July measures was previously presented as an abstract and a paper in a congress in Turkey in 1918 (the first Bozok International Congress of Political Sciences). However, that study covered the different aspects of the subject matter and mainly related to democratic governance in Turkey. However, this paper specifically aims at making a comparative analysis of post-15 July civil control measures with the most common coup proofing examples and the Turkish civil control measures taken between 2002 and 2010.

[5] The Sledgehammer Case, which lasted 5 years, resulted in the acquittal of 236 officers. The case, which was accepted as the "conspiracy" by the top level of the state, resulted in the victimization of the detained defendants. A total of 188 high ranked officers from the Land, Air, Navy, and Gendarmerie forces are negatively affected. The professional career of the overwhelming majority was ended. Forty-five active generals and staff officers in the Land Forces, 27 in the Air Force, 98 in the Navy, and 18 in the Gendarmerie became accused. Most of them ended their professional career by being forced to retire or dismissed from the army. For example, considering age and registration status, General Bilgin Balanlı was supposed to be the Commander of the Air Force between 2011 and 2013. However, Balanlı spent that period under arrest (Hurriyet, 2015). Additionally, many unjust sufferings happened due to the Ergenekon trial which, aims to liquidate Turkish Armed Forces. In this context, retired veteran, Gendarmerie Colonel Abdulkerim Kırca, staff senior Captain Berk Erden and, commander Ali Tatar ended their life by committing suicide.

[6] Military education in high schools that were providing modern education with the most contemporary equipment was ceased following the failed coup attempt of July 15. The majority of students of the military academies were coming from the five military high schools, which provide education for students aged 14 to 19.

[7] Some of the scholars suggest that coup-proofing strategies and associated practices in developing states may result in "decreased military effectiveness" (Biddle & Long, 2004) "Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48 (4): pp. 535–546; Pilster and Bohmelt (2011) "Coup -proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967–99", *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28(4):331–371; Quinlivan (1999), "Coup Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East", *International Security*, 24 (2): 131–165 and, "make states vulnerable to international opponents and possibly even domestic enemies as well" Cameron et al. (2016), "Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution", *International Interactions* (42) 1 1–30.

[8] EU Commission Staff Working Document Turkey 2019 Report states "the government has overhauled the legal framework governing the civil-military relations and increased the powers of the executive over the military significantly, thereby strengthening civilian oversight.

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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Mustafa Uluçakar is a retired Turkish Army Colonel. He has served in the Turkish Armed Forces for 30 years. He received his Ph.D. degree in political sciences from Hacettepe University, Ankara Turkey. He currently serves as a lecturer in İstanbul Gelişim University, İstanbul, Turkey.