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**AFRICAN UNION INTERVENTION AND SECURITY IN
SOMALIA BETWEEN 2007-2018**

Master Thesis

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Mustafa Osman Aden

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Dedication

This research is dedicated to my beloved parents especially daddy, and my Brothers who have contributed immeasurably to my studies. Finally I would like to say thanks to all my friends who have always given me courage in my academics.



TO ISTANBUL GELISIM UNIVERSITY
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the study was to investigate the role of African Union Mission (AMISOM) on security in Somalia 2007-2018. The objectives were to determine the effect of African Union Mission Peace keeping force on security, to examine the effect of African Union capacity building on security and to examine the effect of African Union human rights protection on security in Mogadishu Somalia. The data was attained from 384 respondents who provided information quantitatively using a questionnaire and simple documentary review. The study results show that African union capacity building has non-significant effect on security in muqdisho Somalia with level of significance above 0.05. African union peace keeping force and African union Human rights protection has a significant relationship with security in Somalia meaning that the functionality of AMISOM can induce security since all the level of significance were below 0.05. The study conclude that African Union Mission Peace keeping force existed in Somalia. They have operated vastly for long period of time; the study established that a little-significant effect exists between African union missions on security in Mogadishu. It's concluded that African union mission has less contribution to security meaning other avenues are to be explored in enhancing the functionality of security apparatus in Somalia. Secondly the study conclude that AU capacity building in Mogadishu is existing there is little significant effect existing between AU capacity building and security in Mogadishu. Third objective concludes that the status of human rights implementation by African union is significant and can generate effective security management for the country. The human rights can be generated to enhance the security apparatus by increasing human rights observance in the country. The study further recommends that there that avenues for improving the peace keeping forces are prudent in generating the functionality of the state security.

The study recommends that there is need for improved functionality of the capacity systems such as enhancement in capacity provided for the training, increases financial resources for the country by the United Nations in designing mechanisms necessary in increased attained capacity for the employees. The study further recommends that the African union need to generate effective concerns on human rights management with the sensitizations needed for developing effective consideration on concerns of human rights.

Keywords: African Union, Security

ÖZET

Çalışmanın amacı, Afrika Birliği Misyonu'nun (AMISOM) Somali 2007-2018'deki güvenlik üzerindeki rolünü araştırmaktır. Amaçlar, Afrika Birliği Misyonu Barışı koruma gücünün güvenlik üzerindeki etkisini belirlemek, Afrika Birliği kapasite geliştirmenin güvenlik üzerindeki etkisini incelemek ve Afrika Birliği insan hakları korumasının Mogadişu Somali'deki güvenlik üzerindeki etkisini incelemektir. Veriler, bir anket ve basit bir belgesel inceleme kullanarak nicel olarak bilgi sağlayan 384 katılımcıdan elde edildi. Çalışma sonuçları, AMISOM Barış Gücü'nün Somali'de güvenlik üzerinde önemli bir etkiye sahip olduğunu göstermektedir ve önem düzeyi 0.000'ın üzerindedir ($p < 0.05$). AMISOM Kapasite geliştirme ve AMISOM İnsan haklarının korunması, Somali'deki güvenlikle anlamlı bir ilişkiye sahiptir, yani şu anlama gelir: AMISOM'un işlevselliği, tüm önem düzeyi 0.005'in altında olduğu için güvenliği sağlayabilir. Çalışma, Afrika Birliği Misyonu Barışı koruma gücünün Somali'de var olduğu sonucuna varmıştır. Afrika birliği misyonunun Mogadişu'da güvenlik konusunda güvenlik konusunda var olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Afrika birliği misyonunun güvenliğe daha az katkısı olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır, bu da Somali'deki güvenlik aygıtlarının işlevselliğini artırmak için başka yolların araştırılması gerektiği sonucuna varılmıştır. İkinci olarak çalışma, Mogadişu'da AU kapasite geliştirmenin gerekli olduğu sonucuna varmıştır. mevcut Moga'da AU kapasite geliştirme ve güvenlik arasında önemli bir etki var yemek. Üçüncü amaç, Afrika birliği tarafından insan hakları uygulamasının statüsünün önemli olduğu ve ülke için etkili bir güvenlik yönetimi oluşturabileceği sonucuna varmaktadır. Ülkede insan haklarına uyumu artırarak güvenlik aygıtını geliştirmek için insan hakları oluşturulabilir. Çalışma ayrıca, orada barışı koruma güçlerini geliştirme yollarının devlet güvenliğinin işlevselliğini oluşturmada ihtiyatlı olmasını tavsiye etmektedir. Yerel topluluklardaki yerel güç entegrasyonlarını artırarak güvenlik yollarının yönetiminde etkinliği geliştirecek politika mekanizmalarına ihtiyaç vardır. İkinci olarak, çalışma, çalışanlar için artan kapasitede gerekli mekanizmaların tasarlanmasında Birleşmiş Milletler tarafından eğitim için sağlanan kapasitenin artırılması, ülke için mali kaynakların artırılması gibi kapasite sistemlerinin işlevselliğinin iyileştirilmesine ihtiyaç olduğunu önermektedir. Çalışma ayrıca, Afrika birliğinin insan haklarına ilişkin kaygılar üzerinde etkili bir değerlendirme geliştirmek için ihtiyaç duyulan duyarlılıklarla birlikte insan hakları yönetimi konusunda etkili kaygılar yaratması gerektiğini önermektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Afrika Birliği, Güvenlik

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ARPCT	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
ASF	Africa Standby Force
AU	African Union
CPD	Community Professional Development
DIFID	Department for International Development
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States Standby Force
ENDF	Ethiopian National Development Force
EU	European Union
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FOBs	Forward Operating Bases
ICU	Islamic courts union
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authorities on Development
IGASOM	Inter-Governmental Authorities on Development Somalia
ISF	International Stabilization Force
MPF	Multi Partner Fund
NARC	North African Regional Capability
OECD	Organization economic cooperation development
PSC	Peace Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operations
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RSFs	Regional Standby Forces
SIP	Strengthening Institutional Performance
SSF	SADC Standby Force
SNA	Somali national army
STEFS	Support to Emerging Federal States
TCCS	Troops contributing countries
TFG/I	Transitional Federal Government/Institution
UNDP	United Nations Development Programs
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNOSOM	united Nations operations Somalia
UNITAF	Unified task force

UNSOS **United nation support office Somalia**

UIC **Union Islamic force**

WB **World Bank**



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PREFACE

FIRST, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY GRATITUDE TO ALLAH, THE ALL-POWERFUL, THE MOST GRACIOUS, AND THE MOST MERCIFUL, FOR HIS BLESSINGS ON ME DURING MY ACADEMIC CAREER AND IN THE COMPLETION OF THIS THESIS.

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I would like to thank all the research participants for agreeing to be questionnaire for this study. During the online questioner I had with them, I benefited from the support and involvement of many ordinary people and local levels, and I want to thank them for their excellent contribution. Additionally any person who help to fill questioner so I say thanks so much.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

AMISOM has been sent into the weak State of Somalia as a result of the constant violence there. The AU has been able to start peace support operations through a UN Support Office. Since the early 1990s, when the country's national government fell, Somalia has remained unstable. Previous peace support missions fell short of their objectives. Since 2007, the AMISOM mission has presented with muqdisho. Those who have supported Somalia's feeble federal government in implementing its strategy. The unpredictable cost of the wars, the difficulty of resolving prolonged interstate wars trying to follow a Civil War, and the constantly evolving nature of Asymmetric combat just have a few gridlocks that ongoing conflict wars create, such as activities promoting security. It is crucial for approaching such impasses in peacebuilding operations from a solutions-based perspective, especially now the UN, national security institutions, and the global community are becoming more aware of the human cost and material support of peacebuilding initiatives. The issue regardless of where the current assembled peace bolster activities would also accomplish expectations Report card displays provide to achieve peaceful relations, mainly important so the bloody dispute in muqdisho ongoing endangers peace and regional security, and also that previously intercessions due to Somali wars' failings to give difficult stability. Peace support operations (PSOs) are the primary necessity to intervene in world community violence. Their main goal is to eliminate the conflict by bringing about social transformation within these places lowering the degree of crime as well as dealing with its root causes. Intrastate conflicts have dominated the world since the Cold War ended. Those were frequently a country where different militias supported a variety of interests, including ones related to the economy, support, or preferred local politics. When localized violence crosses state borders, conflicts frequently worsen and regional or even global stability and security are threatened. So even though Somalia provides an excellent training facility for terrorists, it currently poses a threat to the stability of the region. Change in some of these situations involves a transformation of the local social and political structures. Because they offer support and serve as recruitment centers for

hostile combatants, local organizations in that struggle zones' armed forces were becoming their priorities. In these situations, peaceful activities coexist with terrorist attacks, as well as humanitarian efforts are carried out in the background of armed confrontation. Fighting also can break out anywhere at any time, not only in relatively isolated areas the disputed use "will not have a properly specified initiation or definite end" as a result. People's choices of military actions are complex, nonlinear conflicts that are fought over people's hearts and minds with the goal of laying the groundwork for social responses. Argues between different genders might take various shapes, such as in Palestine, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq, and they often share a number of similarities. Instances include malleable goals, hazy distinctions between the army, operational, or structural levels, a focus on force prevention (rather than just operation completion), as well as asymmetrical relationships among state and also non state actors

1.1 Nature of operations

Activities should have been intended to support peace-building strategies. Some operations would make the task take longer. AMISOM has demonstrated obvious flaws in the way they carry out its operations. Such peace-building strategies are bolstered by frameworks that are weak nor need lacking in implementation. The military element of the system protects a country and its people from militant attacks. Nevertheless, until AMISOM troops leave Somalia, armed forces have promised to continue their hostilities. Military forms, operational and cultural tacticizations awareness, military attacking and defending indicators, diplomatic moves, weakness and strength of the militant Group, vulnerability assessment of army detachments, and strategic attitude can be used to examine the nature of operations. These factors influence the process of maintaining peace. The military organization should revise its own tactics in terms of achieving sturdy.

1.1.2 Background of the study

A historical perspective, theoretical perspective, contextual background, and conceptual perspectives of the study are used as the foundation for the background of the thesis, which will be provided below.

1.2.3 Historical Perspective

The first peaceful, representative democracy transfer of authority in Africa may well have taken place in Somalia while the parliamentary system had been in for nine years that followed the country's independence in 1960. (Samatar A., 2016). The military under Mohamed Ziyad barre removed the elected civilian government in coalitional with various clan-based rebel organizations and finally viciously overthrew the military regime in 1991, completing the period of twenty-one years of dictatorial control (Elmi, 2010). The military regime infringed on people's human rights severely while being in power. Particularly the past ten years have been incredibly violent and coercive (Africa Watch Committee, 1990). It's really crucial to have a deep understanding of Somali history, society, and culture in assessing. Somalia is positioned near the Arabian Peninsula as well as the Gulf of Aden. It was historical similarities with such a variety of cultural currents in the region. For instance, Somalia has been revered as "God's Land" (also recognized as the Land of Punt) by the Egyptians, while the Greek traders who actually traveled the Red Sea called it the "Land of Blacks." The name Beriberi was provided to this region by its Arab neighbors. German researchers claim that the Somali people, who are responsible for giving Somalia its name, first inhabited and governed the Horn of Africa 5,000 years ago. Even so, historians and archaeologists have discovered linguistic, cultural, and traditional similarities between Somalis and Eastern Cushitic Genealogical groups.

The Oromo, and Ethiopia's most populous ethnic group; the Afar people who lived between Ethiopia and Sudan. Djibouti; Eastern Sudan's Baja tribes; and Kenya's Boni tribes. To put it another way, modern Somalis are deeply ingrained in African culture.

The commonly accepted assumption that the Somali people, also known as Samaale or Samaal, originated in Africa is in conflict with this theory.

Globally, Security is an important force of life and countries that have lived to the expectation of peace have attained an appropriate intervention forces that have ensured security and peace in their countries. Western states, in particular the United States, were concerned about the growing strength of the Islamic courts union (ICU) an alliance of Islamic-based factions, which reportedly harbored terrorists including those

who bombed the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The United States also declared that the ICU maintained ties with the Al-Qaeda terrorist network.

In response, the United States funded a second alliance of Somali factions known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) founded in February 2006 (Kraleev, 2006). Street fighting increased in March 2006 as the ICU initiated a more aggressive offensive against its rivals. By early June 2006, the ARPCT were on the retreat and the ICU demonstrated that it held the upper hand in Mogadishu and other areas outside the capital.

In Africa, African Union mission in Somalia actual birth can be traced to January 2007 when the AU's Peace and Security Council voted to assume the mandate and responsibility from IGAD for a peacekeeping mission in Africa (AUPSC, 2007). Transferring the mandate from IGAD to the AU was a result of needing greater African military involvement in the operation. The UN did present its authorization in Security Council Resolution 1725 (2006) for non-IGAD African states to contribute forces to IGASOM in recognition of the few IGAD members available for deploying contingents. In recognition of this statement, the AU assumed responsibility for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia on 19 January 2007 and officially mandated the operation. The AU by this action officially opened the peacekeeping operation to all AU members and not just those of IGAD. Members of IGAD officially backed the transfer of responsibility to the AU on 28 January. However, this left one possible legal technicality. The UN authorization of December 2006 specifically named IGAD and IGASOM in reference to a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. To eliminate any possible question of international authorization, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1744 (2007) on 20 February 2007. In the same resolution, the UN provided a specific partial exemption to the 1992 arms embargo for AMISOM (UNSCR, 2007). A small advance element of Ugandan peacekeepers arrived in Somalia on 1 March 2007 and was quickly followed by a battalion sized unit under the banner of AMISOM.

Somalia's security remains unstable since the fall of national government in the early 1990s. Previous peace support operations failed to meet their mandates. African Union Mission (AMISOM) in Somalia has been there since 2007. They have been supporting the weak Federal Government of Somalia in stabilization plan (Hesse, 2014). Violent conflicts continue to unfold fresh gridlocks for peace support operations not limited

to; unpredictable cost of wars; uncertainty in ending protracted intrastate conflicts in the post-cold war periods and the ever changing face of asymmetrical warfare. The urgency of a solutions based approach to such impasses occasioned in peace support operations is real, especially at a time when UN, regional security mechanisms and the international community are grappling with the actualities of human cost and material support in peace building schedules (Reno, 2011). Given that Somalia's unending violent conflict threatens regional peace and stability, and that previous interventions for Somali wars failed to yield durable peace, the question of whether or not current mounted peace support operations will live up to expected scorecard performances to deliver sustainable peace is imperative.

1.3.4 Theoretical Perspective

The research is based on Lederach's peacebuilding conflict transformation theory. According to the theory, a broad definition of peace includes Johan Galtung's negative and positive peace. Lederach's (1997) study on the relationship between peacebuilding approaches and long-term peace outcomes is dependent on timeframes ranging from immediate to long-term strategies, integrated frameworks that link the multiple actors involved in various peacebuilding activities, and local people as the most valuable resource. Structure, process, reconciliation, resources, and coordination are the five major concepts in Lederach's (1997) framework. The structured way of looking at the people in a conflict zone and figuring out how everyone can help bring about peace. The top, middle, and bottom levels of peacebuilding. The state of security required is based on the efforts made to provide security through established peace avenues. In order to increase people's security through organizations the Somalia Mission of the African Union (AMISOM) heavily relies upon a structure, process, reconciliation, resources, and coordination.

1.3.5 Conceptual Perspective

In this study, there are two independent and dependent variables. Security is the dependent variable, and the African Union Mission (AMISOM) is the independent variable. The African Union is going to be leading the UN Security Authority AMISOM is a regional peace support effort led by the African Union. Its duties include helping in the development of a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian assistance supporting interim governments, carrying out a plan for global defense, going to

prepare security forces in Somalia as well as aiding in executing a strategy for country safety. The AMISOM, an African Union Task with a six-month policy, was founded by the African Union Security Council on January 19, 2007. (UNSC, 2007). The operation's mission was approved by the UN Security Council on February 21, 2007. With an obligation of six months (UNSC, 2007). After that, Every 6 months, AMISOM's mandate has been renewed. both the African Union Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Security Council also provided their blessing. The Union of Africa Mission (AMISOM) is examined on its potential to uphold security, foster capacity development, and defend human rights. A peacekeeping force is something this study concentrates and it refers to the powers and military members that the purpose of an African Union in Somalia sent to maintain security and catch criminals. The term "capacity building" in this study refers to the training and funding that AMISOM has given to the forces and societies to fight anxiety. Protecting human rights involves keeping people's basic liberties intact, especially once AMISOM operations are taking place to keep people safe.

Conversely, security, which is described as freedom (or strength to) possible damage (or other unwanted coercive change) affected by others, is a dependent variable, Persons and social classes, things, as well as organizations, ecologies, or other issues and phenomena that is susceptible to change, can be considered beneficiaries (technical of security (Maruf, 2018). Security can also be used to describe the lack of harm, an existence as for the necessary positive, resistance against possible hurt, injury, concealment, and a state of mind Defense against hostile forces is the most frequent association of security. Once determining security, consideration is given to factors such as personal protection, human security, and overall security (Hassan, 2018).

1.4.6 Contextual Perspective

From the collapse of the nation in 1991 until the implementation of AMISOM, Somalia appears to lack a stable, functioning government. But After AMISOM has been founded in 2007 An African Union-mandated peacekeeping force with the permission a member of the United Nations "the Transitional Federal Government/Institution (TFG/I) was established and given the authority to rule the nation (Nduwimana, 2013:3). The parliament of Somalia elected the "first permanent president" to head a national Government in muqdisho in 2012 with a help of operational TFIs (Fisher,

2013). (FGS). The involvement of cessations organizations, endorsing for the referendum, and technical initiatives have all assisted the peace process in Somalia. The countries disbanded security forces there have reconstructed and are being instructed by AMISOM (AU, 2014). AMISOM restored peace and security, repulsing al-Shabaab from their strongholds. The outcome has been of this conciliation, Somali leaders were able to involve different conflict participants. AMISOM forces carried out counter-radicalization efforts while maintaining a military presence (AU, 2014). As a result of these successes, Somalia's state sovereignty is gradually being restored (Fisher, 2013). Radical organizations like al-Shabaab have become more powerful because no previous intervention had described these accomplishments. The "largest and most important The "only peace operation initiated under AU command and control" and the "only peace operation ever conducted by the AU" (Bruton and Williams,2014: 2) initially experienced troop dedication constraints, struggled with numerous staff loss and revealed with material, financial, and bureaucratic limitations. In spite of this, the mission has successful in terms of building a stronger military, political, and state building.

The African Union Mission in Somalia has encountered Mission challenges, including the inability to completely secure the region, despite state-building interventions and the removal of the African Union from significant strongholds. The Somalia areas, particularly Mogadishu, continue to be targeted by the Al Shabab. Travel in the city of Mogadishu is still restricted, with bomb attacks occurring on a daily basis (Fisher, 2016). The situation in terms of security and humanitarian aid is still complicated. The struggle for power and resources continues unabated, exacerbated by clan politics and the threat of Al-Shabab. These factors have posed a serious threat to Somalia's peace. Noting that military efforts have been undertaken for so long, it is possible that military action will not be able to sufficient a permanent solution to the muqdisho conflict. In this light, a shift in attitude and behavior triggered by relationship building, trust, and understanding may be able to affect the fundamental construct of people's ideology, bringing the violent conflict to an end (Kingsley, 2017)

1.5.6 Statement of the Problem

Security in Somalia continue to be a continuous problem since the country's main government fell in 1991. Security issues persist despite the creation of a federal transitional government in 2012. Periodic bombings, attacks on civilians, a high level of armed security in the city, the presence of internally displaced camps in Mogadishu, and restricted movement of people in the city are all common occurrences. Despite the presence of an African peacekeeping force known as AMISOM, security instability exists (Hassan, 2018). Since 2007, when it was sanctioned, Stability has been provided by the African Union mandated in muqdisho to important buildings like the government offices, parliament, and the state house.

Africa has provided training to local forces in order to empower them to work harder in areas such as human rights education. Despite the progress made, security in Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu, remains a major challenge (Roggio & Gutowski, 2018). Investigation into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on security in Somalia is needed as a result of this to iron out any kinks in security provisions in Somalia.

1.6.7 Purpose of study

Assessing how it African Union Mission (AMISOM) operated in terms of Somalia's security from 2007 to 2018 was the study's main objective.

1.7.8 Specific Research Objectives

To determine an impact within African Union Mission's peacekeeping force in Mogadishu, Somalia.

- 1 To assess the impact of African Union peace keeping force on Mogadishu's security?
- 2 To assess the impact of African Union capacity building on Mogadishu's security?
- 3 To assess the impact of African Union human rights protection on Mogadishu's security?

1.8.9 Research questions

- 1 What does effect of African Union's peace keeping force on security in Mogadishu, Somalia?
- 2 What does the African Union's capacity building impacted security in Mogadishu, Somalia?
- 3 What role does the African Union's human rights protection play in security in Mogadishu, Somalia?

2.0 Scope of the study

2.1 Geographical Scope

Mogadishu, Somalia was the site of the writing. Because of the insecurity in the Mogadishu area, Mogadishu was chosen as the location. Insecurity has rocked Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia, which is why the study will be conducted there.

2.2 Subject Scope

The thesis looked into the impact of the Somalia Mission of the African Union (AMISOM) on security in Mogadishu. The study's goal was to determine how the African Union's peacekeeping force affected security as well as the impact of African Union human rights protection and capacity building on security.

2.3 Time Scope

The topic of the research took place over a 12-year period. From 2007 to 2018, will focus on this period. The thesis research took place over the course of four months, from March 2022 to June 2022. The time allotted can be used to collect data from the field in a manner that is appropriate and reasonable.

2.4 Significance of the study

The following actors will benefit from the research: students, scholars, policy makers.

2.5 Research interview

The interview is a crucial method of collecting data that involves verbal communication between the researcher and the respondents. Even though surveys regularly utilize interviews, would much rather design a questionnaire for exploratory and descriptive studies. There are several different methods for conducting an interview, ranging from totally unorganized, where the participant is available to talk about anything they want, to strongly structured, in which the person involved's responses have been constrained to having to respond to relevant questions, so I will likely have used a questionnaire method. The design of the interview, which expects responses from the participant directly, will determine the quality of the data that is gathered. With the assistance of formal interviews, one is able to enquire every participant the identical inquiries in the same manner. There will be careful planning out a timetable of questions, and a quantitative approach to data analysis is frequently planned.

I will document or register all responses to the questionnaire. The period amount of time required for coding and content analysis is drastically decreased by reducing the number of open-ended responses, and frequently the information can be entered directly into an analyzing computer. It is crucial that I strictly follow the interview guidelines provided, so according to university policy, once trying to conduct a structured interview.

2.6 Policymakers:

The study will provide information that will assist policymakers in establishing police that will aid the African Union's effective operation in bringing lasting peace to Somalia.

2.7 Academia

As a result, this paper contributes to a greater body of knowledge about the capacity of international society to protect populations living in surroundings that are considered to be "failed state" conditions. The writing will provide a student with knowledge on AMISOM and security, allowing the student to graduate with a master's in public administration and political science

2.8 Governments

The study will then make recommendations to the African Union on how to move forward in bringing lasting peace to Somalia in collaboration with the government. The study will also reveal whether the African Union is taking the right approach to ending the conflict in Somalia.

The thesis also contributes to the investigation of peacekeeping efforts by offering a redefinition of peacekeeping practices the government can use to achieve total peace and security in Somalia.

2.9 Operational definitions

The African Union is actually leading the UN Security Council-approved African Union operation in muqdisho (AMISOM), a regional peacekeeping operation. The AMISOM is assessed on how well it upholds human rights and, builds capacity, and role as a peacekeeping force. According to Gee (2016), the peacekeeping mission of the African Union forces/military personnel is responsible for securing and combating criminality in Somalia. In this study, capacity building refers to the financial and training resources provided by AMISOM to the forces and communities to combat insecurity. Human rights protection refers to the preservation of human beings' fundamental freedoms, particularly during AMISOM operations aimed at ensuring people's safety. Stability also can refer to missing damage, an appearance of a necessary great, resistance to harm or damage that might occur, confidentiality, containment, and a state of mind. Protection against hostile forces is the most frequent association of security. Security is considered in terms of personal security, human security, and national security (Kralev, 2006). security refers to both institutional security measures (such as ensuring that doors are secured, alarms are on, windows are closed, etc.) and individual security measures (such as making sure doors are locked, alarms are on, windows are closed, etc.). (Arsenault, 2014). The term "human security" refers to a new paradigm that prioritizes personal and communal security in nation-states' traditional emphasis on their right to self-defense (United Nations, 1945). The term "national defense protects a national state, which includes its own citizens, economy, and institutions. State and local governments employ a variety of strategies, including diplomacy, economic may very well, and military capabilities, to accomplish their objectives (United Nations General Assembly, 2010).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This section presents information that has been attained by different authors concerning the study of the African Union Mission (AMISOM) and security in Somalia. This chapter is dimensioned into theoretical perspective, and related literature review based on the specific research objectives and finally the research gaps.

2.1 Theoretical Review

The research is based on Lederach's peacebuilding conflict transformation theory. According to the review, a broad definition of peace incorporates Johan Galtung's negative and positive peace. Lederach's (1997) study on the relationship between peacebuilding approaches and long-term peace outcomes is dependent on timeframes ranging from immediate to long-term strategies, integrated frameworks that link the multiple actors involved in various peacebuilding activities, and local people as the most valuable resource.

Structure, process, reconciliation, resources, and coordination are the five fundamental concepts of Lederach's (1997) framework. The structure of looking at the people in a conflict zone and figuring out how everyone can help bring about peace. The top, medium, and bottom layers of peacebuilding. The state of security necessary is based on the efforts made to offer security through established peace outlets. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is heavily reliant on structure, procedure, reconciliation, resources, and cooperation to improve people's security through organizations.

The third concept of reconciliation, according to Lederach, is crucial to maintaining peace. Reconciliation entails persuading the aggrieved parties to look beyond the current dispute concerns in order to recognize their interdependence and rebuild their relationships. The fourth resource notion acknowledges that "the greatest resource for long-term peace is always rooted in the local people and their culture" (Lederach, 1997, p. 94). While financial and material resources are necessary for achieving peace, Lederach believes that sociocultural resources are crucial in maintaining it. Finally,

the concept of strategic coordination of peacebuilding efforts through a peace infrastructure will maximize resource utilization and generate synergy across the various levels and phases of peacebuilding.

2.2 AMISOM: A Very Brief Overview

Since arriving in Mogadishu in March 2007, AMISOM has experienced a dramatic change. Since its inception, the mission has expanded geographically to include all of south-central Somalia. More than 22,000 Ugandan troops have joined AMISOM since its inception, up from an original deployment of roughly 1,600 troops. The origins of those troops have likewise changed throughout time. Because of the potential for harmful political dynamics, the AU and UN initially determined that AMISOM should not include troops from neighboring nations i Somalia. Djibouti, on the other hand, altered its decision and sent troops to AMISOM in December 2011. AMISOM was not involved in Kenya's and Ethiopia's operations, which took place at the end of 2011. Some of Kenya's military joined AMISOM in 2012, while others from Ethiopia joined in January of 2014. A little more than half of the force is now constituted by these "frontline states," and the acting Force Commander is Ethiopian. Initially, AMISOM served as a protective force for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the United Nations Security Council's "all-inclusive Somali security forces," which were the TFG's institutions.

AMISOM began fighting al-Shabaab in cities in 2009. This grew into a bigger counter-insurgency and stability campaign that was carried out in both rural and urban regions over the next few years. Despite obtaining a temporary boost of about 4,000 more (mostly Ethiopian) troops in January 2014, AMISOM launched a number of combat operations targeting al-Shabaab holdings in south-central Somalia. The national army of Somalia (SNA) as well as its associated troops were involved in the majority of these operations.

2.3 UNOSOM I (1992-93)

In January 1992, during the Somali civil war, the UN sent a small observer team and a protection force to Mogadishu to monitor a ceasefire agreement. When the situation on the ground shifted, a cease-fire was quickly broken, and the mission was forced to retreat to its barracks. In the face of rising public concern about the war's civilian losses, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) is trying to keep the peace. The Unified Task Force, a far larger intervention force led by the United States, arrived and began the withdrawal process (UNITAF). Following UNITAF's withdrawal, a new UN peacekeeping force, UNOSOM II, was established in its place.

2.3.1 UNITAF (1992-93)

For humanitarian aid efforts in Somalia, a secure environment had to be established as soon as feasible in December 1992, when a US-led task force landed in the country. US-led UNITAF (unified task force) deployed over southern and central Somalia, numbering around 37,000 soldiers. UNITAF sought to leave Somalia after achieving some early successes in calmly providing humanitarian assistance and dissuading of the military parties. While other countries wanted UNITAF to focus on disarming local militias, the United States specifically did not want UNITAF to get engaged in any aspects of state formation or disarmament. When UNITAF and the UN Secretary-General couldn't agree on these problems, UNITAF began a gradual withdrawal from Somalia in March 1993 and transferred some of its forces to UNOSOM II, a new and larger UN peacekeeping operation. Thus, UNITAF's withdrawal strategy was to transfer some of its forces to a successor mission, while the United States left behind some unilateral forces that were meant to act in tandem with the new UN operation.

2.3.2 UNOSOM II (1993-95)

The United Nations decided to deploy a multifaceted peacekeeping mission with around 28,000 uniformed people after UNOSOM I (united nation operation Somalia) was defeated and the United States decided to withdraw the majority of its forces from UNITAF. UNOSOM II was tasked with the mission of disarming "unauthorized armed elements" involved in the conflict in Somalia and preventing a return to violent activity throughout south-central Somalia. It was difficult for this organization to carry out its

purpose, and in June of 1993, 24 peacekeepers lost their lives while attempting to disarm rebels led by Mohammed Farah Aideed. On October 3 and 4, 1993, a unilateral operation carried out by the United States (US) with the intention of apprehending individuals accused of leading the Somali National Alliance went terribly awry. It is estimated that between eighteen United States soldiers, one United Nations peacekeeper, and one thousand Somalis were slain in the subsequent conflict. The United States withdrew its military from Somalia as a direct result of this occurrence. The United Nations began planning for a phased departure of its operation as it became clear that it would soon lose one of its most important contributing countries. This was especially concerning given that US forces had provided the majority of the logistical support for UNOSOM II. Beginning in the latter half of 1994 and continuing into the early months of 1995, UNOSOM II began to reduce the number of troops that was stationed in Somalia. As a result, the country is now in a condition that is comparable to when the organization first arrived.

2.3.3 IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (2005- 06)

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) recommended the deployment of a 10,500-strong Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) in response to a request from TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf in January 2005. Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, would be the organization's first stop. The African Union's Peace and Security Council backed IGASOM in May 2005 and agreed in July that an AU peace operation will eventually succeed IGASOM. 32 Only Uganda prepared any soldiers for the expedition since the IGASOM idea failed to gain enough political traction. It was as a result of this that IGASOM was not deployed. Nonetheless, a clear departure strategy was envisioned: IGASOM would be transferred to an AU-led operation as part of an institutional transfer.

3.1 International Stabilization Force (2008)

For a short time toward the end of 2008, the concept of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) was discussed as a means of easing the transition from AMISOM to an UN-led peacekeeping force. Although the African Union and a number of African states had long desired for AMISOM to be recognized as a United Nations peacekeeping mission, the notion did not receive much support from outside the region until late

2008. The United States government under George W. Bush at the time spearheaded a fresh effort to get the United Nations involved in Somalia. Washington's primary concern was that AMISOM would be unable to fill the security void that would be created if Ethiopia withdrew. A lot of diplomatic work was done in New York, and in the middle of November 2008, the UN Secretary-General recommended sending an International Stabilization Force of "approximately two brigades" to Mogadishu. The ISF's role was to facilitate the implementation of the Djibouti peace deal and the deployment of a comprehensive United Nations peacekeeping force. 34 Middle of December saw the UN Secretary-General told the Security Council that only 14 of the 50 countries he had asked for help had responded to his request for assistance with the ISF, despite his belief that only "a multinational force" was "the right tool for stabilizing Mogadishu." This was despite the efforts of the United States and senior African Union officials to gain support for the idea.

However, just two of them were willing to provide money (the United States and the Netherlands). There were no military commitments or offers of leadership from any country. To prepare for the anticipated security void that would result from the demise of the ISF, the Secretary-General looked into various options.

3.2 Ethiopian Intervention 1 (2006-09) In 2006,

Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia has ordered the Ethiopian military to assist the Somali TFG (transitional federal government) in their move to Mogadishu. Eritrea's destabilizing mission from the north and the UIC's proclamation of jihad against Ethiopia were two of the four interrelated grounds he cited for the involvement. "clear and present danger" triggered the Somali government's right to self-defense under international law due to the presence of Ethiopian insurgents who seek to overthrow Ethiopia's government by force and the continued influx of foreign terrorist groups aiming to advance the extremist agenda of the UIC. 36 Ethiopia's officials realized their presence in Mogadishu was problematic soon after ENDF (Ethiopian national defense force) troops installed the TFG (transitional federal government) there in December 2006. Because military occupations are typically met with hostility on the ground (the ENDF operation was one of just since 1989), this was not surprising (the others being Iraq in Kuwait, Uganda in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the US-led coalition in Iraq). All other foreign forces should be withdrawn from Somalia,

as well, according to the UN Security Council. To protect the TFG in Mogadishu, Ethiopia envisioned using AMISOM to remove its soldiers while leaving a security presence behind. As originally planned, AMISOM was expected to become a UN peacekeeping mission by mid-2007. This meant that Ethiopian forces were left without a backup security force in Somalia when AMISOM couldn't raise enough troops and countries to cover their withdrawal. Meles Zenawi officially acknowledged in December 2007 that the Ethiopian soldier withdrawal was taking "a lot longer" than expected. Meles was under increasing pressure from inside the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front to leave Somalia by the end of 2008. (EPRDF). To begin with, Ethiopian forces were not scheduled to leave until Djibouti agreements were reached in the second half of 2008. In order to avoid a political quagmire, increased casualties, and rising financial expenditures, Ethiopia developed a strategy for withdrawal. Over the course of 18 months, the ENDF had to put up with partial success (the installation of the TFG) in order to preserve itself from complete failure. As a result, AMISOM became Ethiopia's strategy for exiting the country. A staged departure from Mogadishu was done by the ENDF, which reduced its initial intervention numbers fast but left behind a smaller, besieged force.

3.3 Kenyan Intervention, Operation Linda Nchi (2011-12)

Operation Linda Nchi was initiated on October 16, 2011, by 6,000 Kenyan troops (Swahili to protect the nation). It was the first time troops had crossed the border in such a public manner. One of Kenya's stated goals was to prevent al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya by constructing a buffer zone up to the al-Shabaab stronghold of Afmadow. An arms embargo on Somalia was violated by Kenyan activities between October 16, 2011, and June 2, 2012, as they were not members of AMISOM, and only after January 5, 2012, was their area of operations expanded to include Sector 2. An estimated US\$180 million and 50 deaths a month were estimated by some observers in February 2012, while Kenya did not give any public records of its deaths. Due to a variety of factors operation, Linda Nchi was halted. First and foremost, the mission's financial burden was becoming increasingly burdensome. Second, the Kenyan government decided that a multinational force, rather than a solo expedition, would give them greater international legitimacy. Re-hatting most of Kenya's forces into the successor mission, AMISOM, was Kenya's disengagement option here. Like Ethiopia, AMISOM offered

Kenya a way out of its unilateral military operation in January 2009. In the future, Kenyan authorities would add more air and sea capabilities that were not under AMISOM command and control to their AMISOM forces.

3.3.1 Ethiopian Intervention 2 (2011-14)

Ethiopian military returned to Somalia in December 2011. This time, they join Kenya's Operations Linda Nchi to attack al-Shabaab from a different angle and create a safe haven the danger. In December and February 2012, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) took control of the strategic towns of Beletweyne and Baidoa. The ENDF operations helped AMISOM grow beyond Mogadishu by giving al-Shabaab a new place to attack. Soldiers from the ENDF remained in Somalia to help stabilize what would constitute sections 3 and 4 of AMISOM. Many troops cooperated with AMISOM soldiers up till January 2014 also Ethiopia opted to send as part of a brief "spike" of reinforcements for the AU operation, it will dispatch a few of its own troops to join AMISOM, as had been agreed endorsed in November 2013 by the UN Security Council. Alterations in the global political climate influenced Ethiopia's second military incursion. For instance, Ethiopian troops are already in Somalia, therefore the UN Security Council expanded AMISOM to make it simpler for them to join the campaign.

This changed how Ethiopia's troops left the country. Ethiopia also had a lot of worries about money, which were eased when it joined AMISOM. Ethiopia, like Kenya, kept doing operations on its own in Somalia to help its AMISOM contingent.

In the Third Ethiopian Response (2015-ongoing) there were reportedly around 3,000 ENDF soldiers in the Gedo region of Somalia as of July 2015. There may be more Liyu police in Somalia's Galgadud region than the 4,000-8,000 reported by other official sources. To the best of our knowledge, ENDF forces are currently engaged in combat alongside their AMISOM counterparts in the Bay and Gedo regions in support of Operation Juba Corridor. It's now unclear how these ENDF troops and Liyu police officers plan to evacuate. Is there anything the AMISOM soldiers may take away from these operations? There appears to be a pattern of passing the peacekeeping baton on to different operations. UNOSOM II and the initial Ethiopian intervention force were the only ones to completely withdraw their troops from Somalia. As for the latter, they

were only gone for a short time, as additional Ethiopian troops returned late in 2011. Second, till September 2012, Somalia lacked a political system that might theoretically form a security force able of performing autonomous operations for national defense. Third, four separate overseas military operations—the unsuccessful Operation IGASOM in 2006, Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi, and the two Ethiopian interventions in Somalia in 2006 and 2011—have all employed AMISOM as their escape plan. This means that other countries have been sluggish to withdraw their soldiers from Somalia despite the numerous issues that arise as a result of these military operations. Related to the previous point, Kenya and Ethiopia took unilateral action to establish buffer zones or halt what they perceived to be a threat in Somalia. They did so by advocating for decentralization of government authority in Somalia, which would give Nairobi and Addis Ababa more influence than the central government in Mogadishu. This created a difficult situation for AMISOM, which had to balance the needs of the Federal Government with those of the countries on the front lines. Many Somalia, as we'll see later, believe the mission hasn't accomplished its stated goals.

3.3.2 Assessing the Effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

The African Union Operation in Somalia (AMISOM) and the wider political and security dynamics in Somalia are examined in this investigation to determine whether or not the mission has met its current strategic objectives. One of the several international actors working to stabilize the country, AMISOM is now in its eleventh year of service. This arrangement highlights the advantages and drawbacks of working together in modern peace operations. In addition, it stresses the importance of good coordination between various entities, including the Somali government, the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and several significant bilateral partners, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Consequently, AMISOM does not have complete control over its own future. There are other performers who need to be relied upon for this task. Since the task has not taken the lead in addressing Somalia's primary concerns, which include differences over its political framework, a lack of reconciliation, and many, frequently connected armed battles over various subjects, this has consequences for the assessment that AMISOM is effective. While the state of Somalia in early 2007 was dire, AMISOM has achieved

significant strides despite the adversity. Since it was sent, AMISOM has always had inadequate resources. Mogadishu when al-Shabaab held most of the city and parts of south-central Somalia. Although the AU force was decimated by heavy losses, it was able to drive the militants out of the capital city in August 2011 and expand its operations in subsequent months.

Al-Shabaab militants were driven out of major population centers in south-central Somalia during the next few years. As a result, the mission was instrumental in ensuring the safety of two governments in transition, two federal governments, and two national elections. As a result, Somalia's authorities have been able to address their most pressing domestic issues, including governance and a lack of reconciliation, thanks to AMISOM's efforts. The mission also assisted facilitate the return of many international actors, including the United Nations, to Somalia. Critics as well as supporters agree that these beneficial improvements would not be feasible without AMISOM's efforts. There has been progressing in diminishing the threat al-Shabaab poses to Somalia and other armed opposition groups, as well as providing security for Somalia's democratic process and efforts at reconciliation, by AMISOM's three current strategic objectives. It is clear that if the mission continues on its current course, it will be difficult and time-consuming to accomplish a smooth transition to Somali forces. While AMISOM might do more to weaken al-strength Shabaab will not be able to defeat the militants. A military plan alone cannot do this, but Somalia's federal and regional leaders must reconcile and pursue a definitive strategy to either prioritize the defeat of al-Shabaab or engage in a political conversation that might result at end of the war. At the moment, civil society organizations and foreign partners are concerned that AMISOM's momentum and progress in this area have and that al-Shabaab has recovered power and influence in the last several years, which is clear. Secondly, Somalia's elites have failed to take advantage of the political space that AMISOM has helped create. Despite years of work, it has been hard to create a truly "national" set of Somali security forces and institutions due to delays in establishing the national constitution and federal government arrangements. A new national security architecture was agreed upon in April 2017 and a Somali Transition Plan was agreed upon in early 2018. However, the details of the political and financial agreements needed to make these structures work have not been resolved. Key features remain unimplemented as a result. According to the two operational readiness assessments that were done in

2017, the Somali National Army (SNA) and police forces are in a sad state of affairs. Until the end of 2018, a continuous operational readiness assessment of Somalia's "regional troops" will be performed. Al-defeat Shabaab has left AMISOM with no viable local partners capable of stabilizing and delivering a peace dividend in the retaken communities. As a result of the unhelpful policies implemented by various Gulf governments, the federal government and regional administrations in Somalia have become even more divided and at odds. Third, AMISOM is still a mission with significant shortfalls in resources. As a whole, since 2012, the mission has been unable to transcend its national boundaries. A lack of unified command and control between its force headquarters and those countries that contribute troops is to blame for this problem to it another way, AMISOM's contingents receive significantly fewer reimbursement allowances than their counterparts in UN peacekeeping operations because of a lack of predictable and sustainable financial resources, and a lack of the twelve military helicopters that were authorized by the UN Security Council in 2012 to serve as part of AMISOM's aviation component. As of December 2016, just one of AMISOM's three military chopper units has been deployed. However, despite the fact that helicopters would not have vanquished al-Shabaab, they would have been able to quickly target militants, protect loyal troops, guard convoys, and respond quickly to attacks. It is our opinion that AMISOM has effectively completed militarily, that is, it is unable to achieve more big results in its existing form. Alone, AMISOM cannot fix Somalia's underlying problem: the country's crisis of governance, which has given rise to al-Shabaab and other forms of opposition to the government. These three issues show that. With the help of Somalis and those external actors who have the most influence over Somalia's local authorities, such as the UNSOM and those countries, this can only be remedied by the country's transition to democracy. Thus, AMISOM's military efforts have been unable to keep pace with wider political developments in Somalia's federal and regional governments. AMISOM will need to reorganize its operations and presence in Somalia in order to support the Somali Transition Plan in the future. The AU and UN undertook a joint assessment of AMISOM's capabilities in August and September of last year, and the results of that assessment were incorporated into a revised Concept of Operations paper. State-building efforts in Somalia must be supported by reorganizing the mission's force headquarters and the development of multinational sectors. Priority missions should concentrate on ensuring perimeter security at the key population centers, as the mission's participating nations are beginning to

exhibit indications of exhaustion and have a fair desire to reduce future casualties at a minimum, Mogadishu and the region. In order to conduct successful offensive operations against al-Shabaab, AMISOM forces would need to leave their defensive and static positions and become more agile, ideally with the ability to overrun the rebels' forces and strike them from a distance. There should be constant interaction and coordination with offensive operations undertaken by the Somali Danab advanced infantry troops, which operate with US backing.

AMISOM's forward operating bases (FOBs) and trucks have been targeted by Al-Shabaab attacks as well as the increasingly common issue of combating The majority of recent attacks have involved improvised explosives (IEDs). AMISOM casualties the number of AMISOM FOBs would very probably be reduced as a result of this. The relationship between AMISOM and the muqdisho protection forces, as well as the UNSOS, is critical in this situation. It's imperative that AMISOM's civilian component be strengthened to take advantage of the mission's comparative advantage in being able to deploy civilians in areas where UN personnel cannot be deployed if it is to play a larger role in stabilizing settlements recently recovered from al-Shabaab outside regional capitals or priority areas for the Somali Transition Plan. AMISOM, the Somali government, and the mission's international partners must work together in tight coordination regardless of the priorities set by the African Union and the United Nations. So it makes sense to divide up the work as indicated in the five strands of the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS). However, the Somali government, the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), and the mission's international partners will have to provide the necessary political and financial support for their implementation. Some of the advances AMISOM has made in the last decade could be reversed if these are not forthcoming.

3.3.3 Review of Related Literature

4.1 Effect of African Union peacekeeping force on security

Kasumba and De Coning (2010) contend that Africa's common framework to deal with peace and security issues, following lessons learnt from the Rwandan genocide. According to Okumu and Jaye, the AU PSC has the mandate to resolve conflict by deploying peace support missions through the ASF. The ASF consists of standby multidisciplinary contingents stationed in their countries of origin. The concept of a standby capacity is not intended to have a standing army in Africa, but rather a standby arrangement that consists of contributions from AU member states and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms.

The standby capacity for Africa is important for a rapid response to conflict linked to the ASF six deployment scenario most especially in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly (Okumu & Jaye, 2010). The Regional Standby Forces (RSFs) that makes up the ASF include: the East African Standby Force (EASF), the Economic Community of West African States Standby Force (ESF), the North African Regional Capability (NARC), the SADC Standby Force (SSF), and the Economic Community of Central African States Standby Force (ECCAS). The AU PSC has undertaken peacekeeping missions in Sudan, Darfur, Burundi, Somalia, Central African Republic, Mali and the Comores.

According to AMISOM (2014), the AU sees a continent united in preventing and responding to violence. The AU now has the obligation of equipping itself with the operational institutions necessary to intervene when peace is threatened. Despite the fact that state unity is at the heart of this strategy, the AU affirmed states' sovereign rights to determine whether or not to participate in multidimensional peace operations. According to the African Union's strategic strategy for peace and security on the continent, all AU peace mission planning processes must aim to discover the true underlying causes of a conflict, as well as associated dependencies and linkages, in a "cause and effect" study. The mission can create the environment for other agencies to rebuild after recognizing that the PSOs environment will be complex, and that heads of civilian components and commanders at all levels must endeavor to identify where power and influence reside, as understand societal perceptions. It's also worth noting that, as part of this big strategy, caution must be exercised to avoid the undermining effect of bad perception.

Wafula and jaye (2007), noting the major problem AU in its peace operations, according to is peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, as envisioned by the Brahimi report in 2002. (Okumu and Jaye, 2007:19). Despite this issue, the African Union (AU) and its Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have greatly strengthened their capacity to conduct and administer peacekeeping missions in Africa.

In Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia, the African Union took the lead in peacekeeping operations. The African Union continues to put in place the necessary policy frameworks and mechanisms to strengthen its capacity.

Boutellis and Williams (2013) argued that both the UN Security Council and the PSC of the AU have a vested interest in conducting more effective peace operations in Africa. These operations are once again in high demand with possible new deployments in Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and Sudan. AU deployments have also increased largely due to AU-UN collaboration in Somalia and Mali.

AU deployments have also increased largely due to AU-UN collaboration in Somalia and Mali. In February 2012, the UN Security Council endorsed the expansion of the UN support package for AMISOM, and increased its uniformed personnel from 12,000 to 17,731. Despite the proliferation of UN-AU coordination mechanisms and a growing mutual recognition that each institution has its comparative advantages, there is still significant scope for enhancing collaboration between the AU, its RECs, and training institutions, for effective PSOs in Africa. As such, cooperation and harmonization of best practices is seen as effective for all AU peace operations.

Brooking Global economic development (2008) further noted that "Somalia has perceived terms security throughout decades, and some regions of it remain relatively devoid of violence". Multiple levels of armed conflict and insecurity exist and are increasing in some parts of the country. These include localized communal clashes over resources, political clashes over control of the state and its resources, regional involvement sometimes through proxies, and violence fuelled by global ideologies.

Upsall (2014) argued that "a top-down approach to state-building has been ineffective, and a lack of government structure at the time of independence created an environment

in which clan-based fracturing of the government was inevitable." According to Gordon's (2012) analysis, Somalia has been the world's number one failed state, According to the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy's Failed States Index, these countries have failed because numerous transitional governments that have received international support have been unable to seize power and because repeated foreign interventions have only partially succeeded in bringing about stability.

The United Nations Security Council increased the number of troops deployed from 12,000 to 17,731 in February 2012. The decision follows a string of recent victories over al-Shabaab fighters who had previously held locations in the country's central and southern regions. AU Commander Fred Mugisha said in the same month that Al-Shabaab was "at [its] weakest" and will "implode in the not-too-distant future" as a result of recurrent military setbacks and an evacuation of hundreds of the group's fighters to the Arabian Peninsula (Joint Communique) (2011). As a result of the successful military operations against the Islamists, the US has increased efforts to train and equip AMISOM troops in order to put an end to the Al-Shabaab insurgency and limit its influence. In October 2011, the Somali military and the Kenyan military launched a joint operation in southern Somalia against the Al-Shabaab insurgent group. The Somali army is officially in charge of the campaign, with Kenyan forces providing support. Kenya decided to reorganize its forces under AMISOM direction on November 12th and later declared in March 2012 that it would send 5,000 troops to join the coalition. Analysts anticipate that the fresh AU troop deployments will assist Somali authorities in progressively expanding their authority. In December 2013, the U.S. At the request of AMISOM and the Somali government, the administration formed a military coordination cell in Mogadishu. A tiny staff of fewer than five consultants, comprising planners and communicators between AMISOM and Somali authorities, make up the outfit. Its goal is to give all forces consultation and planning support in order to improve their capabilities and promote peace and security throughout the country and area.

4.2 Effect of African Union capacity building on security

According to Peacock (2016), a solution to the Somali crisis can no longer be sought solely AMISOM. Instead, a strong emphasis should be placed on a political solution that includes restoring AU institutions and re-engaging the international community, as well as rebuilding Somalia's armed forces. While this argument cannot address the core causes of the war, it can help the AU's PSOs in Somalia by improving its institutions. Peacock questioned the extent to which AMISOM has helped to political stability in Somalia in his research on the mission's successes and challenges, concluding that, given the multiple challenges, the mission cannot resolve the conflict on its own. A range of operational obstacle have arose as a result of the troublesome situation. A variety of operational issues stemming from the problematic structure of the AU institutional framework, a succession of attacks against AMISOM troops, and a lack of resources available to the mission are among the challenges.

Hull and Svensson (2015) in their endeavor to analyze AMISOM's role and capability to sustain stability in Somalia, proposed another theoretical argument in 2008, asking whether the African Union will be able to retain the concept of African solutions to African problems. They came to the conclusion that the AU can only retain the paradigm of African solutions and undertake successful peace operations with international cooperation. There can be no advancement without it (Hull &Svensson, 2015:35-49).

Mugisha (2015) in his to appraise Somalia's obstacles, came to the conclusion that public support for the TFG is critical to the mission's success. In order to gain this support, the conflict's underlying root causes must be addressed. In order to overcome the security dilemma in Somalia, Bruton (2007) proposes a strategy of "constructive disengagement." He also requested that the US declare its willingness

To tolerate an Islamist leadership in Somalia, including Al-Shabaab, as long as it does not obstruct UN humanitarian efforts and refrains from regional aggression and support for international jihad.

Elmi (2007) In Somalia, investigates the benefits of using education to effect societal change. He argues that education can serve as a vehicle for long-term societal change.

Elmi (2007) went on to say that, despite a general lack of resources to improve Somalia's educational system, education may play a critical role in altering the conflict.

UNSC (United Nations Security Council) Resolution 2125 (2013) stressed the need for AMISOM to strengthen state institutions, economic and social development, human rights respect, and the rule of law as crucial aspects for the long-term eradication of piracy and armed robbery in Somalia's coast. It went on to say that Somalia's long-term security depends on Somali authorities' effective growth of the Somali NSF. To this purpose, AMISOM is working in Somalia to establish state institutions that meet the organizational economic developments (OECD's) criteria of state-building. The mission has even a tendency to participate in far more operations than are specified in its mandate. As a result, while AMISOM works to construct peace with the help of other actors on the ground, it also tends to focus on building the state. A distinct overlap is depicted when describing whether AMISOMs are performing peace-building or state-building missions.

De Coning is a Dutch politician (2007) AMISOM may examine its activities to see if any of these shortcomings are present and draw crucial lessons from them to improve the effectiveness of its peacebuilding and state-building efforts. The necessity for this arises from the fact that peace-building has largely failed to produce constructive peace as a result of an uncertain expectation of modifying all of a society's odds — an endeavor that has taken other continents generations to complete. The lack of local support mechanisms, as well as the repercussions of ongoing armed conflict, are drivers that affect the success of peacekeeping missions.

Somalia has been weekend by years of civil conflict, and the type of security approach likely concentrated on is state security," according to Queenie (2011). 2011:2 (Queenie). The government of Somalia, the African Union, and the United Nations are working to build strong institutions in order to achieve state security goals, with the latter group arguing that strong institutions "can provide public services that are resilient to internal political and economic challenges, as well as external economic pressures."

According to Abdi (2012), the establishment of state institutions will most likely be responsive to society's needs and legitimate. Because of a lack of vision, government

resources, and delivery capacity, postcolonial institutions in Somalia were remote and inattentive to the concerns of ordinary individuals. During the Cold War, the state was characterized by strong institutions and improved economic progress, but it was also marred by violence, exclusion, and nepotism.

4.3 Effect of African Union human rights protection on security

"Women and girls suffered disproportionately," according to the United Nations (2014), "a woman in Somalia has a 1 in 12 probability of dying during her reproductive years." Somalia (United Nations, 2011). "Years of conflict, drought, and flooding have generated a prolonged humanitarian crisis, with 2.3 million people projected to be in need of emergency assistance," according to DIFID (2011). (DIFID, 2011: 1). Somalia's insecurity has had broader regional and economic repercussions, affecting Somalia's natural resources. According to UNEC (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) (2015), actions aimed at alleviating suffering on a big humanitarian level caused by malnutrition, persecution and the refugee crisis are effective. Human rights violations are also humanitarian problems that can lead to sanctions. Ethnic cleansing, forced labor, executions, rape, and illegal detentions are examples of such breaches. The UN Security Council has sanctioned abuses of human rights and humanitarian law to assist those in need. Peace operations have utilized enforcement tactics to ensure humanitarian relief, construct safe havens, and maintain law and order. Economic penalties, such as weapon embargoes, have also been utilized, either alone or in combination with enforcement measures. Two conceptions emerge when defining humanitarian intervention: humanitarian intervention, which entails the use of force, and humanitarian help, which entails the use of non-violent tactics.

According to Tahir (2013), the fixation on the state reveals itself normatively in the attachment of overriding importance to human rights themes of security, order, and stability. Metonymic slippage is established between concepts such as barbarism, statelessness, anarchy, chaos, and lawlessness. On the other hand, this conceptual conflation combines at least four independent phenomena into a single concept: state collapse, societal breakdown, the existence of a set of 'lawless' activities analogous to criminality, and the existence of a civil war situation. Other features of a complex emergency have been linked by statisticians to social conflict and 'lawless' behavior, as well as the lack of a state (or of the right kind of state). These qualities, in distinguish, to

discriminate between peaceful and warring stateless societies, or between peaceful and warring stateless societies. And those who have some form of 'government'.

According to Stephan and Erica (2011), the possibility which has been suggested in the empirical literature on Somalia that the worst issues in complex emergencies could be reduced instead by evolving toward a more peaceful and less predatory sort of statelessness is just outright ruled out. The framing also disregards the necessity of recognizing and addressing contingent causes of intergroup conflict.

Njoku (2016) asserts that the AU has explicitly recognized that, in keeping with the recent expansion of traditional security concepts in the promotion of human rights, focused on efficient governance, strong democracies, and continued economic and social progress are necessary suitable answers to political, economic, and social instability. In another hand, there has been a recognition that Africa in fundamentally new and different context than it was prior to 1990 and new solutions are needed to address previously overlooked elements of insecurity and instability.

Anderson and McKnight (2014) detailed al-self-reinvention of Shabaab and how it used terrorist retribution to expand the conflict to Kenya and Uganda. Militarized counter-terrorism is ineffective unless it is accompanied by political and psychosocial counter-radicalization AMISOM is doing in Somalia. The complex obstacles of restoring sanity in Somalia after three decades of instability continue. Africans rejected indifference and cynicism by bearing AMISOM's expenditures and combining different intervention efforts, demonstrating shared readiness to confront Somalia's crisis. By re-establishing the Somali state and allowing it to gain "sovereignty trappings" and self-determination.

Bellamy (2011) goes on to say that African unions' rights enable large-scale change to be achieved indirectly through the political system's influence. "Campaigning through NGOs necessitates the formation of an efficient and effective team of professionals capable of keeping supporters informed and engaged. They must organize and conduct protests and events to keep their cause in the news. They must maintain a strong, well-informed network of supporters who can be mobilized for events in order to gain media attention and sway policy changes.

According to Tahir (2013), information serves an educational and preventive function by contributing significantly to the public understanding of existing legal norms, which is critical for preventing human rights breaches and facilitating their application. Some organizations are dedicated to informing the public about existing human rights norms, redress options, and information dissemination, both to the general public and to vulnerable groups, so that they are aware of their rights and freedoms. Others are dedicated to improving awareness of their need to refrain from abuse of power and to ensure the preservation of others' rights among practitioners such as judges, lawyers, law enforcement officers, and others who protection state power.

The united nation development program (UNDP) recognized that the Somali institutional framework was not operating as a result of the Somali Compact and took advantage of the opportunity by formalizing a CPD. (continuing professional development) "The New Deal was the foundation around which we built the entire program," says informant B. And that was the starting point because the New Deal was where most of the goals and what needed to be done were established, so we used that as a springboard to continue forward" (2017). The CPD was developed in close collaboration with the World Bank, which is likewise concentrating on boosting essential government activities such as "human resources, procurement, financial management policy [and] planning" (Informant D, 2017). The UNDP implements two initiatives directly related to the CPD through the CPD. The UNDP is now working on two programs that are directly related to the Somali government's capacity: the Strengthening Institutional Performance (SIP) program and the Support to Emerging Federal States (StEFS) project (Ibid). The UNDP works on three levels within the two initiatives: institutional, organizational, and individual.

Using integrated financing options, such as pooled funding through trust funds, allows for more flexible and cooperative money disbursement as well as a platform for risk sharing. The UN and the World Bank's Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPF) are Somalia's major trust funds, accounting for about 20% of overall financing from 2015 to 2017. (FRoS, 2017: 13). Donors can prefer up to 50% of their money under the WB MPF, but in practice, donors prefer approximately 30%. Donors have a higher preference for funding in the UN MPTF. The trust funds are better positioned to commit funding for longer-term projects since they have a lower share of preference funding.

4.4 Gaps in Literature Review

The literature review highlighted the need for a more comprehensive empirical study on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Security from 2007 to 2018. The study was based on data or literature obtained from the field of literature offered by Bellamy (2011), who also claims that African union rights enable large-scale change to be achieved indirectly through political system influence. Even Tahir (2013) noted that information serves an educational and preventive function by contributing significantly to public understanding of existing legal norms, which is critical for preventing human rights breaches and supporting their implementation. Anderson and McKnight (2014) documented al-self reinvention of Shabaab and how it used terrorist retaliation to expand the conflict to Kenya and Uganda.

Njoku (2016) claims that the AU has openly acknowledged that effective governance, strong democracies, and ongoing economic and social development are necessary components of appropriate responses to ongoing political, economic, and social instability. It's in line with the recent broadening of traditional security concepts in the promotion of human rights.

UNSC (united national security council) Resolution 2125 (2013) stressed the need for AMISOM to strengthen state institutions, economic and social development, human rights respect, and the rule of law as crucial aspects for the long-term eradication of piracy and armed robbery on Somalia's coast. The study found that gaps in the literature still exist, despite limited attempts in terms of literature consolidation in Somalia, resulting in geographical, time, and theoretical gaps that the study must address.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

The study is shown in this section. The Methodology and design it was using to conduct this study display the conceptual framework, the research design, the entire population and sampling techniques, research tools, tools for gathering data, and the method of data analysis


3.1 Research design

This study employed a descriptive survey research design. A descriptive research design is a process of gathering information to respond to inquiries about the current condition of the study's subjects. While trying to conduct a descriptive study, at the same period, both independent and dependent variables are assessed. Allowing for description also comprises the various study-related factors (Bhattacharjee, 2012). According to Bhattacharjee surveys were perfect for gathering documentation from really huge populations that were difficult to observe directly and utilize questionnaires, which are typically participants' preferred option due to their unobtrusive nature as well as the flexibility to just being completed at one's appliance. They also improve the measurement of a wide variety of unobservable data, such as participants' preferences, traits, and attitudes. Quantitative approaches are used to use in the writing to collect information from participants. Quantitative research counts and measures and even perform statistical analysis on a set of numerical data and determine the relative size of a particular phenomenon using numerical indicators.

3.2 Conceptual Review

A framework reveals the interaction among both independent and dependent variables. An independent variable is measured through African Union Mission (AMISOM) constructs while the dependent variable is measured through security that included human security, home security, and national security.

Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework showing the relationship between African Union Mission (AMISOM) and security in Somalia.



Source: AU (Bruton and William 2014) modified by the researcher

3.3 Study population

Those respondents in the sample who provided their identities from the entire population of 384 according to krejcie and morgan table. The study population was used to provide information according to the study.

3.4 Sample Population

A sampling design is a framework or road map that shows the chosen survey sample. This writing is interested to obtain some information obtained through a survey of a certain population. A sample size that could be the same as the population.

Table 3.1 Table of Krejcie and Morgan

Table 3.1									
<i>Table for Determining Sample Size of a Known Population</i>									
N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S
10	10	100	80	280	162	800	260	2800	338
15	14	110	86	290	165	850	265	3000	341
20	19	120	92	300	169	900	269	3500	346
25	24	130	97	320	175	950	274	4000	351
30	28	140	103	340	181	1000	278	4500	354
35	32	150	108	360	186	1100	283	5000	357
40	36	160	113	380	191	1200	291	6000	361
45	40	170	118	400	196	1300	297	7000	364
50	44	180	123	420	201	1400	302	8000	367
55	48	190	127	440	205	1500	306	9000	368
60	52	200	132	460	210	1600	310	10000	370
65	56	210	136	480	214	1700	313	15000	375
70	59	220	140	500	217	1800	317	20000	377
75	63	230	144	550	226	1900	320	30000	379
80	66	240	148	600	234	2000	322	40000	380
85	70	250	152	650	242	2200	327	50000	381
90	73	260	155	700	248	2400	331	75000	382
95	76	270	159	750	254	2600	335	100000	384

Note: N is Population Size; S is Sample Size *Source: Krejcie & Morgan, 1970*

Categories of respondents for Questionnaire

Categories	total
Amisom	95
Police	94
Clan leaders	152
Mogadishu city authority	43
Total	384

Source: Hodan and Waabere district, Report, 2021

3.4.1 Sampling Techniques

I have been using random sampling and purposeful sampling as my two sampling methods. The goal is credibility, not representativeness or generalizability, so random sampling, which uses small sample sizes, is a strategy that strengthens the truthfulness of a sample so when the size of a potential purposeful sample is too great to handle. Random sampling is also referred to as chance or probability sampling ensures that the A random sample will typically have the same composition and characteristics as the entire universe's population, according to the law of statistical regularity adopted by giving Each unit in the population has an equal chance of has been included in the sample (Kothari, 2004). Purposive sampling was used to choose the clan leaders and policy, while random sampling was used to choose the AMISOM officials and Mogadishu city authority. Observing and choosing individuals or groups of individuals who have knowledge of or experience with an interesting phenomenon is known as purposeful sampling.

3.5 Data sources

I focus on data secondary and primary sources in order to obtain accurate data. The core information for this writing was obtained using surveys and interviews in order to fulfill the study's goals. Secondary data was obtained from a variety of official statistics sources, including books, journals, and online sources, as well as writing findings from many experts on the subject under the thesis and other publications.

3.5.1 Data collection instruments

The two data collection methods employed in these writings were a questionnaire and a documentary review guide.

5.2 Primary source

3.5.3 Questionnaires

Through the use of self-administered questionnaires, were used to obtain primary data from the participants. As a result, using questionnaire instruments while administering the questionnaire method. The use of a questionnaire for the survey was deemed appropriate because one section of the questionnaire allowed respondents to select their answers from a list of alternatives, and another section allowed them to qualify their answers (Amin, 2005). The ability to continuously reach thousands of people makes questionnaires advantageous. Self-administered questionnaires had the advantage of being answered anonymously, increasing the probability that private and delicate questions would receive an answer.

The writing was conducted by AMISOM, Police, Clan Leaders and Mogadishu City authority using the questionnaires.

3.5.2 Documentary Review

This was used documentary review guide to review documents on African Union Mission (AMISOM) and security in Somalia from 2007-2018. The writing reviewed documents and provide inference on the status of the African Union Mission (AMISOM)

on security processes in the country. The documentary review enabled the attainment of historical data for the writing to add on the current information for the study.

3.6 Secondary source of data

AMISOM and security publications, as well as some recorded documents, are used to gather secondary data. Other information was gathered from electronic sources including the internet, books, journals, online sources, publications, and municipal papers, and data gathered by a party unrelated to the writing but who did so at a different time in the past and for a different purpose. Because secondary data saves time, money, and resources while enhancing the quality of thesis writing, I was using it.

3.6.1 Data analysis

The Statistical Package for Social Scientists' quantitative data analysis utilized both descriptive statistics and inferential statistics (SPSS). Descriptive statistics involved estimating measures of dispersion, such as standard deviation and percentages, as well as measures of central tendencies, such as mean. The data analysis for the first to third aim considered how the constructs have been assessed on the variables.

Mean range	respondent	interpretation
4.22 - 5.00	strongly agree	very good
3.42 - 4.21	agree	good
2.62 – 3.41	Not Sure	fair
1.81 - 2.61	disagree	poor
1.00 - 1.80	strongly disagree	very poor

Frequency and percentages were used to analyze the bio data, while mean and standard deviation were used to analyze an objective. To demonstrate the type of relationship between the independent and dependent variables, correlation analysis was used to evaluate the effect at a significance level of 0.05. The hypothesis is rejected if the significance value was greater than 0.05 and accepted if it was less than 0.05 when the hypothesis was tested at a significance level of 0.05. Quantitative analysis of qualitative data was

based on how the observations were relevant to the research question and the qualitative data analysis methodology. Having followed data collection, similar categories of information were gathered together compared to quantitative data to produce written reports. The process of creating explanations or descriptions from qualitative data was used to interpret it. A quotation or a description was used to illustrate and support the qualitative data.

Table 3.1 Questionnaire Design

Section	statement	question
	African union peace keeping force	4
	African union capacity building	5
	African union human rights	4
	Security	10

For part A, researcher were asked questions related to the demographic characteristics about the respondents, including gender, age, race, course of study, nationality, employment status. For part B, the respondent should make a choice based on likert Scale follows:

Table 3.2 Format of likert Scale

SCALE	Meaning
5	Strongly agree(SA)
4	agree (Ag)
3	Neutral (N)
2	Dis Agree (A)
1	Strongly Dis agree (SA)

3.6.2 Validity of Instruments

The researcher must obtain supervisor approval before distributing questionnaires to respondents. To assure that the results have the trust and validity of the instruments, this validation should take place before the questionnaire was distributed. On the instrument–instrument that has been confirmed:

Table 3.3 African union peace keeping force

NO	statement	source
1	African union has a peace keeping force in Key installations of government	Hull, C. &Svensson, E. (2015).
2	African union force keeping peace are spread across the City to provide security	Kingsley, C. (2017).
3	There is provision of security by the keeping force to busy Places like markets	
4	African peace force provide sufficient security in places of Of worship in Mogadishu	

Table3.4 African union capacity building

No	statement	source
1	African union provide trainings to the local Forces on security	fisher,j.(2016).
2	there is provision of training by African Mission to locals	
	On defense and security issues	Mahmoud S.H.P (2013)
3	African union provide financial capacity to communities	
	In efforts to curb insecurity	
4	African union mission provide finance to security organs	
	In a bid to boost their work	
5	African union mission in Somalia has source for finance to	
	Support Emergency security arrangement	

Table3.5 African union human rights

No	statement	source
1.	The African union mission provide training to communities On Human right	Hassan, M.O (2018)
2.	African union provide implementation of human rights And observance in Somalia	Hesse, B.(2014)
3.	African union has established mechanisms for arresting of Human rights offenders	
4.	The African Union Mission (AMISOM) agitate for human Rights observance among people	

Table3.6 Security

No	statement	source
1	There is sufficient security to enable freedom of movement	Maruf,H. (2018)
2	The people's lives in Mogadishu are at less risks in the city	DIFID. (2012.)
3	People in the city are free to interact for trade without fear on lives	
4	The people's lives is guaranteed, minimal deaths occur on people	
5	The people's homes are secure all the days of the lives	
6	Peoples can easily move to other's homes without suspicion on motives	
7	There are no physical rebel attacks on the homes	
8	The state security is well and guaranteed	
9	There is no threat to the country from the national borders	
10	There has been able national security protection of its local population	

3.7 Plan for Data Analysis

I will use *SPSS 25.0* Version to analyze the data that was collected from the respondents. Inside the data analysis system, researchers use mean score and standard deviation to test the result and the reliability of data collected. Both of these items are also use to analyses the dependent variable and independent variable (African union mission (AMISON), (African union peace keeping force), (African union capacity building), (African union human rights) and (security).

I also use descriptive method including frequency and percentage to analysis Demographic part.

The table below is clearly stated out the method of data analysis that used by Researchers.

3.7 table research questionnaire

Section	RESEARCH QUESTIONS	SPPS Techniques
	African union peace keeping force	Frequency Descriptive, reliability Correlation, Regression
	African union capacity building	Descriptive, Reliability

	Regression, Correlation
African union human rights	Descriptive, reliability
	Regression, Correlation
Security	Descriptive, Reliability
	<u>Regression, correlation</u>

Table 3.7: SPSS towards research question

After that getting the results from data analysis system SPSS, I have to interpret the findings and results.

3.7.1 Summary In chapter 3, I have described and explained the research design, sampling data collection for design, study population, and sampling method and process, instruments of development and plan for data analysis.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

4.0 Introduction

The study's purpose was to assess the role of the African Union Mission (AMISOM) on security in Somalia from 2007-2018. This chapter discusses the statistical evaluation of data collection by using a questionnaire. The overall data collected from 384 respondents were analyzed through The Statistical Package of Social Science (SPSS). The data gathered will be analyzed in this chapter using descriptive analysis, reliability analysis, correlation analysis, and multiple regression analysis in order to determine the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables.

4.1 Frequency Analysis

Frequency analyses that are analyzed will describe the details of the name from the data and the frequency of the results. This analysis will use to examine the demographic information of respondents and profiles including gender, age, education level, marital status, and time period of work experience.

Table 4.1 Fraction of respondents by gender

Gender	Frequency	Percent
Male	212	55.2
Female	172	44.8
Total	384	100.0

Results in table 4.1 reveal that the major of its respondents were 55.2% male while 44.8% were females representing the respondents. The study results indicate that

many respondents of the study were males, it is pivotal to assess that Mogadishu city, community, and Amisom employ more men than women, it's never less pivotal to argue that information can't be doubted on gender grounds since it is undertaken in the direction of effective gender representation.

Table 4.2 Fraction of respondents by Age

Age	Frequency	Percent
21-30 years old	178	46.4
31-40 years old	121	31.0
41-50 years old	73	19.0
51-60 years old	11	2.6
60 Above	1	1
Total	384	100.0

Findings in table 4.2 reveal that the majority of respondents of the study were aged 21-30 years represented by 46.4% of the study followed by those of 31-40 years with 31.5% of the respondents then 41-50 years old 19%, also 51-60 had 2.1% respondents and finally those who above of 60 are 1%. The study results indicate that data was attained from mature respondents; it can't be doubted on maturity levels.

Table 4.3: Education Level of respondents

Education	Frequency	Percent
Secondary	29	7.6
Diploma	137	35.7
Degree	143	37.2
Master	62	16.1
Ph.D	13	3.4
Total	384	100.0

Results from the study indicate that the majority of respondents were secondary at 7.6% of the study followed by Diploma holders at 35.7%, then Degree holders were 37.2%, followed by Master Field contributions at 16.1%. Followed by Ph.D.olders with 3.4%. The study results indicate the majority of respondents have a higher level of education for this reason they have to be a better understanding of the questions.

Table 4.4: Marital status of respondents

Marital Status	Frequency	Percent
Single	131	34.1
Married	245	63.8
Divorce	8	2.1
Total	384	100.0

The study results indicate that the majority of responses were from married people constituting 63.8% of the respondents, the singles who responded were 34.1%, and divorced/separated were 2.1% of the study. The results show that many respondents

agree with the prevalence that they are responsible for it, information attained is sufficient for data analysis.

Table 4.5 Time Period of work experience

Time	Frequency	Percent
1-4 years	165	43.0
5-9 years	141	36.7
10- 14 Years	70	18.2
Above 15 years	8	2.1
Total	384	100.0

Findings in table 4.5 on the time of work revealed that the majority of respondents had 1-4 years of experience 43% of the study followed by those with 5-9 years of who was 36.7%, then 10-14 contributed 18.2% and finally above 15 years were 2.1% of the respondents. The results indicate that data was attained from respondents who have an appropriate understanding of the study area. The data collected is relied upon for data analysis.

4.2 Descriptive Analysis

Table 4.6 Descriptive Analysis

No	Item	Mean	Standard Deviation
1	Security in Mogadishu Somalia	3.55	0.868
2	AU peacekeeping force	4.59	0.903
3	AU Capacity Building	4.61	0.901
4	AU Human Rights	4.58	0.941

4.2.1 Reliability Analysis

Table 4.7 Reliability test of all variables

No.	Variables	Cornbrash's alpha	Decision
1.	Security	0.899	Pass
2.	AU peacekeeping force	0.817	Pass
3.	AU Capacity Building	0.777	Pass
4.	AU Human Rights	0.671	Pass

A reliability test is applied to gauge the capacity of data which involves the uniformity and steadiness of the items. The test is vital for this study, in order to make sure the scale is measuring the same particular feature. One of the most popular used indicators to gauge reliability is using Cornbrash's alpha coefficient (Pall ant, 2013). Hair, et al., (2010) stated that reliability focus on the extent to which the observed variable measured the "true "value and is error-free. In this research, Cornbrash's Alpha was utilized to test the correlation between the items of measurement and the internal consistency of each variable. According to Hinton, et al., (2004) indicated that reliability with Cornbrash's Alpha above 0.9 shows excellent, from 0.7 to 0.9 shows high, from 0.5 to 0.7 show Moderate, while 0.5 and below will be considered low reliability. For this study, the value of reliability analysis

in Table 4.7 shows that Cronbach's alpha range between 0.671 and 0.899. All the variables used the reliability test by using Cronbach's alpha as an indicator, Cronbach's alpha considers pass when they are more than the cut-off point of 0.60.

Table 4.8 Security

Item	Mean	Std. Deviation	C. Alpha	N
Q1	3.55	.868	.899	384
Q2	3.46	.848		384
Q3	3.36	.999		384
Q4	3.31	1.02		384
Q5	3.38	1.15		384
Q6	3.33	1.16		384
Q7	3.56	1.30		384
Q8	2.78	1.40		384

The study tested reliability among the variables using Cronbach's alpha and all items of security in Somalia interrelated each other with overall .899 Cronbach alpha as table 4.8 stated.

Table 4.9 African union Peace Keeping force

Item	Mean	Std. Deviation	C. Alpha	N
Q1	4.59	.903	.671	384
Q2	4.53	.960		384
Q3	3.45	1.25		384
Q4	4.74	1.36		384

Study test reliability among the variables using Cronbach's Alpha all these African union peace keeping force four items has closely related overall 0.671 Cronbach Alpha as table 4.9 stated.

Table 4.10 African Union capacity building

Item	Mean	Std. Deviation	C. Alpha	N
Q1	4.61	.901	.817	384
Q2	4.46	1.00		384
Q3	4.35	1.13		384
Q4	4.32	1.15		384
Q5	4.45	1.05		384

Study test reliability among the variables using Cronbach Alpha all five items of African union capacity items has closely related each other when it test Cronbach alpha overall .817 as table 4.10 stated.

Table 4.11 African Union human rights

Item	Mean	Std. Deviation	C. Alpha	N
Q1	4.54	.954	.777	384
Q2	4.58	.886		384

Study test reliability among the variables using Cronbach's alpha and African union Human rights one and two items has closely related each other with overall .777 Cronbach alpha as table 4.11 stated.

4.2.2 Pearson Correlation Analysis

Table 4.12 Results of Pearson Correlation Analysis

No.	Variables	Security	AU Peace keep- ing Force	AU Ca- pacity Building	AU Human Rights
1	Security	1.00			
2	AU Peace keeping Force	.770**	1.00		
3	AU Capacity Building	.814**	.775**	1.00	
4	AU Human Rights	.570**	.488**	.535**	1.00

****.** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The Pearson correlation value demonstrates the relationship between the independent variable and dependent variable, the Pearson correlation value recorded in the range of 0.00 -0.20 suggests weak to no correlation between independent variables and dependent variable, following the rule of thumb. The weak correlation value varies between 0.2-0.40, moderate correlation value varies between 0.41-0.60, strong correlation value varies between 0.61-0.80 and very strong correlation value varies between 0.81 -1.00 (Hair, Jr.,Celsi,Bush,2013).In order to analyze hypotheses 1 (one) to 3 (three), a Pearson correlation analysis was employed to access the degree of the association between the two variables, the independent variable, and the dependent variable. The correlation analysis indicates the way, strength, and significance of the bivariate relations of the study variables (Sekaran, 2003). The association enables the reader to understand whether there is any connection between these variables. As illustrated in Table 4.13 the details of the results of the Pearson correlation to identify the link between the variables. The correlation between AU peacekeeping force and security was obtained as a positive and significant relationship with home security, human security, and national security in Mogadishu Somalia which the correlation coefficient, $r = .770^{**}$, so there is a strong positive correlation between AU peacekeeping force and AU capacity building. Besides that, the AU capacity building indicates a positive and significant relationship with Security in Mogadishu Somalia with a correlation of $r = .814^{**}$ $p < 0.01$. However, for the AU human rights and AU capacity building Shows a moderate positive and significant relationship with Security in Mogadishu Somalia with a correlation of $r = .570^{**}$ $p < 0.01$. The details are shown in Table 4.12. Table 4.12 shows that the variables used in this study have a significant value (2- tailed), 0.000.

There will be a significant relationship between variables if the significant value is less than the p-value, 0.05; ($p < 0.05$). From the correlation analysis above, IV 1, African union Peacekeeping Force has a relationship with IV 2, African union Capacity building, IV3, African union Human rights, and DV, Home Security, human security and national security in Mogadishu Somalia since it has a correlation value in 0.000. Moreover, the African Union Peacekeeping Force also have a significant relationship with the African Union Human rights (0.000), African union Capacity building (0.000), and home security, human security, and national security in Mogadishu Somalia (0.000).

Lastly, the result also shows that the dependent variable has a strong positive relationship with African union Peacekeeping, African union Capacity building and African union Human rights due to the Pearson Correlation value are 0.770, 0.814 and 0.570 respectively.

Table 4.13 Correlation Value and the Strength of Relationship

Correlation Value	The Strength of the Relationship
$r = 0.10$ to 0.29 / $r = -0.10$ to -0.29	Weak
$r = 0.30$ to 0.49 / $r = -0.30$ to -0.49	Medium
$r = 0.50$ to 1.00 / $r = -0.50$ to -1.00	Strong

Table 4.13 indicates the connection between three independent variables such as the African Union Peacekeeping Force, African union Capacity building, and African union Human rights with the dependent variable Security. Based on Table 4.13, the relationship between variables, which are the African Union Peacekeeping Force, African union Capacity building, and African union Human rights, has a positive and significant relationship with Security in Mogadishu Somalia. The direction of relationships is positive and indicates that if the value of the African Union Peacekeeping Force, African union Capacity building, and African union Human rights value increases, it will promote to maximize the level of home security, human security, and national security in Mogadishu Somalia.

4.2.3 Multiple Regression Analysis

Table 4.14 Model Summary

Model Summary				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. The error in the Estimate
1	.584 ^a	.341	.335	5.74955

the multiple regression analysis results using the standardized model is portrayed in table 4.14 indicating the R- square of 34.4 percent and adjusted R- square of 33 percent, this that the variables such as AU peacekeeping force, AU capacity building, and AU human rights predicting of Security illustrated that 34 percent of factors can explain Security in Mogadishu Somalia. As suggested by Cohen (1988). Multiple regressions were applied to test the effect of many independent variables on the dependent variable continually. This procedure helps researchers to know how much a decision of independent variables is illustrating the variance in the dependent variable (Cavana et al., 2001). Thus, in this study, the correlation between the dependent and its determinants was analyzed with the use of standard regression analysis. This is because Sakaran and Roger (2013) indicated that standard regression permitted the whole variables of the research to be inserted into the model at one time and examined based on variance contribution.

Table 4.14 shows the R Square is 0.34, means which that there are 34.4% of independent variables are influencing the dependent variable.

Table 4.15 Coefficients

	Coefficients ^a				
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standard Coefficient	t	Sig
	B	Std. Error			
(Constant)	7.486	1.809		4.137	.000
AU peacekeeping force	1.072	.220	.377	4.861	.000
AU capacity building	.110	.147	.053	.747	.456
AU human rights	.568	.238	.187	2.391	.017

Table 4.15 shows there were significant differences between independent variables and dependent variables when the significant value of regression is 0.000, which is less than ($p < 0.05$). Table 4.15, also shows that there is a significant relationship between the African Union Peacekeeping Force, African union Capacity building, and African union Human rights. The significant value of 0.000, 0.017, and 0.456 which are above ($p > 0.05$) indicates that, the African Union peacekeeping Force (IV1), African union Capacity building (IV2), and African Union Human rights (IV3) Security in Mogadishu Somalia.

Therefore, the African Union Peacekeeping Force (IV1) and African union Human rights (IV3) of this independent variable are accepted H1.

4.3 Hypothesis Testing

This section will be discussed all the results for the hypotheses of the study with correlation tests and multiple regression analysis. SPSS 25.0 was employed to analyze the results to accept or reject the hypotheses.

Table 4.16 Summary of hypothesis result

Hypothesis	Result	Decision
H1: African union Peacekeeping Force has a significant relationship with security.	0.000	Accepted
H2: African union Capacity building has non-significant relationship with security.	0.456	Rejected
H3: African union Human rights have a significant relationship with security	0.017	Accepted

Table 4.16 state the result of the hypothesis for all variables. For independent variable 1, the result shows that there were significant relationships between African union Peacekeeping Force has a significant relationship with security in Mogadishu and H1 was accepted due to the value 0.000 being less than ($p < 0.05$). For independent variable 2 African union Capacity building, H2 was rejected due to the value 0.456 being greater than ($p > 0.05$). Finally, for independent variable 3, H3 was accepted with a value of 0.017 less than ($p < 0.05$). This means there was a significant relationship between all independent variables to a dependent variable on Security in Mogadishu Somalia.

Table 4.17 Residuals statistics

Residuals	Minimum	Max	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	19.0667	36.4382	31.7682	4.11615	384
Residual	-13.14716	19.26645	.00000	5.72699	384
Std. Predicted Value	-3.086	1.135	.000	1.000	384
Std. Residual	-2.287	3.351	.000	.996	384

Table 4.18 Anova

ANO- VA ^a					
Model	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	6489.048	3	2163.016	65.432	.000 ^b
Residual	12561.8	380	33.057		
Total	19050.8	383			

4.3.1 Summary

This chapter presented the statistical results of this study and the three leading hypotheses were tested together. SPSS Version 25.0 has been used to analyze the data. This chapter indicated the data of demographic of respondents, reliability of variables, and implement the Pearson correlation analyses to assess the relationship between the independent variable and dependent variable. Multiple regression was used to test the significant correlation between the dependent variable Security in Mogadishu Somalia and the independent variables African union Peacekeeping Force, African union Capacity building, and African Union Human Rights.



CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Summary of Findings

The aim of this thesis is to ascertain the interaction between a dependent variable and an independent variable, therefore there are three hypotheses two of which have been accepted while the other one reject. For independent variable 1, the result shows that there were significant relationships between African union Peacekeeping Force has a significant relationship with security in Mogadishu and H1 was accepted due to the value 0.000 being less than ($p < 0.05$). For independent variable 2 African union Capacity building, H2 was rejected due to the value 0.456 being greater than ($p > 0.05$) Finally, for independent variable 3, H3 was accepted with a value 0.017 being less than ($p < 0.05$). This means there were significant independent variables to a dependent variable on Security in Mogadishu Somalia. The presentation result of the writing is based on the designed research questions. SPSS package 25 was used for the analysis.

There will be a significant relationship between variables if the significant value is less than the p-value, 0.05; ($p < 0.05$). From the correlation analysis above, IV 1, African Union Peacekeeping Forces have a relationship with IV 2, African union Capacity building, IV3, African union Human rights, and DV, Home Security, human security, and national security in Mogadishu Somalia since it has a correlation value of 0.000. Moreover, the African Union Peacekeeping Force also has a significant relationship with the African Union Human rights (0.000), African union Capacity building (0.000), and home security, human security, and national security in Mogadishu Somalia (0.000). Lastly, the result also shows that the dependent variable has a strong positive relationship with African union Peacekeeping, African union Capacity building and African union Human rights due to the Pearson Correlation value are 0.770, 0.814 and 0.570 respectively.

5.1 Discussion of findings

5.2 Effect of African union mission peacekeeping force on security Mogadishu Somalia

The study results indicate the African Union Mission Peacekeeping force had less contribution to security in Mogadishu Somalia. The study results based on data attained show that there was a substantial relationship between peacekeeping and security for people in Mogadishu. The study results are in agreement with previous authors who provide information in similar manners Wafula and Jaye (2010) noted that the key challenge facing the AU in its peace operations is peace-building and post conflict reconstruction as envisaged by the Brahimi report in 2002 hence their low contribution to security. The results are also in line with those of Boutellis and Williams (2013) argued that The UN Security Council and the PSC of the AU have a vested interest in carrying out more successful peace operations in Africa. With potential additional deployments in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and Sudan, demand for these missions has increased once more. There have also been more AU deploys. Largely due to AUUN collaboration in Somalia and Mali which is significant in Somalia. The results are in agreement with the results of AMISOM (2014) argued that the AU envisions a continent united in preventing and acting against conflict. This gives the AU the responsibility to capacitate itself with the operational structures to intervene where there is a threat to peace. Boutellis and Williams (2013) argued that The PSC of the AU and the UN Security Council both have a role in carrying out more successful peace operations in Africa. With possible new deploys in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and Sudan, there is once again a significant demand for these missions. Even Brookings Global Economy and Development (2008) additionally, it was noted that "Somalia has known periods of stability and security over many years, and some of its regions continue to be relatively free from violence.

5.3 Effect of African Union capacity building on security in Mogadishu Somalia.

Secondly, the study reveals that there exists little significant effect between African Union capacity building and security in Mogadishu Somalia. The results indicate that capacity building is an icon for security enhancement much more effective. The study's findings are consistent with those of earlier authors who have offered information in a similar way, such as Hull and Svensson (2015), a new theoretical discussion in 2008 on the issue of whether the AU can maintain the idea that there are African solutions to African challenges as they assessed AMISOM's role and capacity to maintain stability in Somalia. Even Mugisha (2015), in an inspection to evaluate the obstacles in Somalia, concluded that the public's support for the TFG is important to the mission's success. The conflict's underlying root causes should be addressed to win this support. According to Abdi (2012), the establishment of state institutions will probably be legitimate and responsive to society's requirements. In the historic context of Somalia, post-colonial institutions were remote and inattentive to the concerns of common people because of a lack of vision, resources, and delivery capacity. Peacock (2016) also stated that the Somali war cannot be resolved only through AMISOM. Instead, a strong emphasis must be placed on a political solution that includes strengthening Somalia's armed forces, re-engaging the international community, and building AU institutions. According to De Coning (2010), AMISOM can evaluate its operations to see if any of these flaws are apparent and can then use the information to design its peacekeeping and state-building initiatives to be as effective as possible. The necessity for this is because peace-building has largely failed to establish a peaceful solution as a result of an unclear expectation of changing all the odds in a community.

5.3.1 Effect of African Union human rights protection on security in Mogadishu Somalia.

The thesis finally provides that African Union human rights protection effectively leads to security in Mogadishu Somalia. The results showed a significant effect between AU rights protection and security, it's revealed that improved security comes from human rights enhancement in Mogadishu. The study's findings are consistent with those of earlier authorities who have similarly provided information. For instance, Tahir (2013) it has been argued that the normative manifestation

of the fixated on the state is the attached of an overriding significance to themes of security, order, and stability under human rights. As opposed to that, there are recognized terms like barbarism, statelessness, anarchy, chaos, and lawlessness interchangeably. Also, Njoku (2016) asserted that the AU has openly acknowledged the need for Good governance, stable democracies, and continued economic and social progress are the proper solutions to ongoing political, economic, and social insecurity. In line with the recent broadening of the scope of notion protection in the promotion of human rights. Finally, Bellamy (2011) argues that the rights of African unions help to effect large-scale change that is indirectly fostered by the political system. "NGOs must have an effective campaigning team that can inform, inspire, and organizes their supporters, and Tahir (2013) argued that information has an instructive and preventive function for making an invaluable contribution to enhancing public understanding of existing legal norms, which is crucial to preventing abuses of human rights and supporting their application.

5.3.2 Conclusion

The purpose of the study looked into the function of the African Union Mission (AMISOM) on security in Somalia from 2007-2018. The objectives were to determine the effect of the African Union Mission Peace keeping force on security, examine the effect of African Union capacity building on security, and examine the effect of African Union human rights protection on security in Mogadishu Somalia.

The study's findings are based on the data gathered. Concluded that the African Union Mission Peacekeeping force existed in Somalia. They have operated vastly for a long period of time, the study established that a significant effect exists between African union missions on security in Mogadishu. It's concluded that the African Union mission has less contribution to security meaning other avenues are to be explored in enhancing the functionality of the security apparatus in muqdisho Somalia. Secondly, the study concludes that AU capacity building in Mogadishu is existing there is a significant effect existing between AU capacity building and security in Mogadishu. The study concludes that an essential means for generating capacity is necessary for developing the security mechanisms and is necessary if improved avenues for security enhancements are.

The third objective concludes that the status of human rights implementation by the African Union is significant and can generate effective security management for the country.

Over the centuries, the Somali people have demonstrated, as part of their tradition, a vigorous independence and unwillingness to surrender to a single political authority.

It has already been seen that, after the fall of Said Barre in 1991, opportunistic warlords effectively feudalized Somalia back into a dark age. Their bands ravaged the country amidst uncontrollable civil war, as they battled for strategic towns and regional footholds.

Thus, the U.S. and its Ethiopian ally decided to resolve this Somali crisis by force. Their ICU rival responded with an ultimatum demanding the departure of the Ethiopian troops from Somalia within seven days; failure to do so would result in a holy war against the Ethiopian government. Predictably, these demands were not met. On December 20, 2006, a full-scale war broke out between the Ethiopian army and ICU militants near Baidoa, the temporary TFG administrative center. The ICU was defeated within a couple of weeks, as Ethiopian professionalism overwhelmed the essentially amateur rebel militia. The ICU still did not fall back on its promise, however. Its leadership and forces retreated to different parts of the country, where they resumed their “holy war” via guerilla tactics. This Iraqi-style insurgency was most significant in Mogadishu. Historically, Somali culture is not based upon compromise. It sanctions a “winner take all” mentality that has become part of its current political practices, meaning less many aggression and show of force to prove a point. It must be understood that Somalia has no concept of minority protection in the political process. This means that majority tribes dominate every decision and ignore smaller voices. The United States is not much different, in truth. One sees different names but the same method in its political system, only political parties and candidates replace the clan-family. Basically, bigger clans are enabled to dominate smaller ones. After independence, the Somali government tried to emulate the Western political and economic system by implementing democracy and capitalism. This was judged to be the best way to attract essential economic aid into which Somali’s young nation could root itself. However, decolonization had been a poor, hasty process. Europeans left little in the way of economic infrastructure. They had been interested in resources, not the development of a real, self-sustaining economy.

The indigenous people of Somalia did not have the training or experience to build a working democracy. For that matter, they did not have the culture either. Tribalism and democracy did not work well together. Traditionally, Somalis had taken what they needed, fought for resources, and divided themselves. Not only did people misunderstand the state; they did not have the patience to live under one.

Somalia's nomadic society continued to fight amongst itself, only now the prize was bigger than land and livestock. The new government provided a route to power. The various opportunist clan leaders began to feel that the way to prosperity was power in government. The colonial administration had excluded rather than incorporated the Somali people into the governmental process. Thus, it never taught the true spirit of democracy: that public service carries responsibilities as well as rights, and that everyone who participates in it represents these rights for all of the people – not just this or that tribe. People never learned that government belongs to all people and they, collectively, are the sovereign: the highest form of political authority with the most sacred responsibility to one another. Contrarily, in its nine years of free democracy, some tribes enjoyed all of the government privileges while the rest suffered injustice at the hands of the powers that were supposed to protect them. For the nine years of civilian government (1960-1969), more than 80 political parties surged onto political scene, all but one (SYL), based on tribal lineage. Needless to say, no broad coalitions could be built on the basis of blood. The Somali Youth League (SYL) was the original political party and partly responsible for freedom and independence from Italian and British colonialism.

Human rights can be generated to enhance the security apparatus by increasing human rights observance in the country. Rebuilding state institutions can only be Successful if it is supported by the populations of the territory who have a deep interest in their formation, strengthening and perpetuation (Meier enrich, 2004, p. 154).

Moreover, the best way to ensure people's faith in politics and state institutions is to Base the new institutions on human rights standards and the rule of law.

According to Lederach's conflict transformation theory of peacebuilding, which states that conflict can be transformed, the study investigates whether the deployment of AMISOM in Somalia can provide security benefits for the nation. In contrast to claims that AMISOM only has a limited

impact on security, the study introduces a new paradigm by demonstrating that AMISOM's gradual unsuccessful can encourage national army troops to improve its security.

5.3.3 Recommendations

The thesis further recommends that there that avenues for improving the peacekeeping forces are prudent in generating the functionality of state security. There is a need for policy mechanisms to develop effectiveness in the management of the security avenues through increasing the local forces integrations in the local communities.

Secondly, the thesis recommends that there is a need for improved functionality of the capacity systems such as enhancement in capacity provided for the training, and increases in financial resources for the country by the United Nations in designing mechanisms necessary in increased attained capacity for the employees.

The thesis further recommends that the African Union needs to generate effective concerns on human rights management with the sensitizations needed for developing effective consideration on concerns of human rights. It's fundamental to argue that effective human rights development can be developed in the policy agenda of AMISOM so as to increase the security situation of the people.

5.4 Areas for further study

The thesis explored the avenues for generated through the effective African Union Mission (AMISOM) on security in Somalia from 2007-2018. Further studies could be done on the challenges of AMISOM on security implementation in Somalia and the role of other parties in developing security in Somalia.

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APPENDIX I: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

Section A: Respondent Demographic Information

Dear Respondent

I'm Mustafa Osman Aden a student at Istanbul Gelisim University in turkey conducting a final research for the master's degree. This questionnaire is designed to seek information from you on the "African Union Mission (AMISOM) and security in Somalia 2007-2018. It is carried as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Master's Degree in political science and public administration of Istanbul Gelisim University in turkey. Your contribution, opinions and experience will be highly appreciated.

Thanks for your cooperation.

PART I: Demography of respondents

1. Gender

- a) Male
- b) Female

2. Age

- a) 21 – 30
- b) 31– 40
- c) 41 - 50
- d) 51 -60
- e) 60 Above

3. Education Level

- a) Secondary
- b) Diploma
- c) Degree
- d) Masters
- e) Ph.D.

4. **Marital status**

- a) Single
- b) Married
- c) Separated/divorced

5. **Time period of work Experience**

- a) 1-4 years
- b) 5-9 years
- c) 10-14 years
- d) 15 and above

Under the following sections, please tick according to your level of agreement

- 5. SA Strongly Agree
- 4. Agree
- 3. Not Sure
- 2. Disagree
- 1. Strongly Disagree

Please evaluate the statement by ticking in the box with the number that best suits you.

SECTION B: African Union Mission (AMISOM)

		Rankings				
	Response	1	2	3	4	5
	African union Peace Keeping force					
Q ₁	African union has a peace keeping force in key installations of government					
Q ₂	African union force keeping peace are spread across the city to provide security					
Q ₃	There is provision of security by the keeping force to busy places like markets					

Q4	African peace force provide sufficient security in places of worship in Mogadishu					
	African Union capacity building					
Q5	African Union provide trainings to the local forces on security					
Q6	There is provision of trainings by African mission to locals on defense and security issues					
Q7	African union provide financial capacity to communities in efforts to curb insecurity					
Q8	African union mission provide finance to security organs in a bid to boost their work					
Q9	African union mission in Somalia has sourced for finance to support emergency security arrangements					
	African Union human rights					
Q10	The African union mission provide training to communities on human rights					
Q11	African union provide implementation of human rights and observance in Somalia					
Q12	African union has established mechanisms for arresting of human rights offenders					
Q13	The African Union Mission (AMISOM) agitate for human rights observance among people					

Section C: Security

		Rankings				
	Response	1	2	3	4	5
Q ₁	There is sufficient security to enable freedom of movement in the city					
Q ₂	The people's lives in Mogadishu are at less risks in the city					
Q ₃	People in the city are free to interact for trade without fear on lives					
Q ₄	The people's lives is guaranteed, minimal deaths occur on people					
Q ₅	The people's homes are secure all the days of the lives					
Q ₆	Peoples can easily move to other's homes without suspicion on motives					
Q ₇	There are no physical rebel attacks on the homes					
Q ₈	The state security is well and guaranteed					
Q ₉	There is no threat to the country from the national boarders					
Q ₁₀	There has been able national security protection of its local population					

Appendix C Analysis result from SPSS (Full research)

Frequencies

		Statistics				
		Gender	Age	Educational Level	Marital Status	Time Period of work experience
N	Valid	384	384	384	384	384
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0
Mean		1.4479	1.7917		1.6797	1.7943
Std. Deviation		.49793	.86615		.50996	.80913

Gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	212	55.2	55.2	55.2
	Female	172	44.8	44.8	100.0
	Total	384	100.0	100.0	

Age

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	21-30 years old	178	46.4	46.4	46.4
	31-40 years old	121	31.5	31.5	77.9
	41-50 years old	73	19.0	19.0	96.9
	51-60 years old	11	2.9	2.9	99.7
	60 Above	1	.3	.3	100.0
	Total	384	100.0	100.0	

Educational Level



		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Secondary	29	7.6	7.6	7.6
	Diploma	137	35.7	35.7	43.2
	Degree	143	37.2	37.2	80.5
	Master	62	16.1	16.1	96.6
	Ph.D	13	3.4	3.4	100.0
	Total	384	100.0	100.0	



Marital Status


		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Single	131	34.1	34.1	34.1
	Married	245	63.8	63.8	97.9
	Divorce/Separated	8	2.1	2.1	100.0
	Total	384	100.0	100.0	



Time Period of work experience

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1-4 years	165	43.0	43.0	43.0
	5-9 years	141	36.7	36.7	79.7
	10-14 years	70	18.2	18.2	97.9
	15 and Above	8	2.1	2.1	100.0
	Total	384	100.0	100.0	









Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
African union has a peace keeping force in key installations of government	384	4.5964	.90319
African union force keeping peace are spread across the city to provide security	384	4.5391	.96060
There is provision of security by the keeping force to busy places like markets	384	3.4583	1.25926
African peace force provide sufficient security in places of worship in Mogadishu	384	3.7474	1.36584
African Union provide trainings to the local forces on security	384	4.6120	.90138
There is provision of trainings by African mission to locals on defence and security issues	384	4.4661	1.00073
African union provide financial capacity to communities in efforts to curb insecurity	384	4.3594	1.13387
African union mission provide finance to security organs in a bid to boost their work	384	4.3203	1.15350
African union mission in Somalia has sourced for finance to support emergency security arrangements	384	4.4505	1.05348
The African union mission provide training to communities on human rights	384	4.5859	.94103

African union provide implementation of human rights and observance in Somalia	384	4.5443	.97655
African union has established mechanisms for arresting of human rights offenders	384	3.3464	1.16849
The African Union Mission (AMISOM) agitate for human rights observance among people	384	4.5495	1.06089
There is sufficient security to enable freedom of movement in the city	384	3.5599	.86809
The people's lives in Mogadishu are at less risks in the city	384	3.4635	.84811
People in the city are free to interact for trade without fear on lives	384	3.3646	.99995
The people's lives is guaranteed, minimal deaths occur on people	384	3.3177	1.02608
The people's homes are secure all the days of the lives	384	3.3854	1.15277
Peoples can easily move to other's homes without suspicion on motives	384	3.3385	1.16967
There are no physical rebel attacks on the homes	384	3.5651	1.30311
The state security is well and guaranteed	384	2.7865	1.40726
There is no threat to the country from the national borders	384	4.5365	.97687
There has been able national security protection of its local population	384	4.5052	.90255
Valid N (listwise)	384		

Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	384	100.0
	Excluded ^a	0	.0
	Total	384	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.671	4

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
African union has a peace keeping force in key installations of government	11.7448	7.799	.365	.659
African union force keeping peace are spread across the city to provide security	11.8021	7.397	.409	.635
There is provision of security by the keeping force to busy places like markets	12.8828	5.733	.520	.557
African peace force provide sufficient security in places of worship in Mogadishu	12.5938	5.171	.550	.536

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.817	5

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
African Union provide trainings to the local forces on security	17.5964	11.442	.610	.782
There is provision of trainings by African mission to locals on defence and security issues	17.7422	11.189	.566	.793
African union provide financial capacity to communities in efforts to curb insecurity	17.8490	9.930	.666	.762
African union mission provide finance to security organs in a bid to boost their work	17.8880	10.121	.617	.779
African union mission in Somalia has sourced for finance to support emergency security arrangements	17.7578	10.790	.589	.786

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.777	2

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
The African union mission provide training to communities on human rights	4.5443	.954	.635	.

African union provide implementation of human rights and observance in Somalia	4.5859	.886	.635	.
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Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.899	8

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
There is sufficient security to enable freedom of movement in the city	23.2214	38.256	.694	.888
The people's lives in Mogadishu are at less risks in the city	23.3177	38.552	.683	.889
People in the city are free to interact for trade without fear on lives	23.4167	36.583	.734	.883
The people's lives is guaranteed, minimal deaths occur on people	23.4635	36.463	.722	.884
The people's homes are secure all the days of the lives	23.3958	35.697	.685	.887
Peoples can easily move to other's homes without suspicion on motives	23.4427	35.532	.686	.886
There are no physical rebel attacks on the homes	23.2161	35.011	.633	.893
The state security is well and guaranteed	23.9948	32.590	.740	.883

Correlations

		Afri- caunionP.force	Afri- caunionC.Build- ing	Afri- caunionH.Rights	Security
AfricaunionP.force	Pearson Correlation	1	.770**	.814**	.570**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000
	N	384	384	384	384
AfricaunionC.Building	Pearson Correlation	.770**	1	.775**	.488**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000
	N	384	384	384	384
AfricaunionH.Rights	Pearson Correlation	.814**	.775**	1	.535**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000
	N	384	384	384	384
Security	Pearson Correlation	.570**	.488**	.535**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	
	N	384	384	384	384

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.584 ^a	.341	.335	5.74955

a. Predictors: (Constant), AfricaunionH.Rights, AfricaunionC.Building, AfricaunionP.force

b. Dependent Variable: Security

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	6489.048	3	2163.016	65.432	.000 ^b
	Residual	12561.785	380	33.057		
	Total	19050.832	383			

a. Dependent Variable: Security

b. Predictors: (Constant), AfricaunionH.Rights, AfricaunionC.Building, AfricaunionP.force

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized	T	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Coefficients Beta		
1	(Constant)	7.486	1.809		4.137	.000
	AfricaunionP.force	1.072	.220	.377	4.861	.000
	AfricaunionC.Building	.110	.147	.053	.747	.456
	AfricaunionH.Rights	.568	.238	.187	2.391	.017

a. Dependent Variable: Security

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	19.0667	36.4382	31.7682	4.11615	384
Residual	-13.14716	19.26645	.00000	5.72699	384
Std. Predicted Value	-3.086	1.135	.000	1.000	384
Std. Residual	-2.287	3.351	.000	.996	384

a. Dependent Variable: Security

Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual

Dependent Variable: Security

